The Influence and Stability of the United Kingdom: The National Security Ramifications of a No Deal Brexit

Brexit presents a scenario in which, all at once, the UK must: maintain its relevance on the world-stage whilst simultaneously reducing its legislative and policy making influence;  satisfy Scotland’s call to remain; and assuage Northern Ireland’s border concerns. At risk is the fragmentation of its union and a shrinking of its international role.

by Matthew Wentworth

The referendum campaign leading up to June 2016, which questioned Britain’s continued membership of the European Union (EU), was based on the argument that the United Kingdom (UK) could be a self-governed, self-sustaining, wholly independent nation, free from the limiting bureaucracies of the EU, and stronger out. After the result these promises waned and now, whatever Brexit brings, Britain’s leaving of the EU could prove to be a rare historical turning point for the UK and a tectonic shift in European Security. If the UK fractures it could lead to diminishing fiscal and political capacity in terms of national security policy making[1]. These concerns are based on the detrimental effect Brexit could have to Britain’s influence both globally and within multilateral institutions, as well as the increased possibility of the break-up of the UK through Scottish independence or the reunification of Ireland.

The placement of UK officials is the first direct global status ramification of the UK becoming a third-state outside of the EU. Absent a deal, the UK Defence Minister will no longer take part in meetings of EU Defence Ministers and will therefore not be involved in decision-making or planning EU defence and security. British personnel currently hold senior positions within major bodies like Europol, the loss of which would significantly affect the British ability to exercise leverage and influence in the development of European security agencies like Europol, which many currently consider a British-friendly institution[2]. Even a soft Brexit will come at a price to overall UK security. Britain will lose both power and influence by no longer having a say in EU legislation addressing terrorism, crime, foreign policy, or security.

Perhaps more concerning, however, is that the UK’s diminished capacity may not be limited to influence within the EU but could extend further to bodies like NATO. Brexit will certainly not change the fact that NATO is Britain’s multilateral defence forum of choice; in fact, the government champions a ‘renewed emphasis in NATO on deterrence and collective defence’ in what it labels a worsened security environment[3]. The assumption that many make with regard to the UK being able to use NATO to rebalance its security role in Europe however is unsound. The UK will undoubtedly lose influence within NATO after the inevitable appointment of a non-British Deputy Supreme Allied Commander to Europe, the first amongst many other likely changes, which will be a blow to the UK’s global standing in symbolic terms at the very least.

If British global influence is eroded, then current arrangements with allies like the US are also likely to suffer. Britain is considered an intelligence superpower due to UK intelligence-sharing arrangements with the US and membership in the Five Eyes Network[4]. Historically however, the security role of the UK in the EU was favoured greatly by Washington who saw the value of the UK as deriving at least in part from its EU membership. This influence cannot be replicated via NATO – meaning the UK cannot necessarily count on being ‘America’s closest partner’ indefinitely as British Prime Minister Theresa May has maintained[5]. The US intelligence community might begin to see the UK as a diminishing asset and opt to reach for another, more stable, ally for fear that the UK might disintegrate or lose access to EU intelligence[6].

This idea of political instability within the UK is recognised by many, both domestically and internationally, with the ostensible exception of the UK government itself. The months immediately following the referendum in the UK saw a Cabinet reshuffle, leadership contests and, eventually, a general election. This election cost the Conservative Party their majority at the expense of sizeable Labour gains and forced them to turn to Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to maintain their ruling position. Since this general election, the Cabinet alone has suffered no less than 23 resignations over the Brexit issue, including two Brexit Secretaries and the Foreign Secretary. We have also seen two narrowly won votes of no confidence based purely on the Brexit negotiations: one in Mrs May, as the leader of the Conservative Party; and one in the Government itself. Political instability of this kind does not a secure nation make.

The disjointed strategies, lack of consensus, and infighting displayed are not restricted simply to Westminster, but stretch to the Union at large. The different referendum results witnessed in Scotland and Northern Ireland (NI) compared to England and Wales increase the danger to the currently delicate fabric of the UK[7]. Firstly, the Scottish issue forces one to consider whether the Scottish people will stand for being removed from the EU by Westminster against their expressed will. If Scottish voters assert that they stand to gain more from the EU than the British Union, then the UK could become still less united. Whilst this issue was muted in recent months, the growing prospect of a no deal exit has driven Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon to confirm that she will reveal plans for a second Scottish independence referendum after this phase of the Brexit negotiations has ended[8]. In discussing these plans, Mrs Sturgeon recently confirmed her vision for an independent Scotland that would apply for EU membership within the next five years[9]. The success of Scotland’s application to rejoin the EU would be dependent on both economic and political variables, but the point remains that Westminster’s wilful ignorance of Scotland’s resolve to remain is fuelling stronger calls for self-governance.

