Impact of Non-Repatriation on Europe’s Security Environment
Part one of this article analysed the security implications for Europe of foreign fighter repatriation from Syria and Iraq. It concluded that fears of a drastic deterioration of Europe’s security environment are overstated, and the risk emanating from returnees manageable. Part two discusses the impact of non-repatriation, showing that policy alternatives outsourcing the problem increase the terrorist threat for Europe.
By Livia Margna
If not repatriated, European foreign fighters remain either incarcerated in camps or prisons in the conflict zone where they could eventually stand trial, or on the run. Those on the run have the possibility to continue fighting in Syria, hide on site, try to sneak back home, find refuge elsewhere, or move to another conflict. Whatever situation non-repatriated foreign fighters find themselves in or choose for themselves bears significant consequences for European states’ and other countries’ security.
The most fierce foreign fighters remaining in the conflict area are likely to regroup when the opportunity arises, rejoin the residual Islamic State troops or allied terrorist groups, and re-engage in the materialisation of an ideology which is far from being defeated. Insights from the Afghan war inform us that foreign fighters inhibited from returning home are likely to continue their engagement for jihad. [1] Others could try to sneak back to Europe. Chances are that they remain undetected and can thus neither be brought to justice nor be rehabilitated. [2] Moreover, when unmonitored they pose an increased threat, not only to the security of their home countries, but also to the states through which they transit.
Some of those who leave the conflict theatre do so to relocate to third countries, either to seek refuge there or fight in other conflicts. A relocation to third countries, however, shifts the insecurity associated with foreign fighters to states that are not at fault for their radicalisation and often have less resources to mitigate threats than their European counterparts. It also creates new hazards for Europe. First of all, it negatively affects geopolitical stability. [3] Relocatees can incite new or exacerbate existing conflicts in their new homes by spreading extremist ideology, fostering radicalisation and recruitment for jihadi causes, and importing military skills. Secondly, the retreat to so-called safe havens neither threatening prosecution nor surveillance allows indoctrinated foreign fighters to regain strength and reorganise, and potentially even establish sleeper cells which could eventually be activated to attack Europe. [4] Thirdly, even if foreign fighters genuinely relocate to third countries to find refuge and rebuild peaceful lives, their illegal status could force them into an underground existence, rendering them susceptible for the recruitment efforts of globally acting crime networks. [5]
A significant number of European foreign fighters remaining in the conflict zone are currently incarcerated. In February 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) claimed to hold 800 male European Islamic State fighters in prisons, as well as 700 women and some 1500 children in camps. [6] Further Europeans are in the hands of other paramilitary groups in Iraq and Turkey. The past, however, has repeatedly shown that incarceration of foreign fighters in the conflict region does not take them out of the threat equation as they are often unexpectedly freed or released. Turkey, for example, has already unilaterally released some of its European Islamic State prisoners because of their home country’s reluctance to take them back. [7] The Islamic State, on the other hand, has a long history of liberating its incarcerated members by staging prison attacks. Furthermore, many foreign fighters, predominantly women and children who never assumed violent roles in the war and might not have gone to Syria voluntarily, are detained in overcrowded camps known for their ‘appalling and sometimes deadly conditions’ [8] or are, due to a lack of alternatives, hiding. With their husbands and fathers dead or imprisoned and with nowhere else to turn, individuals are pushed ‘to seek assistance elsewhere, which often leads them right back into extremist circles’. [9] Hence, depriving them of assistance is not just a humanitarian offence, but might promote the alienation, radicalisation, and manipulation of hundreds of low-risk individuals, thus turning them into a potential future security threat.
Moreover, policy alternatives to repatriation nurture the terror threat from Islamists in the long-term by fostering anti-Western narratives. Denying support to European foreign fighters and their families in destitution, non-intervention in cases where they face torture or the death penalty, implementing discriminatory citizenship revocation practices disproportionately affecting individuals with an immigration background, [10] and tolerance or even execution of extrajudicial killings – as in the case of France and the United Kingdom [11] -- nourish the narrative depicting Muslims in the West as second-class citizens to whom the principles of human rights and international law are only selectively applied. Thus, by signalling ‘that an individual is no longer seen as part of the society’ [12] states arguably increase the animosity towards Western societies that motivated many Muslims to travel to Syria and join the Islamic State which had successfully co-opted this narrative into their recruitment propaganda. Moreover, it could further radicalise those foreign fighters who are not terrorists but see themselves treated as such, as ‘labelling them [terrorists] may irritate rather than dissuade the fence-sitters’. [13] Refusing assistance and repatriation thus ‘add[s] fuel to fire’ [14] and could even ‘incite possible acts of retribution’. [15]
Denying European nationals in Syria and Iraq the possibility to return thus not only shifts the problem to other countries. It also creates new threats for Europe which are much harder to pre-empt, as not only controlling and monitoring but also prosecuting, deradicalising, and rehabilitating alleged terrorists is virtually impossible from afar.
In liberal societies, terrorism cannot not be fully eradicated. We have to live with the fact that attacks have become part of our everyday lives. Yet, this does not mean that threats cannot be mitigated and extremists be deradicalised. Politicians denying their citizens who participated in the Syrian war to return, however, do the exact opposite. Instead of containing extremism by repatriating and consequently monitoring foreign fighters, they allow it to spread uncontrolled and thus create more threats. Hence, European states would benefit from bringing back their nationals as soon as possible.
Sources
[1] Pokalova, E. (2020). Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters – Threats and Challenges to the West. Washington DC: Palgrave Macmillan.
[2] Jenkins, B. (2019, June 6). Options for Dealing with Islamic State Foreign Fighters Currently Detained in Syria. CTC Sentinel, 11-23. Retrieved from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Herzliya: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2403/Dealing_with_IS_Foreign_Fighters_Detained_in_ Syria#gsc.tab=0
[3] Reed, A., de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., & Bakker, E. (2015). Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (Un)Intended Consequences. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Kiley, S. (2019, October 13). Europe Never Really Dealt with its ISIS Fighters. A Reckoning is Coming. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/30/opinions/trump- europe-isis-threat-intl/index.html
[7] Sariyuce, I., & Mackintosh, E. (2019, November 14). Turkey Begins Deporting Suspected ISIS Fighters to US, UK, Germany. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/14/europe/turkey-deports-isis-fighters-us-uk- germany-gbr-intl/index.html
[8] Human Rights Watch. (2019, July 23). Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/23/syria- dire-conditions-isis-suspects-families, p. 1.
[9] Pokalova, p. 135.
[10] Pokalova.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Reed, p. 13.
[13] Hegghammer, T. (2013). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. The American Political Science Review, p. 13.
[14] Hussin, S. (2019, April 8). Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation: Way Forward for Returnees. Retrieved from RSIS Commentary: https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10356/82781/1/CO19065.pdf
[15] Reed, p. 13.