Abstract
Sudan is at a democratic crossroads. In September 2019, following months of bloody protests, the thirty-year Islamic dictatorship of Omar el-Bashir was ended. [1] and a new interim civilian-military government, the Transitional Military Council (now the Sovereignty Council of Sudan), took his place. [2] The aim of this Council is to transform Sudan into a fully democratic state by 2022. [3] However, certain military elements, along with a still significant minority of Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party still in Parliament are strongly opposed to this new objective. [4] In this environment, Sudan’s ‘secularist’ Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, faces a difficult challenge in bringing forward his hope for democracy. [5] A particular obstacle Sudan had was its listing in the United States (U.S.) State Sponsors of Terror List, a list compiled by the State Department to mark countries that have “repeatedly provided support for acts of terrorism”. [6] Sanctions resulting from this designation include restrictions on U.S. aid, an arms sales ban, restricted exports of dual-use items, and a range of miscellaneous financial sanctions, including the U.S. rejecting any proposals for loans from the World Bank. [7] These sanctions have a tangible effect on the prosperity of these nations. However, there are signs that designation is politically motivated. This article discusses the effects of such a politically motivated list, how it has fed into a recent American policy of tit for tat foreign policy and will focus particularly on how this spiel affects fragile nations such as Sudan.
Keywords: Foreign Policy, Sudan, U.S,
By Luke Hatch
With a revolutionary political change of the magnitude experienced in Sudan, it was expected that the U.S. would engage with the new government to cement this fledgling democracy in an often-turbulent part of the world. Removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terror List, on which it was placed in 1993 after the country provided refuge to Osama bin Laden, would have been a good start. This would allow the new government, which has inherited a severely mismanaged economy, to access debt relief and allow Western investment that is needed to stabilise the country. [8] This may not have been overly controversial a step for the U.S., as The Department of State has paradoxically considered Sudan both a State Sponsor of terror and a counterterrorism partner since 2017. [9] Eventually, on 14 December 2020, Sudan’s listing on the State Sponsors of Terror List was rescinded. This process was completed after Sudan agreed to pay compensation of $335 million to American victims of the East African Embassy bombings in 1998 and, crucially, to normalise relations with Israel. [10]
Sudan serves as an example of the marketisation of U.S. foreign policy goals in the region and the politicisation of the State Sponsors of Terror List for achieving these goals.
The State Sponsors of Terror List as a political tool
Such politicisation is not anomalous. Other examples have occurred in the past decade. In 2017, North Korea rejoined the State Sponsors of Terror List after the assassination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother on Malaysian soil. Experts still debate whether this fits the description of terrorism and, contrary to President Trump’s assertions, question whether North Korea has really shown enough proof of ‘repeatedly provid[ing] support for acts of international terrorism’. Trump noted that this formed part of the U.S. ‘maximum pressure’ policy. [11] In 2015, President Obama delisted Cuba after thirty years of sanctions. Previous accusations included harbouring Basque terrorists and supporting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as harbouring fugitive terrorist subjects from the U.S. However, Cuba has long been acting as a mediator between Colombia and the FARC. [12]
The American State Sponsors of Terror List, in fact, seems to have little bearing on whether the country is supportive of terrorists or not. Pakistan has long supported terrorist groups as part of its Afghanistan and Kashmir policy, but remains both a U.S. ally and off the State Sponsors of Terror List. Pakistan maintains this policy primarily to avoid being “encircled” by pro-India countries. A necessary evil of this is supporting groups that it believes may have a stake in future power deals, whether or not they can fully control them. [13] Likewise, private citizens from Saudi Arabia are widely alleged to have been behind financing the 9/11 attacks. [14] Yet, the oil-rich American ally remains off the list. These examples suggest the State Sponsors of Terror List cannot reasonably be construed as a list of countries that support terrorism. More likely, it represents a list of countries with which the U.S. strongly disagrees. This could be because they have been affiliated with groups that the U.S. does not like, or just a country on which the U.S. wishes to exert pressure. [15]
The Business of Normalisation and the law of unintended consequences
In 2020, Sudan joined a list of Arab League countries that have normalised relations with Israel. The Abraham Accords marked the change in Israel-Bahrain and Israel-United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) relations. The U.A.E will reportedly get F-35 stealth fighter planes, EA-18 electronic jets, and Reaper drones as a sweetener for the deal. [16] In December 2020, Morocco also declared that it would normalise relations with Israel. In response, the U.S. has recognised the Moroccan annexation of and sovereignty over large parts of the Western Sahara, recognised by the African Union as an independent territory. [17]
Making such cultural cornerstones transactional can have its risks. First and most obvious, these moves may leave Palestine and the Lebanese Hezbollah feeling isolated, with no option but to retaliate against Israel, as it sees international support dwindling. The risk of reneging on deals is also more acute. The UAE may not fully keep its side of the bargain, were President Biden not to deliver the Predator and Reaper drones. However, powerful oil monarchies in the Gulf have at least a firm grip on power. This minimises the chance of domestic backlash to a ‘riskier’ foreign policy line.
