Current Challenges to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Kosovo

Twenty years after the Kosovo War, which left a scenery of destruction behind, and eleven years after the country’s declaration of independence, the challenges posed to Kosovo are far from solved. The ongoing processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding have had countless positive results for the region, yet have so far been unable to grant Kosovo real legitimacy either internally or externally. Kosovo has reached a deadlock.

by Mariana Garrido

Twenty years ago, Kosovo was victimised by a series of bloody events. First, Former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević’s campaign of stigmatisation and aggression against the Kosovan Albanians culminated in acts of ‘ethnic cleansing and tendencies for genocidal acts’.1 Second, the actions of Kosovo’s Liberation Army (a seperatist militia founded in 1996) which, despite its role in resisting the Serbian aggressions, also committed many atrocities against civilians.2 And third, NATO’s 11-week air intervention against Serbia, which failed to minimize civilian casualties, caused a whole scenery of destruction.3

Today, years after its unilateral proclamation of independence, Kosovo remains a puzzle. Over the past two decades the region has been developing processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Though this has mainly been under the supervision of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the parallel European Union mission, EUlex, Kosovo has nevertheless facilitated a growing autonomy.4 Yet, the lack of agreement in regards to what happened during the conflict, the geopolitical interest of certain great powers in the region, the remaining ethnic-religious tensions, and the issues of legitimacy faced by the country at the external and internal levels are putting Kosovo’s peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in a deadlock.

Many of the challenges now encountered by Kosovo mirror the causes of the conflict and/or how it developed. The Kosovo War did not happen solely because of ethnic-religious tensions, but rather as a result of geopolitical and geo-economic interests in place.5 NATO’s intervention occurred without prior authorisation from the UN, making it an illegal aggression against a sovereign state.6 7 Kosovo was the perfect opportunity for NATO, after the fall of the Soviet Union, to reinvent itself from a collective defence alliance to an international security organisation.8 The Kosovo case created the opportunity for NATO to test its capacities of intervention under a high moral legitimisation of stopping the suffering that the people from Kosovo were being subjected to by Milošević’s regime.9 10 After this, Kosovo irremediably became an ally of the United States, forever thankful to the Western world and resentful of those who refused to protect them. In this sense, Kosovo is a crystalised relic of the Cold War confrontation.

Second, and in accordance with  the first point, the peace process taking place in Kosovo is not simply a result of two parties who voluntarily wanted to make peace, but a consequence of a ‘victors’ peace’.11 The Serbian regime, which never wanted to make a truce, was ultimately obliged to due to NATO’s strong military capabilities. The way the war was put to an end naturally created lasting tensions and distrust between the two parties, Kosovo and Serbia. Continuing points of disagreement include the existence of competing narratives about  the conflict,12 lack of agreement in establishing a border between Serbia and Kosovo, mutual impediments to further European integration or to enter other international organisations, ethnic tensions and punctual episodes of violence, and, most notably, other delays in Kosovo’s normalisation and statebuilding.

Third, ethnic tensions and exclusion are still present both between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as in Kosovo at the internal level. Tensions between Albanians and Serbs are often mirrored by incidents of intercommunal hate crime, harassment and obstruction.13 The city of Mitrovica is the mirror of all ethnic divisions, border disagreements, and power-sharing issues.14 Split by the River Ibar, in the South of the city, Kosovar-Albanian people use the Euro and openly exhibit US flags and Albanian symbols. On the Serbian side, the currency is the dinar, the buildings are decorated by Serb and Russian flags, and a mural that states ‘Kosovo is a part of Serbia just as Crimea is a part of Russia’ can also be found. Along with the ethnic polarisation between Albanians and Serbs, the remaining exclusion of other minority communities should equally be mentioned. According to the 2011 census, Kosovo’s minority groups are composed of  1.6% Bosniaks, 1.5% Serbs, 1.1% Turks, 0.9% Ashkali, 0.7% Egyptian, 0.6% Gorani and 0.5% Roma.15 Minority Rights Groups state that since Kosovo’s independence, there has been a lack of attention to protecting Kosovo’s minorities facing social exclusion, discrimination, and lack of political representation.16 Although Kosovo’s political system represents the interests of all ethnic groups, Romans, Ashkali, and Egyptians encounter obstacles when trying to access personal documents, health care, social assistance, and education, which creates polarising effects in the society of this new-born country.17

