The Securitisation of COVID-19: Implications for Civilian Privacy

COVID-19 has been disrupting people’s lives and forcing governments to take measures rapidly to contain the virus and prevent further deaths. It took governments by surprise and revealed their lack of preparedness, leading them to formulate policy responses which engaged with securitisation. [1] To fight the pandemic, authorities have introduced measures that drastically infringed upon citizens’ personal freedoms, starting with their freedom of movement. They engaged in a process of securitising COVID-19 using these exceptional times as a rationale to enact exceptional measures. A glaring example is the introduction of contact tracing apps: for citizens to be able to move around freely again, governments had to find a way to track the virus by identifying contaminated citizens and their contacts. Seen by some as an open door to governments collecting more health data, this measure is questionable in terms of ethics and privacy. This article argues that the introduction of contact tracing apps is the result of a securitisation process that stems from governments’ desire to show that they are taking action and controlling the situation.

By Apolline Rolland

Securitising Global Health

            The securitisation process refers to the action of defining an issue as a threat and framing it as a security issue that calls for exceptional measures. It gives legitimacy to governments to enact measures that would not have been accepted by the audience under different circumstances. Securitisation is performed through speech acts and requires a securitising actor, here governments, a securitising move, here calling COVID-19 a security threat, and a target audience that needs to accept the securitising move, here the citizenry. Generally, an issue becomes securitised when it poses a threat to the values and norms of a society. 

In recent years, global health has been increasingly subject to securitisation. In the case of COVID-19, the pandemic was framed as an ‘existential threat to the people’s lives and the regular functioning of societies’. [2] COVID-19 is not as deadly as viruses such as Ebola or AIDS, but it has a higher mortality rate than that of influenza and is also more contagious. [3] As it is a new strain of virus, governments quickly engaged in exceptional measures such as confinement, social distancing policies, the collection of citizens’ health data, and made numerous emergency declarations. This virus quickly became a threat to the public health of all states as it had the potential to spread internationally due to globalisation and the rapid flows of people transnationally. [4]

The securitisation of diseases is dangerous as it gives good ground to the militarisation of public health, which shifts the focus from civil society to intelligence and military agencies, undermining personal freedoms. [5] In fact, diseases are usually development and poverty issues rather than security issues. [6] It is therefore important to incorporate oversight in mitigation policies to ensure that the COVID-19 crisis does not unduly erode individual freedoms in democracies.

The use of the Word ‘Pandemic’

            On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) finally declared the COVID-19 epidemic a pandemic, constituting the speech act in securitisation theory. In its classical definition, a pandemic is ‘an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people’. [7] It considers who is infected and where they got sick. [8] A pandemic occurs when chains of transmissions multiply throughout the world and clusters appear beyond the birthplace of the outbreak. What does this qualification change in practice? In reality, not much; it simply allows the WHO to legally make recommendations, unlock funding, and provide political support to affected countries. [9] However, the word can trigger fear easily. The WHO was late to announce the pandemic and was careful to use the terminology to prevent unnecessary suffering and panic. [10] Indeed, although the qualification does not change many things in practice, it does mean that the virus is no longer contained. The focus shifts towards slowing down the spread of the disease by introducing mitigation policies. [11]

Framing COVID-19 as a Security Issue in Political Discourses

First presented as a distant health issue, COVID-19 quickly became a fundamental security threat which required exceptional measures. [12] It bypassed normal politics and impacted the regular functioning of health services, of nations, and of society as a whole.

In the academic literature, two different kinds of discourses have appeared since the pandemic was announced. [13] First, it was framed as a common threat to citizens from across the globe which required a coordinated and global response. This discourse was usually found in the speeches of representatives of international institutions, examples include qualifying COVID-19 as ‘an enemy against humanity’ (Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus) and ‘a common threat’ (António Guterres).

Secondly, it was framed as a national security threat. This rhetoric was more likely to be found in the speeches of world leaders addressing their nations. [14] Examples include Emmanuel Macron’s ‘Nous sommes en guerre’, Boris Johnson’s declaration of a ‘national fightback’ against COVID-19 calling for the need of ‘drastic action’ and ‘extreme measures’, as well as his call for victory against the virus — ‘we’re going to win, we’re going to beat it’ ‘we have the resolve and the resources to win the fight’. [15] [16] This war rhetoric reflects the securitisation process, invoking a sense of emergency and state power to claim the legitimate use of extraordinary measures, which have the potential to undermine sovereignty of the people. [17]

Technology to the Rescue?

