Abstract
The internet forms an important component of ideological radicalisation, as it provides a platform for like-minded individuals to communicate in virtual communities like the ‘Chanosphere,’ which in turn allows for extremist groups to develop safe havens of communication and information exchange [1]. Using the case study of a cluster of alt-right terrorist attacks initiated by the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019, this analysis will demonstrate that alt-right memes played a central role in radicalisation, in that they acted as vessels of encoded racist ideology which used ‘weaponised irony’ as a means of communicating group identity [2].
By Francis de Satge
At the outset of this article, it is necessary to consider Gill et al’s assertion that it is difficult to tell where the internet stops as ‘there is no clear dichotomy between online and offline radicalization’ [3]. For instance, the impact of memetic visual culture on alt-right radicalisation inevitably does not take place in a vacuum and is intertwined with other elements. For the purposes of this analysis, radicalisation can be loosely defined as ‘the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs which may or may not result in a terrorist attack [4].
An important part of this radicalization process is the ‘sense of belonging’ that alt-right adherents find online [5]. Bogertz and Fielitz explain that many recent extreme-right terrorists have not been members of political organisations or militias, but participants in ‘digital hate communities’ that have used specialised visual language to communicate ideas [6]. This language often takes the form of memes, which can be defined as ‘cultural units of meaning that develop and spread virally by copying or combining with other units’ [7]. Memes can be any easily disseminated textual, visual or auditory item(s) that act as a holder of cultural meaning for an audience [8].
Key online platforms used for sharing alt-right ideas and memes are ‘Chans’ (e.g. 4Chan, 8Chan, Endchan, Neinchan, among others], anonymous online imageboards frequented by extreme-right meme-posters. The network of Chan sites has created what Baele et al. term the ‘Chanosphere’. Chans allow anons (anonymous contributors) to post memes and captions on the topic threads of different boards (e.g., cartoons, pornography, etc.). The ‘politically incorrect’ board on 4Chan, for example, and its equivalent on 8Chan “8Chan/pol” (now defunct) were central in the 2019 cluster of alt-right terror attacks, with 8chan/pol being used by three of the five attackers to post their manifestos, many of which contained references to memes [9].
To the untrained eye, extreme right memes are politically incorrect or edgy satire, not potential terrorist content. However, their specialised in-jokes and jargon, which often reference seemingly innocuous pop culture items (e.g. cartoons, films, video games), are often uploaded with the intention of ‘rolling off brazen racism’ as ‘half-joking’ [10]. By consequence, the ubiquity of this niche style of humour reinforces the in-group identity of alt-right Chan anons.
To the trained eye, as Perez reiterates, alt-right memes are not ‘merely an invitation to humourous fun, but to white supremacist ideology’ [11]. The ‘Pepe the Frog’ cartoon marks an example of an avatar strategically claimed by the extreme-right to disguise racism as irony. The harmless-looking frog, created by cartoonist Matt Furie for the slacker comic Boys Club in 2005, was categorised as a hate symbol by the Anti-Defamation League in 2016 [12]. Following its popularisation on social media platform Myspace and 4Chan in 2008, the cartoon was adopted by the alt-right in the 2010s, and often stylised as a Nazi, and later as Donald Trump (see appendix).
In this way, alt-right memes are no longer an internet subculture but have been weaponised in the highest echelons of American politics. In 2015, then-President Donald Trump posted an image on his Twitter page of himself represented as a ‘Pepe the Frog’ humanoid (see appendix). This served to both legitimise the politically loaded visual language of the alt-right and tacitly validate its ideas.
Moreover, the role of Chan sites and memes on alt-right terrorism in recent times cannot be understated, exemplified by the wave of attacks in 2019 occurring in Christchurch, Poway, El Paso, Bairam, and Halle (see appendix). The Christchurch shooter, Brenton Tarrant, who can be considered a catalyst for the subsequent attacks, encouraged others to make memes shortly before his attack, posting on 8Chan ‘I have provided links to my writings below, please do your part by spreading my message, making memes and shitposting as you usually do’ [16]. The shooter had also written ‘Remove Kebab’ (a reference to a popular anti-Muslim meme) on one of his rifles, and his manifesto made numerous references to alt-right in-jokes. He live-streamed the attack on Facebook using a helmet-mounted camera and received 4000 views before the video was removed, along with 300 000 reuploads in the first 24 hours [17].