Scottish independence would bring more than just concerns regarding the break-up of the Union, it will also bring with it practical security implications. Scotland and Scottish bases form a crucial part of the UK’s air defence perimeter and maritime zone[10]. Multiple major platforms for building and storing warships, munitions, and naval heavy weapons would be at risk. Independence could also mean losing facilities such as Britain’s Trident Force, directly affecting the UK’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. The political and fiscal costs of moving this base elsewhere in the UK or to an overseas territory make it potentially infeasible. Though 55.3% of Scots voted to remain as part of the UK in the 2014 referendum, attitudes amongst the Scottish people might be swayed back to independence as a result of Westminster’s continued disregard for the Scottish stance on Brexit, and the probable recession resulting from leaving the EU. Further fuelling this call is the potential for a violent reopening of the Irish Question, which is a distinct possibility in the ever-increasing likelihood of a botched Brexit[11].

The troubled violent history in NI coupled with the fact that the government still considers there to be a present threat of NI related terrorism create a fragile environment in which to negotiate change. This fragility is compounded by the fact that the current Conservative government is propped up by ten pro-Brexit DUP members insistent on NI leaving the EU on the same terms as the rest of the UK, scuppering the previously proposed backstop arrangements. Failure to satisfy the DUP concerns would likely result in their withdrawal from the confidence and supply arrangement they hold with Mrs May’s government, leaving a ruling party with no majority.

In the event of a no deal scenario, it is difficult to envisage anything but the recreation of a real, as opposed to virtual, border between the Republic of Ireland and NI which defies the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The type of border that emerges is extremely important for the UK’s national security, as undermining of the rules in place governing the border amounts to an undermining of the agreement itself[12]. There is a consensus that anything which upsets the delicate status-quo of NI’s political environment could cue a resurgence of dissident paramilitary activity and further national security concerns for the UK[13]. The vote for remain in NI signifies that opinion there might be disjointed with that of England and Wales, potentially giving greater priority to links with the Republic whilst simultaneously breeding a new polarisation along sectarian lines: another example of how Brexit has made the Union more fragile[14].

The extent of the UK’s post-Brexit strategic vision amounts to a determination for a ‘Global Britain’. The plan however has no more structure than that empty phrase; it is a goal unlikely to be attained by seceding from the EU[15]. Far from elevating the UK to new heights, the Brexit process has thus far suggested the UK’s retreat from world affairs and a shrinking of Britain’s international role through diminished capacity in NATO, no say in EU policy, and a potentially weakened intelligence relationship with the US. The turmoil surrounding the political management of Brexit could also have dire consequences for the stability of the UK itself. Mrs May’s precarious majority looks to be in constant jeopardy, and Westminster’s alienation of the Scottish people, coupled with the impossibility of delivering a hard Brexit which is compatible with the Good Friday Agreement, might prove as deciding factors in the weakening of the stability of the UK through either Scottish Independence, a unified Ireland, or both.

Sources:

1. Blagden, D. (2017) Britain and the world after Brexit. International Politics. 54(1), pp.1–25.

2. Dawson, J. (2017) Brexit: implications for national security. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

3. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

4. Inkster, N. (2016) Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism. Survival. 58(3), pp.23-30.

5. May, T. (2018) PM Speech at Munich Security Conference 17 February 2018. Munich Security Conference, Munich.

6. Konstantopoulosa, I.L., and J.N. Nomikos (2017) Brexit and intelligence: connecting the dots. Journal of Intelligence History.16(2), pp. 100-107.

7. Macpherson, N. (2016) The case for Scottish independence looks stronger post-Brexit. Financial Times. [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1219f41c-4456-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1 [Accessed 6 Jan. 2019].

8. Nutt, K. (2019) Nicola Sturgeon set to unveil indyref2 plans soon. The National. [online] Available at: https://www.thenational.scot/news/17341120.nicola-sturgeon-set-to-unveil-indyref2-plans-soon/?ref=mr&lp=4 [Accessed 9 Jan. 2019].

9. McLaughlin, M. (2019). Scotland will be independent in five years, declares Sturgeon. The Times. [online] Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/scotland-will-be-independent-in-five-years-declares-sturgeon-8r7nc62zj [Accessed 13 Feb. 2019].

10. Blagden, “Britain and the world after Brexit,” 11.

11. Heisbourg, F. (2016) Brexit and European Security. Survival. 58(3), pp.13-22.

12. Duke, S. (2018) Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham: Springer Nature.

13. Morrow, D., and J. Byrne. (2016) Playing Jenga? Northern Ireland after Brexit. Political Insight. 7(2), pp.30-31.

14. Gamble, A. (2018) Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit. Journal of European Public Policy. 25(8), pp.1215-1232.