National economic output stopped suddenly as lockdowns were introduced all over the world. This choice was not adopted as the optimal strategy, rather as the only option available given the lack of government preparedness. [18] In many countries, which quickly became overwhelmed by the amount of deaths, this lack of preparedness was the result of years of budget cuts which have reduced the capacity of health systems to answer to such crises efficiently, and showed how vulnerable the neoliberal model is. [19]

Governments faced a security dilemma every time they had to make a choice between pursuing lockdown measures to preserve public health and the life of their citizens or easing the measures to prevent a worse economic crisis from occurring. [20] Being able to track and trace the whereabouts of citizens to know if they had been in contact with infected individuals seemed to become a prerequisite to return to ‘normal life’, therefore governments introduced contact tracing apps. To cite a few examples: the Chinese government opted for issuing QR codes to allow its citizens to go out or to enforce quarantine. [21] In South Korea and Taiwan, personal data was used to ensure that people respected quarantine measures. [22] Israeli intelligence services used counterterrorism tools to locate Israelis’ phones and order a quarantine to those who had come into contact with infected people. [23] In Europe, downloading the app relied on a voluntary basis due to privacy concerns, but health authorities have been able to receive data from telephonic operators to see movements of populations when lockdown measures were introduced, such as in France or Italy. [24]

 As Pr. Didier Bigo of Science Po Paris-CERI puts it, government officials were quick to embrace the “folly of technological solutionism”, or in other words, in ‘the belief that one can solve every problem with a click’. [25] Was it really a necessity or rather a willingness of governments to prove that they were in control and ready to react?

Governments have looked at what we have to gain from the development of contact tracing apps: the ability to regain our freedom of movement during the pandemic. But have we, the people, weighed what we could lose? In reality, contact tracing apps in Europe have mostly been developed safely. However, they normalise mass data collection by governments from populations. Today we accept it for our health, but we must at least question whether we want this to become the norm to solve any issues without real safeguards and oversight.

The emergence of these new monitoring technologies are understandable during the crisis to fight the pandemic. But the real question is whether this will become a lasting feature of our democracies under the guise of security purposes. [26] The risk we run is the normalisation and the trivialisation of data collection.

Sources

[1] Sears, N A (2020) ‘The Securitization of COVID-19: Three Political Dilemma,’ [online] available from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/03/2020/securitization-covid-19-three-political-dilemmas, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[2] Nunes, J (2020) ‘The COVID-19 pandemic: securitization, neoliberal crisis, and global vulnerabilization,’ Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1-4.

[3] Breteau, P (2020) ‘Coronavirus, Zika, Ebola… quelles maladies sont les plus contagieuses ou les plus mortelles?,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2020/01/29/coronavirus-zika-ebola-quelles-maladies-sont-les-plus-contagieuses-ou-les-plus-mortelles_6027661_4355770.html, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[4] Ventura, D (2016) ‘From Ebola to Zika: international emergencies and the securitization of global health,’ Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 1-4.

[5] Bigo, D (2020) ‘Covid-19 tracking apps, or: how to deal with a pandemic most unsuccessfully,’ [online] available from https://aboutintel.eu/covid-digital-tracking/, accessed 25th August 2020.

[6] Baele, S (2020) ‘On the Securitization of COVID-19,’ [online] available from https://pandemipolitics.net/baele/, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[7] Kelly, H (2011) ‘The classical definition of a pandemic is not elusive,’ Bulletin of the World Health Organization Vol. 89, No. 7, pp. 540-541.

[8] McKeever, A (2020) ‘Coronavirus is officially a pandemic. Here is why that matters.,’  [online] available from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/02/how-coronavirus-could-become-pandemic-and-why-it-matters/, accessed on 25th of August 2020.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Baele, 2020.

[13] Sears, 2020.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Le Monde, Transcription of the speech  ‘‘Nous sommes en guerre’: le verbatim du discours d’Emmanuel Macron,’ [online] available from  https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/03/16/nous-sommes-en-guerre-retrouvez-le-discours-de-macron-pour-lutter-contre-le-coronavirus_6033314_823448.html, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[16] Baele, 2020.

[17] Hanrieder, T and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) ‘WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp.331-348.

