An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic
By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk
For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.
For this seventh episode, we interviewed Francesco Trupia, Research Fellow at the Prague-based Center for Security Analyses and Prevention (CBAP). He has a PhD in Political Philosophy from the University of Sofia (Bulgaria) and works on the societal role of minority groups and democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe, the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia) and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and south western Russia) in particular. In our conversation, we discussed the impact of the pandemic on the Balkans and the role of foreign actors in the region.
We tend to refer to the Balkans as a unit, but to what extent is this approach appropriate for research and political affairs?
Southeast Europe is a fascinating region for comparative research, yet it displays from within a large diversity of phenomena on a national level. The Covid-19 crisis has confirmed this. On the one hand, there was not a single country prepared to handle the pandemic. On the other hand, however, the Covid-19 is anything but a great equaliser. There is no doubt that the pandemic has hit the most vulnerable groups within the Balkan countries, while impinging on the region as a whole. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina [hereinafter: Bosnia] face migration and border issues due to a large number of refugees and migrants attempting to cross the border. In refugee camps, social distancing is almost impossible to be respected due to the poorly-maintained hygienic conditions and the crowd of migrants. Serbia is currently facing political unrest and the outbreak of protests on a domestic level, while the normalisation talks with Kosovo remain tense on a regional one. The solved ‘name dispute’ with Greece has brought Northern Macedonia to deal with Bulgaria’s scepticism in light of contested pages of history and related issues. Weak opposition, state capture, and democracy decline are not only on the rise in these two contexts, but also in Montenegro, Albania, and Romania. The pandemic seems to have temporarily washed away such issues, but the latter are about to stay under the parapet of the political narrative and rhetoric hegemonised by the Covid-19 discourse. However, when it comes to political problem solving, we should understand the commonalities that Balkan countries share. It is a region that must cooperate in order to find its place on the European stage as part of Europe.
To what extent is the pandemic jeopardising the future of democracy in the Balkans?
The situation in the Balkans has been critical since the very beginning of the pandemic. Governments were found unprepared to properly monitor and act against the spread of the virus. Accordingly, while ordinary people were not fully aware of the contagion risks, only certain segments of Balkan societies were affected by some mechanisms of control. Among others, minority groups and people living under the line of poverty have been hit the most and subjected to subtle forms of control through neighbourhood curfews, police patrols, and restriction of freedom of movement. On a national level, the pandemic began to expose pre-existing structural problems and accelerate democratic backsliding. On a local one, instead, the Covid-19 outbreak has shed light on well-known phenomena, such as the labour exploitation of seasonal workers coming back home once the lockdown was introduced in the UK, France, Italy, for example. Overall, although democracy was already being damaged from a variety of domestic issues, COVID-19 has worsened the situation.
When looking at the latest Serbian elections and Aleksandar Vučić’s landslide win, one can see how democracy has been further challenged during the pandemic. The Serbian opposition has tried to denounce the authoritarian tendency within an already-shrinking space for civil society actors and critical voices. During and after the latest political campaign, media were de facto controlled and so they are now, by Aleksandar Vučić’s establishment and circle of oligarchs. In Bulgaria, ongoing protests are not succeeding in forcing Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and his government to resign. Grassroots protests in front of the Parliament in Sofia and across other big cities in the country are instructive for understanding how power hierarchies were ossified well before the pandemic and have been reinforced throughout. Thus, in my opinion, the Covid-19 crisis is part of an already long-term democratic backsliding phenomenon that found a more fertile terrain for extending its claws as executive competences tend to be expanded and justified in the face of emergency situations. From this perspective, recent unrest and protests are potentially seen as a clear contestation against restrictions and political elites, yet there are other interwoven issues underneath.
If we also focus on Kosovo, which is worth paying attention to for the future of the region, the former Prime Minister Albin Kurti has not managed to even begin with his mandate after being elected. The vote of no confidence and decisions taken within the Parliament, rather than going to the polls due to the pandemic, paved the way for the old political caste to return to the stage. In this, the return of the Kosovo-Serbia normalisation talks under the auspices of the European Union (EU) and the indictment of Kosovan President Hashim Thaçi for war crimes do not help people in Kosovo to leave the socio-political limbo they are trapped in. Going back to the issue along the Bosnian-Croatian border, violations of human rights are happening on a daily basis. Migrants are seen as potential carriers of the virus and police push-backs are nothing new. In that respect, all basic pillars of democratic governance seem at risk.
While the pandemic seems to enhance authoritarian powers, does it also empower non-state actors, such as criminal groups?
