Abstract
Today, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) represent a growing and neglected topic in international security. Currently, various forms of PMSCs are known to be active in Yemen, Libya, Syria, Belarus, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, and were also instrumental in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, PMSCs are active in non-traditional roles such as the Cartel Wars in Mexico, the Gulf of Aden protecting freighters from Somali pirates, and, beyond these more obvious examples, PMSCs have taken on support roles for standing militaries. Both Canada and the United States (US), for example, maintain PMSC contracts for logistics, training, and supply [1]. PMSCs represent a truly global trend as prominent groups emerge not only from prominent military powers like the US, United Kingdom, France or Russia, but also have emerged from other states such as Iraq, Israel, South Africa, and Peru. Despite the PMSC industry being involved in virtually every conflict of the 21st century in one way or another, the topic remains polarizing and misunderstood. The purpose of this article, and the subsequent series, is not to reinvent the wheel--we will not attempt to define or solve such a polarizing topic. Instead, we aim to shed some light on a far-reaching and under-discussed security issue of privatised warfare.
Keywords: Weapons, Military, Security, PMSC
By Matthew Sutherland
Mercenaries have been labelled as the world's “second oldest profession” [2]. Indeed mercenaries were referenced in the Old Testament and were not only present but a defining feature of European warfare well into the Middle Ages [3]. From much-lauded Swiss pikemen to pirates and privateers these for-profit actors were a significant force in conflicts. It was not until the Peace of Westphalia and the corresponding notion of state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, that "Mercenarism'' faded into obscurity. However, following the post-Cold War demilitarization period, mercenaries began to re-emerge into the global theatre. As their use proliferated PMSCs began to shed negative connotations and earn legitimacy. There were military and logistics gaps to fill and money to be made.
PMSCs and Mercenaries will be interchangeable terms for the purpose of this series. Those within the industry prefer to avoid the term “Mercenary” and the connotations that come along with it and tend to favour “PMSC'' as it fosters an aura of legitimacy. However, the fact remains that any company capable of PMSC contracts is capable of support and training contracts are equally capable of combat contracts and traditional “Mercenarism”, therefore the terms can be used interchangeably. Evidenced by the fact that contemporary PMSCs handle everything and anything, from combat missions to delivering humanitarian aid, to equipping and operating drones [4].
PMSCs do not operate strictly at the behest of their host state - at least not anymore. Beyond states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and multinational corporations represent a significant customer base. Particularly the mining and extraction industries in Africa and the Middle East, opting to pay top dollar for PMSC protection rather than risk the often corrupt local government protection. More concerning is the potential for PMSCs to be used by terrorist or criminal elements ( e.g. Malharma Tactical, a PMSC based out of Uzbekistan, caters exclusively to jihadist extremists. Its members, primarily Sunni, operate not only for ideological reasons but also for profit) [5].
PMSCs also remain active in the humanitarian sector, offering protective services for organisations like the Red Cross. There have even been voices from within the United Nations (UN) suggesting that PMSCs supplement UN peacekeeping missions that lack the required troop numbers [6]. Interestingly, actress Mia Farrow brought forth this exact suggestion in 2008, broaching the topic with the UN and South African PMSC ‘Executive Outcomes’ and aiming to stop the genocide in Darfur [7].
Furthermore, it is important to note that PMSCs are not a phenomenon unique to Western societies. The shadowy Wagner Group, known to have close ties to the Kremlin, has been active throughout Africa and the Middle East as well as Latin America and is currently entrenched in Libya despite international pressure for foreign fighters to be removed from the conflict [8]. Further, Chinese PMSCs have recently begun to equip border troops with drones and advanced tactical gear [9]. PMSCs remain a relatively new development for Asian states, however, the emergence of the industry in China has been well documented and continues to grow.
