Abraham Accords: Past, Present, and Future

Abstract

        The Abraham Accords, normalisation agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Sudan, and Bahrain, were one of the cornerstones of Donald Trump’s Middle East policy in his first term. Now that he has returned to the White House, the administration is eager to expand them. Saudi Arabia and Syria are viewed as likely candidates to join the Accords. While the first agreements in many ways fell short of expectations, there is reason to believe Washington will push for their expansion over the next four years.

BY ALFRYD VAN BRUGGEN

editor: Lydia Hanna

Introduction

   Donald Trump views the Abraham Accords as the most significant policy achievement of his first term, even going so far as to suggest he could win a Nobel Peace Prize because of it [1]. Even amongst their detractors, the significance of the Accords is widely recognised. It should be no surprise that Trump seeks to expand upon them in his second term, making frequent references to bringing new states into the Abraham Accords. A firm grasp of the history, implications, and potential future of the Abraham Accords is therefore an invaluable asset to understanding the politics of the Middle East over the next four years.

The Abraham Accords of 2020

        On September 15 2020, Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates signed a joint statement declaring their intent to establish friendly relations with one another. Morocco and Sudan echoed similar sentiments a few days later [2]. By doing so, these countries became the first Arab states to normalise relations with Israel since Jordan in 1994. It also marked the abandonment of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, in which every member of the Arab League pledged to only collectively normalise relations with Israel once an independent Palestinian state was established [3]. The signatories of the Abraham Accords decided that prioritising their own national interests was more important than resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict [4].

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE signed the Abraham Accords to achieve closer security and economic cooperation with Israel and the United States. They had hoped that normalisation would facilitate Abu Dhabi acquiring US-manufactured F-35 stealth fighters and MQ-9 Reaper drones [2]. At the time of writing, negotiations for these aircraft have stalled; it remains uncertain if the UAE will attempt to reopen negotiations with the new Trump administration [5]. However, the Emirates have acquired Israeli-made Barak aerial-defence systems, signifying Israeli-Emirati military cooperation [6]. A realm that more closely matches the expectations of the UAE is economics. The two countries have signed numerous agreements promoting free trade, visa-free travel, and new trading routes. These deals have persisted even through Abu Dhabi’s condemnation of Israel’s prosecution of the Gaza war [3]. While trade of Israeli and Emirati goods remains small, the UAE’s status as a hub of global finance allows it to facilitate trade between Israel and countries in Asia [2]. The I2U2 agreement between Israel, the UAE, India, and the United States demonstrates the value of the Abraham Accords for Abu Dhabi [3].

Morocco

        Morocco’s primary motivation for signing the Abraham Accords was obtaining recognition of its occupation in Western Sahara. Morocco’s control over Western Sahara has long been deemed illegal by the international community. Rabat hoped that by normalising its relations with Israel, Washington and Tel Aviv could grant legitimacy to their control of the territory and potentially spur more countries into following suit [7]. So far, no other countries have done so; however, both France and Spain have signalled their support for resolving the conflict in favour of Morocco’s position [8]. This shift is likely influenced by America’s recognition as part of the Abraham Accords, exemplifying their significance.

        Beyond recognition of Western Sahara, Moroccan-Israeli cooperation has been limited. While the countries have engaged in security and economic cooperation, the extent of these agreements is relatively small, especially in the wake of the Gaza war [3]. Morocco was also responsible for the effective breakdown of the Negev forum, an attempt to further cooperation between Israel and the Arab states which had normalised relations, by continually postponing meetings in protest of Israeli settlements in the West Bank [2].

Sudan

        Sudan is unique among the signatories of the Abraham Accords because it has not yet normalised relations with Israel, despite committing to do so in 2020 [3]. The ongoing civil war and lack of a stable government have made this process difficult. Consequently, little economic or security cooperation has occurred. Sudan’s main motivation for signing the Accords was sanction relief. In exchange for signing, the US removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, allowing desperately needed aid into the country [7]. Normalisation with Israel had more support in Sudan than in any other Arab country [9]. Nonetheless, the future of Sudanese-Israeli relations remains uncertain.