[18] Bigo, 2020.

[19] Nunes, p. 2.

[20] Eves, L and James Thedam ‘Applying Securitzation’s Second Generation to COVID-19,’ [online] available from  https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/14/applying-securitizations-second-generation-to-covid-19/, accessed 25th August 2020.

[21] Mozur, P, Raymond Zhong and Aaron Krolik (2020) ‘In coronavirus fight, China gives citizens a color code, with red flags,’ [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html, accessed 14th September 2020.

[22] Utersinger, M (2020) ‘Contre la pandémie due au coronavirus, de nombreux pays misent sur la surveillance permise par le “big data”,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/03/20/contre-la-pandemie-de-nombreux-pays-misent-sur-la-surveillance-permise-par-le-big-data_6033851_4408996.html, accessed 14th September 2020.

[23] Halbfinger, D M ,  Isabel Kershner and Ronen Bergman (2020) ‘To track coronavirus, Israel moves to tap secret trove of cellphone data,’ [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/world/middleeast/israel-coronavirus-cellphone-tracking.html, accessed 14th September 2020.

[24] Utersinger, 2020.

[25] Sears, 2020.

[26] Bigo, 2020.

Emergency Management as a Security Discipline

Emergency Management is a sub-discipline of security relying heavily on planning and co-ordination. Effective emergency management leverages resources during natural disasters and other crises to ensure human security both domestically and internationally. Analysing this field at the United States’ municipal and state-levels allows us to examine the varying command structures and assess how the government ensures its citizenry and critical infrastructure during major incidents.

By Caitlyn Roth and Casey Cannon

The Emergency Management field in the United States (US) holds a unique position in its national security apparatus. Emergency Management (EM) is dissimilar from the more prominent security fields in that its agencies do not contain intelligence divisions, enforcement arms, nor do they ensure national defence. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is positioned within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is responsible for ‘reducing the loss of life and property and protecting American institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery’ (1). Based on this definition, emergency management would fall into the Human Security school of security theory. Like other security fields within the US, Emergency Management agencies vary to some degree in each state and generally feature a FEMA division responsible for their region, a state Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and municipal emergency management agencies that are tasked with coordinating response between agencies during crises. At each level of government, these agencies have different protocols and Incident Command Structures (ICS) that dictate operations in anticipation of, during, and after major incidents (2). This paper will evaluate two cases: the July 2019 New York City (NYC) power outage, and Hurricane Irma, which hit Florida in 2017. The responses to these incidents will be examined to analyse the ways in which emergency management operations differ on opposite corners of the country and through the lens of two different levels of government. The evaluation of the (NYC) power outage will focus on the response by the NYC agencies and how co-ordination played an essential role during the outage. The Hurricane Irma case will assess how the government at the state-level organises and responds to a major hurricane. These instances will provide an overview of the EM field, and how geography and levels of government influence EM coordinated responses.

New York City Blackout 

On July 13th of 2019, a power outage struck New York City, leaving more than 70,000 residents and critical infrastructure, such as traffic lights, without power (3). Significant power outages such as this pose substantial risk to the citizens living in the affected area. Blackouts can present challenges to public health, medical services, transportation, hospitals, emergency services, as well as several other areas. To co-ordinate incidents that require a multi-agency response, NYC relies on a management structure called the City Incident Management System (CIMS), which defines the strategy and agency roles during an emergency from the start of the incident until stability is restored (4). In the case of a significant blackout, NYC’s power utility provider, Con Edison, is responsible for restoring power and identifying the cause of the blackout. In an outage of this scale, however, other agencies would necessarily be involved. The city’s first priority is to ensure the safety of people that might be endangered by a loss of power. In this instance, the New York Fire Department (FDNY) was dispatched to buildings to rescue individuals trapped in elevators; the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was responsible for assessing the impact on the subways and addressing risk posed to passengers; the New York Police Department (NYPD) was tasked with, among other things, responding to vulnerable populations (defined as adults over 65 and residents who require assistance with daily activities that rely on electrical power) (5)(6). 