As the contemporary PMSC faces polarizing public perception, they shed their skin and rebrand. Today's PMSCs are indistinguishable from any other corporation on name alone. Academi, G4S, FDG Corp, DynCorp, MPRI, Erinys International, Defion Internacional all represent the biggest names in the PMSC field. Blackwater for example, notorious for the Nisour Square massacre, remains active today under the name Academi as part of the Constellis group [10], and its largest client remains the US government. In fact, the Constellis group is one of the largest PMSCs in the US market today, active in areas beyond traditional PMSC scope such as insurance, manufacturing, diplomacy and international relations [11]. The leadership groups of PMSCs resemble less a military chain of command and more a corporate boardroom. Some contemporary PMSCs are actually owned by Fortune 500 companies [12]. As larger corporations continue to not only utilise PMSC services but outright purchase them, experts have asserted that someday corporations like Exxon Mobil or Google may “hire an army” [13].
“PMSC’s are adaptive entities that evolve as a function of forces external to themselves” [14] – so, as the international landscape shifts, so does the role of the PMSC. Beyond a new customer base, PMSCs adapt to emerging trends in international security as well. Cyberwarfare for example is not immune to this growing tendency as “hackback firms” have emerged offering a sort of “digital deterrence” [15]. A growing number of companies also sell offensive cyber capabilities, providing clients with the ability to hack cell phones, computers, and databases [16].
For how ubiquitous PMSCs have become in contemporary international security the topic remains misunderstood and contentious. As an expert, Dr Sean McFate notes: “Mercenaries are more powerful than experts realize, a grave oversight” [18]. Despite this, the field of study is limited and often characterized by rigid definitions attempting to categorize PMSCs. Distinctions of size, capabilities, customer base, country of origin and region of operation have all been proposed to varying degrees. This is especially problematic when considering how easy it is for PMSCs to blur these lines. For example, PMSC engaging in training and logistical support can and often have transitioned to combat operations [19]. After all, it is easier to justify a larger contract publicly by burying clauses including combat operations under a mountain of seemingly benign support roles.
The resurgence of "Mercenarism" is one of the most polarizing trends to emerge in recent years, due not only to the relative lack of attention but to its potential impact. The privatised force has been evidenced to be both incredibly useful and dangerous. PMSCs have been used to fight both extremist groups and internationally recognized governments alike. The positive or negative effects of a PMSC have as much to do with their patrons as they do with the companies themselves. Despite its potential to influence world order, the private market for force remains criminally misunderstood. Beyond its potential impacts, history or even its future, it is important to understand the breadth of the topic. When discussing both the combat, noncombat, and support capabilities of PMSCs it is important to understand that they can and often will, blur the lines between active and passive operations, as it is imperative to understand the varied roles PMSCs provide to varied customers. . In this series we will discuss the theoretical implications of PMSCs, their widespread use, and emerging trends.
Sources:
[1] Singer, P.W. (2007) “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.” Cornell University Press; Updated edition (November 26, 2007)
[2] McFate, Sean. (2017) “The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order”. Oxford University Press
[3] Ibid.
[4] Prem, Berenike. (2018) “Who Am I? The Blurring of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) Category” in Security Privatization. Oldrich Bures and Helena Carrapico, eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp51-79 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63010-6.
[5] McFate, Sean (2018) “Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today.” National Defense University Press. Accessed January 23, 2021. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2031922/mercenaries-and-war-understanding-private-armies-today/.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] BBC News. (2020) “Wagner, Shadowy Russian Military Group, ‘Fighting in Libya.’” May 7, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52571777.
[9] Xuanzun, Liu. (2020) “Private arms firms equip PLA with intelligent equipment for better border defense” Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1205362.shtml
[10] Prem, p. 66
[11] Ibid.
[12] Singer, p. 43
[13] McFate, “Mercenaries and War”
[14] Prem, 54
[15] McFate, “Mercenaries and War”
[16] Burt, Tom. (2020) “Cyber Mercenaries Don’t Deserve Immunity,” [online] available from https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/21/cyber-immunity-nso/. Accessed Jan 23 2021.
[17] Prem, 66
[18] McFate, “Mercenaries and War”
[19] Ibid
