The World's Fastest Emptying Nation: Eritrea

Eritrea has been one of the world’s largest producers of refugees since the country’s struggle for independence in the early 1960s. While the nation’s wars have contributed to this exodus, the root cause lies within the authoritarian government under the leadership of Isaias Afwerki, and the technically mandatory indefinite national service for all citizens.

If fortunate enough to survive or avoid getting injured by shots from the security forces at the border, migrants undergo perilous journeys to escape repression and forced labour. Obligated to follow irregular routes because of the government’s impediments, they risk being victims of human trafficking by criminal networks. Even after fleeing, evaders of the national service face ongoing fears of the consequences their families left behind will have to suffer.

By  Sofía Vilas Muñiz


Introduction

Eritrea is an East African country situated in a strategically crucial location, given its access to the Red Sea, its proximity to the maritime choke point of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and its position as a gateway between Africa and the Middle East. It shares land borders with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

The country has faced a turbulent modern history marked by colonisation, prolonged conflicts, and persistent authoritarian rule; these conditions have contributed to and indeed prompted mass migration. This article examines the main causes of Eritrea’s mass exodus, focusing on the compulsory national service and the authoritarian policies of the Eritrean government. The aim is to provide a comprehensive understanding of why Eritrea has become a nation experiencing such a high level of refugee outflows.

Background

In the 19th century, Eritrea became a target for European colonial powers and was under the rule of Italy from 1882 until 1942. After Italy lost its colonies at the end of World War II, Eritrea became a UN trust territory under British administration. It was not until 1952 that it was first recognised as an autonomous region.

Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, causing a 30-ýear conflict for independence, commonly referred to as “The Struggle”. Eritrea eventually emerged victorious and was recognised as a sovereign state in 1993. Since its independence was approved by a referendum, Eritrea has only been under the governance of Isaias Afwerki, leader of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDF).

Tensions between the two countries flared again in 1998 with a territorial-related war over control of the city of Badme. The conflict, which lasted until 2000, is known as the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. The two-year war ended with a ceasefire agreement and Eritrea regaining control of Badme.

The turning point came in the summer of 2018, when Ethiopia and Eritrea finally agreed to peace, ending decades of hostility. Both countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations and resume trade and transportation connections [1].

It is said that Eritrea unofficially participated in Ethiopia’s civil war, the Tigray War (2020-2022), providing military support to the federal government and allied regional forces [2]. Allegations of Eritrean troops still present in Tigray and Amhara persist. 

Although Eritrea’s conflicts have mainly revolved around Ethiopia, it has also been involved in border disputes with Djibouti and contested maritime boundaries with Yemen.

Military Service

Eritrea is a highly militarised state [3], stemming from the regional instability and its need to maintain security in the face of perceived threats.

The Eritrea National Service was created in 1991, when the nation gained de facto independence, but did not fully function until 1994. Eritreans thought a political change would occur after the 2018 peace agreement, but the government refused to change this system.

In order to obtain their high school diploma and qualify to write the final examinations, Eritrean students must complete training at the Sawa military camp. There, many are victims of violence. Some students drop out of school to avoid military training.

Legally, being conscripted in the national service for 18 months is compulsory for all Eritreans between the ages of 18 and 40, including unmarried women. However, minors who look older can also be recruited, such as happened during the Tigray war [4]. People over 50, reservists, have been recalled on several occasions [5].

Military training is supposed to last six months, following which recruits are assigned either free military service or civil work roles [6]. However, in practice, the service can be extended at the government’s discretion, sometimes indefinitely. Very few and rare exceptions are allowed, mainly for people with disabilities or health issues.

The involuntary conscriptions and indefinite serving have been characterised as forms of forced labour by organisations such as Amnesty International, and slavery by the UN Human Rights Council.

Eritrea’s Government “No-exit” Policy

The government employs various measures to restrict citizen's ability to leave the country legally and punish them for fleeing. Security forces at the border are authorised to shoot those attempting to flee the country without permission. Additionally, the government usually conducts four or five “roundups” in a year, intending to identify and capture national service evaders.