Bahrain

        While Bahrain and Israel have engaged in intelligence and commercial cooperation, this is limited by Bahrain’s small population [2]. The true significance of Bahrain’s normalisation with Israel lies in its implications for Saudi Arabia. Bahrain’s monarchy is closely tied to that of Saudi Arabia. Without Saudi military intervention, the Bahraini government likely would have been overthrown during the Arab Spring [10]. Manama would never have taken such a drastic step of normalising relations with Israel without the approval of Riyadh; their participation in the Accords was a signal from Saudi Arabia that they were open to closer ties with Tel Aviv.

The Future of the Abraham Accords

        The Biden administration sought to build on the momentum of the Abraham Accords by pushing for a normalisation deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel [11]. This effort was thwarted, at least for the time being, by October 7th and Israel’s response [3]. Ignoring the question of Palestine became much more difficult for the Arab states. Nonetheless, the second Trump administration is eager to expand the Abraham Accords [11]. Two countries in particular, Saudi Arabia and Syria, are likely to be the focus of this effort.

Saudi Arabia

        Donald Trump has definitively declared that Saudi Arabia will join the Abraham Accords [12]. While this appears far from certain, it remains a distinct possibility. Riyadh is keen to increase relations with Israel for both geopolitical and economic reasons. Saudi Arabia remains concerned about Iran; closer security cooperation with Israel may assuage these fears [2]. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also knows that his country is on borrowed time; if they cannot diversify their economy away from its oil dependency, the global green energy transition risks seriously undermining Saudi stability. Israel’s technological expertise and developed economy would be well suited to helping this endeavour [3].

        However, normalisation would be a risky move for Saudi Arabia. Public opinion towards Israel has soured even further since October 7th. The Saudi government has officially labelled Israel’s actions in Gaza as genocide and now conditions any further negotiations on the establishment of a Palestinian state, reversing their pre-war position [11]. Establishing relations with Israel in this context would insight severe domestic and international backlash. Additionally, the weakening of Iran’s proxy network and the Saudi-Iranian détente have robbed normalisation of its urgency [3]. Signing the Abraham Accords may very well weaken Saudi security more than strengthen it.

Syria

        Syria’s new government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, has signalled its potential willingness to join the Abraham Accords [1]. This would be a shocking move for an Islamist militant whose nom de guerre, al-Golani, is a reference to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Nonetheless, there are several reasons why Damascus might seek to normalise relations. For one, America still maintains its severe Assad-era sanctions on Syria [13]. Removing these is essential to Syria’s economic recovery. In much the same way that Sudan joined the Accords in exchange for sanction relief, Syria might hope that improving relations with Israel will ease the imposed restrictions. Furthermore, al-Sharaa might attempt to use normalisation to regain control of the Golan Heights, which have been under Israeli control since 1967. Israel returned control of the Sinai Peninsula, which had been occupied at the same time as the Golan Heights, to Egypt when the two countries normalised relations. Perhaps Syria will seek the same approach.

        Syria joining the accords is anything but certain. Israel has remained sceptical of al-Sharaa, pushing for a harsh stance against the former Jihadist [13]. They have launched hundreds of strikes into Syria since the fall of Assad, making any future negotiations increasingly difficult [14]. While Syria has condemned all foreign intervention, they have stopped short of accusing Israel specifically of launching these attacks [14]. Al-Sharaa appears keen to maintain strategic flexibility while not alienating Western powers.

Conclusion

        The Abraham Accords were the most prized accomplishment of the first Trump administration in the Middle East. Now that Trump has returned to the White House for a second time, the Accords are set to return to centre stage. However, the new regional dynamics pose significant challenges to further normalisation. For various reasons, the Accords have fallen short of their lofty ambitions. Israel’s popularity has plummeted further as Palestine returns to importance for Arab states. It remains to be seen if the Abraham Accords can be expanded over the next four years and what the consequences of such expansions might be.

Biography

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