Rohingya refugees are among the most persecuted ethnic groups in the world. Over the last two decades, the Rohingya people have been systematically persecuted by Myanmar's military and the local Buddhist monks. Due to the influence of Russia and China, The UN Security Council has thus far failed to take decisive action against Myanmar’s consistent human rights violations in the Rakhine State against the Rohingya people. If the international community continues to ignore the Rohingya crisis on the basis of individual states’ internal affairs, then the situation risks devolving into a crisis on the scale of Rwanda.
Preventing mass atrocities was the founding objective of the United Nations (UN). Since its establishment, the UN has enacted various international humanitarian laws aimed to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity[1]. The UN also passed laws like ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, and established political commitments such as ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), which establishes a code of rights directing states to protect individuals within and beyond their borders. It is the responsibility of individual states as well as the international community to uphold these laws to prevent mass atrocities. Nevertheless, at the time of implementation, participants in the assembly refrained from incorporating the word ‘genocide’ in the humanitarian crisis legislation in order to avoid moral and legal condemnation against states who fail to intervene[2]. When a crisis does not serve strategic interests, foreign states are usually reluctant to interfere in the internal matters of another country. Human rights abuses typically result in nothing beyond states formally condemning the perpetrators and distributing humanitarian aid to the victims[3]. A meaningful intervention requires financial support, troops, and military resources. States, both individually and as a collective, typically decide against deploying such resources absent any major perceived benefit from intervention.
American statesman, George Kennan, argued that diplomatic and political support are employed only when they serve the states’ own interest, without considering the moral implications[4]. The difference in the international response towards the Rwandan genocide and the Bosnian genocide is a good example of this. NATO conducted airstrikes in concert with United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) under the mandate of United Nations in 1994 and 1995 to stop massacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina[5]. However, at the same time in 1994, the United States, Belgium, France, and others ignored the Rwandan genocide where 800,000 people were slaughtered within 100 days[6][7]. Additionally, it is difficult to evaluate the full extent of atrocities due to restricted access to affected areas. International laws and established norms are very important for the protection of human beings, but states are rarely obliged to follow them. Moreover, the principle of the R2P has not yet been fully actioned since R2P is neither a law nor a legally binding framework. UN member states remain at odds regarding under which cases this principle should be applied. The division between great powers in the Security Council underlies this gridlock.
The United States, United Kingdom, and France see mass atrocities as a threat to international stability. On the other hand, Russia and China continue to promote absolute state sovereignty above R2P, though they vocalize their agreement with the R2P principles[8]. The Myanmar government has ignored the calls of the international community and continue to receive political and military support from countries like China and Russia. In 2007, China and Russia vetoed the first ever Burma resolution to stop attacks on ethnic minorities, to release political prisoners including Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and to allow humanitarian organizations into the country. It was the first multiple state veto since 1989[9]. China and Russia argued that the situation in Myanmar was not a threat to peace and security. In addition, they argued that the Security Council is not an appropriate venue for discussing other state’s internal affairs. China and Russia have consistently used their veto power against the UN Security Council and General Assembly initiatives in order to prevent intervention in Myanmar. In March 2017, China and Russia blocked a Security Council meeting to discuss the situation in Rakhine State[10]. Moreover, the UN resolution on Myanmar to permit aid workers, safeguard the return of all refugees, and grant full citizenship to the Rohingya was also opposed by China, Russia, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Vietnam, Belarus, Syria, and Zimbabwe[11]. Experts predict that China and Russia will veto the draft resolution on Myanmar which requires nine votes without any vetoes by the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China in order to pass. China, however, failed to stop the Security Council briefing that accused Myanmar’s military of genocide against Rohingya Muslims and urged pressuring Myanmar to put an end to human rights abuses[12].
Presently, China and Russia continue to provide political support to Myanmar. For instance, both countries recently voted against the UN Third Committee’s draft resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar[13]. China is interested in increasing its presence in Myanmar to constrain Western influence because of its economic and strategic objectives and Beijing’s long term strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, China is seeking to increase its presence in the Bay of Bengal by building ports in territorial waters of countries in the South Asian coastal region. China is the biggest investor in Myanmar, and is looking to build a seaport in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State[14]. Moreover, China wants to develop its southwestern region, which shares a common border with Myanmar. It is easier and more cost effective for China to use Myanmar’s port and territory to develop this region. In 2007, Reuters reported that China was looking to take a stake of up to 85% of strategically important seaports in Myanmar for its One Belt, One Road initiative[15].
Russian interest in Myanmar is related to arms sales, and, more importantly, as a potential source of gas reserves, a resource for which Russia is also a major producer. The Russian oil company Bashneft has invested US $38.3 millions in a central Myanmar oil field[16]. Moscow is one of the main sources of arms for the Myanmar military, particularly advanced weapons[17]. Myanmar signed a contract with Russia in 2018 for the purchase of six Sukhoi Su-30 SM multirole advanced fighter jets worth $38.3 million[18]. Moreover, Russia views Myanmar as its entry point in a pivot to Asia and a gateway to expanding Moscow’s presence in Southeast Asia[19]. Southeast Asia is becoming a strategically important region for economic and military power, while Myanmar’s geographical location offers land connectivity with East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia. The rise of China in this region challenges the security of ASEAN countries and the US military presence. Therefore, Russia seeks to serve as a potential counterweight through its relations with countries like Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia[20]. Furthermore, Western economic sanctions on Russia due to the annexation of Ukraine intensify Russian focus on Southeast Asian countries like Myanmar as a means to balance its economic and political partners. In a geopolitical context, Russia and China support each other and are seeking to create a bloc against US-led Western initiatives. On the other hand, as a regional and neighboring power, India also supports Myanmar because it shares a large eastern border. In this way, India shares a strategic interest with China because Myanmar is a good source of natural resources, and geopolitical connection for India.
Finally, Myanmar’s constitutional reform in 2008 remodeled the state into an “eye wash democracy”, a governmental system appearing democratic on the surface that is actually undemocratic. Myanmar remains under strong military rule wherein the military maintains complete autonomy in matters of defense, security, and foreign relations[21]. In addition, prior to 2011, during the five decades of the authoritarian regime and the implementation of the current democratic facade, Myanmar’s military controlled its economy, resources, political system and foreign relations. Therefore, the military remains a prominent political actor in the minds of Myanmar’s civilian population. For that reason, military action against minority groups tends to be supported by most Buddhists citizens. Moreover, Buddhist monks, including the civilian leadership in the government, consistently spread propaganda against Rohingya Muslims[22]. As a result, most of Myanmar’s citizens support the attack on the Rohingya. Nevertheless, it is imperative to view the Rohingya case in terms of the international community’s, especially the UN Security Council’s, R2P. If the R2P was applicable in the cases of Kosovo and Darfur, then it should be invoked in the case of Myanmar. In Kosovo, NATO commissioned airstrikes without a Security Council mandate nor the UNSC resolution 1769 for the deployment of UN and AMIS troops to end violence and mass killings in Darfur[23][24]. The international division within the council may hamper the process, but if the Security Council continues to ignore this genocide on the grounds of state sovereignty, then the it is likely to result in a crisis on the scale of Rwanda.
Sources
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