Strategy-making is a process that encompasses a wide range of interdependent variables, from cultural to technological factors. It reflects the way a polity imagines itself and its opponents. It is true that historical contexts are unique; thus, Strategies have varied – in terms of objectives, means, and enemies. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating if immutable tenets shape the Strategy function. Indeed, this inquiry constitutes an insightful analysis to unveil patterns in the way societies, given limited resources, think and use force for political aims. The cases of early theories of air power, the annihilation logics of Germany’s colonial policy in Southwest Africa, and US drone warfare against terrorists provide rich observations to test the existence of recurrent features in Strategy.
By Jacopo Grande
1. The function of Strategy: searching for immutable tenets
Polities interact within a geometry of cooperation and conflicts, whose underpinning function is that of Strategy. This is the process of thinking and using organised force for political aims [1], given limited resources [2]. But it is also the way in which polities imagine themselves, their threats, and enemies.
When observing the War on Terror and its recent long-distance decapitation drone warfare, the securitisation of Southern European borders against migrants, or the Syrian government’s strikes targeting its own population, the mechanics of strategy-making prove to be vital in exposing recurrent patterns in terms of men, machines, and beliefs that contribute to choices. Hence, unpacking the function of Strategy constitutes a valuable analytical process. It is key, in fact, to uncover the complexity of international relations and security, since its variables, all intertwined and reciprocally dependent, capture single fragments of the logics of war-making and statecraft [3].
Strategy-making has ancient origins [4], whereas circumstances constantly evolve and wars are always fought. Therefore, it is worth assessing strategy’s immutable features, elements which are not subject to change despite transforming societies, technologies, and conflicts. This assessment will be conducted through three case studies: early air strategies of the 20th century (A), German colonial practices in 20th century Southwest Africa (B), and American drone warfare (C), to demonstrate that time, mutual interactions, and the culture-technology continuum are immutable factors of strategy-making.
2. CASE STUDY (A)
Machines, prophecies, and civilians: selecting targets
The first case exposes the intimate connection between culture, technology, and target selection, drawing on early air power strategies. H. G. Wells [5] envisioned the splintering of New York by a German bombing fleet of airships in 1908 and a few years later, the world witnessed Wright brothers’ first motorised flight [6]. As soon as the airplane had been imagined, even before its actual use, there was much speculation about its potential military use and prophecies of destruction in the next war were asserted in public debates and tabloids [7]. The conquest of the air has opened a new dimension of warfare, [8] erasing the boundaries of traditional battlefields, since aircrafts can easily pass behind armed forces on the ground and aim directly at the heart of the enemy: industrial capability, or civilians’ morale [9]. Therefore, the line between soldiers and non-combatants has been expunged in the new totalised warfare [10], and civilians reduced to ‘machines behind the machines’ [11] in the ruins of Guernica, Dresden, and Tokyo [12]. Despite weaponry reaching the nuclear stage, this evolutionary pattern is not alien to the function of technological advance for military use – the longbow prevailing over the sword, or the breech-loaded rifle over the musket [13]. Yet, what has truly changed with airpower is the identification of enemies. They are no longer embodied solely in the armed forces, but also in the unarmed people; those, as considered supporters of the war effort, are now turned into targets [14]. Under air raids, rushed preparations for the next strike took place in Britain and likewise in Germany during World War II, which have shaped fears and architectures [15], making conflict part of a domesticized war-peace continuum [16]. This suggests that considerations about targets are central to Strategy and that such targets are defined within the parameters of culture and technology. Furthermore – as examined through the second case study – those categories are senseless if Strategy falls short of its temporal dimension.
3. CASE STUDY (B)
Automated scripts for victory surrogates: mass killings and concentration camps
The second case study aims at acknowledging the dimension of time in Strategy. Namely, time plays a core role in terms of planning and then employing a strategy; indeed, time affects the way wars are waged. Yet, the temporal factor is often overlooked in the conclusive phases of conflicts: when Strategy proves unable to address the aftermath of war, it is certainly defective.
German colonial policy at the beginning of the 20th century constitutes an interesting case for examining time and Strategy. Here, the relationship between organisational, cultural, and tactical aspects of Strategy [17] proves to be central in explaining the victory, but helpless in understanding its consequences.
Southwest Africa was confronted with uprisings of the local Herero population between 1904 and 1907, and the Reich responded assertively. The Germans started killing rebels and civilians through mass starvation, and then via a mechanised process of annihilation enabled by concentration camps [18]. The imagined equivalence between national pride and state security – and an innate sense of inferiority resulting from an uncomfortable geography [19] – combined unavoidably with the Bismarckian structure of governance [20] based on the unchecked power of the executive branch and the military. The organisational military doctrine, easily paired with the Clausewitzian obsession with decisive victory [21]. When classical European battles proved to be useless to defeat local warriors, German soldiers resorted to a victory surrogate – the actual disappearance of the enemy [22]. The Strategy adopted in that scenario resulted from cultural assumptions, historical experiences, and the shock of an asymmetric confrontation with the opponent: concentration camps functioned as lethal bureaucratic devices of disappearance and mechanised annihilation, and eventually ensured victory [23]. Yet, the validity of such a triumph should be tested against its consequences: in strategy-making, planning the aftermath of conflict should represent the measure of a victory because victory is a complex negotiation, not a single event [24]. Destruction, occupation, and the end of hostilities alone are insufficient to claim that victory, since it results from various actors’ mutual interactions, like any phase of Strategy. Hence, the last case study focuses on the interactive dimension of Strategy.