Eritrean law imposes penalties on those who do not accomplish national service obligations. These penalties include imprisonment and financial sanctions. Offenders who flee the country and re-enter after the age of 40 risk extended imprisonment and the suspension of various rights. Moreover, the penalties extend beyond the evaders to their families. They can be fined, their properties can be confiscated, they may be forced to replace the member in the national service, or even be imprisoned. Punishing individuals for acts they are not responsible for, contravenes international law [7].

As an interesting remark, the Eritrean football team rarely participates in international competitions. Recently, it has withdrawn from the 2026 World Cup qualifiers owing to fear of players trying to seek asylum abroad and never coming back [8]. This is something that happens frequently.

Migrants’ Vulnerability

When Eritreans decide to leave, they usually keep their plan as discreet as possible, not even sharing information with their family due to fears of the government’s surveillance. Most of them leave illegally because, to obtain the necessary documents, the completion of the national service is a requirement. There is also a lack of access to information. Consequently, they commonly do it by themselves, in small groups, with the help of a voluntary guide or a paid “smuggler”. This can be dangerous as it makes them particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. A very serious concern is that minors often attempt to leave the country, without their relatives, to avoid the military training that takes place during the last year of high school and escape from the inexistent socio-economic mobility [9].

Attempts to cross the border are often unsuccessful and require several more tries, often needing expensive bribes to succeed. When successful, they normally land in neighbouring countries, but their intentions are not to stay long due to the lack of safety and opportunities. Some migrants then head to Europe following the Central Mediterranean Route, or to countries such as Uganda, South Africa, or Kenya [10].

Conclusion

The legacy of various decades-long struggles has made Eritrea highly militarised, with a mandatory and often indefinite national service system. Many claim this system forces citizens into labour and violates international norms through strict punitive measures directed at deserters and their families. To escape this lifestyle, Eritreans often resort to clandestine and perilous migration routes, becoming susceptible to exploitation and trafficking.

Despite recent geopolitical developments, such as the peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018, Eritrea’s authoritarian regime persists in its coercive policies. Eritreans' struggle for freedom is enduring. The severe migration issues underscore their unwavering pursuit of human dignity. This quest for a better life demonstrates the profound impact of Eritrea’s policies on its citizens.


References

[1] “Eritrea.” 2024. CIA.gov. Central Intelligence Agency. February 20, 2024. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/eritrea/#military-and-security.

[2] BBC News. 2022. “Eritrea’s Mass Mobilisation amid Ethiopia Civil War,” September 16, 2022, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62927781

[3] “Eritrea: Crackdown on Draft Evaders’ Families.” 2023. Human Rights Watch. February 9, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/09/eritrea-crackdown-draft-evaders-families#:~:text=Eritrea%20has%20a%20policy%20of.

[4] Smits, Klara, and Morgane Wirtz. 2023. “Escaping Eritrea”: Langaa RPCIG EBooks, January, 255–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8137444.13.

[5]  “Eritrea: Crackdown on Draft Evaders’ Families.” 2023. Human Rights Watch. February 9, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/09/eritrea-crackdown-draft-evaders-families#:~:text=Eritrea%20has%20a%20policy%20of.

[6] “Why Indefinite National Service in Eritrea Has Created a Generation of Refugees.” 2015. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR6429302015ENGLISH.pdf.

[7] Smits, Klara, and Morgane Wirtz. 2023. “Escaping Eritrea”: Langaa RPCIG EBooks, January, 255–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8137444.13. / 

[8] Aarons, Ed, and Alex Cizmic. 2023. “Eritrea Withdrew from 2026 World Cup Qualifying ‘over Fears Players Will Flee.’” The Guardian, November 13, 2023, sec. Football. https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/nov/13/eritrea-withdrew-from-2026-world-cup-qualifying-over-fears-players-will-flee.

[9] Belloni, Milena. 2019. “Family Project or Individual Choice? Exploring Agency in Young Eritreans’ Migration.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, March, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2019.1584698.

[10] Smits, Klara, and Morgane Wirtz. 2023. “Escaping Eritrea”: Langaa RPCIG EBooks, January, 255–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8137444.13.