Legitimacy, both at the external and internal level, seem to be the biggest issues slowing down Kosovo’s progress. Since its independence in 2008, Kosovo has been under a process of statebuilding, focused on creating guarantees of security and stabilisation, the rule of law, and economic and institutional development.18 However, according to experts Oliver Richmond and Gezim Visoka, peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo have been in a permanent struggle between externally set conditions and dynamics of local state formation, and state contestation19. On one hand, it seems that a small political elite aims to maintain domestic stability in exchange for securing external legitimacy at the expense of ignoring other pro-peace social groups’.20 On the other hand, this same domestic stability has revealed itself as quite unstable due to Kosovo’s weak rule of law and judicial system, high levels of corruption, and political stability and credibility being undermined by episodes such as the recent resignation of the Prime Minister Haradinaj as a result of his call to answer for war crimes in The Hague.21 22

At the external level, although 112 states have recognised Kosovo, there is still a significant number of states which refuse such as Spain, Russia, and China. Simultaneously, while Kosovo has become a member of international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and even FIFA, it has not yet become a part of the United Nations, nor the European Union, Interpol, or NATO. Furthermore, even though Kosovo has unilaterally adopted the Euro as its currency and conquered the status of potential candidate for EU integration, such dreams seem more and more unattainable both for internal reasons, such as the lack of agreement with Serbia, and reasons related to the political phase the EU is going through, with enlargements being practically frozen, countries such as Spain opposing any negotiations with Kosovo, and more restrictive immigration policies.23

Kosovo’s deadlock may be explained by matters of internal and external legitimacy. It is clear that geopolitics still get in the way of Kosovo’s recognition and integration into international structures, as well as feed into polarisation, political and ethnic, and contribute to the existence of competing versions of the facts. Simultaneously, internal dynamics of elite-based politics, decision-making impasses, ethnic exclusion, and corruption prevent a widespread internal legitimacy. It is possible that Kosovo would profit more from locally generated peacemaking rather than elite-oriented and externally-influenced liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. Kosovo’s progress utterly depends on breaking the vicious cycle of external reliance the newborn country has entered. Furthering international recognition strictly depends on internal transformations, such as attaining a border agreement with Serbia, strengthening the rule of law, and political and economic stability. Tackling the issue of internal legitimacy will not be successful if Kosovo remains solely dependant on support from the United Nations, donors, and the European Union, rather than generating and utilising local initiatives.24

Sources:

1. Ristic, M., 2012. Dacic Denies His Party’s Role in Balkan Conflicts. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from: https://balkaninsight.com/2012/09/18/dacic-denies-his-party-s-role-in-war-crimes/ [accessed 11/09/2019].2. Human Rights Watch, 2001. Under orders: War Crimes in Kosovo. Retrived from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/10/26/under-orders/war-crimes-kosovo [accessed 14/10/2019].

3. Ibid.

4. De Wet, E., 2009. The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of Eulex. The American Journal of International Law, 103(1), 83-96.

5. Yannis, A., 2009. The politics and geopolitics of the status of Kosovo: the circle is never round. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, 2009, Issue 1-2.

6. Rebelo da Cruz, 2014. O Processo de Paz no Kosovo: Percepções dos Militares do Exército Português no Teatro de Operações. Universidade Aberta.

7. Gromes, T. 2019. A Humanitarian Milestone? NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo and trends in military responses to mass violence. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Report 2/2019, p. 1. Retrived from: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif0219.pdf [accessed 14/10/2019].

8. Roberts, A., 1999. NATO's ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo. Survival, 41:3, 102-123.

9. Gibbs, D., 2011. Kosovo: a template for disaster. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/kosovo-template-for-disaster-libya [accessed 14/10/2019].

10. Severiano Teixeira, N., 2019. A NATO aos 70. Público. Retrieved from: https://www.publico.pt/2019/03/27/mundo/opiniao/nato-70-1866843 [accessed 14/10/2019].

11. Bono, G., 2010. 'The European Union and ‘Supervised Independence’ of Kosovo: A Strategic Solution to the Kosovo/Serbia Conflict?. European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 2, pp. 249–264.

12. Ferati-Sachsenmaier, F., 2018. Reconciliation in the Balkans: Twenty Years after the Yugoslav Wars, What Went Wrong?. 21st Century Global Dynamics. Retrived from: https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/september-2018/reconciliation-balkans-twenty-years-after-yugoslav-wars-what-went-wrong [accessed 14/10/2019].

