Western navies have found themselves increasingly reliant on weapons systems doctrinally understood as “last lines of defence” in the Red Sea. This article investigates the nature of the Houthi threat and the operational intricacies faced by the “Prosperity Guardian” and “Aspides” coalition missions. This article serves to analyse some of the most relevant developments in the military technology and procurement fields.
By PABLO VILLAR BOLAÑOS
Escalating Maritime Threats
The security environment in the sea off Yemen is becoming ever more uncertain. Since November 2023, international vessels (both of commercial and military nature) have suffered 145 separate attacks in the area, and 4 ships are currently being held hostage somewhere along the primary navigation routes [1]. This unparalleled disruption of commercial shipping has sent shock waves through the global economic dynamics and continues to impact greatly on many countries' assets and interests.
The Houthi movement has exhibited its capacity to target shipping via Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Submarine Vehicles (USV), missiles and other aerial and aquatic weapons, and may even have successfully hit underwater technology installations in the region [2]. To tackle this threat, both the U.S. and the E.U. have deployed a series of naval assets that have adopted both a defensive (Op. “Aspides”) and an offensive (Op. “Prosperity Guardian”) mission. This article will explore a part of the technological perspective of these two task forces in the current Red Sea scenario.
The Houthi faction has employed anti-ship technology for over a decade; it was not until quite recently, however, that the by-then outdated Soviet-made missiles were replaced by modern Chinese and subsequently Irani weapon systems. Teheran’s focus on naval coercion along the Persian Gulf and throughout Aden has resulted in a vehement support not only via arming operations, but also through the granting of wider military aid in the form of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, including radar and precision-guided technologies [3] to this faction.
The Role of CIWS in Modern Maritime Defence
The Houthi menace, as explained before, consists not only of their use of anti-ship missiles, either in their ballistic or cruise categories; unmanned vehicles of the aerial and surface kinds, as well as speedboats, have repeatedly targeted international shipping these last 6 months. To tackle all of these threats, the Western navies have resorted to an unlikely asset in their arsenal: the Close In Weapons System, or CIWS. As per the US Navy fact file, it is “a complete combat weapon system that automatically detects, evaluates, tracks, engages, and performs ill assessment against anti-ship missiles and high-speed aircraft threats in an extended self-defence battle space envelope around the ship” [4]. In practice, CIWS are usually employed as a last line of defence, tackling enemy rockets or missile rounds before they can reach their target.
But how can a 50-year-old, complementary defensive system be making the headlines in an asymmetric conflict in 2024? Originally developed around the later part of the Vietnam War as a hard-kill defensive system against the Soviet missiles, it is an electronically operated, fully automatic doctrinal successor of the long-famed Bofors AA gun that gained acclaim during World War II for its effectiveness in defending ships and ground installations against aircraft. Following several technological overhauls, and after some publicised incidents in the Gulf War, the CIWS continues to be operated in the U.S. Navy, Royal Navy and Hellenic Navy vessels currently deployed in the Red Sea. It could appear that, hardly being a spearpoint of the Western navies’ ships’ defence system, they would gradually be sinking into irrelevance and eventual phasing-out.
However, and although it is a technology that has been present in their ships for decades, the current scenario off Yemen has put them to use in a scale that was practically unpredictable. The current operations, remarkably, have reportedly bore witness to the first time a U.S. Navy CIWS managed to shoot down an enemy airborne threat [5]. This barrier that had stood for over 50 years has been broken not once, but several times in quick succession by different navies, only in the space of a few months, in a very concrete area with apparently heightening tensions, amidst constantly complicating regional tensions. Drones, UAV and USV, and not only missiles, have all been targeted by CIWS. They have been proven a vital resource, as well – USS Gravely has admitted to have resorted to CIWS to eliminate an Anti Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) that was, at the time of its shooting down, less than a mile away from the ship.
These facts offer a remarkable analytic standpoint to the allied struggles against the Yemeni insurgence. As opposed to other naval deployments, such as E.U. 's Operation “Atalanta”, the present experience is one of extensive ordinance use, with many weapon and threat detection systems being put under heavy operational stress. For the majority of the navy vessels currently in the Red Sea, the interceptive measures they have had to deploy have been incredibly extraordinary. The U.S. Navy, remarkably, has had to demand its Congress to pass a plan for a supplemental spending bill to maintain its operational levels in the area. More explicitly, they have underlined they need to urgently replenish over $1B worth of ordinance exclusively spent by ships currently deployed in the Red Sea [6].
Conclusion
Current protracted conflicts, such as the one in Ukraine, have come to highlight a risk faced by many Western powers today; the rate of ammunition consumption is growing and remains critically high along many categories. Industries and militaries alike are increasingly incapable of managing this rhythm of fired shots in regard to their ordinance’s capacity of production.
The military operational challenges of the present and the immediate future will likely require a wider understanding of the traditional threat framework. The myriad of possibilities available even for non-state actors such as the Houthis to critically strike assets and infrastructure is worrying: their variety is constantly increasing and some of their weapons are also getting cheaper every day. Our security, indeed, ought to include an effective layering of defences to engage all of this; it may even be the case that we might find that the cheapest and oldest systems are the best match to counter the cheapest and newest weapons.
References
[1] Hellenic European Union Operational Headquarters (EL EU OHQ) (2024) “Maritime Security Off Yemen Coast Threat Update – 18th Week of 2024”, [online] available from https://on-shore.mschoa.org/media/1933/20240429-aspides-maritime-security-threat.pdf
[2] Vreÿ, F and Blaine, M “Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability”, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 9th. [online] available from https://africacenter.org/spotlight/red-sea-indian-ocean-attacks-africa-maritime-vulnerability/#:~:text=Missile%20and%20armed%20drone%20strikes,trade%20for%20all%20of%20Africa.
[3] Hinz, F (2024) “Houthi anti-ship missile systems: getting better all the time”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 4th January. [online] available from https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/
[4] Navy Production Division (2022) “Owners and Operators Manual”, All Hands Magazine, [online] available from https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/14/2002922620/-1/-1/1/OANDO%202022%20FINAL.PDF
[5] Mizokami, K (2024) “The Navy’s Missile-Killing Gatling Gun Is a Weapon of Last Resort – And It Just Made Its First Score”, Popular Mechanics, 6th February. [online] available from https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a46615851/navy-phalanx-cisw-weapon-of-last-resort/
[6] Shkolnikova, S (2024) “Navy seeks urgent replenishment of $1B in munitions spent countering Iran-led attacks in Middle East”, Stars and Stripes, 16th April. [online] available from https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-04-16/navy-missiles-israel-middle-east-iran-houthis-13568189.html
