Emergency Management as a Security Discipline

Emergency Management is a sub-discipline of security relying heavily on planning and co-ordination. Effective emergency management leverages resources during natural disasters and other crises to ensure human security both domestically and internationally. Analysing this field at the United States’ municipal and state-levels allows us to examine the varying command structures and assess how the government ensures its citizenry and critical infrastructure during major incidents.

By Caitlyn Roth and Casey Cannon

The Emergency Management field in the United States (US) holds a unique position in its national security apparatus. Emergency Management (EM) is dissimilar from the more prominent security fields in that its agencies do not contain intelligence divisions, enforcement arms, nor do they ensure national defence. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is positioned within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is responsible for ‘reducing the loss of life and property and protecting American institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery’ (1). Based on this definition, emergency management would fall into the Human Security school of security theory. Like other security fields within the US, Emergency Management agencies vary to some degree in each state and generally feature a FEMA division responsible for their region, a state Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and municipal emergency management agencies that are tasked with coordinating response between agencies during crises. At each level of government, these agencies have different protocols and Incident Command Structures (ICS) that dictate operations in anticipation of, during, and after major incidents (2). This paper will evaluate two cases: the July 2019 New York City (NYC) power outage, and Hurricane Irma, which hit Florida in 2017. The responses to these incidents will be examined to analyse the ways in which emergency management operations differ on opposite corners of the country and through the lens of two different levels of government. The evaluation of the (NYC) power outage will focus on the response by the NYC agencies and how co-ordination played an essential role during the outage. The Hurricane Irma case will assess how the government at the state-level organises and responds to a major hurricane. These instances will provide an overview of the EM field, and how geography and levels of government influence EM coordinated responses.

New York City Blackout 

On July 13th of 2019, a power outage struck New York City, leaving more than 70,000 residents and critical infrastructure, such as traffic lights, without power (3). Significant power outages such as this pose substantial risk to the citizens living in the affected area. Blackouts can present challenges to public health, medical services, transportation, hospitals, emergency services, as well as several other areas. To co-ordinate incidents that require a multi-agency response, NYC relies on a management structure called the City Incident Management System (CIMS), which defines the strategy and agency roles during an emergency from the start of the incident until stability is restored (4). In the case of a significant blackout, NYC’s power utility provider, Con Edison, is responsible for restoring power and identifying the cause of the blackout. In an outage of this scale, however, other agencies would necessarily be involved. The city’s first priority is to ensure the safety of people that might be endangered by a loss of power. In this instance, the New York Fire Department (FDNY) was dispatched to buildings to rescue individuals trapped in elevators; the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was responsible for assessing the impact on the subways and addressing risk posed to passengers; the New York Police Department (NYPD) was tasked with, among other things, responding to vulnerable populations (defined as adults over 65 and residents who require assistance with daily activities that rely on electrical power) (5)(6). 

CIMS recognises that a multi-agency response of this scope requires significant co-ordination. In such instances, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM), an agency that is specifically tasked with managing and providing support in anticipation of and during crises, serves as the Co-ordinating Element. NYCEM is responsible for ensuring that the CIMS command structure is in place and facilitating interagency coordination. In an incident like a power outage, NYCEM would be in consistent contact with Con Edison to get updates on the scope of the outage and estimated time to restoration while updating other agencies, including the mayor's office (7). To facilitate seamless connectivity between agencies, NYCEM has liaisons in nearly every NYC agency and direct lines to gather information and update stakeholders. NYCEM also has a substantial cache of resources and teams of emergency responders available for dispatch. During an incident like a blackout, clear and timely communication is essential to preventing panic and the spread of misinformation. Throughout such instances, NYCEM will put out regular communication through its NotifyNYC program and Twitter account. As the incident unfolded, the NYCEM Twitter account tweeted and retweeted several dozens of messages that provided updates on the outage and affected areas. In this instance, there was public concern that the outage might have been caused by a malicious actor as part of a cyber-attack. Consistent messaging, however, confirmed that the blackout was in fact due to a faulted 13,000-volt distribution cable that relay systems failed to isolate. The fault shut down power to a large portion of the Upper-West Side of Manhattan (8). If the incident were to become so large in scope that the city became unable to manage the crisis, the state and federal emergency management structures can step in and provide support. Fortunately, in this instance, the inter-agency co-ordination structure executed its function and power was restored later that evening with no significant injuries reported. The July power outage demonstrated the essential function that CIMS plays in multi-agency co-ordination during major incidents.