CIMS recognises that a multi-agency response of this scope requires significant co-ordination. In such instances, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM), an agency that is specifically tasked with managing and providing support in anticipation of and during crises, serves as the Co-ordinating Element. NYCEM is responsible for ensuring that the CIMS command structure is in place and facilitating interagency coordination. In an incident like a power outage, NYCEM would be in consistent contact with Con Edison to get updates on the scope of the outage and estimated time to restoration while updating other agencies, including the mayor's office (7). To facilitate seamless connectivity between agencies, NYCEM has liaisons in nearly every NYC agency and direct lines to gather information and update stakeholders. NYCEM also has a substantial cache of resources and teams of emergency responders available for dispatch. During an incident like a blackout, clear and timely communication is essential to preventing panic and the spread of misinformation. Throughout such instances, NYCEM will put out regular communication through its NotifyNYC program and Twitter account. As the incident unfolded, the NYCEM Twitter account tweeted and retweeted several dozens of messages that provided updates on the outage and affected areas. In this instance, there was public concern that the outage might have been caused by a malicious actor as part of a cyber-attack. Consistent messaging, however, confirmed that the blackout was in fact due to a faulted 13,000-volt distribution cable that relay systems failed to isolate. The fault shut down power to a large portion of the Upper-West Side of Manhattan (8). If the incident were to become so large in scope that the city became unable to manage the crisis, the state and federal emergency management structures can step in and provide support. Fortunately, in this instance, the inter-agency co-ordination structure executed its function and power was restored later that evening with no significant injuries reported. The July power outage demonstrated the essential function that CIMS plays in multi-agency co-ordination during major incidents.

Hurricane Irma

On September 10th, 2017, Hurricane Irma was upgraded to a Category Four hurricane just prior to making landfall on Cudjoe Key, 20 miles north of Key West, Florida. The Florida Keys, a 356 kilometer archipelago at the southernmost part of the State of Florida, received approximately 30 centimeters (cm) of rainfall, and experienced a storm surge of over three meters (9). The average elevation of the lower keys, where Cudjoe Key is located, only sits one metre above sea level (10).  With maximum sustained winds in the Atlantic Basin recorded at 298 kilometres per hour (kph) for 37 hours at its peak, Hurricane Irma was named the strongest hurricane ever observed, according to an analysis by the National Weather Service (11). The hurricane also held seven trillion watts of energy, or twice the amount of energy than that of all bombs reportedly used during World War II. The force of this storm was so powerful that earthquake seismometers recorded it (12). The death toll, encompassing the moment Irma first made landfall on the Leeward Islands in the northeast of the Caribbean, to the storm’s end over South Carolina, reached 134, with 94 casualties recorded in the United States (13).

Hurricane Irma posed an immense risk to the critical infrastructure and residents of Monroe County, which is vulnerable to extreme weather events due to its position in the Atlantic Basin, therefore, disaster mitigation plans were crafted to be extensive and highly organised. Florida’s Division of Emergency Management (FDEM), which reports directly to the Executive Office of the Governor of Florida, is tasked with maintaining a comprehensive statewide emergency management program. Within FDEM, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) co-ordinates the efforts of the federal government with other departments and agencies of the state, county, and municipal governments, as well as school boards and private agencies having a role in emergency management. Under SERT, all state agency personnel are trained and equipped to work in collaboration during an emergency and to combine resources to provide streamlined and effective disaster mitigation to victims in Florida. Just prior to the storm, an executive order (17-235) by Governor Rick Scott, set limitations and rules for disaster mitigation, and provided a comprehensive framework to lead reaction and response efforts (14). Among the most important aspects of Executive Order 17-235 were provisions for directing all state, regional, and local governmental agencies to identify necessary personnel to assist in meeting the needs created by this emergency. It further suspended any statute, rule, or order that would prevent, hinder, or delay any mitigation, response, or recovery action necessary to cope with the disaster. Additionally, the Adjutant General of Florida was ordered to activate the Florida National Guard, and the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) was ordered to waive the collection of toll road fees and other charges used for major public highways to assist in efficient evacuation processes. They also reversed the flow of traffic as necessary, closed roads to facilitate gasoline deliveries and emergency response personnel, and waived size and weight restrictions for vehicles transporting other emergency equipment (15). The FDEM director was designated as the State Co-ordinating Officer for the duration of the emergency and was tasked with executing the the state’s comprehensive emergency management plan. 

