After the breakout of the civil war, Libya’s fragmented political landscape led to internal partitions and the rise of two political establishments, in addition to other armed militias. In the ongoing conflict, all belligerent parts are fighting for the control of oil, among other things. More specifically, Libya’s hydrocarbon sector has long been a magnet for non-state groups such as armed militias and even terrorist organisations, which are trying to gain control over oil facilities with the purpose of gaining political power and capitalising on illicit oil smuggling. This paper aims to delve into the role of oil in the Libyan crisis, by briefly investigating what sort of political outcomes each belligerent faction would obtain by control of oil facilities.
By Elisa Marra
In addition to being an economic instrument, oil is also a political one. In comparison with other war-torn countries, Libya owns the largest crude oil reserves in Africa. The hydrocarbons sector is the country’s main source of income. As the African Development Bank reports, ‘over 2014-18, the oil, gas, and related extractive sectors accounted for more than 65% of GDP, more than 95% of export earnings, and 96% of the budget.’ [1] In Libya, petroleum turned out to be the most powerful factor dictating the dynamics of the political crisis. Indeed, the abundance of hydrocarbons had always been used as a powerful tool to control tensions derived from the country’s intricate social fabric. [2] However, the importance of oil in the Libyan political crisis became especially tangible after the outbreak of the civil war and the country’s partition into seperate spheres of influence. Evidently, the various factions realised that whoever controls oil also holds political power. Therefore, the unstoppable battle for dominance of energy sources became one of the principal disputes in the conflict, involving not only the two official administrations, – the Government of National Accord and the House of Representatives backed by the Libyan National Army – but also a series of armed militias and non-state actors who seek to take advantage of the fragmented political landscape. [3]
To understand the role of oil in the Libyan crisis, it is necessary to clarify the current fragmentation into different spheres of influence, as well as the country’s politics more generally. Galvanised by the outbreak of revolutions in neighbouring Arab countries, in 2011 the Libyan population revolted against long-reigning dictator Muammar Gaddafi. However, the revolution soon morphed into a bloody civil war, which not only led to Gaddafi’s death, but also divided the already socially ruptured country into different areas of influence. Nowadays, Libya is divided into two main regions: the Tripoli-based United Nations (UN)-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Fayez al-Serraj, which controls western Libya; and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, in control of eastern and central Libya and supported by the Libyan National Army (LNA). The latter is an anti-Islamist armed group led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a retired Gaddafi-era general. Moreover, a series of armed militias are belligerent actors as well. Among them are the Benghazi Defence Brigades, revolutionary Islamic fighters opposing the LNA, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. [4]
Gaddafi’s fall broke the previous status quo of resource distribution, and thus control of oil created tensions and conflict among all these factions. [5] The reason is found in the inevitable interdependence between the hydrocarbon sector and Libyan politics. First, some academics, such as Chivvis and Martini, argue that Libya is a victim of the ‘Resource Curse’: a theory according to which countries rich in natural resources tend to have less democratic regimes and lower economic growth. [6] According to the oil or resource curse theory, authoritarianism or even the collapse of the state are much more likely to occur in a country rich in hydrocarbons, and especially when this sector is controlled by the state. Reliance on extractive industry may stimulate the spread of corruption or even lead to state capture by individuals or groups. Secondly, lack of security, political turbulence, and violence allowed terrorist groups and armed militias to take control of multiple oil production facilities, therefore impeding economic stabilisation. [7]
