Conversing COVID – Part V, with Floris van Straaten

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

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For this fifth episode, we interviewed Floris van Straaten, Middle East Editor at NRC Handelsblad, a Dutch daily newspaper. He was previously Asia Editor at the same newspaper and he worked in Pakistan as a freelancer during the 1980s, covering the war in Afghanistan, among other things. In our conversation, we discussed the political and economic consequences of the pandemic for the Middle East.

This interview was conducted on June 17th.

Figures on COVID-19 cases across countries in the Middle East vary largely. What does this tell us about how the region is dealing with the pandemic?

In the Gulf states and Northern Africa, it seems the figures are not very high. However, the real figures could be well above what officials tell you, as they do not do a great deal of testing. Iran, however, still has one of the highest numbers of COVID-19 cases in the region. And still, people think the real figure is in fact higher. From Iran, many infections spread to several other Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon and Iraq. And in Bahrain, for example, nearly half of the first batch of people that was repatriated from Iran was infected with COVID-19.

In Iran, health workers were threatened by the Iranian government to prevent them from disclosing actual numbers of COVID-19 deaths to the media [1]. What does this mean for how the Iranian government is perceived?

Economically, Iran was already in dire straits before corona started, because of the sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and widespread corruption in the country. Iranians could be doing much better if there was better economic management by the government. Thus, the corona crisis came at a very awkward moment for the Iranian authorities. The first reports on COVID-19 cases in Iran indicated there were infections in the city of Qom, a holy city for Shia Muslims. Those reports were covered up by the authorities, because they were hesitant to close mosques and first wanted to hold legislative elections, which were to take place in February. The ‘hardliners’, who oppose engagement with the west and who the powerful religious establishment sympathises with, were likely to win. Eventually, the elections did take place without restrictions, even in Qom. This probably contributed to the spread of the virus. In March, the number of infections rose very quickly and there were informal reports saying the real figures of people who had died were much higher than what the authorities claimed. Videos of mass graves near the city of Qom appeared.

The Iranian authorities handled matters in a way they do most often, by suppressing the news. Similar incidents occurred over the last year. In November, the government had tried to increase the fuel prices, which led to an outbreak of large-scale protests. The government suppressed the protests with a lot of bloodshed; hundreds of people were killed. In January, Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed in Iraq. This was followed by a wave of sympathy in Iran, but it was immediately squandered by the clumsy mistake of downing a passenger flight from Tehran to Ukraine. The Iranian government tried to cover it up for days, wiping out the little confidence they had just regained. So, when COVID-19 struck, many people in Iran were very sceptical about anything the government was saying.

The crisis seems to be an extra blow to Iran on top of the current state of the US-Iran relations. What do you think will be consequences of the pandemic for the relations between the two?

Some people hope this crisis might lead to some rapprochement between the two, as some other countries realised that Iran was in serious trouble and were willing to offer help. The US, however, were more severe in their response and added more sanctions, which obviously did not improve the relations with Iran. This makes the lives of the Iranian people even more difficult.

Recently, the Iranian government decided to open up, ending a lockdown that only lasted three weeks. The authorities said they could not afford to maintain the lockdown any longer, because it would lead to financial problems and food shortages for many people. Now that the lockdown is suspended the metro and buses in Tehran are full again and the number of infections is increasing again. Some people say it is the beginning of a second wave. Iranians, however, seem to be beyond caring. They have a somewhat fatalistic approach; if it happens, it is God’s will. You can also see this in other countries, as the patience of people is running out.

At the same time, in one of your articles you argued the corona crisis could be a chance for Iran to abolish its isolated position. China and European countries, for example, were offering help to Iran [2]. How exactly could this be an opportunity for Iran?

They could try to reinforce the ties with the European countries and China. I think China was already intensifying its relations with Iran, as it realised that many Western companies have left Iran because of the sanctions. On the other hand, Iran has not been very accommodating, maintaining its old rhetoric of how bad the West is and how they leave the Iranians to their fate. The US in particular are being vilified, like before.