As in the case of the 2019 New York City blackout, accurate and timely communication was considered paramount in anticipation of Irma. Misinformation and panic can spread quickly, therefore FDEM and SERT set up 24 hour call centers at the Florida Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee, staffed with volunteers who could assist people affected by the storm. Additionally, SERT maintained a constant presence on social media, primarily through its Twitter account to disseminate accurate information in real time to Floridians. Both Governor Rick Scott and the FDEM director made a point to bolster communications via regular updates on all major news broadcasts. 

A state of emergency was declared four days before the storm made landfall that covered all 67 Florida counties, and Keys residents were placed under a mandatory phased evacuation due to the fact that there is only one road out of the archipelago (16). This was to ensure a safe and speedy exit and prevent major traffic congestion. In total, 6.5 million people within the state evacuated and 77,000 people sought refuge in hurricane shelters (17). When the storm passed, entrance to the Keys was restricted to emergency personnel and equipment only to begin the initial response process. FDOT was tasked with ensuring the entire overseas highway and its 41 bridges were structurally sound and critical infrastructure had not been washed away (18). The Coast Guard assisted in recovery efforts as well as general policing to reduce looting concerns, and a curfew was put into place restricting movement overnight. Residents were permitted to enter on a scheduled basis with vehicle permits once the highway was deemed safe for travel, but only during specific times. Each vehicle had to be cleared at a checkpoint by the Monroe County Sheriff’s office prior to being granted entry. In total, once adjusted for inflation, Hurricane Irma’s path of destruction cost $50 billion, making it the fifth costliest hurricane on record. Presently, Monroe County has the nation’s highest building standards to mitigate effects from these powerful storms, and the damage caused by Irma could have been significantly worse in a low lying coastal area like the Keys, as there is currently no structure in Monroe County built to withstand the 298 kph winds Irma generated in the Atlantic Basin (19).  

Conclusion

The EM field relies on after-action reports to identify lessons learned and apply them to future disasters. The wide range of stakeholders, both public and private, that may be involved in this process underscores the essential role of an EM agency in co-ordinating responses to these crises. The NYC blackout and Hurricane Irma response efforts demonstrated the importance of the EM offices, but also how emergencies are managed at differing levels of government in different parts of the country. Specific EM agencies, however, are not unique to the US, as the European Union offers the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the United Nations (UN) contains the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), to name but two (20). Threats such as climate change will continue to call upon creative and effective institutions and decision-makers prepared to learn and adapt to developments in the threat landscape. This reality will call for continued investment in planning, personnel, and infrastructure to address the breadth of security threats in this emerging field.

Sources:

1. Witt, J ‘Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Statement’ https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/vp-rpt96/appendix/fema.html

2. ‘NEW YORK STATE COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN: Volume 3’ http://www.dhses.ny.gov/planning/cemp/documents/NYS-CEMP-Vol3.pdf

3. Barron ,J & Zaveri, M ‘Power Restored to Manhattan’s West Side After Major Blackout’ New York Times

4. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

5. Bauman, Ali ‘NYC Blackout: Cause Of Massive Manhattan Outage Under Investigation’ New York CBS local: https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/07/14/new-york-city-power-outage-cause/

6. Hames, E et al, ‘A GIS Approach to Identifying Socially and Medically Vulnerable Older Adult Populations in South Florida’ (2017) Link: https://academic.oup.com/gerontologist/article/57/6/1133/2632031

7. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

8. Frehse, R & Romine, T ‘Preliminary report shows faulty relay protection system caused NYC power outage’ CNN https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/15/us/new-york-city-power-outage-con-edison/index.html

9. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

10. Gastesi, R. (2019) ‘Green Keys! A Plan to Create a Sustainable Florida Keys’ Sustainable Action Plan: http://greenkeys.info/intro-policy-outreach/

11. National Weather Service. ‘Detailed Meteorological Summary on Hurricane Irma’ Hurricane Irma Synopsis: https://www.weather.gov/tae/Irma_technical_summary

12. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

13. Tropical Weather (2019). ‘Hurricane Irma Facts’:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

14. Executive Office of the Governor (2017). ‘Executive Order Number 17-235: Emergency Management- Hurricane Irma’: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SLG-BIZHUB17090402490.pdf

15. IBID

16. Monroe County Emergency Management (2017). ‘Evacuation Information’:https://www2.monroecounty.gov/oem

17. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

18. Goodhue, David (2017). “No automatic re-entry post-irma, county says’ Florida Keys News: https://www.flkeysnews.com/news/local/article172306727.html

19. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

20. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination - UNDAC Field Handbook (2018) https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/1823826E_web_pages.pdf

Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Twenty Years of Attempted United Nations Peacekeeping

‘The year 2019 sees the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) cross the threshold of 20 continuous years. Violence in the country endures despite numerous mandate expansions of the UN peacekeeping mission to a point where it now allows the use of proactive force for mandate implementation. Proactive force stands in opposition to the original concepts of UN peacekeeping, creating conflicting opinions within the authorising United Nations Security Council. The UN’s 20 years in the DRC tells a story of increasingly desperate measures without a mission completion in sight.’ 