Undoubtedly, all belligerent factions are fighting for control of fuels as revenue sources. More notably, as Jason Pack argues, ‘it is not much of an oversimplification to state that the Libyan militias themselves are fighting primarily over money.’ [8] First and foremost, oil represents yet another factor of conflict between Haftar and Serraj. In particular, Haftar is unable to capitalise on the oil facilities controlled by the LNA, since the majority of international companies only negotiate with the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC). Therefore, the GNA obtains the majority of the revenues. [9] However, the mounting economic crisis represents a major challenge for the government of Tripoli, which is unable to pay salaries. Although this might seem an irrelevant detail, it is important to understand why factions are competing for the control of fuels. The government’s inability to pay salaries to employees might play significantly into the hands of armed militias. Indeed, if the government fails to provide a significant form of prestige and social positions, rebels may consider the alternative of joining other armed militias or even terrorist organisations. Ultimately, this might contribute to the strengthening of already powerful non-state actors, who may succeed in controlling significant territories. [10]
The fragmented political landscape has indeed already provided non-state groups with the chance to become stronger. Since the outbreak of the conflict, these groups have attempted to consolidate their control over economic sectors, primarily that of energy. What are the reasons for this? First and foremost, as previously explained, controlling fuel implies gaining political power. Blocking a pipeline or even being able to control an oil reservoir is a successful political instrument. The reasons for these blockages range from political demands, to extortion in exchange for money or prisoners, to instruments aimed at debilitating the opponent. [11] In addition, the control of oil terminals represents a source of revenue for non-state actors. Terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State have increasingly attacked oil and gas infrastructures. Undoubtedly, the group is seeking a way to increase its income through illicit activities, and more specifically the Islamic State is seeking to profit from oil and gas smuggling, just as it has done in Iraq and Syria. [12] Therefore, by gaining control over the oil sector, these non-state actors are not only able to leverage the smuggling of fuels, but they would also gain in strength and political power.
In conclusion, Libya’s wealth seems to represent a curse, rather than a blessing. Indeed, the country’s abundance of hydrocarbons has not only prevented its economic stabilisation and the development of its democratic institutions, but has also played a significant role in the continuing bloody conflict. Certainly, control over hydrocarbons represents one, or even the main, factor pitting the belligerent factions against one another. Furthermore, dominance over oil facilities and infrastructure is also tempting for armed militias and terrorist organisations, which aim at gaining control over the fuel sector for much the same reasons as other belligerents. Against this background, Libya’s dependence on hydrocarbons represents a significant challenge to stability in the years to come.
Sources
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[2] Marinone, Lorenzo. ‘Il Ruolo Del Petrolio Nella Crisi Libica.’ RIENERGIA, 2018. [Online] available from: rienergia.staffettaonline.com/articolo/33103/Il+ruolo+del+petrolio+nella+crisi+libica/Marinone. Accessed 27th November 2020.
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[3] Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020. [Online] available from: https://atalayar.com/en/blog/war-libya-and-its-oil-resources-order-inside-chaos. Accessed 25th November 2020.
[4] Wehrey, Frederic. Introduction. ‘This War Is Out of Our Hands’ in The Internationalization of Libya’s Post-2011 Conflicts From Proxies to Boots on the Ground. New America, 2020, pp. 7–11. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26366.4.
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[5] Wehrey, p.10.
[6] Chivvis, Christopher and Martini, Jeffrey. ‘Economic Stabilization and the Oil Economy.’ in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 53–64. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt6wq7w7.11
[7] ‘Oil and Gas in the new Libyan Era: Conflict and Continuity’. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2019. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Oil-and-Gas-in-a-New-Libyan-Era-Conflict-and-Continuity-MEP-22.pdf
[8] Pack, Jason. ‘How Libya’s economic structures enrich the militias’. Middle East Institute, 2019. https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-libyas-economic-structures-enrich-militias
[9] See Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020.
[10] See Chivvis, Christopher and Martini, Jeffrey. ‘Economic Stabilization and the Oil Economy.’ in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future.
[11] See Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020.
[12] ‘Extremist Groups’ in LIBYA, EXTREMISM, & THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLLAPSE. Soufan Group, 2016, pp. 11–15. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10785.9.
Geiger, Julianne. ‘Can ISIS gain power over Libya’s Oil?’ USA Today Money. Online available from: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/mon ey/markets/2016/01/16/can-isis-gain-power-over-libyas-oil/78873374/ . Accessed 27th November 2020.