The testing of India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in May 1998 marked the beginning of a period of nuclearisation and proliferation in South Asia. This is an ongoing process as seen with India’s completion of the Nuclear Triad in 2018, allowing for nuclear deterrence by land, air and sea,[1] as well as Pakistan’s growing development of tactical nuclear weapons which can be deployed on the battlefield. [2] The consolidation of the two states’ nuclear arsenals is significant due to the addition of nuclear capabilities in states which are currently involved in a protracted conflict, having engaged in four large scale military conflicts since partition and independence in 1947. The consolidation of nuclear weapons and continued hostilities in the region presents two key questions that must be considered. How has nuclearisation been used in relation to the protracted conflict and more importantly, has nuclearisation in India and Pakistan effectively created regional stability or further injected instability to the regional conflict?
By Steven Mulholland
Protracted conflict is by definition a conflict which ‘resists the most serious attempts at resolution because of the deep-rooted issues over critical resources, meaning, justice and power.’ [3] The lack of reference to proliferation as a basic feature of protracted conflict in the definition is significant because it assumes that protracted conflicts are already inherently difficult to resolve prior to nuclearisation. This assumption is quite clearly supported in the context of India and Pakistan. Three major conflicts in 1947, 1965, and 1971 occurred between the two states prior to nuclearisation, with no solution being achieved over the major issue of the Kashmir State, perpetuating tensions and instability. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and its continued proliferation of weapons has naturally created a division of opinion as to how proliferation impacts the protracted conflict and the region’s stability as a whole. I argue that proliferation has increased instability in the region and further entrenched the protracted conflict.
It should be noted that advocates for nuclear deterrence have argued that India and Pakistan’s nuclearisation would have a positive impact on the protracted conflict, citing the argument that nuclear deterrence would effectively prevent the large-scale conflicts seen in the region, by making ‘war terribly expensive and creating a source of constancy amongst nuclear opponents.’ [4] This argument has been supported to an extent by the nature of India and Pakistan’s operation under a more restrained nuclear policy than the Cold War dynamic between the USSR and US. This dynamic is a result of developing a minimal deterrence system [5] that allows for second strike capabilities, further increasing the costs of conflict in the region.
But of course, the Kargil War in 1999 that occured one year after nuclearisation, refuted the deterrence argument in terms of preventing large-scale conflict. Supporters of deterrence argue that India and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would not have been consolidated enough to provide a substantial deterrence at the time. However, the conflict did prove that known nuclear capabilities did not make the prospect of conflict too costly, and that the two states were willing to deploy military forces in the Kargil region regardless of the nuclear threat. The conflict more accurately showed how nuclearisation contributed towards the escalation, because of ‘both sides possessing a different understanding of nuclear deterrence theory.’ [6] In the case of Pakistan, nuclearisation is perceived as a means of finally being able to respond to Indian military might in conflict. In contrast, India perceives proliferation as a means of deterring conflict and preserving the balance of power with both Pakistan and China, a key military ally of Pakistan.
Supporters of deterrence have also neglected the fact that the conflict in the region is not limited to large-scale outbreaks. The vast majority of disputes in the region have been on a much smaller scale, as seen with the border mobilisation in 2002, India’s use of ‘surgical strikes in Azad Kashmir in 2016’, [7] and the most recent dispute in 2019 over an Indian Air Force pilot taken into Pakistani custody after being shot down in Pakistani controlled Kashmir. It also neglects the fact that small scale attacks, especially the ‘Pakistani-sponsored attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008’, [8] have been made possible by nuclearisation providing a form of protection against a more aggressive military response or retribution by India. This argument is particularly salient when examining Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, which refuses to commit to a no first use policy. Their policy assumes that a low threshold for a nuclear response creates an umbrella of protection that can be used to carry out ‘sub-conventional attacks’ [9] on India. The doctrine is significant in suggesting that proliferation in the region has become a justification and allowance for conducting small-scale action in the region as opposed to serving as a successful deterrent.
Overall, it is impossible to make the claim that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan has not had an impact on the protracted conflict in the region. However, it can be asserted that the nuclearisation of South Asia has become a significant detriment to the conflict. Instead of providing regional stability through effective deterrence on both sides of the conflict it has failed to prevent large-scale conflict and has served as a means of carrying out and perpetuating small-scale conflict. The presence of nuclear capabilities has only entrenched the protracted conflict and created further instability in the region.
Sources
1. Narang, V (2018) ‘India’s nuclear strategy twenty years later: From reluctance to maturation. India Review,’ Vol. 17 No.1. pp. 159-179.
2. Gul, Ayaz (2019) ‘Pakistan Equips Military with Tactical Nuke-Capable Missiles,’ Voa news.https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-equips-military-tactical-nuke-capable-missile
3. Coleman, Peter (2003) ‘Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development,’ Peace and Conflict, Vol.9. Pp. 1-37.
4. Noreen.S & Khan T.M (2016) ‘An Analysis of Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines,’ Al-Idah, Vol. 33. pp. 50-68.
5. Basrur. R (2013) ‘China, India and Pakistan: models for an intermediate stage towards disarmament?’ Australian journal of international affairs, Vol. 67 No.2. pp.179-189.
6. Leghari, Farooque & Moorthy Ravichandaran (2015) ‘Nuclear Deterrence: A complete failure at Kargil,’ Research on Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 5. No. 15. Pp. 105-108.
7. Hindustan Times Correspondent (2016) ‘India’s surgical strikes across LoC,’ Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-surgical-strikes-across-loc-full-statement-by-dgmo-lt-gen-ranbir-singh/story-Q5yrp0gjvxKPGazDzAnVsM.html
8. Brewster, D (2015) ‘Murky waters, dangerous currents: India, Pakistan, China and the coming nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean,’ Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.11 No.2. pp. 1-5.
9. Brewster, (2015) ‘Murky waters, dangerous currents: India, Pakistan, China and the coming nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean,’ pp. 3.