On November 30th, 2019, 28-year-old Usman Khan stabbed five people at the north end of London Bridge. While this is one of multiple attacks Londoners have suffered, something about this attack sets it apart from others, grabbing the attention of the media [1]. The attacker, Usman Khan, had previously been convicted of terrorism-related offences and had undergone two deradicalisation programmes during the 8 years he spent in prison [2]. This placed deradicalisation under the spotlight, reminding the international community of the importance of understanding the challenges and limitations of these programmes. This new Security Distillery piece will provide an insight into the adversity these programmes face through the example of the Pontourny Centre, a French deradicalisation centre that has generally been regarded as a failure [3]. Only by understanding what went wrong in previous deradicalisation efforts, it is possible to enhance the effectiveness of the newer programmes.
The term deradicalisation has been considered a problematic concept. This is because, in contrast with disengagement, it involves an attempt to transform not only an individual's behaviour, but also his or her beliefs [4]. Hence, underlying the concept of deradicalisation is the assumption that there are wrong and, consequently, right systems of thoughts.
Given the subjectivity of the concept of right and wrong, the broad diversity found within deradicalisation discourse is understandable. Indeed, the only aspect that allows us to refer to deradicalisation programmes as a category is their similarity of objectives. Thus, it is possible to distinguish two main general goals of these programmes: to ‘create the circumstances under which individuals become more open to alternative viewpoints; and (...) to externally bring the radicalized individual to more moderate viewpoints’[5].
Inside this broad category is our subject of study, the Pountourny Centre (officially called “Centre for Prevention, Integration, and Citizenship”), created by the French government in September 2016 in a rural castle near the Loire Valley. It consisted of a ten-month deradicalisation programme designated for French citizens between the ages of 18 and 30.
Before the establishment of the Centre, the French government had already encountered the first challenge of deradicalisation programmes: how to measure success. In the French case, an independent team of psychologists came up with a “psychometric test” aimed to determine the extent to which the participants´way of thinking was evolving [6]. The Centre never got the chance to yield final results, since after only 5 months of the experiment the nine participants decided to abandon the programme (presumably as a result of the continued protests against the Centre that were being held by the citizens of the village), which marks the largest failure of the programme. Not much is known about what happened with the participants because, as tends to occur with deradicalisation programmes, only short-term results are available. In this case, all we know is that after leaving the programme three of them started calling themselves “the rigorist Salafist gang” and another one was arrested for the crime of “apology for terrorism” [7]. The lack of access to long-term information on the life of previous participants prevents a better understanding of the effects that deradicalisation programmes have over time.
Furthermore, taking part in the programme was completely voluntary. This raised concerns at the outset, since it implies that the French government assumed that an individual could recognize that he or she was submerged in a radicalisation process and would react to it by searching for help, which is a large assumption to make. Its voluntary character contrasts with similar programmes, such as the British Chanel Project, which relied on police, local authorities, or local communities to identify those individuals who were exhibiting alarming behaviours and enlist them into the programme [8]. Whether the deradicalisation programmes should adopt an active role in the enrolment of participants is subject to debate. However, it is important to acknowledge how the decision can limit the scope of the programme. From the twenty-five spots that were available at the Pountourny Centre, only nine of them were filled.
To deal with the subjectivity issue that characterizes the concept of deradicalisation, the French government decided to emphasize disengagement instead of deradicalisation [9]. As a social worker of the Pountourny Centre stated: “You can’t tell someone, ‘What you think is bad, here’s good information’” [10]. Trying to focus on 'disengagement from violence… rather than denying the validity of the grievance'[11] is usual in these programmes. The British Chanel Project followed the same path, clarifying among the objectives of the programme that the intention was not to prevent individuals or groups from expressing extreme opinions [12]. While the debate between disengagement and deradicalization continues, the Pountourny Centre serves as an example of the difficulty that entails translating concepts into actions.
Each part of the programme promoted French nationalist elements that could have been interpreted by the participants as propaganda and the imposition of a secular counter-truth [13]. The daily life of the participants was based on therapy, group conversations on democracy, religion and laïcité (secularism), and lessons on French history, philosophy or literature. Apart from these activities, they were expected to wear uniforms and sing La Marseillaise, France's national anthem, every morning.
