Recent far-right extremist attacks in Germany, like the attacks in Hanau on the 19th of February this year and the attack in Halle in late 2019, have started a new debate [1]. The media regularly reports about new right-wing extremist movements and far-right ideologies that are on the rise. However, others argue that the latest attacks in Germany are not as surprising as they may seem. The case of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) which took place almost ten years ago gives an idea of the German intelligence systems’ struggle to investigate potential violence stemming from right-wing extremism in its early stages.
In May 2013, Munich held the highest-profile trial in Germany for the disclosure of the neo-Nazi terror network, the National Socialist Underground (NSU). They were responsible for ten racially motivated murders, two bomb explosions in Cologne, and several robberies between 1998 and 2011 [2]. These events were a nation-wide shock, but should not have come as any surprise – as multiple NSU commission reports later revealed [3]. It was only after the NSU released video material and claimed responsibility for the ten murders that the security service made the connection between the attacks and the network [4]. Following this, the state established a parliamentary inquiry committee to look into alleged ‘systematic failures’ of the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic (the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV), and the federal police (the Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) [5]. The trial questioned the role of the BfV and the causes for its failure to identify the threat, however many questions remain unanswered [6]. This article examines the question ‘to what extent did the terror attacks led by the NSU constitute an intelligence failure by the German intelligence system?’
The manifestation of several interrelated errors within the security system explains how German intelligence failed to connect the dots and stop the NSU attacks. Sandow-Quirks defines intelligence as, ‘a cyclical process by which information, broadly defined, is acquired, processed, evaluated, stored and used as the basis for action [7].’ With multiple failures evident within the intelligence cycle, I argue that the handling of the NSU attacks represents a major intelligence failure on the part of German intelligence
COMMUNICATION CHAIN DYSFUNCTION
The lack of communication within the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany (BfV) contributed to a failure in effectively processing intelligence data. In their report, the commission of inquiry into the NSU attacks observed that the failure was not down to poor or insufficient collection of raw data, but rather bureaucratic dysfunction within the system [8]. The intelligence service was well aware of the existence and violent potential of right-wing terrorists [9], especially after the discovery of a garage containing high explosives rented by Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt. The trio had been known to the police as members of the so-called Thuringia Home Guard [10], a militant neo-Nazi collective, since the 1990’s [11].
After the Cold War, the German Federation implemented a separation of powers between the domestic federal intelligence agencies and the federal police [12]. This was a structural control mechanism to protect citizens and prevent excessive personal information sharing between the agencies [13]. It is important to note that Germany has no overarching domestic intelligence agency; the responsibility of intelligence collection is split among the different states within the country. This structural separation inhibits intelligence data sharing. The terrorist trio operated within several German states, however information from investigations into the murders of migrants was not adequately shared [14]. Consequently, the police never drew any connection between the murders even though they were all committed with the same Ceska 83 pistol [15]. The intelligence structure and the restriction of information sharing in Germany both hinder the ability to make proper connections between investigations [16].
SOURCE PROTECTION: INTELLIGENCE AGENTS AND THE NSU NETWORK
The interaction between the domestic intelligence service and the right-wing network offers greater understanding as to why German intelligence did not follow up any investigations regarding the NSU. Whether intelligence agents purposely or unconsciously supported the NSU network is a matter of debate. The commission reports show that information from informants and covert actions had been leaked from the BfV to the NSU network [17]. One murder case in 2006 stands out significantly and sheds dubious light on the role of the intelligence agents. The victim was shot in an internet café in which Andreas Temme, a domestic secret service agent was present [18]. The agent did not notify the police of his presence at the murder scene and later on, after being tracked down by the police, denied having witnessed the murder [19]. If the intelligence system fails in profiling their own informants and agents’ motives and does not properly vet their backgrounds, as in Temme’s case, then information risks being misused, hidden and in some cases falsified [20]. In other words, the problem goes further than communicational errors. The intertwining of the BfV and the radical right network was counterproductive. Alrich and Richterova concluded that the European national accountability bodies, whose role is to ensure the objectivity and accuracy of the intelligence services, have performed poorly during the past decade [21]. The failure of intelligence oversight to sufficiently check the backgrounds of the secret service agents constitutes another error in the cycle of failure regarding the NSU attacks.
FAILURE OF PERCEPTION
The German political agenda in the 21st century resulted in the underestimation of right-wing terrorism and thus ineffective policy formulation. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 led to a shift in the German intelligence structure. Threats were redefined and accordingly prioritised [22]. When it was revealed that the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda were planned in Hamburg, Germany was put under the spotlight and accused of failing to spot a potential Jihadist terrorist threat [23]. Germany joined the War on Terror after 9/11, publishing several BfV reports that underlined their increased perception of Islamist radicalisation as a serious threat [24]. In 2004 the BKA and BfV established the ‘Common Terrorism Defense Center’. Its main purpose is to collectively investigate and share files regarding Islamic extremism and jihadist terrorism [25]. At that time, there was no corresponding intelligence-sharing mechanism focused on right-wing terrorism. The BfV in 2004 even concluded that, ‘Right now, there are no recognizable far-right terrorist organisations or structures in Germany’ [26].
