Navigating Troubled Waters: the Escalating Crisis in the Red Sea

Emerging from Yemen’s civil war, the Houthi militia is disrupting vital global shipping routes with its actions, creating the necessity of finding alternative routes and exacerbating costs for companies. This conflict has further created humanitarian and environmental consequences, which added to the economic ones, have profoundly affected the interests of Western powers, notably the United Kingdom and the United States, who support Israel. These countries sought to secure the region with the creation of several different operations, such as Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Poseidon Archer, aimed at securing the area. Concurrently China and Russia managed to reach an agreement of safe passage with the Houthis. This article delves into the complexities of the conflict, emphasising its far-reaching global repercussions, and the challenges it poses.

BY Sofía Vilas Muñiz

Introduction

The Southern part of the Red Sea, once a vital artery of global commerce, has become an extremely dangerous battleground since the Houthis started targeting cargo vessels in November 2023 in response to Israel’s attacks on the Gaza Strip. Initially, the group declared that they aimed to target boats owned by Israel or those with a connection to the country, in solidarity with Palestine. However, the militia decided to expand their attacks to boats with links to the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) due to their support for Israel in the war. There is a potential risk that all commercial ships are attacked indiscriminately since boats not related to the previously mentioned countries have also been targeted. Instead of being mitigated by international responses, the attacks have only increased in frequency and violence with time. 

This conflict holds significant relevance within the current geopolitical landscape due to its profound impact on the economy, regional security, and stability. It is, therefore, crucial to understand its background, key players, complexity, policy implications, and resulting outcomes.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthis, officially called Ansar Allah, are a Shia group that emerged in Yemen in the 1990s. They demonstrated signs of conflict in 2004 when the militia rebelled for the first time against the weak Saudi-backed Sunni government of Ali Abdullah Salleh, the first president of the modern Yemen state which was created with the unification of both the US-backed north province and Soviet-backed south province. The conflict evolved into a civil war in 2011 [1]. While the Houthis were trying to take control of the entire country, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida or the Islamic State exploited the situation, creating more chaos and consequently causing the president of Yemen to flee to Saudi Arabia [2]. Ever since then, Yemen has been a setting for competition between the eternal rivals of Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which became involved in the conflict. 

In 2014, the militia gained control of Yemen's Capital, Sana’a. A year later, in 2015, the Saudi Arabian military and a list of other eight Arab states intervened to help defeat the Houthis and restore order in  the country. That same year, Iran started to support the Houthis, support which has only increased in consequent years. This also led to Iran becoming one of the country’s most important partners in 2021 [3]. More precisely, it is the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that provides advanced weapons, ammunition, and military trainers to the militia. The main aim of the Quds Force is to expand Shiism overseas.

Religion plays a crucial role as Iran is the Shia regional power in the Middle East, while Saudi Arabia is the Suni one. Iran feels threatened because it is surrounded by countries with a Sunni majority. The Houthis declare themselves to be part of the “axis of resistance.” Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been trying to expand its ideas through this network of countries that it leads. The coalition includes Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Syrian militias [4]. These groups share their hate for Israel and the United States. The support offered to the Houthis by Iran has caused great damage to Saudi Arabia, concretely the attacks in the Red Sea, have halted its plan of developing a non-oil-dependent economy by creating a tourist industry in the area [5].

The complexities  in Yemen, exacerbated by  multiple actors, have caused the Yemeni population to suffer one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with the population suffering from poverty, diseases, food shortages, and more than four million people displaced [6].

Importance of the Red Sea

The Red Sea is a narrow body of water located between the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula. This extension of the Indian Ocean stretches from the Suez Canal to the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait. Six countries border the sea:  Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.

It serves as a route to connect Asia and Europe; therefore, it is one of the most common shipping routes between both continents. Moreover, it is of enormous importance for maritime trade. 30 percent of all container traffic in the world used to flow through it before the crisis began [1]. A great portion of fundamental natural resources followed this route in 2023, for example, about 12% of the world’s oil and 8% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments [7].

Yemen, located in the southwestern end of the Arabian Peninsula, has a strategically important geographic position. The country can easily control important choke points such as the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-El-Mandeb or “Gate of Tears” strait, a critical waterway.

The Houthi attacks

The Houthis initially launched missile and drone attacks against Israel and US forces in the region, after which attacks on vessels began in November 2023, they first seized a British-owned and Israeli-co-owned vessel named “Galaxy Leader”. This vessel has now become a tourist attraction while, three months after the event, its 25-member crew is still held captive. More than 40 boats have been attacked since then [8]. 

Recently, the Houthis targeted both the UK-owned Rubymar bulk carrier and the Marlin Luanda oil tanker, which sank, causing environmental problems. However, it was not until the 6th of March 2024, that a Houthi missile attack first caused mortal victims among crew members. The event took place in the Gulf of Aden, and in this case, the True Confidence bulk carrier was Barbados-flagged and belonged to a Liberian-registered company. The container was not linked to the main target countries: Israel, the UK nor the US.

The International Maritime Organization periodically updates a list of all the vessels affected by the incidents since the 19th of November. Most of them were caused by unmanned aerial devices [9].

Implications of the attacks

The disruptions have forced important shipping companies such as Maersk and MSC to temporarily halt Red Sea shipping and find an alternative route to avoid the hazardous area. Their vessels now must navigate the south of the African continent through the Cape of Good Hope, which means that the duration of the route is approximately ten days longer [10]. This causes a huge increase in fuel expenses and delays in delivery times. Furthermore, commercial vessels following that route face the threat of piracy

Commercial vessels that still navigate through the Red Sea have started to use the Automatic Identification System (AIS) messages to declare they have no relation with Israel [8]. AIS messages constitute a means for exchanging relevant information, such as position, destination, or speed, among vessels or with shore stations via radio waves. Currently, they are being used to indirectly communicate with the rebels, to mitigate the risk of an attack by, for example, warning them of the presence of armed guards on board.