What is the impact of Iran’s economic problems on its allies in Lebanon and Syria, for example?

Currently, Iran has less money than it had fifteen years ago to support Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime, for example. They also cannot help Syria much with reconstructing the country. Furthermore, the US installed new sanctions against Syria, which will make things more difficult for the Syrian population. The US are also hoping to hurt Iran with these sanctions, as it will be more difficult for Iran to maintain its presence in Syria.

Also Lebanon is dealing with political instability during the pandemic. The outbreak of the virus was an argument for politicians to say it was too dangerous to go out on the streets to demonstrate for health reasons. Despite that, protests continued after the outbreak of infections.

Not only US sanctions are hitting Middle Eastern economies. Several economies in the region are highly dependent on oil production and export, but there has been a significant drop in oil prices. How are states that rely heavily on income from fossil fuels responding to this?

The drop in oil prices is a major problem for all the oil producing countries, such as the Gulf states, Iran, and Algeria. They all face enormous budget deficits and debt mountains that are rapidly increasing. Saudi Arabia, for example, had reserves of 750 billion US Dollars about five years ago. That has already dwindled to less than 500 billion US Dollars. They can afford to carry on for some time, but they have to realise that income from oil is not guaranteed. Even when the pandemic is over, the economy will not immediately be the same as before, because the demand for oil could remain lower than it used to be, especially if European countries would really turn into green economies, using fewer fossil fuels.

The Saudi Arabian economy might also be hit because of the cancellations of pilgrimages, which usually attract millions of people. Could this affect Saudi Arabia’s power position in the Middle East?

Saudi Arabia prides itself in hosting the most important holy places for Muslims, Mecca and Medina, but already had to cancel several pilgrimages. So indeed, it is a blow not only in economic terms. However, I do not think it will affect its power position so much, because it still possesses the aforementioned reserves. Nevertheless, it will have to think about its foreign policy, especially regarding the war in Yemen. This war has cost them billions, while they are basically in the same place as five years ago when they started their armed intervention. It might be wise for Saudi Arabia to come to some sort of peace agreement with the Houthis.

What other consequences is Yemen facing because of the pandemic?

It is disastrous for Yemen. About two-thirds of the population needs humanitarian assistance. Corona came on top of a terrible cholera epidemic, which is still not entirely gone. The number of COVID-19 cases in Yemen seems limited, but there are reports coming from hospitals – the ones that have not been destroyed yet – that corona patients are turned down because there is not enough room for them. However, I talked to some people from Yemen who said: “We have so many issues, this one extra problem does not make a difference. Our main wish is to get peace.” Furthermore, a lockdown is simply not feasible in Yemen, because there are so many refugees and people who lost their homes, who now have to stay together in rooms and tents with large families.

Which other developments have you observed in the Middle East regarding the pandemic?

Firstly, several governments in the Middle East are developing systems of surveillance that go much beyond what was already there. Amnesty International has expressed its concern about COVID-19 contact tracing apps in countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which allows governments to see exactly where people are, among other things. So, many governments in the Middle East have used the pandemic to increase their already considerable power over their population. This could lead to even less freedom in the Middle East.

Secondly, the pandemic exposes inequality. I think you can already see how the weakest are becoming the main victims. They cannot afford to go to hospitals. In Egypt, for instance, public hospitals are getting crowded and the service is poor; sometimes dentists have to treat the corona patients. If you have money, on the other hand, you can go to private clinics, where you will not be treated by a dentist. In several Gulf states, there are many foreign workers who often have to live in dirty, crowded places. Some states are trying to get rid of foreign workers by paying for flights to their home countries, but many of them do not want to go back because they need the money.

Finally, the pandemic shows many Middle Eastern countries are even more dependent on oil than we thought and that they need to diversify their economies. It is risky to be dependent on just one commodity like oil or gas. It is not easy to turn an economy into a more modern one, but they could and should try harder than they have done until now. 

Sources

[1] Van Straaten, Floris (2020), ‘Ayatollahs verliezen tegen het virus’ NRC

[2] Ibid

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.