Hurricane Irma

On September 10th, 2017, Hurricane Irma was upgraded to a Category Four hurricane just prior to making landfall on Cudjoe Key, 20 miles north of Key West, Florida. The Florida Keys, a 356 kilometer archipelago at the southernmost part of the State of Florida, received approximately 30 centimeters (cm) of rainfall, and experienced a storm surge of over three meters (9). The average elevation of the lower keys, where Cudjoe Key is located, only sits one metre above sea level (10).  With maximum sustained winds in the Atlantic Basin recorded at 298 kilometres per hour (kph) for 37 hours at its peak, Hurricane Irma was named the strongest hurricane ever observed, according to an analysis by the National Weather Service (11). The hurricane also held seven trillion watts of energy, or twice the amount of energy than that of all bombs reportedly used during World War II. The force of this storm was so powerful that earthquake seismometers recorded it (12). The death toll, encompassing the moment Irma first made landfall on the Leeward Islands in the northeast of the Caribbean, to the storm’s end over South Carolina, reached 134, with 94 casualties recorded in the United States (13).

Hurricane Irma posed an immense risk to the critical infrastructure and residents of Monroe County, which is vulnerable to extreme weather events due to its position in the Atlantic Basin, therefore, disaster mitigation plans were crafted to be extensive and highly organised. Florida’s Division of Emergency Management (FDEM), which reports directly to the Executive Office of the Governor of Florida, is tasked with maintaining a comprehensive statewide emergency management program. Within FDEM, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) co-ordinates the efforts of the federal government with other departments and agencies of the state, county, and municipal governments, as well as school boards and private agencies having a role in emergency management. Under SERT, all state agency personnel are trained and equipped to work in collaboration during an emergency and to combine resources to provide streamlined and effective disaster mitigation to victims in Florida. Just prior to the storm, an executive order (17-235) by Governor Rick Scott, set limitations and rules for disaster mitigation, and provided a comprehensive framework to lead reaction and response efforts (14). Among the most important aspects of Executive Order 17-235 were provisions for directing all state, regional, and local governmental agencies to identify necessary personnel to assist in meeting the needs created by this emergency. It further suspended any statute, rule, or order that would prevent, hinder, or delay any mitigation, response, or recovery action necessary to cope with the disaster. Additionally, the Adjutant General of Florida was ordered to activate the Florida National Guard, and the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) was ordered to waive the collection of toll road fees and other charges used for major public highways to assist in efficient evacuation processes. They also reversed the flow of traffic as necessary, closed roads to facilitate gasoline deliveries and emergency response personnel, and waived size and weight restrictions for vehicles transporting other emergency equipment (15). The FDEM director was designated as the State Co-ordinating Officer for the duration of the emergency and was tasked with executing the the state’s comprehensive emergency management plan. 

As in the case of the 2019 New York City blackout, accurate and timely communication was considered paramount in anticipation of Irma. Misinformation and panic can spread quickly, therefore FDEM and SERT set up 24 hour call centers at the Florida Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee, staffed with volunteers who could assist people affected by the storm. Additionally, SERT maintained a constant presence on social media, primarily through its Twitter account to disseminate accurate information in real time to Floridians. Both Governor Rick Scott and the FDEM director made a point to bolster communications via regular updates on all major news broadcasts. 