13. Minority Rights Group. Kosovo: Minorities and Indigenous peoples. Retrived from: https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/ [accessed 14/10/2019].

14. Estadão, 2019. Nos 20 anos da Guerra do Kosovo, tensão étnica ameaça paz nos Balcãs. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from: https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nos-20-anos-da-guerra-do-kosovo-tensao-etnica-ameaca-paz-nos-balcas,70002864039 [accessed 14/10/2019].

15. Minority Rights Group. Kosovo: Minorities and Indigenous peoples. Retrived from: https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/ [accessed 11/10/2019].

16. Ibid.

17. Human Rights Watch (2019) World Report 2019. Serbia/Kosovo: Treatment of Minorities. Retrived from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo [accessed 14/10/2019].

18. Allison, J., 2018. State-building in Kosovo - Challenges of Legitimacy. E-International Relations Students. Retrived from: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/09/state-building-in-kosovo-challenges-of-legitimacy/ [10/09/2019].

19. Richmond, O., Visoka, G., 2017. After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo. International Studies Perspectives, 18, 110-129, p. 111.

20. Idem, p. 113.

21. Transparency International (2014) Kosovo: Overview of Political Corruption. Anti-corruption helpdesk. Providing on-demand research to help fight corruption. European Commission.

22. The Guardian (2019) Kosovo PM resigns before questioning at The Hague. The Guardian. Retrived from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/19/kosovo-pm-resigns-before-questioning-at-the-hague [accessed 14/10/2019].

23. Allison, J. 2018. State-Building in Kosovo – Challenges of Legitimacy. E-International Relations Students. Retrived from: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/09/state-building-in-kosovo-challenges-of-legitimacy/ [accessed 14/10/2019].

24. Richmond, O., Visoka, G., 2017. After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo. International Studies Perspectives, 18, 110-129, p. 112.

Post-Revolution Libya’s Internal State-Building Challenges

The 17 February 2011 Libyan revolution brought a sense of freedom to the Libyan people. Eight years later, the country has erupted into another war, with numerous internal state-building challenges. Many of these challenges are rooted in the Gaddafi regime.

by Shahed Warreth

Libya has become a deeply divided country in the eight years following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Facing many challenges, it has yet to stabilise as warring factions, all interested in ruling, have made it difficult for Libya to find peace, thereby plunging the country into a civil war. Libya is split between the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Council of Deputies. Libya’s current issues, such as this divide, stem from Gaddafi’s reign. In order to understand the challenges that the country faces, we must first understand the foundations of fear, tyranny, and corruption it was built on prior to the revolution.

Prior to the Gaddafi era, Libya was a federal monarchy with three distinct provinces between 1951-1963: Tripolitania to the northwest; Cyrenaica, also known as Barqa, in the east; and Fezzan in the southwest.[1] The federal form of governance was soon abolished, and with it the three provinces were re-structured into baladiyat. The 1969 coup d’état led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi brought with it a new way of arranging the country, the latest version being the 22 shabiyat established in 2007.

As a result of Gaddafi’s coup, the once stable and progressive monarchy transformed into a dictatorship distinctly lacking infrastructure and institutions.[2]Under Gaddafi’s oppressive regime, there was a sense of powerlessness felt among the Libyan people. This includes the torture, imprisonment, and murder of anyone who opposed Gaddafi’s regime, including those living abroad.[3] When Gaddafi’s security state finally collapsed in 2011, it left a ‘huge political vacuum’ that multiple forces are competing to fill without any overall sense of direction’.[4]

The 2011 revolution gave the Libyan people a sense of freedom but brought about another set of problems, one of which is ethnic divisions. There was and remains a strong sense of tribalism in Libya compared to its neighbouring countries[5]. During his reign, Gaddafi attempted to diminish tribal importance and influence by pitting tribes against each other and adopting an ideology of pan-Arab Nationalism[6]. Gaddafi then used these tribes to reassert his power. Nepotism was bountiful as loyal tribes were given high ranking government jobs, while others were sidelined.[7] Furthermore, tribal loyalty to the regime was used to undermine the military. In post-revolution Libya where ‘the state is traumatically absent’, tribes offer a form of social protection that the state has failed to provide[8].