By Matthew Wentworth

Origins of the Conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been engulfed in conflict since 1996. The origins of the current violence lie in the massive refugee crisis and spill-over from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda after which Hutus involved in the genocide fled to the east of the DRC and formed armed groups. In response, opposing Tutsi and other opportunistic rebel groups arose. The Congolese government proved unable to control or defeat the various armed groups, some of which directly threatened populations in neighbouring countries and as a result, in 1998, the Second Congolese War broke out. The United Nations’ (UN) presence began just after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was negotiated in August 1999 between the DRC, and five other states in the region: Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It was the UN’s assumption that the Lusaka Agreement would mark the end of the Second Congolese War and that peacekeeping efforts would be necessary to manage the transition period. To this end, the UN deployed a small peacekeeping mission to the DRC with a mandate to observe the ceasefire, ensure disengagement of forces, and maintain liaison between all parties. This mission was titled the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

MONUC: 1999 – 2010

What followed the Lusaka process however was not an end to the war but rather ‘the disintegration from a “rational” war’[i]into a number of privatised, socially, and economically motivated sub-conflicts situated in the east, mainly in the North and South Kivu region. This region alone held 132 active non-state armed actors, causing insecurity in the eastern part of the country and necessitating that MONUC remain deployed. The mission failed, however, in protecting civilians during the 2002 Kisangani Massacre leaving at least 160 dead at the hands of a Rwandan-backed rebel group. MONUC forces similarly failed to act in 2003 during violence in the Northeastern Ituri region. They were unable to stop the carnage, being unauthorised to intervene, and instead ‘hid in their well-protected bases as hundreds were slaughtered’[ii]. The UN troops were said to be unable, under-resourced, and poorly-equipped to halt the widespread killing, atrocities, and displacements throughout 2003[iii]. Due to this failure in the protection mandate, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested an EU Member State to head up a multi-national force to provide security and protection in Ituri. This was a significant move because it amounted to the UN acknowledging the failure of MONUC and requesting that an external body lend assistance. France agreed to be the framework nation and the European Council authorised an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis). The mission suffered from a restrictive geographic remit of 15km2 (mainly the city of Bunia) which merely resulted in the relocation of the atrocities to the fringes of the towns where killings continued. The Interim European Military Force (IEMF), acting under Operation Artemis, though mandated to operate from June – September 2003, withdrew only three weeks after becoming concerned that the upcoming expiration of their authorised mandate would leave them without legal cover in the case of any incident. Nevertheless, the EU force did make progress with regards to civilian protection and in response, the UN, attributing the success to Operation Artemis’ use of force mandate, authorised in September 2003 an increase of military personnel to MONUC and sanctioned all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and North and South Kivu. This was both a recognition of the difficulties with peacekeeping in an area where there is no peace and signified a shift towards a robust peacekeeping mandate with a more proactive use of force.

MONUSCO & The Fall of Goma

In 2010, further changes to the mission were made with ‘stabilisation’ being added to the mission’s title meaning it became the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The name change was seen by critical commentators to be an attempt at rebranding after criticisms from Human Rights Watch and others over MONUC’s lending of direct operational support to the Congolese Army in spite of their negative human rights record This support weakened MONUC’s legitimacy and tarnished its image in the eyes of the locals. With the updated MONUSCO mandate the UN recognised that the successful protection of civilians necessitated a more proactive use of force nationwide. Yet, in 2012, the ongoing cycle of violence, especially in the eastern provinces, remained. The most humiliating incident for MONUSCO came with the fall of the provincial capital of Goma in November 2012 to forces of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. Goma, the capital of North Kivu, with a population of nearly one million, was overrun in the presence of 1500 UN peacekeepers, highlighting the failure of MONUSCO’s efforts to bring stability to the east. MONUSCO forces were unable to defend the city despite the fact that it had actually begun preparation for the M23 offensive as early as July of the same year, recognising that the fall of Goma would be ‘disastrous’[iv]. This was a massive breakdown of MONUSCO’s mandate implementation, most notably civilian protection and assisting the government in extending and protecting state authority[v].

