Abstract
Space policy issues are often framed in the context of great power competition. States like Russia, the People’s Republic of China and the United States are the main drivers of technological innovation in this area, but their rivalries also constitute barriers in negotiations regarding international governance. Nonetheless, the space efforts of middle powers are not just important for the preservation of these states’ economic position in the international system but also offer a potential for international cooperation that defies the dynamic of great power competition.
Keywords: Space, Security, Canada, Republic of Korea
By Laura Neacsu and Hendrik A. Pasligh
Introduction
The competition for supremacy in space has historically been dominated by the United States and Russia. However, the focus of analysis has recently shifted to the rivalry between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this context, great powers are often perceived as seeking to gain an advantage over other actors through their space strategies. Discussions about space governance, particularly the issue of space debris, are in deadlock due to perceptions of threats between great powers. Middle powers differ from great powers not only in the number of resources available but also in the roles these resources allow them to play in the international system. [1] The resources available to middle powers are significantly fewer than those available to great powers, and as a function of this, they perform different roles in the international system, acting below the level of great power rivalry but still with more potential to impact international politics than smaller states. Considering this, is there a role for middle powers beyond great power competition in space? This article seeks to explore what middle powers can do with limited resources by conducting two case studies. The first part of the article will analyse Canada’s new space strategy while the second part will discuss the Republic of Korea’s space efforts.
Canada
After years of a slow-down in Canada’s space program, a long-awaited national space strategy was unveiled on 6 March 2019 by the Canadian government. Its vision statement highlights the desire to improve ‘exploration, imagination and innovation’ in the space sector. [2] Backed with over $2 billion in new funding, what does the new Canadian space strategy really mean?
Its overarching objectives are to develop the country’s space program, produce jobs, and benefit all Canadians through space-related technologies. In order to achieve these, it focuses on artificial intelligence, deep-space robotic systems, Earth-observation capabilities, and new endeavours with the European Space Agency and NASA. [3] However, the central focus of the new strategy is the commitment to the US-led Lunar Gateway Mission, which seeks to create a space station in the Moon’s orbit to facilitate exploration of the celestial body. [4] To this end, the Canadian strategy allocates a substantial financial contribution to cover a 24-year period. This will make Canada the first nation to formally commit to the Gateway project and pave the way for the first Canadian visit to the surface of the Moon. The country will also develop a new generation of AI-enabled deep-space robotic systems – Canadarm3 – expected to consist of both a large manipulator arm and a smaller dexterous arm that will restore and maintain the Gateway. [5]
Beyond the moon funding
Aside from the considerable funding for the moon initiative, Canada has committed to further develop future Earth observation capabilities. This was expected, as not many countries have so few people dispersed over such a large area, with so much land and ocean to monitor and communications infrastructure to provide. Since the announcement of the space strategy, Canada has already made significant progress in this area – the country launched the RADARSAT Constellation Mission in early June. [6] Moreover, the strategy also notes that the Canadian Space Agency is planning for a new generation of Earth-observation satellites. [7]
The Canadian government will also review and modernise the country’s regulatory framework for space-related activities – a critical issue that will support Canadian business and could lead to foreign investments in the country. As part of diversifying trade, Canada is also planning to solidify its relationship with the European Space Agency, which will allow Canadian firms and researchers to benefit from collaboration with the agency’s missions. By the same token, Canada will continue to pursue similar benefits through its existing collaborations with NASA, a mission that signals to Canada’s primary partner, the US, that its diminished role in the heavens is long gone. [8]
South Korea
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has one of the youngest space programs, with the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) established in 1989. [9] The budget constraints inherent to a middle power notwithstanding, the ROK government has formulated ever-more ambitious plans for the country’s space program since then. The motivations behind Korea’s space efforts mainly stem from economic and national security considerations. [10] Furthermore, the country’s distaste for depending too heavily on its main ally, the US, drives the push for the development of indigenous capabilities and strategic technological independence.
While the government is trying to foster the domestic commercial space sector, [11] arguably the most important issue from both an economic as well as a strategic perspective is the development of a space launch capability, which KARI plans to achieve by 2021. [12] On the one hand, this would be central to developing a commercial space launch capability, which is planned for after 2025. [13] On the other hand, this demonstrates the aspect of international cooperation: initially constrained by a lack of collaboration with a reluctant US afraid of proliferation, [14] KARI cooperated with Russia for the development of a space launch vehicle and human space flight. [15] However, obtaining a domestic space launch capability would provide South Korea with “an opportunity to join a growing network of allied (e.g. Japan’s) critical space capabilities”, Dr Jana Robinson, Director of the Space Security Program at the Prague Security Studies Institute, told the Security Distillery. [16]
So far, the ROK has cooperated with European Arianespace, American SpaceX, and Japan to launch its satellites into orbit. [17] Obtaining its own space launch capability would mean that the ROK has something to offer to other countries. It might therefore emerge as an alternative to the PRC, Japan, or the US for space cooperation in the region. As a middle power, Korea’s potential political endeavours are likely to be perceived differently – and, therefore, promise to be more successful – than those of great powers. [18]
The ROK also needs adequate Earth-observation capabilities to monitor missile launches in North Korea. Such an ability, as well as satellites that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the Korean armed forces, are a requirement for “the transfer of the wartime operational control” (OPCON) of the ROK military from the US to South Korean command”. [19] While the ROK has made notable progress particularly in satellite technology, [20] its lack of ISR capabilities is a reason for the delay of this transfer. [21] In this sense, the ROK’s space efforts are central to solving a core issue of national sovereignty.
Conclusion
What makes the position of middle powers in the international system so interesting is the dynamic of factors that limit and expand their potential. Middle powers have fewer resources at their disposal than great powers. This limits their potential for unilateral action. However, great powers can become entangled in great power competition, forcing them to pursue policies that merely react to other great powers. In addition, this limits their foreign policy options as most proposals are likely to be perceived as serving their own interests within this rivalry.
Middle powers are free from these political constraints. Canada’s and the ROK’s space programs are less likely to be perceived as a threat than the PRC’s or the US’s. This makes them suitable partners for the civilian ESA, with which Canada is already involved as a Cooperating State. Their ambitious space programs also open up this field for foreign policy. Specifically, Canada has the potential to improve governance on space debris through its cooperation with ESA, and the ROK has the potential to foster regional cooperation. According to Dr Robinson, Canada and the ROK have the potential to push forward some of the contentious discussions on space governance. [22] At the same time, the programs are important for the development of the domestic economy and therefore for maintaining the middle powers’ strong position in the international system. Both Canada and the ROK have the technological capabilities and political aspiration to impact international politics in general and space governance in particular. However, this depends on several political factors such as their respective association with the US, their geostrategic location, relationships with other countries and how well they can integrate their space strategies into their overall foreign policy.
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