Although limited data and information about the impact of organised crime on societies does not provide the big picture yet, there are few doubts that criminal groups can very easily benefit from the current crisis. Indeed, the latter provides new opportunities for outlaw activities. In the Balkans and elsewhere alike, when governments cannot timely provide aid and support to the needy, organised crime is more likely to fill the vacuum.
Another factor that comes into play in Southeastern and Eastern Europe is that local populations do not trust political institutions due to the fact that many leading figures managed to recycle themselves into power along the transition period, especially on a local level. Since then, political dissatisfaction is on the rise, but state capture remains strong enough to permit populist rhetoric and alt-right movements to win ground. Moreover, the people’s distrust often turns into conspiracy theories, which are fairly popular in this context of public health emergencies and disputes between politicians and experts.
The EU has mobilised a package to support the Western Balkans in June. To what extent can such European interventions help to support both public health and the political situation?
The EU has invested a lot in the region. The EU emergency funds have been delivered in the region due to the pandemic, especially in the Western Balkans. Overall, however, in Southeast Europe people do not perceive such support. They do not realise that they have been benefiting from the EU, which is instead understood as a rather external actor whose transnational and complex mechanisms of doing politics are interlinked with corrupt national elites. In the eyes of many, indeed, the EU is doing nothing more than imposing conditionalities. In EU member states, but even more in potential member states, the EU has to work on conveying the message that it is a partner and not just a foreign actor.
The EU is not exempt from criticism, of course. The mistakes made with Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 should be avoided at all costs - both countries were not ready to join the EU but became members anyway. Nowadays, they show disappointing performances when it comes to discussing issues such as the rule of law and human rights. In fact, strategic miscalculations could accelerate today’s democracy decline. Therefore, it is paramount to encourage regional actors to cooperate as a solution to soften domestic issues that cannot be solved by the EU’s interventions. It is essential for the EU to monitor the region and participate in its future.
Clearly, the EU is not the only actor that has interests in the region. Can you tell us more about responses from other foreign actors to the pandemic in the Balkans?
National leaders look instrumentally at the East. They know they can benefit from large investments and military partnerships with China, Russia or Turkey, for example, which do not require any preconditions or respect for the status of democracy. Those investing have political and economic interests that they will defend regardless of values and norms of Western-like liberal democracy. The latter remains a concern since Sino-Russian spoiler tactics work as a public relations component, aiming to be perceived by locals as more valuable than the EU, which appears as an elitist, remote, and abstract concept. For example, Russia rewrites history and identity sentiments through handy nationalist packages that ordinary people can easily deal with. This phenomenon is very clear in Serbia for instance, where President Vučić is trying hard to strengthen the relationship with Russia and China whilst balancing his position with the EU. However, this was already the case before the pandemic, which has only accelerated this cooperation.
In the last years, the region seems to be going through a wave of populist and authoritarian developments and hence political instability. How likely is another outbreak of violence in the Balkans in the near future?
The post-communist transition period has made the Balkans earn the “powder keg” designation. Tensions have largely been triggered by interstate antagonisms on different grounds. At present, the most blasing dispute is obviously on the recognition of the statehood of Kosovo by Serbia. In August 2018, a contentious resolution based on an “exchange” of territories was proposed and never fully discarded since then. To my mind, the majority of academics and security experts have correctly expressed criticism against such a proposal. It might not only complicate the reconciliation process, but it might also fuel regional rivalries and inflame borderlands where ethnic minority groups live. However, I do not think that the aftermath of the pandemic will lead to new military confrontations, even though locals in Kosovo fear so. Considering its political instability and economic vulnerability, it would be convenient neither for Serbia nor for Kosovo to engage in a military confrontation. The same applies for all Balkan countries. After all, a war must be feasible and potentially worth it on an economic level before being started.
Nevertheless, violence on a local level is definitely more likely to happen in different forms of radicalism and radicalisation in certain clusters of populations. Once again, in Kosovo, for example, there was no extensive media coverage of hostile behaviour against a few Serbian villages that were attacked during the curfew.
What are the key takeaways of the impact of the pandemic for the region?
It is hard to draw the takeaways of the pandemic as it is still ongoing. However, rooted national problems, the decline of democratic values and norms, and the reinforcement of segments of society with malignant interests can easily find more and more space in the years to come.
This period is being highlighted by the existing discrepancies between high-politic dynamics and grassroot responses. The former continue to remain deaf to the latter. In this regard, the role of the EU becomes paramount in order to foster the whole region towards the path leading to a wealthier transition to full-fledged democracies. Whether the pandemic has significantly deteriorated the pre-existing fragile and tense interstate relations between Balkan countries, it is also worth considering that a period of profound crisis can show new perspectives. The years to come look more uncertain than they were prior to the Covid-19 outbreak, but European institutions cannot lose momentum.
The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.