The Force Intervention Brigade

In direct response to this failure of the UN peacekeeping mission, in February 2013, 11 regional countries agreed on a Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC[vi]. This established a brigade-strength Neutral Intervention Force under the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and was a move to explicitly cut out the UN. However, with the estimated cost being £165 million it proved an unattainable goal. In a bid to salvage the last remnants of its reputation in the DRC after not being able to stop the M23 with the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the world, the UN made a counter-proposal to establish and fund a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of troops from the SADC countries. The FIB was subsequently authorised in 2013, and the UN simultaneously mandated MONUSCO to ‘take all necessary measures to “neutralise” and “disarm” groups that were posing a threat to state authority and civilian security’[vii]. The UN was careful to explicitly state that the FIB was established on an exceptional basis in order to avoid creating a precedent or prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping which fundamentally prohibits the use of force except in self-defence. Nevertheless, this assertion did not assuage the concerns of Security Council members who had long been opposed to the mandated use of force by UN missions, most notably China and Russia who warned that ‘what was once the exception now threatens to become the unacknowledged standard practice’[viii]. The two key concerns voiced were that peace-enforcement mandates to UN peacekeeping missions may compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations and jeopardise the safety and security of peacekeepers. It was feared that the use of force could increase the perception that the UN was taking sides and increase the risk of attacks against civilian and humanitarian personnel of the UN. Nevertheless, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, labelled MONUSCO’s FIB a ‘milestone that signalled the resolve of the UN Security Council to address the changing nature of conflict and the operating environment of United Nations peacekeeping’[ix].

Despite Ban Ki-moon’s endorsement, concerns continue to grow, including the doctrinal criticism that the mandate to neutralise all armed groups implicitly presumes that all armed groups are hostile to peace processes and cannot or should not be integrated into a political process. Such mandates ignore the fact that there is an interconnected relationship between rebellion, bargaining, and shifting power relations[x], as evidenced by the events in the months following the start of the M23 rebellion. The fall of Goma forced the Congolese government back to the negotiating table in late 2012/early 2013 and resulted in the aforementioned Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, a peace accord involving national, regional, and international players. The government recognised the dysfunction of the DRC’s state institutions as a root cause of the conflict and committed to substantial reforms to address them, including security sector reform, decentralisation, and democratic reform. 

In 2015, MONUSCO became the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, its mandate has seen similarly dramatic expansions, including from 2007 onwards the extension of state authority, the protection of civilians, and use of surveillance drones being included in the mandate. The extension of MONUSCO’s mandate continues to push the boundaries of what can legitimately considered UN peacekeeping, but this has not been accompanied by a similar identifiable success in establishing or keeping peace in the country. The continued expansion of the use of force and acceptance of robust mandates has shown very little success for a mission that this year turns 20 years old and remains deployed with no clear path to successfully conclude the mission.

Sources:

[i]Berdal, M. (2018) ‘The state of UN peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(5). Pp.721-750.

[ii]Astill, J. (2003) ‘UN troops wait behind razor wire as Congo’s streets run with blood’. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/23/congo.jamesastill [Accessed 6 June 2019].

[iii]Berdal (2018) ‘State of UN Peacekeeping’.

[iv]Tull, D. M. (2018) ‘The limits and unintended consequences of UN peace enforcement: the Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo’. International Peacekeeping, 25(2). Pp.167-190.

iv]BBC News (2012) ‘DR Congo M23 rebels 'enter Goma city'’. BBC News. [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739 [Accessed 1 June 2019].

[vi]Karlsrud, J. (2015) ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’. Third World Quarterly, 36(1). Pp.40-54.

[vii]Karlsrud (2015) ‘UN at War’.

[viii]UNSC Verbatim Record (25 April 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6952, 2.

[ix]Ban Ki-moon (2014) ‘Remarks at Security Council Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping’. UN Peacekeeping. [online] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/remarks-security-council-open-debate-trends-united-nations-peacekeeping[Accessed on 30 May 2019].

[x]Tull (2018) ‘Limits and unintended consequences’.