Post-Raisi Iran: President Pezeshkian’s Reform Ambitions

The results of the July 2024 presidential elections in Iran marked a departure from almost two decades of conservative dominance. This has sparked hope for potential change within the Islamic Republic. This article explores the underlying reasons behind the demand for change and assesses whether meaningful reform is achievable. It provides the historical context surrounding the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, examines how the political system functions, and considers the background of President Pezeshkian and the goals he has set to achieve.

By Sofía Vilas Muñiz

Introduction

The reformist Masoud Pezeshkian has succeeded President Ebrahim Raisi, who died while in office in a helicopter crash on the 19th of May 2024. Raisi, along with other prominent Iranian figures who also died in the accident, such as the Foreign Minister, were returning from the inauguration of two dams in East Azerbaijan [1]. This incident unexpectedly ended Raisi’s polemic presidency.

Pezeshkian has assumed the presidency at a time of domestic economic difficulties and social unrest, coupled with escalating regional tensions and critical foreign policy issues. Despite his role, the ultimate authority remains with the current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, to whom the President must remain loyal.

Why is Iran an Islamic Republic?

Iran became an Islamic Republic following the Iranian Revolution, a series of protests and uprisings that began in 1978. Various sectors of the population expressed their dissatisfaction with Shah Reza Pahlavi’s monarchy.

Conservative sectors were unhappy with secular policies, including the ban of women wearing the hijab or the prohibition of instructing the Quran in public schools. Leftists and Marxist parties felt marginalized by the regime. The Shah’s close ties with the West, particularly the United States under President Kennedy, and his intentions to westernize the country through the White Revolution were also subject to criticism. Another major source of unrest was the repression of political dissent conducted by SAVAK, the Shah’s secret intelligence and security service [2].

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was one of the figures who condemned the Shah for expanding what he considered colonialist values and for repressing human rights. An Ayatollah is a cleric with one of the highest titles in Shia Islamic doctrine, considered as a representation of the descendants of Muhammad [3]. Due to his criticism, Khomeini was exiled in 1963. However, exile did not prevent him from spreading his ideas through mass media and his contacts in Iran [4].

The protests of the Iranian Revolution were brutally suppressed by the SAVAK, leading to tragic events like Black Friday, which left over 3,000 deaths. Despite the repression, protests persisted, and political prisoners remained numerous. Eventually, the Shah fled to Egypt, and the increasingly popular Khomeini returned to Iran. On the 1st of April 1979, following a referendum, Iran was officially declared an Islamic Republic [5].

Elections in the Islamic Republic

The political-religious doctrine established is the Velayat e-faqih, developed by Khomeini, which refers to the idea that a senior Islamic jurist should have ultimate authority over public and political matters within an Islamic society [6]. Under the new regime, Iran underwent profound changes, including the imposition of hijab and the prohibition of coeducational schools.

The most powerful figure is the Supreme Leader; who commands both the conventional armed forces, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) created by Khomeini. The Supreme Leader holds the authority to declare war, dismiss a President if deemed appropriate, appoint the Head of the Judiciary, and has significant influence over the appointment of members of both the National Security Council and the Discernment Council. According to the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Leaders are appointed by the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics elected by the population after passing a screening by the Guardian Council.

The President is elected by the population for a four-year term, only after having passed the screening of the Guardian Council, an institution composed of twelve members; half of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader. This ensures regime-allied candidates run for office. Furthermore, the Guardian Council oversees all legislation passed by the Parliament, limiting its power. The President selects his Cabinet which must be approved by the Parliament, elected by the population but subject to the Guardian Council’s oversight. From a list of candidates proposed by the Head of the Judiciary, he appoints the Justice Minister [7].

Summarizing, there are only three elective institutions that are nonetheless heavily vetted by non-elective bodies: the President, the Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts.

Who Is Masoud Pezeshkian?

The new President, a former cardiac surgeon with previous political roles, is the first reformist to win the presidential elections since Mohammad Khatami’s re-election in 2001. Surprisingly, Pezeshkian cleared the Guardian Council’s screening this time, a notable achievement given his disqualification in 2021 [8]. These past years presidential elections were won by conservatives and hardliners, resistant to reforms.