A state of emergency was declared four days before the storm made landfall that covered all 67 Florida counties, and Keys residents were placed under a mandatory phased evacuation due to the fact that there is only one road out of the archipelago (16). This was to ensure a safe and speedy exit and prevent major traffic congestion. In total, 6.5 million people within the state evacuated and 77,000 people sought refuge in hurricane shelters (17). When the storm passed, entrance to the Keys was restricted to emergency personnel and equipment only to begin the initial response process. FDOT was tasked with ensuring the entire overseas highway and its 41 bridges were structurally sound and critical infrastructure had not been washed away (18). The Coast Guard assisted in recovery efforts as well as general policing to reduce looting concerns, and a curfew was put into place restricting movement overnight. Residents were permitted to enter on a scheduled basis with vehicle permits once the highway was deemed safe for travel, but only during specific times. Each vehicle had to be cleared at a checkpoint by the Monroe County Sheriff’s office prior to being granted entry. In total, once adjusted for inflation, Hurricane Irma’s path of destruction cost $50 billion, making it the fifth costliest hurricane on record. Presently, Monroe County has the nation’s highest building standards to mitigate effects from these powerful storms, and the damage caused by Irma could have been significantly worse in a low lying coastal area like the Keys, as there is currently no structure in Monroe County built to withstand the 298 kph winds Irma generated in the Atlantic Basin (19).  

Conclusion

The EM field relies on after-action reports to identify lessons learned and apply them to future disasters. The wide range of stakeholders, both public and private, that may be involved in this process underscores the essential role of an EM agency in co-ordinating responses to these crises. The NYC blackout and Hurricane Irma response efforts demonstrated the importance of the EM offices, but also how emergencies are managed at differing levels of government in different parts of the country. Specific EM agencies, however, are not unique to the US, as the European Union offers the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the United Nations (UN) contains the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), to name but two (20). Threats such as climate change will continue to call upon creative and effective institutions and decision-makers prepared to learn and adapt to developments in the threat landscape. This reality will call for continued investment in planning, personnel, and infrastructure to address the breadth of security threats in this emerging field.

Sources:

1. Witt, J ‘Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Statement’ https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/vp-rpt96/appendix/fema.html

2. ‘NEW YORK STATE COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN: Volume 3’ http://www.dhses.ny.gov/planning/cemp/documents/NYS-CEMP-Vol3.pdf

3. Barron ,J & Zaveri, M ‘Power Restored to Manhattan’s West Side After Major Blackout’ New York Times

4. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

5. Bauman, Ali ‘NYC Blackout: Cause Of Massive Manhattan Outage Under Investigation’ New York CBS local: https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/07/14/new-york-city-power-outage-cause/

6. Hames, E et al, ‘A GIS Approach to Identifying Socially and Medically Vulnerable Older Adult Populations in South Florida’ (2017) Link: https://academic.oup.com/gerontologist/article/57/6/1133/2632031

7. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

8. Frehse, R & Romine, T ‘Preliminary report shows faulty relay protection system caused NYC power outage’ CNN https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/15/us/new-york-city-power-outage-con-edison/index.html

9. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

10. Gastesi, R. (2019) ‘Green Keys! A Plan to Create a Sustainable Florida Keys’ Sustainable Action Plan: http://greenkeys.info/intro-policy-outreach/

11. National Weather Service. ‘Detailed Meteorological Summary on Hurricane Irma’ Hurricane Irma Synopsis: https://www.weather.gov/tae/Irma_technical_summary

12. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

13. Tropical Weather (2019). ‘Hurricane Irma Facts’:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

14. Executive Office of the Governor (2017). ‘Executive Order Number 17-235: Emergency Management- Hurricane Irma’: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SLG-BIZHUB17090402490.pdf

15. IBID

16. Monroe County Emergency Management (2017). ‘Evacuation Information’:https://www2.monroecounty.gov/oem

17. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

18. Goodhue, David (2017). “No automatic re-entry post-irma, county says’ Florida Keys News: https://www.flkeysnews.com/news/local/article172306727.html

19. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

20. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination - UNDAC Field Handbook (2018) https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/1823826E_web_pages.pdf