15. Duke, “Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?,” 92

UK Access to EU Databases: The National Security Ramifications of a No Deal Brexit

The UK’s ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to risks is enhanced by its ability to share data and expertise, exchange information, and collaborate closely with its nearest neighbours. Brexit presents a significant threat to both that information exchange and continued collaboration.

by Matthew Wentworth

At present standing, with one deal presented by British Prime Minister Theresa May having already failed to pass through the Commons, the consequences of a no deal Brexit are looming. It is a scenario which many Members of Parliament expressly wish to avoid as leaving the European Union (EU) without a deal would have ramifications for the United Kingdom’s (UK) transnational policing, counter-terror operations, national border control, and forensic investigative capabilities. Each of these areas will be directly and immediately affected in the event of a no deal Brexit due to the specific instruments that the UK stands to lose access to and the effect this will have on its ability to ensure national security.

Without an agreement the UK would leave Europol and UK police forces would lose use of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), access to Europol’s Information System, and the EU Internet Referral Unit[1]. Not only this but the National Crime Agency would lose access to the EU’s network of Financial Intelligence Units (based at Europol) and the Bomb Data System[2]. Back in 2016 Mrs May cited the EAW when she stated that ‘there are definitely things we can do as members of the European Union that I think keep us more safe’[3]. Informing her view was the fact that in the period 2004–2016 the EAW enabled the UK to extradite 7000 individuals accused or convicted of criminal offences in other EU countries[4]. In the past five years alone, 5000 people have been extradited to EU member states using the EAW[5] highlighting its increasing importance. The prospect of the UK losing rights to the use of EAWs after withdrawing from the EU, and by extension Europol, would mean reverting to more costly and time-consuming measures due to the sudden absence of provisions for mutual recognition of judicial orders[6].

It is well understood that the UK’s lack of access to these instruments would serve neither the UK nor their European partners and whilst examples do exist of bespoke arrangements with third-states, leaving Europol would mean that at best Britain would have to settle for non-voting observer status, forfeiting the right of British officers to lead Europol teams[7]. The argument often presented by leave supporters from all parties that post-Brexit access to the EAW will be straightforward discounts the question of legal oversight of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)[8]. Mrs May has already conceded that any prospect of the UK’s participation in EU agencies such as Europol would mean respecting the remit of the ECJ[9]. This point is entirely at odds with what backbench Commons Members, specifically those of the European Research Group, will accept.

Instead, pro-Brexit Members of Parliament claim that the UK’s contribution to Europol databases as well as the expertise they provide in operations is a big enough bargaining chip to secure the UK access to instruments post-Brexit. Denmark, for example, is able to exchange data with Europol as a third-state, but this is only facilitated through the time-consuming process of Danish officers contacting Danish-speaking Europol staff and being granted the requested information on a case-by-case basis. Denmark does not have right of access to Europol data. The applicability of this arrangement to the UK is extremely doubtful, the EU-Danish agreement depends upon Denmark’s continued membership of the Schengen area, domestic legislative implementation of EU data protection laws, and acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. These conditions are unworkable for the UK since they undermine many facets of the decision to leave the EU[10].

National border control and customs security will be similarly affected with the updated Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) being two further tools that the UK will lose in a no deal Brexit scenario[11]. The SIS II supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation across 22 participating EU countries (plus four associated countries). The staggering extent of its use amounts to it having been consulted 2.9 billion times in 2015[12]. In 2017 Britain alone checked the system over 500 million times in relation to searches for people and objects wanted for law enforcement purposes[13].

ECRIS is a decentralised system utilised by the majority of EU members and provides judges with the information on criminal records of persons which transcends state borders[14]. The government has proposed continued participation in this system, recognising that the UK relies on it for the effective management of violent and sexual offenders. This reliance is reflected in the fact that the UK sent and received over 163,000 requests and notifications for criminal records just in 2017, amounting to over 3,000 a week or 600 requests and notifications to and from the EU per working day[15]. Continued access to both SIS II and ECRIS is of the utmost importance for continued effective law enforcement yet it would require a unique agreement as, to date, there are no examples of access by non-EU or non-Schengen countries in either case[16]. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland have access to SIS II but all are members of the Schengen area[17]. Politicians and academics alike have pointed to these countries as evidence that the UK will be able to access similar databases after it leaves the EU without recognition of the criteria it will have to fulfil as a third-state to do so. It currently takes six days to determine the domestic criminal convictions of EU nationals visiting the UK, post-Brexit the process could take up to ten times longer[18].