After several attempts by the military to overthrow Gaddafi, a new security force was created, the leaders of which were Gaddafi loyalists. They fought for Gaddafi during the revolution, while many generals and soldiers defected.[9]The tribal mindset and way of leading can still be found in post-revolution Libya. This in turn led to the instability and chaos that Libya is facing today. In contrast, neighbouring Tunisia has become relatively stable. This is due to the strong military presence in the country, something which Gaddafi failed to provide in order to strengthen his control. Had there been a strong and unified military after the revolution, Libya may have become a united country without militias and numerous parties vying for power. By segregating the populace, Gaddafi played on his influence so he could remain in power. He exploited tribal differences and pitted them against each other, thereby inadvertently enabling these differences to exist even today.

The rebel forces of the revolution were also divided, and militias were and remain to be plentiful. Instead of establishing an army, the government has instead hired these militias to enforce order.[10] No job prospects or access to training may motivate some to join militias,[11]meaning these militias are a hotbed of the unemployed. Libya has suffered from a high unemployment rate both before and after the revolution, particularly among youths.[12] While different sources give different estimates for the unemployment rate in Libya, the International Labour Organization estimates that the total unemployment rate was 17.6% in 2010, 19.6% in 2011, and 17.3% in 2018.[13] The lack of jobs, and prospects of a bleak future forces youths into a life of militias and violence. In a society where there is low cash flow and no unemployment benefits, some Libyans see this as their only option. There is a societal expectation in Libya for men to be the primary breadwinners, thereby creating a societal pressure to remain employed, even if it means joining a militia. Those who are educated are also unemployed as many graduates lack the necessary skills across different industries and sectors.

Libya’s economy is heavily dependent on public sector employment, and hydrocarbons, with the latter accounting for 95% of exports in 2013. However, oil exports have decreased, and the economy has fluctuated greatly since 2011, some years being the fastest growing economy in the world, while other years being the slowest.[14]Without the revenue it generates, the government cannot provide a sufficient number of jobs in order to steer its citizens away from a life of militias. Ironically, it is these militias, along with the Libyan National Army (LNA), who have largely seized control of the oil production.[15]

Another obstacle that Libya must overcome is the lack of a coherent government. The National Transitional Council (NTC) of the revolution left Libyans unsatisfied, and was ineffective in quashing the militia problem.[16] Their successors, the General National Congress (GNC), also failed to govern effectively yet have refused to step down.[17] Neither have been successful in drawing up a constitution, disarming the militias, and forming a unified army. Moreover, the GNC formed 99 new baladiyat after the revolution, which later grew to 108. However, in 2012, the Cyrenaica Transitional Council (CTC) was formed. Renamed in October 2013 to the Council of Cyrenaica in Libya (CCL), the CCL declared Cyrenaica an autonomous province, bringing the old divisions back to the forefront.[18]

Though the GNA and the Presidential Council (PC) to the west of Libya are recognised internationally as the legitimate government, they have not gained the support of the Council of Deputies and the House of Representatives (HoR) to the east.[19] The Council of Deputies does however back the LNA, headed by General Khalifa Haftar who had previously served in Gaddafi’s army but later tried to overthrow him, and who’s military has now expanded into southern Libya.[20] However, it is clear that both governments ‘may actually be in a worse position than that enjoyed by [Gaddafi, whose] militias and military forces were loyal to him; the militias in Libya today answer to themselves and secondarily to their paymaster government’.[21] Rather than coming together in order to rebuild the country, they have instead chosen to fight for power and control and, in the case of the militias, to push their Islamist agenda.

Eight years after the revolution, Libya remains in conflict, with many of the challenges largely stemming from its past. After 42 years of living under a dictatorship, the Libyan people are once again living in a time of oppression and fear. The mindset of the Gaddafi era is still present throughout Libya; the struggle for dominance and power can still be found between warring factions looking to control the country and its resources. Post-revolution Libya has seen the rise of federalism as the citizens are fearful that if one government rules, the country will revert to old ways.[22] While the country has been liberated from Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, it has been plunged into a never-ending conflict. It is clear that there is more to do in order to obtain peace and security in such a turbulent nation.

Sources:

[1] Pack, J. and Barfi, B. (2012) In War’s Wake: The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 11;

Pusztai, W. (2016). ‘Does Federalism Have a Future in Libya?’ Atlantic Council, 22 August. Available from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/does-federalism-have-a-future-in-libya.

