During the Cold War, Pakistan became a staunch ally of the United States (US) and became part of the decades-long war between the two world powers and against terrorism. Pakistan protected its national interests during the Cold War but is still facing a number of challenges. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – now tribal districts – had become a safe haven for terrorists while suffering from militancy, insurgency, and a lack of peace during and after the Cold War served the interests of both Pakistan and the US. This article focuses on the question, how has this piece of land been misused for so many decades by both the national government and imperial powers?

The post 9-11 “War on Terror” era is characterized by the parallel ascension of social media. Social media has become a strategic tool to communicate and enact terrorism, thereby revolutionizing its impact. It has also been a key medium in the rise of radicalization and the dissemination of online extremist content around the world. This has offered terrorists groups the unprecedented ability to disseminate images and sentiments at a rapid pace to a borderless audience. While there has always been a relationship between terrorism and traditional media in the forms of print and television, social media networks have given terrorists the ability to have their acts communicated in a more potent and instantaneous way – with a lens that can been distorted by their bias.

For eight years now, we have heard about the Sahel as the theatre of a war on terror. Sparked in Mali with the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, the conflict, largely waged by jihadist organisations, quickly spread beyond the borders. Islamist groups have constantly been striving to expand their influence. They have built up their power by exploiting state weaknesses in the face of deeply rooted economic issues and socio-ethnic tensions already amplified by climate change. However, a key ingredient of their success lies in the dangerous potential of organised crime and trafficking networks in the Sahel. This piece will first look at the criminal rings that have contributed to turning the Sahel into a powder keg, and for which the conflict has played a catalyzing effect. Then, it will develop the argument that those trafficking practices nurture each other, which makes them even more arduous to overcome. 

For this sixth episode, we interviewed Daniela Pisoiu, Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP) and expert of the Radicalisation Awareness Network. She has over fifteen years of experience in Islamist, right-wing and left-wing radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, and is specialised in individual radicalisation processes. Her fieldwork includes interviews with (former) radicals and analyses of court files. In terms of regional focus, she works on Austria and Germany, as well as the Western Balkans and Europe more broadly. In our conversation, we first discussed radicalisation and deradicalisation mechanisms and then the exploitation of the pandemic by extremists. 

‘The pandemic has been exploited by jihadis, presenting the coronavirus as a punishment of Allah for the West, by right-wing extremist movements denouncing a Jewish plot, and by all sort of radicals fuelled with conspiracy theories, which are the first step into indoctrination.’

‘In the Middle East and Africa, the pandemic can increase the importance of terrorism. We often underestimate this, because we tend to be western-centric. In Europe, this crisis accelerating the empowerment of ring-wing radicals.’

‘Crises have always been good market opportunities for radicals to capitalise on.’

Finances are the lifeblood of terrorist organisations and countering their financial infrastructure is, therefore, a crucial element of the global fight against terror. One increasingly prevalent method for financial procurement is Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR). These hostage-takings have created a major predicament for authorities, as the consequences of acceding to terrorists’ demands remain controversial. Using empirical research and past cases, I will analyse the no-concession policies of the United States (US). I will demonstrate that the permanent refusal to negotiate does not seem to have the anticipated effect and can even be counterproductive when combatting KFR.

In 2014, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) published a report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Detainee and Interrogation Program (DIP). The report presents ‘overwhelming’ and ‘incontrovertible’ evidence of torture used against CIA detainees between 2001 and 2009. This, however, should come as no surprise knowing that the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs). Although EITs merely amount to a euphemism for torture, proponents claim that such methods are simply ‘enhancing interrogation’ and crucial to obtain information from uncooperative detainees in order to prevent imminent terror attacks. The following questions thus remain: What is considered torture? and Does torture work?  

On November 30th, 2019, 28-year-old Usman Khan stabbed five people at the north end of London Bridge. While this is one of multiple attacks Londoners have suffered, something about this attack sets it apart from others, grabbing the attention of the media. The attacker, Usman Khan, had previously been convicted of terrorism-related offences and had undergone two deradicalisation programmes during the 8 years he spent in prison. This placed deradicalisation under the spotlight, reminding the international community of the importance of understanding the challenges and limitations of these programmes. This new Security Distillery piece will provide an insight into the adversity these programmes face through the example of the Pontourny Centre, a French deradicalisation centre that has generally been regarded as a failure. Only by understanding what went wrong in previous deradicalisation efforts, it is possible to enhance the effectiveness of the newer programmes.

THE DORMANT STAGE OF THE CHECHEN INSURGENCY AND THE CHALLENGES IT POSES TO THE PRO-RUSSIAN CHECHEN REGIME

“Following the end of the Russian military operations in 2008, Chechnya has experienced a period of economic recession and consistent low-level political violence perpetrated by Jihadist and separatist insurgent movements. The brutal Counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Chechen security forces inflicted severe casualties on the rebels but antagonised large segments of the local population. A sudden decline in the regime’s capacity to enforce law and order could arouse the dormant Chechen insurgency and drive the little republic towards a new, bloody civil war.“

WHAT ISIS’ DEFEAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST MEANS FOR EUROPE: COUNTER-RADICALISATION IN THE EU

Radicalisation has emerged as a sincere issue in Europe in the last five years. Since ISIS started to lose territory, foreign fighters have begun to return to Europe, while ISIS’ web presence has strengthened and increased. In response, the European Union has created some of the most successful anti-radicalisation programmes to tackle those threats. However, these measures have failed to prevent some of the worst terrorist attacks that have ever occurred on European soil. This is due to a lack of true coordination and cooperation between member states’ approaches and at the broader EU level.

THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAR-RIGHT’S RISE IN EUROPE

The far-right’s most recent electoral emergence in Europe raises concerns about the possible securitisation of multiculturalism, the inspiration of radical right terrorism and the destabilisation of liberal democracies. Understanding its rise and tactics can help liberalism address the far-right’s challenge.

CHOOSING THE RIGHT STRATEGY: (COUNTER)INSURGENCY AND (COUNTER)TERRORISM AS COMPETING PARADIGMS

Distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency is becoming increasingly challenging for policy-makers and military planners. Terrorist organisations cannot be disrupted through counter-insurgency techniques and insurgencies are extremely resilient to counter-terrorism strategies. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, although similar in certain respects, identify divergent assumptions and modalities for dealing with terrorism and insurgency.

STRATEGIC TURNAROUND? RUSSIA’S SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN TALIBAN AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

We know that the Russians are involved, stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban. Russia’s logistical and financial support to the Afghan Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.