Investigations into the ten NSU murders were not connected before 2011, when the terrorist trio was discovered. Investigations into the murders had almost exclusively focused on the key characteristic ‘migrants’ and the ‘victims’ alleged ties to organised criminal groups such as the ‘Turkish Mafia’ [27]. As a result of those discriminating misperceptions, the threat of radical right-wing militancy receded into the background. Although it was well known at an early stage that the terrorist trio had significant radical beliefs and access to explosives, it seemed unimaginable that they could become a threat.
CONCLUSION
The first error within the German intelligence system can be found in a lack of coordination between the BfV and the BKA [29]. The second concerns the failure of intelligence accountability and the role of the covert agents within the radical right-wing network. They did not merely hinder investigations, but seemingly contributed to the success of the NSU. The third error appeared at the stage of analysis and the inability of the security service to effectively recognize and prioritize threats.
The secret service can be viewed as a single entity, whereby an error in one aspect does not necessarily cause an entire intelligence failure, if the other parts of the security service are properly functioning. In the case of the NSU terror attack, it would be reasonable to argue that an intelligence failure was unavoidable, but not every failure was rooted in intelligence. Rather, several malfunctions within the security system, including the irresponsibility of policy and decision-makers, came together in time and place and therefore constituted a huge, systemic failure of intelligence.
Sources
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[2] McGowan, Lee (2014) ‘Right-Wing Violence in Germany: Assessing the Objectives, Personalities and Terror Trail of the National Socialist Underground and the State's Response to it,’ German Politics Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 196-212.
[3] Von Der Behrens, Antonia (2018) ‘Lessons from Germany’s NSU Case,’ Race & Class Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 84–91.
[4] ‘NSU-Bekennervideo’ (2015) YouTube video, posted by ‘ZOB,’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bLdBWtCzD4
[5] Von Der Behrens, ‘Lessons from Germany’s NSU case’
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[9] Von Der Behrens, Antonia (2017) ‘Summary of Political, Social and Legal Aspects of the Case against the National Socialist Underground (NSU)’.
[10] In German: Thüringer Heimatschutz
[11] Virchow, ‘Der »NSU« Und Der Staatliche Sicherheitsapparat,’ pp. 147.
[12] This is governed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in § 2 para. 1 and § 8 para. 3 BVerfSchG.
[13] Virchow, ‘Der »NSU« Und Der Staatliche Sicherheitsapparat,’ pp.145.; Glossar online "Trennungsgebot", Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, accessed December 2, 2019, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/_lT
[14] Hillebrand, Claudia (2019) ‘Placebo Scrutiny? Far-Right Extremism and Intelligence Accountability in Germany,’ Intelligence and National Security Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 38-61.
[15] Von Der Behrens, ‘Lessons from Germany’s NSU case’
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[17] Hillebrand, Placebo Scrutiny? Far-Right Extremism.
[18] Von Der Behrens, ‘Lessons from Germany’s NSU case’
[19] Schultz, Tanjev, NSU: Der Terror von rechts.
[20] Förster, Andreas, et al. (2014) ‘Geheimsache NSU. Zehn Morde, von Aufklärung keine Spur,’ pp.121.
[21] Aldrich, Richard J. and Daniela Richterova (2018) ‘Ambient Accountability: Intelligence Services in Europe and the Decline of State Secrecy,’ West European Politics 41, no. 4, pp. 1011.
[22] Heuer, Richards J. (2005) ‘Limits of Intelligence Analysis’ Orbis Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 80
[23] Schultz, Tanjev. NSU: Der Terror von rechts, pp. 63.
[24] Hillebrand, Placebo Scrutiny? Far-Right Extremism.
[25] Translated from German: Gemeinsames Terrosismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ). Bundeskriminalamt. https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Kooperationen/GTAZ/gtaz_node.html
[26] Verfassungsschutz, Bundesamt (2004) Radikalisierungsprozesse und extremistische Milieus. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz Köln.
[27]Von Der Behrens, Antonia (2017) ‘Summary of Political, Social and Legal Aspects of the Case against the National Socialist Underground (NSU)’; Virchow, ‘Der »NSU« Und Der Staatliche Sicherheitsapparat,’ pp.145.; Glossar online "Trennungsgebot", Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, accessed December 2, 2019, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/_lT
[28] Koehler Daniel, edt. (2017) ‘Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century: The National Socialist Underground and the History of Terror from the Far Right in Germany,’ Journal of Terrorism Research Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 89-91.