In the shadows of the COVID-19 pandemic, the State of Israel is making a serious move. In a matter of weeks, it will be decided whether the Jewish state will annex parts of the landlocked territory of the West Bank. While speculations about the effects of such a move on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are in full swing, little attention has been placed on the future of Israel’s relations with other states in the Middle East. This article stresses how an annexation could affect Israel’s relationship with one of its most important strategic partners in the region: the Arab Republic of Egypt.
By Mats de Rooij
Building capacity, having patience, and seizing the moment. These three policy cornerstones were followed tightly by Israel’s founding fathers in the creation of a Jewish state back in the 1940s. Now, 72 years later, Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to seize the moment once again.
In late April 2020, Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz reached agreement on the formation of an emergency government to fight the spread of COVID-19.[1] Surprisingly, however, only one non-coronavirus issue may also be discussed during the first six months of this government: an annexation of more than 30% of the West Bank. This move was first presented in January 2020, when Netanyahu and President of the United States Donald Trump released their “Peace to Prosperity” plan that recognises a majority of Israeli settlements to be part of the Jewish state.[2] Despite strong Palestinian objections, the Israeli Knesset will be allowed to vote on the annexation from the 1st of July 2020 onwards.
One understudied consequence of a possible annexation is its impact on Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation. The roots of this partnership date back to the late 1970s. After the horrors of four inter-state wars, Egypt and Israel enjoyed rapprochement by means of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. During his 30-year reign that lasted until 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak committed not to resort to war and employed non-violent foreign policy tools towards Israel.[3] A cold peace between the two states was established.
However, the Egyptian government has never been able to count on strong public support towards this cooperative relationship. One of the most fundamental reasons is the persistence of anti-Israel sentiments in Egypt, at least partly resulting from Israel’s stance towards Palestine.[4] After decades of discontent with the cold peace, uproar surged at the dawn of the Arab Spring. Eight Israeli citizens were murdered in a series of militant cross-border attacks in 2011, and five Egyptian soldiers were killed in the military hunt that followed.[5] The Israeli embassy in Cairo was stormed by thousands of protestors only shortly after, forcing the Egyptian government to declare a state of emergency.[6] In an attempt to appeal to the public, then Prime Minister of Egypt Essam Sharraf assured that Camp David is by no means sacred, but rather an agreement that is ‘always open to discussion.’[7]
And now, in 2020, Egypt has no other option than to strongly condemn the possible Israeli annexation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry has called it a ‘flagrant violation of all principles of international law,’ and has accused Israel of using the coronavirus pandemic as a façade for its ‘unilateral’ agenda.[8] He calls upon the international community to bring stability to the people of Palestine and warns that an annexation invites terrorism, extremism, and overall violence to the region.
But is a condemnation enough, or will the Egyptian public demand more? In case of the latter scenario, security cooperation between Egypt and Israel may be at risk — and that could play out unfavourably for both governments. Indeed, Netanyahu and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have robustly improved their security relations over recent years. In 2015, an anonymous high-level Egyptian source disclosed that ties with the Jewish state were at their ‘best – perhaps the best they have ever been.’[9] And for good reason. Murat Agdemir of the Turkish Ministry of National Defence has stated that Israel is unable to protect its domestic security without compliance from the Egyptian government and its security agencies.[10] But Egypt also stands to gain from collaborating with its neighbour.
The core reason for this gain lies in Sinai. Poverty and a perceived local sense of marginalisation inflicted by the Egyptian national government are among the factors that have made the north of this peninsula a breeding ground for terrorism, and a magnet for jihadi groups.[11] The most prominent of these, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, and has thereby become the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Sinai Province (ISIL-SP).
This growing jihadism has posed a threat to both Egypt and Israel. Since the Arab Spring, the Egyptian police and military, tourists, and infrastructure have been among the targets of attacks conducted by Sinai-based militants. Additionally, the number of attacks against Israel took off after 2011.[12] Rocket attacks and infiltrations threaten the state’s security, while chaos on the peninsula allows for streams of African asylum seekers to enter Israeli soil. As a result, Israel has conducted more than one hundred airstrikes targeting the insurgency since July 2015.[13] While President el-Sisi normally keeps quiet on working together with his neighbour to the northeast, in early 2019 he admitted that he cooperates unprecedently close with the Israelis to counter Islamist militants in Sinai.[14] Indeed, the strategic interests of both states coincide here.
But now, if Netanyahu seizes the moment and proceeds with the annexation as proposed, a condemnation by the Egyptian government may not be enough to satisfy its citizens. It has been difficult for el-Sisi to juggle domestic support and the Israeli-supported fight against jihadism, and an annexation may be the final blow that forces him to choose which one of these two balls to drop. Needless to say, he cannot drop the former. So, what’s next? In the first place, all eyes are on the Knesset. And then, only time can tell if Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation would survive in the face of a potential public backlash. The countdown has begun.
Sources
[1] Hendrix, S and Eglash, R (2020) ‘Israeli Leaders Agree to Form Unity Government with Netanyahu Remaining Prime Minister for Now,’ The Washington Post, 21st April.
[2] Holmes, O, Taha, S, Balousha, H and McGreal, C (2020) ‘Trump Unveils Middle East Peace Plan with No Palestinian Support,’ The Guardian, 28th January.
[3] Amnon, A and Ginat, R (2014) ‘Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From Cold Peace to Strategic Peace,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 562.
[4] Jacoby, TA (2013) ‘Israel’s Relations with Egypt and Turkey During the Arab Spring: Weathering the Storm,’ Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 30.
[5] Agdemir, AM (2016) ‘The Arab Spring and Israel's Relations with Egypt: A View from Turkey,’ Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 226.
[6] Fam, M and Hamid, N (2011) ‘Egypt Declares Emergency After Attack on Israeli Embassy,’ Bloomberg, 11th September.
[7] Blomfield, A (2011) ‘Egypt Declares Camp David Accords with Israel Not a Sacred Thing,’ The Guardian, 15th September.
[8] Egypt Today (2020) ‘Egypt Affirms Rejection of Israeli Annexation of Occupied Lands in West Bank, Jordanian Valley,’ 30th April.
[9] Agdemir, p. 228.
[10] Ibid, p. 230.
[11] Abdul, A (2020) ‘Terrorism in Egypt: Analysis of the Narrative of Post-Arab Spring Terrorism,’ International Journal of Science and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 272-273.
Idris, I (2017) ‘Sinai Conflict Analysis,’ K4D Helpdesk Report, pp. 1-2.
[12] Byman, D and Elgindy, K (2013) ‘The Deepening Chaos in Sinai,’ The National Interest, Vol. 127, p. 45.
[13] Mandour, M (2018) ‘Egypt’s Evolving Alliance with Israel,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20th March.
[14] Stewart, P and Schroeder, P (2019) ‘Egypt’s Sisi Acknowledges Close Coordination with Israel in Sinai,’ Reuters, 7th January.