Abstract
India’s contemporary relations with Southeast Asia can be viewed through a prism of historical, religious, and cultural influences which it has had in the region for more than a millennium. These relations include the ancient Indianised kingdoms and maritime empires of Sailendra, Funan, Majapahit and Khmer respectively and a legacy that continues to be celebrated through the spread of the Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic faiths which have shaped the contemporary societies of these states.
Since the 20th century, the bilateral relations between the two were impacted by highly divergent positions that were dictated by the onset of the Cold War. This article seeks to trace the historical evolution of relations between India and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states through the dimensions of: (a) Cold War stature, (b) competition with China for strategic influence, and (c) its own domestic development goals with respect to its North-Eastern region.
Keywords: ASEAN, China, India, Development, Maritime Strategy
By Vaibhav Dewan
Bilateral Relations During the Cold War
After gaining independence in 1947, India under the leadership of Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru, highlighted a desire to model its foreign policy firmly by placing key emphasis on building close diplomatic relations with fellow newly independent Asian states [1]. This strategy was based on the common values of anti-imperialism aimed at creating an alliance centred on the notion of Pan-Asian solidarity.
Nehru aspired to reach this goal by spearheading the Non-Aligned Movement, an association of nations that did not officially ally with American or the Soviet-led blocs in the Cold War. However, this ambition did not materialize. In many of his writings, Nehru often referred to Southeast Asia as greater India. This sparked strong apprehensions among these states about India’s hegemonic aspirations and the divide grew further when both India and Southeast Asian states found themselves on the opposite ends of the alliance spectrum in the Cold War climate. In stark contrast to India’s position of non-alignment, a number of states in the region joined the US-led SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation), which was established to contain the spread of communism in the region. India viewed the creation of ASEAN as a trojan horse of the Western world’s imperial ambitions and with its ties with the Soviet Union deepening in the 1970s, mutual suspicions between the two persisted. India thus found itself isolated from playing an active role in the region’s geopolitics.
Soviet Demise Forces New Delhi to “Look East”
1991 was a crucial year that marked a paradigm shift in India’s foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived New Delhi of an important ally that had constantly provided assistance through arms sales and diplomatic support on all international platforms. That year, the Indian economy also underwent large-scale economic liberalization as then-PM Narsimha Rao highlighted his vision for India to become a tiger economy, based on the similar developmental models that led to exponential economic growth in several East Asian states. Aimed at fostering strong economic and maritime partnerships, this initiative was termed the “Look East Policy”.
ASEAN welcomed these reforms and, as a part of a larger re-approachment in bilateral relations, it granted India the status of a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 for research and collaboration in business, technology and tourism. India continued to strategically display its soft power by sending its skilled technological workforce to ASEAN states to set up English-language training centres alongside offering unilateral tariff concessions on the import of goods from these countries. Besides economic co-operation, India’s initiation of Mekong-Ganges River Co-operation with Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam in 2000 was an important standpoint that was aimed at fostering cross-cultural exchange between New Delhi and these states [2]. Since then, ASEAN has also become India’s fourth-largest trading partner with 86.9 billion US dollars worth of trade taking place between the two [3]. Southeast Asia has been a crucial component of India’s regional outreach strategy in forging alternative economic partnerships in the face of New Delhi’s post-Cold War foreign policy.
The China Factor
India’s failure to carve out a regional sphere of influence for itself in South Asia has resulted in its neighbours establishing close commercial ties with China. As Beijing has recently gained access to the ports of Gwadar (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Colombo (Sri Lanka), New Delhi has grown increasingly apprehensive of the danger of a potential maritime encirclement [4]. Therefore, seeking regional cooperation with ASEAN provides New Delhi with a counterweight to potentially keep a check on an increasingly assertive China that seeks regional domination in Asia [5]. Beijing has continued to display its increasing military might through projecting nuclear power and has regularly used aggressive intimidation tactics vis-à-vis its neighbours in the South China Sea. Thus, vulnerability on the maritime frontier has made ASEAN look towards India as a counterweight to deter China’s aggressive tendencies in the region. This trend has been demonstrated in an increased number of joint naval exercises such as: SIMBEX: Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise, which has been held annually since 1994 and the MILAN-Multi Nation Exercise, which takes place biennially between the navies of India, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia [6]. Vietnam has significantly expanded its security ties with New Delhi since signing the official Defence Protocol in 2000. It has not only sought military assistance through the sale of military helicopters, but has granted India the access to develop the Nha Trang port, which occupies a strategic location in the South China Sea.
Domestic Integration Through Regional Connectivity
Since coming to power in 2014, the Indian government under PM Narendra Modi has rebranded the Look East Policy as the Act East Policy (AEP). This policy shift seeks both to bring structure to New Delhi’s foreign policy and to achieve its domestic developmental goals specifically within India’s North Eastern region. The area has been of key concern as its landlocked geography and inadequate infrastructure, along with its history of separatist insurgencies, have often hindered its development [7]. Through the framework of AEP, India seeks to achieve deeper political and economic development goals for the region by creating sophisticated markets and connectivity links between the region and Southeast Asia. The current infrastructural initiatives include the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway that will span more than 1,360 km. The importance of potential investment from ASEAN is considered a strategically important step in addressing grievances of the region not enjoying the benefits of economic and industrial growth occurring in other parts of India [8].
Conclusion
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of China have significantly altered the nature of Indo-ASEAN relations. While the perception of Beijing as a mutual threat has brought about a strategic convergence in bolstering security ties between the two, the relationship will become increasingly crucial as US-China strategic competition continues in Asia. Indo-ASEAN relations can be expected to strengthen further through economic linkages and security cooperation, as another US-led order takes shape in the Indo-Pacific region and as calls for systemic economic decoupling from Beijing grow louder. For India, the Act East policy seeks to fulfil its long-term developmental goals for its North Eastern region and to open up an additional avenue to accelerate its economic growth to counter Beijing’s rising clout in South Asia.
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