Sudan, on the other hand, is a very fragile democracy. Prime Minister Hamdok did not mention normalisation of relations in his tweet regarding Sudan’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terror List. [18] Normalisation of relations with Israel is still a controversial topic in Sudan, and not just among the deposed Islamists, but also secularists. [19] However, with potentially billions of dollars in aid and the chance to be taken off the State Sponsors of Terror List, it is an opportunity the Sudanese government could not afford to pass up. The economic situation in Sudan is dire; lines for petrol and bread can be many hours long. In January 2020, Sudan’s exchange rate amounted to 80 Sudanese Pounds to the U.S. dollar on the Sudanese black market. It has now reached 250 Sudanese Pounds to the dollar. [20] To foist such an important foreign policy decision on this new Sudanese government at such a vulnerable time risks its legitimacy and does nothing for U.S. efforts to build Khartoum up as a legitimate and democratic government in the region. Using the rescinding from the State Sponsors of Terror List and normalisation of relations as a bargaining chip at such a vulnerable time risks the move looking more like exploitation.
The State Sponsors of Terror List can be a useful bargaining chip in U.S. foreign relations. The general policy of tit for tat foreign relations is certainly capable of delivering short-term foreign policy wins. However, the question of whether it is profitable in the long run is still in doubt. The lack of the list’s consistency can lead to accusations of hypocrisy, and, more importantly, foreign policy instrumentalisation for political gains can be politically dangerous, especially if the end-goal is fostering democracy in countries on the precipice, such as Sudan.
Sources
[1] Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda, “Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019): 89–92, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0071.
[2] James Copnall, “Sudan after Bashir: ‘The Revolution Is on the Curriculum,’” BBC News, December 28, 2019, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50835344.
[3] Hassan and Kodouda, Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator
[4] Reuters, “Deal to Normalize Ties With Israel Stirs Opposition in Sudan | Voice of America - English,” [online] available from: https://www.voanews.com/africa/deal-normalize-ties-israel-stirs-opposition-sudan., accessed 20/12/2020.
[5] David Pilling, “Sudan’s Fledgling Government Needs the West’s Backing,” www.ft.com, December 4, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/7a5c7ed8-168e-11ea-9ee4-11f260415385.
[6] U.S. State Department. “State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State.” United States Department of State, 2019. https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/.
[7] ibid.
[8] Reuters, Deal to Normalize Ties With Israel Stirs Opposition in Sudan.
[9] United States Department of State (2017), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - United States Department of State,” [online] available from: https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2017/., accessed 12/12/2020.
[10] Lara Jakes, Declan Walsh, and Adam Rasgon, “Trump Announces Sudan Will Move to Normalize Relations With Israel,” The New York Times, October 23, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/world/middleeast/sudan-israel-trump-terrorism.html.
[11] Mason, J. and Brunnstrom, D. (2017), “Trump Declares North Korea State Sponsor of Terrorism, Triggers Sanctions,” [online] available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-idUSKBN1DK223., accessed 12/12/2020.
[12] Toosi, N. (2015), “Cuba Removed from U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism,” [online] available from: https://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/us-removes-cuba-state-sponsor-terrorism-118411., accessed 12/12/2020.
[13] Felbab-Brown, V. (2018), “Why Pakistan Supports Terrorist Groups, and Why the US Finds It so Hard to Induce Change,” [online] available from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/., accessed 20/12/2020.
[14] United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee On Intelligence and United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 : Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Together with Additional Views. (Philadelphia, Penn.: Pavilion Press, 2003), 172.
[15] Molly McCluskey, “US Terrorism,” www.aljazeera.com, January 26, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/1/26/the-united-states-outdated-terror-list.
[16] Kaplan, F. (2020), “Trump’s New Middle East Accord Is a Big Deal. It Is Not a Peace Deal.,” [online] https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/09/trump-israel-uae-bahrain-deal.html., accessed 20/12/2020.
[14] (2020) “Morocco Latest Country to Normalise Ties with Israel in US-Brokered Deal,” [online] available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55266089., accessed 20/12/2020.
[17] Hudson, J. and Bearak, M. (2020), “Trump Says He Will Take Sudan off List of State Sponsors of Terrorism,” [online] available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-sudan-israel-terrorism/2020/10/19/917cfffc-122d-11eb-82af-864652063d61_story.html., accessed 12/12/2020.
[18] Knopf, P. and Feltman, J. (2020), “Normalizing Sudan-Israel Relations Now Is a Dangerous Game,” [online] available from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/24/normalizing-sudan-israel-relations-now-is-a-dangerous-game/., accessed 12/12/2020.
[19] Hudson, C. (2020), “Sudan Is Removed from the Terror List. Now What?,” [online] available from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/sudan-is-removed-from-the-terror-list-now-what/., accessed 20/12/2020.