Amidst the chaos, on the 26th of February 2024, three undersea cables in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb were damaged, causing the communications to be rerouted. Although sometime before that, the Houthis posted a map of undersea cables claiming that Yemen is in a strategic position regarding internet connection between countries, they denied being responsible for the damage caused. Instead, they blamed both the UK and the US for causing it [11]. Ever since the first seizure, the Houthis have been trying to use their TV channel and even English-language statements on social media to gain global prominence [12].

International reactions

It was indisputable that the attacks would produce international reactions. Western countries have created several operations to secure the area. First, the US, which decided to return the Houthis to the country’s list of terrorist groups after the attacks, created Operation Prosperity Guardian on the 18th of December 2023. The Pentagon claimed that this coalition is composed of 20 members [13], joining forces to defend the principle of freedom of navigation. However, half of them have opted to remain anonymous. Prosperity Guardian operates within the 5th fleet of the US Combined Maritime Forces and is led by Combined Task Force 153. Since its establishment, the coalition has managed to repel multiple attacks by, for example, shooting down anti-ship missiles or sinking small Houthi boats. 

Moreover, the European Union (EU) launched Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES on the 19th of February 2024. This operation acts in accordance with the UN 2722 Security Council’s Resolution adopted on the 10th of January 2024, which condemns Houthi attacks on cargo vessels and defends navigational rights and freedoms [14]. 

Nevertheless, China and Russia were not willing to join the efforts to stop the Red Sea strikes. The Houthis, after a series of talks in which diplomats of both countries participated, granted safe passage for their boats due to both countries' relationship and important business ties with Iran [15]. However, Houthis seem to have broken the agreement as they recently targeted a Chinese-owned vessel called Huang Pu, causing minimal damage on it. On the 28th of March, Russian warships entered the Red Sea, with no clear public reason.

The countries most concerned with the repercussions of the attacks, the US and the UK, created Operation Poseidon Archer, which involves launching attacks against Houthi targets in Yemen to damage their military capability. The first strikes took place on the 11th of January 2024. The effectiveness of these strikes has been questioned, as this form of deterrence is not stopping the Houthis, who are unwilling to stop until Israel halts its hostilities against Palestinians.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Israel’s attacks in the Gaza Strip have caused the Houthis to react, and in doing so, expanded the conflict to the Red Sea and created a crisis which has significantly affected global commerce, created environmental problems, crew retention, and more recently, sailors’ deaths. 

The crisis shows little prospects of  resolution, both because the Houthis are defending a fundamental cause and because neither the EU nor the Western Alliance have managed to induce fear into the Yemeni militia – not even by striking Yemen. In confronting this challenge, it is important to recognise that tackling this crisis demands more than military tactics, and that dialogue and cooperation needs to be fostered. 

References

[1] Romero, J.A. & Castro, I. 2024. "¿Qué está pasando en el mar rojo? Causas y consecuencias de esta nueva crisis." [online] Available at: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_informativos/2024/DIEEEI01_2024_ABEROM_MarRojo.pdf

[2] Serr, Marcel. 2017. "Understanding the War in Yemen." Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 11 (3): 357–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405.

[3] Juneau, Thomas. 2021. "How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran-Houthi Partnership." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, July, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2021.1954353.

[4] Saad, Amal. 2024. "The Houthis Are Not a Group That Can Be Bombed into Extinction – Here’s Why." The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/23/houthis-hamas-israel-iran-axis-resistance

[5] "Saudi-Iranian Relations Restored but Remain Tense." n.d. Wilson Center. [online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-iranian-relations-restored-remain-tense.

[6] Robinson, Kali. 2023. "Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering." Council on Foreign Relations. May 1, 2023. [online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis.

[7] "Red Sea Chokepoints Are Critical for International Oil and Natural Gas Flows." n.d. Energy Information Administration. [online] Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025.

[8] Aljazeera. n.d. "Mapping the Red Sea attacks by Yemen’s Houthis." [online] Available at: https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2024/mapping-red-sea-shipping-attacks/#:~:text=Houthi%20attacks. 

[9] "Red Sea Area." 2024. International Maritime Organization. [online] Available at: https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Red-Sea.aspx.

[10] "How Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Threaten Global Shipping." n.d. Council on Foreign Relations. [online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-houthi-attacks-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping.

[11] "Houthis Blame Western Alliance for Subsea Cable Damage." n.d. The Maritime Executive. [online] Available at: https://maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-blame-western-alliance-for-subsea-cable-damage.

[12] Mohsen, Rashid. 2024. "The Houthis’ Media Machine Is Going Global." Foreign Policy. April 2, 2024. [online] Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/27/houthis-yemen-social-media-israel-hamas-gaza-war-red-sea-attacks/.

[13] Freebairn, T. 2024. "Operation Prosperity Guardian Faces Early Hurdles." Defense Security Monitor. [online] Available at: https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2024/01/02/operation-prosperity-guardian-faces-early-hurdles/.

[14] Council of the European Union. 2024. "Review of Security and Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea: Council Launches EUNAVFOR ASPIDES." [online] Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/19/security-and-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-red-sea-council-launches-new-eu-defensive-operation/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Security%20and%20freedom%20of%20navigation%20in%20the%20Red%20Sea%3A%20Council%20launches%20EUNAVFOR%20ASPIDES.

[15] Aboudouh, Ahmed. 2024. "Yes, China Pressured Iran on Red Sea Attacks – but Only to Protect Its Own Ships." Chatham House. [online] Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/yes-china-pressured-iran-red-sea-attacks-only-protect-its-own-ships.