Rhetoric has always been a powerful tool for winning hearts and minds, but how has moral imperative evolved in times of war and peace? This piece examines success as a moral imperative within the US National Security Strategies written between 2002 – 2017. It traces the recent canon of success as a moral imperative in George W. Bush’s strategy of military primacy and preemptive measures, Barack Obama’s push for technological primacy and diplomatic values, and Donald Trump’s rhetoric of economic fortitude.

Keywords: Rhetoric, Ethics, Security, US, Primacy

After 9/11, George W. Bush’s 2004 campaign slogan of “A Safer World and a More Hopeful America'' was traded for the opening remark that “America is at war” in the national security strategy (NSS) from 2006. [1] Despite three changes of leadership between 2002 and 2017, a singular, moral spirit of military success pervades the five NSSs written during this period. This tension between morality and democratic leadership is something that Joseph Nye teases out with no small conviction in examining the gap between presidential actions and words. Nye claims this ‘moral foreign policy’ is part of a broader Western tradition which mobilises rhetoric to maintain the balance of power. [2]

This is evidenced in the successive declarations of war that have been made over the last decade and a half. A “War on Terror” and a “War on Drugs” are the most immediate examples that come to mind here, but Donald Trump’s disruptive style of governance has also parsed the threat of war numerous times – not least in the assasination of Iranian major general, Qasem Soleimani, in 2019. [3] Though economic and military fortitude are cornerstones of US security, the Trump administration has refashioned the moral imperative into a new, all-encompassing mythology which infamously pits the US as victors against the world: "We’re going to win. We’re going to win so much. We’re going to win at trade, we’re going to win at the border. We’re going to win so much, you’re going to be so sick and tired of winning.” [4]

But Trump and Bush are not the only culpable figures here. The canon of moral imperatives, which follows from Trump’s rhetoric of economic fortitude and Bush’s strategy of military primacy and preemptive measures, sees Barack Obama push for success (although softer) via technological primacy and diplomatic values: “the technology we harness can light the path to peace, or forever darken it.” [5] To frame this using the language of the Copenhagen School, the moral imperatives posited by the NSSs can be interpreted as a form of securitisation borne from speech acts. [6] In this instance, it creates the perception of American success and posits change to come. This securitisation process is inclusive of other Presidential outputs such as campaign slogans and public addresses. But the NSS as a tool for channelling these moral imperatives is the particular focus here, as it establishes the groundwork for moral action in war and peace. [7] This article briefly outlines how this moral imperative takes shape within the NSSs under Bush, Obama and Trump. From this, a presidential mythology of success begins to emerge, advocating for American primacy and democratic values as a moral good – not just for domestic prosperity but for global order.

The moral imperative plays out under Bush’s recourse to preemption in times of war. From 2002’s “axis of evil” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) to 2006’s “heptagon of hate” (North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe), a mythology of success is fashioned through the idea of the triumph of the US’s moral, democratic values over “evil” in the form of terrorism and its accessories. [8] Though there is a shift away from the narrative of preemption, Trump’s 2017 NSS is not dissimilar in borrowing from this moral rhetoric of good and bad, renewing it for an established digital age under a “strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology… American principles are a lasting force for good in the world.” [9] For both strategies in their respective contexts, securing success comes out of seizing opportunities presented by taking charge of foreign responsibilities through cooperation, acknowledging that “the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalised world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them.” [10] Whilst both pose a somewhat paradoxical stance in looking to secure peace by preparing for war, the rhetoric of moral imperatives in a globalised world continues to characterise the security challenges met by the Obama administration.

Further moral imperatives are seen in the NSS written under Obama, with relative peacetime affording more diplomatic reflections on this mythology of success. The legacies of 9/11 and the Iraq War make a tangible impression on Obama’s NSSs from 2010 and 2015 which are determined to recuperate influence in the aftermath of these political milestones as well as the economic deficit of a global economic crisis in the early years of Obama’s presidency. This is particularly explicit in the 2010 NSS which sees a revived interest in complementing tactical defence with economic growth: “America’s growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad.” [11] The moral imperative for America to take the lead (economically and politically) is advanced again in Trump’s 2017 security strategy, starting with a forthright pledge to deliver on domestic industry and “make America great again.” [12] The difference between how mythologies of success manifest under conditions of war and peace are thrown into stark contrast once more when one recalls Obama’s mediation between a domestic and foreign focus, positing “American innovation as a foundation for American power.”[13] While the two NSSs under Obama help bridge the mythologies of success held by two war-prone presidents, there can be no doubt to its moral imperatives of success, albeit in moving towards “diplomacy instead of war.” [14]

Even when placed in the wider context of an ever-shifting geopolitical landscape, the NSS’ ability to posit success as a moral imperative is potent. The decline of American primacy has been furthered by the Trump Administration’s economic tariff war since 2018 against a formidable rising adversary in China which has reacted proportionately, embroiling both manufacturing giants in global supply chain complications. The broader US reaction to the COVID-19 outbreak has also created further geopolitical Sino-US tension. Alongside a loss of primacy on the world stage, the domestic instability that has erupted as a result of mass protests at the murder of George Floyd. These protests have unveiled the extent of police brutality as a critical issue in the US. The true extent of these combined factors is yet to be determined, but it is not a far cry to suggest that the US can hardly call itself a success or feign to spread the “success” to foreign nations. This piece has briefly sketched out the potency of success as a moral imperative within the US’s broader ambitions to maintain power on the global stage. It has traced the recent canon of success as a moral imperative under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations in war and in relative peacetime. But as preparations for the next iteration of the NSS are underway, who knows how well this well-honed rhetoric will serve for leveraging a soft power stance in the context of the uncertainties of the coming decade and waning American influence.

Sources

[1] UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

[2] Nye, J.S., 2020. Do Morals Matter?: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Oxford University Press.

[3] Nelson, L. & Houck, C., 2020. US airstrike kills Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani: what we know. Available at: https://www.vox.com/2020/1/2/21047588/qasem-soleimani-airstrike-iraq-killed. Vox, accessed 8 June 2020.

“Trump’s National Security Strategy isn’t much of a strategy at all: It’s less coherent policy framework than strained justification for the president’s prejudices and blind spots” 2017, The Washington Post, accessed 15 December 2019.

[4] Trump, D.J., 2019. Donald Trump Rally [Online]. 11 April 2016. Times Union Center, Albany, New York. [Accessed 10 December 2019]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tJfeF2-Cq0#action=share

[5] UNITED STATES. 2010. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Barack Obama.

[6] Balzacq, T., 2005. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 171-201.

[7] Hollis-Brusky, A., 2019. Plausible legality: legal culture and political imperative in the global war on terror. International Affairs, 95(3), pp.749–750.

[8] UNITED STATES. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

[9] UNITED STATES. 2017. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Donald J. Trump.

[10] UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

[11] DeYoung, K., 2010, “Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond military might”, Washington Post, 27 May, accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html?hpid=sec-politics

[12] UNITED STATES. 2017. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Donald J. Trump.

[13] UNITED STATES. 2010. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Barack Obama.

[14] MacAskil, E., 2010, “Barack Obama sets out security strategy based on diplomacy instead of war“, The Guardian, 27 May, accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/27/us-national-security-strategy-report