4. CASE STUDY (C)
Altar of technology: roots of the US drone warfare
The third case study is US strategic evolution and aims at highlighting how Strategy is an interactive and history-driven process. Indeed, various actors, cultures, and beliefs, contribute to the process. Since 2001, the US has conducted operations in Somalia through the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). In 2011, the US implemented a targeted-killing strategy employing drones to hit al-Shabaab camps and militants; the same pattern has been repeated in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan [25]. Strategic bombing and decapitation techniques [26] appear to be merged in the new American way of war [27]. This has been framed as the risk-transfer approach [28], based on technological superiority and massive fire power such as substitutes for manpower [29].
Past experiences and beliefs are the main factors in shaping this Strategy: the trauma of Vietnam, resulting in the increasing aversion for human casualties on the ground, has contributed to a distance-striking mentality. This mindset has been reinforced by the success gained through superior air power in the Gulf War. Moreover, the societal background built on the ideals of the American War of Independence mixed with its capitalist path, namely wealth accumulation and the pursuit of happiness as the paramount common good [30], have combined with the assemblage of Congress, the American public, and the industrial-military complex [31]. Hence, piloted Predators flying over the Middle Eastern sands are the embodiment of a tormented effort to reduce the human component in war [32], demonstrating how the US strategy-making process has been heavily affected through interactive beliefs and legacies.
5. Architecture of Strategy, and its immutable tenets
Strategy is a complex function whose variables range from technology to geography, from history to cultural assumptions, ideologies, and resources [33]. Those factors are interdependent and operate within evolving historical contexts, but immutable tenets do exist in strategy-making processes.
Firstly, Strategy requires interactions which occur amongst different categories of actors. Group A and B may decide to wage war against each other or to settle an agreement, or both; at the same time, one group could experience internal disunity. This suggests that the process of thinking and making Strategy is a land of negotiated meanings [34], objectives, sub-interests, and marginal gains [35]. As a result, the elaboration of strategies is a fight per se, for no monolithic polities exist.
Secondly, there is a culture-technology continuum that implicitly affects the way wars are fought, against who, and by what means. There are minds behind machine guns [36], but simultaneously the available weaponry enables the belligerent parties to prefer certain solutions to others, such as surgically targeting a militant, or hiding an improvised explosive device (IED) near a road. Past traumas (such as the trenches in France, or historical legacies of colonialism) and imagined mythologies [37] (like the narratives of pride and power of the German Reich) all contribute to precise strategic postures, which are learnt and automated into the polity of reference, independently from evolving killing technologies.
Thirdly, there is no Strategy without time: when deciding which resources allocate for what aims, any consideration refers to a precise time-frame and has consequences behind the execution phase. Therefore, questions about success and the aftermath should be raised. The ruins and scars following the conflict are crucial to measure a victory and to assess if it is just a zero-sum game, a further unbalanced form of violence, or, if a long-lasting peace is the utmost good, the only one to be worth fighting for [38].
Strategy is a complex function, whose variables are interdependent and dimensions various. Nonetheless, this study, through the examination of historical cases diverse in time, context, and culture, seeks to isolate eternal tenets in strategy-making processes. Such an analysis is extremely valuable to unveil recurrent patterns in the ways societies think, plan, and wage war. Understanding the interplay between culture, technology, targeting, competing beliefs, and time, in fact, is the only guidance we have to navigate uncertain times and unpack the depth of today’s security challenges.
Methodology note
Due to the various facets of historical scenarios, an investigation directed at identifying immutable elements of Strategy must be conducted through a qualitative research approach. Namely, it is worth comparing thick-description cases [a] in space and time to highlight subtle differences, recurrent patterns [b], and imperfect categories that simplify reality. According to this methodological necessity, the prophecies of early air power at the beginning of the 20th century, Germany’s colonial practices in Southwest Africa (194-1907), and the distance-fighting strategy of US drone warfare against terrorist organisations (2003-2019) have been purposively selected as suitable units of observation [c]. Therefore, this research design is useful to avoid quantitative thin theories [d], while providing analytical leverage [e] and reinforcing the explanatory model [f].
[a] Denzin, N. K. (2001), ‘Thick Description’. in Applied Social Research Methods: Interpretive interactionism. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
[b] Heuser, B. (2010), The Evolution of Strategy. Thinking war from Antiquity to Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[c] Bryman, A. (2016), Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[d] Coppedge, M. (1999), ‘Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics’. Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, Issue 4, pp. 465-476.
[e] Gschwend, T. and F. Schimmelfenning (2007), Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
[f] King, G., Kehoane, R., and Verba, S. (1994), Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 205.
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