The July 2024 presidential elections won the record for the lowest turnout, with less than 40 per cent of eligible voters participating in the first round and 49.8 per cent in the run-off [9]. This reflects the population’s unhappiness with the system and a belief that votes will not lead to meaningful change [10]. Dissatisfaction arises from mistrust of electoral fairness, economic hardship with high inflation, and the rigid regime policies they believe will remain unchanged. These hard policies are exemplified by the controversial role of the morality police, part of the Basijs branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The death of a young Kurdish woman in a detention center, after being arrested by the morality police for considering she was violating the dress code, led to a series of uprisings in 2022. These protests were directed against the morality police, the mandatory hijab and the clerical rule, and the crackdown left many dead.

Pezeshkian’s hometown is Mahabad, in the province of West Azerbaijan, a city with a significant percentage of Azeri and Kurdish ethnic minorities [11]. Iran is composed of several ethnic groups, including Persians, Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, and Balochs. Groups that often face discrimination and repression.

He has advocated for change, aiming to achieve greater inclusion of ethnic minorities and censorship reduction by lifting internet restrictions. He has often condemned the morality police and the mistreatment of women, and has promised to curb the coercive measures related to the mandatory hijab [12].

There is some prospect for change, but likely constrained. Iranian history reveals tensions always arise with a reformist President, considering his limited authority and the fact that the Supreme Leader with conservative religious views holds the final decision-making power.

On the international stage, he wants to re-engage in dialogue with the West, particularly with the United States, to address the economic sanctions reimposed after Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal. The President will have to deal with the complexities of Iran’s involvement in Israel’s war on Gaza. Iran has backed Hamas and Hezbollah for long and Israel has recently assassinated the leaders of both members of the “Axis of Resistance”, which suggests an escalation of the conflict.

Conclusion

While Pezeshkian’s presidency represents a turning point for Iran, the potential for meaningful reform is tempered by the structural and political challenges inherent within the Islamic Republic’s system. The outcome of his presidency will profoundly depend on his ability to navigate these challenges and influence the implementation of policies that address both domestic and international concerns.

Bibliography

[1] “Iran Helicopter Crash: What We Know about How Ebrahim Raisi Died.” 2024. BBC News. June 20, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4nnd23d505o.

[2] Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann. 2013. Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic. Georgetown University Press.

[3] Salamanca Rodríguez, Alejandro. 2016. “¿Qué Es Un Ayatolá?” Desvelando Oriente. Desvelando Oriente. February 2016. https://desvelandooriente.com/2016/02/01/ayatola/.

[4] Bakhash, S. (1986). Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and Islamic Revolution. Basic Books.

[5] Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann. 2013. Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic. Georgetown University Press.

[6] Salamanca Rodríguez, Alejandro. 2020. “El Gobierno Del Jurista (Velayat-e Faqih).” Desvelando Oriente. Desvelando Oriente. January 8, 2020. https://desvelandooriente.com/2020/01/08/el-gobierno-del-jurista-velayat-e-faqih/.

[7] Zaccara, Luis. "Irán como Pivote Geopolítico." Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa 35 (2010): 15-31.

[8] Bennett, Tom. 2024. “Masoud Pezeshkian: The Reformist Fromer Heart Surgeon Now Iran’s President-Elect .” BBC News. July 8, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cmm25dq14j3o.

[9] “The Unlikely Election of Another Reformist in Iran - Middle East Council on Global Affairs.” 2024. Middle East Council on Global Affairs. https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/the-unlikely-election-of-another-reformist-in-iran/.

[10] Azimi, Saeed. 2024. “Iran Elections: Record-Low Turnout Shows Even Regime Loyalists Are Unhappy .” Stimson Center. July 1, 2024. https://www.stimson.org/2024/iran-elections-record-low-turnout-shows-even-regime-loyalists-are-unhappy/

[11] Jafari, Saeid. 2024. “Masoud Pezeshkian Is a Possible Game Changer in the Upcoming Iranian Presidential Election.” Atlantic Council. June 19, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/masoud-pezeshkian-reformist-game-changer-election-president/.

[12] Fassihi, Farnaz. 2024. “Iran’s New President Promises Changes. Can He Deliver?” The New York Times, July 16, 2024, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/16/world/middleeast/iran-new-president-pezeshkian.html