India’s development of a ballistic missile system is threatening the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. To regain its credibility, Pakistan is improving its nuclear arsenal, quantitatively and qualitatively, which might lead to an arms race. Additionally, a more developed Indian BMD system would incentivise both India and Pakistan to conduct a nuclear first strike during a conflict.
Author: Buster N. Hartvigsen
No other nuclear dyad is as conflict-prone as the Indo-Pakistani. The development of India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system does little to change that. Quite to the contrary, it increases the chance of inadvertent nuclear escalation as well as fostering a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.
India’s ballistic missile defence system and Pakistani concerns
New Delhi’s rationale for developing a BMD system can be found in its neighbours' actions and capabilities. Nuclear-armed Pakistan to the west and nuclear-armed and conventionally superior China to the north, both whom India has poor relationships with, have caused uneasiness amongst the Indian leadership. The fear of an unexpected nuclear first strike sparked India’s interest in a BMD system [1].
However, the development of a BMD system, despite its technological infancy and minimal coverage, has raised concerns in Islamabad about the credibility of its own nuclear deterrent. Because of the imbalanced conventional power distribution between the two states, Pakistan uses its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against Indian conventional aggression [2]. But as the Indian BMD system matures, it raises the probability that it will be able to intercept a portion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons successfully. In and of itself, this capability does not threaten the credibility of the Pakistani arsenal. However, the BMD system, combined with a potential Indian nuclear first strike, thereby destroying a sizeable part of Islamabad’s arsenal before its missiles could be launched, could jeopardise the Pakistani deterrent by removing its second-strike capability.
The fear of an Indian nuclear first strike instils a qualitatively different fear in Islamabad since it could potentially nullify the threat of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Currently, the biggest threat to the Indo-Pakistani crisis stability is a mature and effective Indian BMD system [3]. If Pakistan's second-strike capability loses its credibility in the eyes of India's leadership, then mutually assured destruction is no longer guaranteed, and an Indian first-strike is incentivised. Consequently, the development of a mature BMD system will accentuate the fears in Islamabad that India could undertake a pre-emptive strike under the cover of its missile shield [4]. Hence, Pakistan fears that the credibility of its nuclear weapons is diminished since its strategic nuclear weapons might not cause harm to the Indian population, which negates their deterrent effect. Furthermore, Islamabad fears that New Delhi would use that lack of a Pakistani nuclear deterrent to alter the status quo by initiating a conventional conflict.
While India is, in general, content with the status quo between the two states, the issue of Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism is a thorn in the side of New Delhi. During a conflict akin to the 2001-2002 standoff after the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terror attacks on the Indian Parliament or the 2008 mobilisation following the Lashkar-e-Taiba terror attack on Mumbai, an Indian BMD system could provide the Indian leadership with a sense of security needed to conduct a conventional attack into Pakistan. India's Cold Start Doctrine, which aims to make rapid incursions into Pakistan without triggering its nuclear red lines [5], will involve significantly less risk if a BMD system is in effect. However, the Indian system is still in its infancy and thus unreliable, rendering this a long-term scenario whose realisation solely depends on the pace with which the Indian BMD program matures.
Eroding credibility and first-strike incentives
In the short term, while an Indian first strike or conventional attack seems unlikely, India’s BMD program has still destabilised the relationship. Although the Pakistani nuclear deterrent might be credible at present, Pakistani leadership cannot be certain that it will remain so in the future. Hence, it is dissatisfied with the slow erosion of its nuclear deterrent’s credibility. The development of BMD systems is exceedingly expensive and technologically complicated, so while it might have been the tit-for-tat response to an Indian BMD system, it is not feasible for Pakistan. Instead, in an attempt to secure the survivability of its second-strike capability, it has decided to expand its nuclear arsenal and improve its means of delivering its warheads to counter the Indian BMD system. These improvements include the completion of the nuclear triad by developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent, the development of nuclear-capable cruise missiles, and fitting multiple nuclear warheads onto its missiles. These developments either aim to increase the survivability of the Pakistani deterrent by hiding it at sea, or to circumvent the Indian BMD system by flying underneath it or by saturating its missile interceptors with multiple warheads [6]. In true arms race fashion, these qualitative improvements of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal have created a reaction in New Delhi, acquiring the Russian S-400 air defence system aimed at countering the cruise missile threat [7]. This action-reaction response will likely continue as both arsenals and countermeasures are improved.
In the long term, as the Indian BMD system matures and its effectiveness and coverage increase, so does the chance of inadvertent escalation. Pakistan sees its nuclear arsenal as its guarantee against India's conventional superiority, and losing it would be detrimental to its sense of security. Hence, as the effectiveness of the Indian BMD system increases over time, the credibility of the Pakistani second-strike capability decreases. This incentivises Islamabad to go first if it fears India might attempt a first strike, placing Pakistani leadership in a 'use them or lose them' dilemma [8]. While there is little evidence to suggest that New Delhi is changing its doctrine from its no-first-use to one of first-use, it is inherently irrelevant for Pakistan whether it does or not. Per its nature, a no-first-use cannot be confirmed a priori; it will always be just a pledge [9]. In other words, Pakistani perception of India's intention is key, but their information on India's preferences will always be incomplete and influenced by decades of hostilities. While India might have many defensive-natured reasons for developing its BMD system, Islamabad perceives it as anything but benign.
Deterrence is more likely to fail when a dyad's distribution of credibility of the nuclear threat becomes increasingly asymmetric. When only one side has a secure second-strike capability, deterrence will likely fail [10]. The most likely cause of inadvertent escalation lies in New Delhi and Islamabad's perception of the effectiveness of the Indian BMD system. If their perception differs, then there are grounds for escalation. Incidents such as the accidental launch of an Indian cruise missile into Pakistan in 2022 could, during a conflict, be misperceived as the start of an Indian first-strike attack, thus triggering a nuclear escalation [11]. Without mutually assured destruction, any sign of the other side going first can cause the other side to pull the trigger.
Conclusion
While the development of India’s BMD system is viewed as defensive in New Delhi, it is viewed as a threat in Islamabad, which significantly impacts the stability of the nuclear dyad. As the BMD system improves its ability to intercept missiles, it will negatively impact the credibility of the Pakistani nuclear deterrent. This is detrimental to Pakistan’s national security, as it relies on its nuclear arsenal to protect itself against its conventionally superior neighbour. In an effort to counter the Indian BMD system, Pakistan has improved its nuclear arsenal, which, in turn, has made India invest in an additional BMD system. Thus, there are signs of an arms race slowly revving up between the two states.
As the Indian BMD system matures, it will erode the Pakistani nuclear deterrent’s credibility, which will increase the probability of inadvertent nuclear escalation during a conflict. If Islamabad believes that New Delhi is capable of launching a splendid first strike with the help of its BMD system, then it will be put in a situation where it feels that it can either use its nuclear weapons in a first strike or lose them to an Indian first strike. On the other hand, India’s leadership might feel so secure about its ability to defend against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons that it will be emboldened to attack Pakistani territory conventionally, especially after another terror attack. Ultimately, despite its defensive intentions, the Indian BMD system is exacerbating existing tensions and insecurities, leading to a more volatile and unpredictable security environment in the region.