[2] Fitzgerald, F., and Megerisi, T. (2015) Libya: Whose Land Is It? Property Rights and Transition. London: Legatum Institute. Available at: https://www.li.com/activities/publications/libya-whose-land-is-it;

St. John, R.B. (2012) Libya: From Colony to Revolution. Oxford: One World Publications.

[3] Diana, E. (2014) ‘“Literary Springs” in Libyan Literature: Contributions of Writers to the Country’s Emancipation’, Middle East Critique, 23(4), pp. 444.

[4] Randall, E. (2013) ‘After Qadhafi: Development and Democratization in Libya’, The Middle East Journal, 69(2), p. 210.

[5] Randall, 2013;

Cherstich, I. (2014), ‘When Tribesmen do not act Tribal: Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia)’, Middle East Critique, 23(4), pp. 405-421;

Meijer, R. (2015) Citizenship Rights and the Arab Uprisings: Foundation for a New Political Order in the Middle and North Africa. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 4.

[6] El-Katiri, M. (2012) State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya. Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, p. 11.

Fitzgerald and Megerisi, 2015.

[7] St. John, 2012;

Geha, C. (2016). Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

[8] Cherstich, 2014.

[9] St. John, (2012); Gaub, F. (2013) ‘The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(2), p. 235.

[10] Larémont, R.R. (2013) ‘After the Fall of Qaddafi: Political, Economic, and Security Consequences for Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2), http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bq;

Roumani, J. (2014) ‘Libya on the Brink: Insecurity, Localism, and the State Not Back In’, Middle East Institute, 12 March. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/libya-brink-insecurity-localism-and-state-not-back.

[11] Mezran, K. (2013) ‘A Holistic Approach to Security in Libya’, Atlantic Council, 10 July. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-holistic-approach-to-security-in-libya.

[12] El-Katiri, 2012, p.7.

[13] International Labour Organization (2018) ‘Key Indicators of the Labour Market: Unemployment Rate – ILO modelled estimates’, International LAbour Organization, November. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/ilostat-home.

[14] Larémont, 2013;

Mattes, H. (2014) ‘Rebuilding the National-Security Forces in Libya’, Middle East Policy, 21(2), p. 97;

Fitzgerald and Megerisi, 2015;

MENA-OECD Economic Resilience Task Force (2018) Country case study: Building economic resilience in Lebanon and Libya, p. 34. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/ERTF-Jeddah-2018-Background-note-Case-studies-Lebanon-and-Libya.pdf;

International Monetary Fund (2018) World Economic Outlook: Real GDP Growth (Libya). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/LBY.

[15] Chivvis, C.S. and Martini, J. 2014. Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation;

El Wardany, S. ‘Libya Oil Boss: Biggest Field Won't Restart Until Militia Leaves’, Bloomberg, 25 February. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-25/libya-oil-boss-biggest-field-won-t-restart-until-militia-leaves;

Assad, A. (2019) ‘From Abu Dhabi, Libyan officials announce lifting force majeure on Sharara oilfield’, The Libya Observer, 26 February. Available at: https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/abu-dhabi-libyan-officials-announce-lifting-force-majeure-sharara-oilfield;

Lacher, W. (2019) ‘Libya’s Conflicts Enter a Dangerous New Phase’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comment No. 8, February. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libyas-conflicts-enter-a-dangerous-new-phase/.

[16] El-Katiri, 2012; Achcar, G. (2016) Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Uprising. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

[17] Roumani, 2014.

[18] Kane, S. (2012). ‘Federalism and fragmentation in Libya? Not so fast…’ Foreign Policy, 20 March. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/20/federalism-and-fragmentation-in-libya-not-so-fast/;

Pack, J. (2012). ‘Federalism in Libya: Tried and failed’, Al Jazeera, 20 April. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241871355584880.html.

[19] Fitzgerald, M. (2016) ‘Libya’s Worsening Turmoil – Bad for Everyone’, Global Geneva, 20 October. Available at: https://www.global-geneva.com/libyas-worsening-turmoil-bad-for-everyone/;

Toaldo, M. (2016) ‘A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players: Political Actors’, European Council on foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.

[20] Lacher, 2019.

[21] Larémont, 2013, p.2.

[22] Geha, 2016; Mattes, 2014; Roumani, 2014.