One could attribute part of the programme´s failure to France's underestimation, as a secular country, of the theological component of radicalisation. This follows the theory of Angel Rabasa, a Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, that sustains the existence of a distinction between the deradicalisation programmes in Muslim-majority countries (centered on the interpretation of Islam) and the ones carried out by Europeans governments, which tend to see radicalisation in terms of a social problem of integration of Muslim communities [14]. France dealt with the theological element indirectly by introducing a Muslim Chaplain into the programme, who had individual conversations with the residents. Nonetheless, as has occurred in other programmes, the participants regarded the Chaplain as untrustworthy due to his affiliation with the government. The distrust participants have towards the government is a reason that some countries, such as the United States, have decided to maintain a political distance by providing deradicalisation grants to selected organisations, rather than setting up their own programmes [15].
Then who should have a role if there is distrust? Apart from the Chaplain, the Pountourny Centre enlisted a team of 25 social workers, psychologists and special educators.[16] The employee make-up contrasts with other, more successful programmes, in which ex-members of radical groups played an important role. A unique example is the Indonesian initiative of introducing former JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) personnel as central figures of a deradicalisation programme. Thanks to their past experiences inside JI, these individuals were regarded as authority figures by the participants, increasing the effectiveness of the conversations. Additionally, the involvement of ex-terrorists in the programme afforded the Indonesian government a level of insight they would probably not have been able to reach through other avenues [17]. Hence, the inclusion of individuals with whom the participants can relate might be a potential solution.
While the Pountourny Centre failed to accomplish its objective, it constitutes an example of how not to deradicalise an extremist. Therefore, it provides us with an opportunity to learn from the mistakes, as well as recognise the limits of deradicalisation programmes. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of gaining long-term information on previous participants of these programmes to enhance research on deradicalisation results. It is not the time to lose faith in deradicalisation measures, but to work to improve them.
Sources
[1]The Guardian (2019) ‘London Bridge attack: victim named as Jack Merritt – as it happened’, 30th November. [online] available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2019/nov/30/london-bridge-attack-police-search-property-in-stafford-latest-updates, accessed on 20th February 2020.
[2] Lewis, Helen (2020) ‘Why Extremists Need Therapy’. The Atlantic, 11th February.
[online] available from: https://accounts.theatlantic.com/products/?source=nav, accessed on 15th February 2020.
[3] Crowell, Mady. (2017). ‘What Went Wrong With France's deradicalisation Program’, The Atlantic, 28th September. [online] available from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/france-jihad-deradicalisation-macron/540699/, accessed on 10th February 2020.
[4] Daugherty, CE (2019), 'deradicalisation and Disengagement: Exit Programs in Norway and Sweden and Addressing Neo-Nazi Extremism', Journal for deradicalisation, vol. Winter, no. 21, pp. 219-260.
[5] Dechesne, Mark (2011). ‘deradicalisation: Not Soft, but Strategic,’ Crime, Law and Social Change Vol. 55 No.4, pp. 287-292.
[6] Crowell, Mady. (2017). ‘What Went Wrong With France's deradicalisation Program?’, The Atlantic, 28th September. [online] available from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/france-jihad-deradicalisation-macron/540699/ accessed on 10th February 2020.
[7] Souris, Elena and Spandana Singh (2018) ‘Want to Deradicalize Terrorists? Treat Them Like Everyone Else’ Foreign Policy, 23 th November. [online] available from:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/23/want-to-deradicalize-terrorists-treat-them-like-everyone-else-counterterrorism-deradicalisation-france-sri-lanka-pontourny-cve/ , accessed on 13th February 2020.
[8] Rabasa, Angel, et al. (2010). Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND Corporation.
[9] Crowell, Mady. (2017). ‘What Went Wrong With France's deradicalisation Program?’ The Atlantic, 28th September. [online] available from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/france-jihad-deradicalisation-macron/540699/, accessed on 10th February 2020.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Kruglanski et al. (2011). ‘Aspects of deradicalisation,’ Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict. 12 January. [online] available from: http://www.asymmetricconflict.org/articles/aspects-of-deradicalisation/, accessed on 25th February 2020.
[12] Rabasa, Angel, et al (2010). Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND Corporation.
[13] Souris, Elena and Spandana Singh (2018) ‘Want to Deradicalize Terrorists? Treat Them Like Everyone Else’ Foreign Policy, 23 th November. [online] available from:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/23/want-to-deradicalize-terrorists-treat-them-like-everyone-else-counterterrorism-deradicalisation-france-sri-lanka-pontourny-cve/ , accessed on 13th February 2020
[14] Rabasa, Angel, et al (2010). Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND Corporation.
[15] Crowell, Mady. (2017). ‘What Went Wrong With France's deradicalisation Program?’, The Atlantic, 28th September. [online] available from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/france-jihad-deradicalisation-macron/540699/ accessed on 10th February 2020.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Horgan, J. & Braddock, K. (2010). ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 267-291.