Similar time-delay concerns abound when considering the forensic investigative capabilities of the UK and the removal of access to both the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac), and the Prüm Framework. In 2016 then Home Secretary Mrs May described the Prüm Framework (a cross European agreement to search DNA and fingerprint databases) as ‘a tool which hugely increases the reach of UK law enforcement’[19]. To have the same accessibility to both Prüm and Eurodac (a mechanism for sharing fingerprint data for asylum and law-enforcement purposes[20]) following a no deal Brexit, the UK would need to negotiate individual agreements with each EU government. The importance of continued access to the Prüm Framework has been challenged due to the fact that equivalent manual requests can be made through Interpol. The reality is that UK police forces sent 69 DNA profiles abroad in 2014-15 using Interpol, whereas 9,931 profiles were sent in less than six months during a pilot of the Prüm system[21] demonstrating that requests through Interpol are not an equitable comparison to the capability facilitated by Prüm.

All these platforms and information sharing systems are mutually beneficial to participating countries and many Brexit fears are exacerbated by the fact that the UK is both a large contributor and consumer of the information held and shared. What is often not considered however is that some mentioned above largely contain information on only convicted criminals rather than terrorist suspects. Classified or secret information on terror subjects, or information on counter-terror operations, are not shared on some databases because they are not sufficiently advanced to host intelligence above a classification level of “confidential”[22]. Intelligence relating to terror suspects and operations is contained on national security databases and are therefore shared between individual countries on a “need to know” basis, something that is not currently set to change after the UK leaves the EU. In the absence of a deal however it is possible that EU countries will demand proof of the UK’s willingness to recognise the rulings of the ECJ if it wishes to maintain current levels of counter-terrorism co-operation. Failure to offer this assurance could lead to renewed concerns amongst Member States about mass surveillance by the UK government and a decrease in the aforementioned co-operation.

The government has in-part identified non-EU mechanisms that exist to replace a proportion of the apparatus identified above but none would provide the same level of capability as those available in either a deal or remain scenario[23] meaning they would increase pressure on UK security, law enforcement, and judicial authorities. The fall-backs are slower, more bureaucratic, and ultimately less effective. The importance of introducing measures to combat these national security concerns is recognised by the government as evidenced by their assertion of the need to maintain, deepen, and strengthen operational and practical cooperation with the EU through an adequacy agreement. Given that over three-quarters of the UK’s data flows are with EU countries[24] it is certainly true that the absence of a deal will inevitably mean that the exchange of personal data for law enforcement and criminal justice purposes would be impacted[25]. UK capabilities in cross-border policing, counter-terror operations, national border control, and forensic investigative capabilities stand to be severely disadvantaged.  The uncertainty and instability that Brexit is causing in the information sharing and transnational policing realms stand to be exploited by terrorists and organised crime cells. Both the EU and the UK would be negatively affected by the immediate operational disruption and security implications[26] potentially affecting the political stability of all concerned.

Sources:

1. de Vries, G. (2018) A hard Brexit will see criminals taking back control. LSE Brexit Blog. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/12/a-hard-brexit-will-see-criminals-taking-back-control/ [Accessed 4 Dec. 2018].

2. ibid.

3. Mason, R. (2016) Leaked recording shows Theresa May is 'ignoring her own warnings' on Brexit. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/26/leaked-recording-shows-theresa-may-is-ignoring-her-own-warnings-on-brexit [Accessed 6 Jan. 2019].

4. House of Lords (2016) Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

5. May, T. (2016) The UK, EU and our place in the world. Institute of Mechanical Engineers, London.

6. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

7. de Vries, “A hard Brexit”.

8. Duke, S. (2018) Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham: Springer Nature.

9. de Vries, “A hard Brexit”.

10. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2017) Third-Second Report of Session 2016–17. London: House of Commons.

11. Inkster, N. (2016) Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism. Survival. 58(3), pp.23-30.

12. House of Lords, Leaving the European Union, p.17.

13. European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (2018) SIS II – 2017 Statistics. Tallinn: eu-LISA.

14. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.62.

15. National Crime Agency (2017) Historical European Arrest Warrants statistics: Calendar and Financial year totals 2004 - May 2016. London: National Crime Agency.

16. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.68.

17. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (2018) Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit: Towards a principled and trust-based partnership. [online] Brussels: CEPS. Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR_EU-UK_Cooperation_Brexit_0.pdf [Accessed 6 Dec. 2018].

18. Inkster, “Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism”, p.31.

19. House of Lords (2015) Hansard. col. 1637. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151209-0002.htm [Accessed 10 Dec. 2018].

20. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.66.

21. Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review, p.6.

22. House of Lords, Leaving the European Union, p.8.

23. Doffman, Z. (2018) Brexit Chaos: Why It Is A Major Terrorism And Security Risk. Forbes. [online] Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2018/11/15/brexit-chaos-why-it-is-a-major-terrorism-and-security-risk/# [Accessed 5 Jan. 2019].

24. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.69.

25. Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review, p.18

26. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.69.