The widespread broadcast of the video created the conditions for mass meme production and quickly inspired memes comparing the point-of-view footage of the attack with popular ‘first-person shooter games’ like Call of Duty. This marks a further phenomenon on Chan sites, the gamification of violence, where anons compare real-life terror attacks with video games (e.g. the El Paso shooter also referred to as Call of Duty in his manifesto). The Christchurch shooter was portrayed in memes as the martyr ‘Saint Tarrant,’ and has been compared to Jesus in the Chanosphere (see appendix)[18].
According to Baele et al, the Christchurch shooter’s attack initiated what they termed ‘the Tarrant effect,’ due to the similarities of the attacks that followed [19]. Like Tarrant, all four subsequent attackers posted a manifesto on a Chan site or similar imageboard. Furthermore, shortly before their attack, two live-streamed their attacks, and two attempted to livestream but failed. Three of the four attackers cited Tarrant as an inspiration, and three of the four posted manifestos demonstrating similar ideological dispositions. It is therefore a reasonable assertion that Tarrant influenced both the subsequent attackers as well as the cognitive radicalisation of Chan anons by referring to familiar alt-right memes in his manifesto, the inscriptions on his rifle and the ‘in-group’ jokes made at the beginning of his livestream.
Conclusion
The impact of the ‘Chanosphere’ on the radicalisation puzzle is inevitably more multifaceted than the scope of this article allows. However, memes have been shown to be important elements of alt-right internet subcultures, as they act as ideologically loaded statements disguised as dark, politically incorrect jokes. Their easy accessibility and ability to be reproduced as ‘units of cultural transmission’ in a closed internet echo chamber can reinforce group identity and ideology that can have deadly consequences in reality [21]. More research is therefore required to investigate the role that memes, and the visual culture of extremist groups more generally, play in driving cognitive radicalisation that may result in political violence.
Sources
[1] Baele, S.J., Brace, L. & Travis G. Coan. (2020) The ‘Tarrant effect’: what impact did far-right attacks have on the 8chan forum?, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 3.
[2] Greene, V (2019) "“Deplorable” Satire: Alt-Right Memes, White Genocide Tweets, and Redpilling Normies", Studies in American humor, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 31-69.
[3] Gill, P., Corner E., Conway, M., Thornton A, Bloom M., Horgan., J. (2017) "Terrorist use of the Internet by the Numbers: Quantifying Behaviors, Patterns, and Processes." Criminology & Public Policy 16, no. 1: 113
[4] Bogost, I. (2019_ The Meme Terrorists. The Atlantic; https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/04/california-synagogue-shooting-worse-you-thought/588352/; Winkler C.K., Dauber, C.E (2015).Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment. United States Army War College, 17.
[5] Gaudette, T., Scrivens, R. & Venkatesh, V. (2020) "The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Right-Wing Extremists", Terrorism and political violence, 8.
[6] Bogertz, L. & Fielitz. (2020) The Visual Culture of Far-Right Terrorism. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. https://blog.prif.org/2020/03/31/the-visual-culture-of-far-right-terrorism/
[7] Ibid.
[8] Liyanage, C. (2020) The Cult of Kek: An Archaic Belief System for an Alt-Right “New Age.” Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/12/03/the-cult-of-kek-an-archaic-belief-system-for-an-alt-right-new-age/
[9] Baele, S.J., Brace, L. & Travis G. Coan. (2020), 2.
[10] Greene, V. (2019), 38.
[11] Pérez, R. (2017) “Racism Without Hatred? Racist Humor and the Myth of ‘Colorblindness,’” Sociological Perspectives 60(5), 966.
[12] Frank, P. (2016) The Strange Internet Journey of Pepe ”The Chilled-Out Stonger Frog. The Huffington Post. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/matt-furie-pepe-frog-meme_n_57ed3a6fe4b0c2407cdc4298
[13] Dafaure, M. (2020) "The “Great Meme War:” the Alt-Right and its Multifarious Enemies", Angles, 10(10); Belew, K. (2020) Why ”Stand Back and Stand By” Should Set Off Alarm Bells. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/opinion/trump-proud-boys.html.
[14] Liyanage, C. (2020).
[15] Bogertz, L. & Fielitz. (2020).
[16] Evans, R. 2019. Shitposting, inspirational terrorism and the Christchurch Mosque Massacre. Bellingcat. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-ofworld/2019/03/15/shitposting-inspirational-terrorism-and-the-christchurch-mosque-massacre/
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ben Am, A., Weimann, G. (2020). Fabricated Martyrs: The Warrior-Saint Icons of Far-Right Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism. 14(5), 135.
[19] Baele, S.J., Brace, L. & Travis G. Coan. (2020).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Greene, V (2019).
Appendix:
15 March 2019: Brenton Tarrant kills 51 people in mass shootings at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.
27 April 2019: John T Earnest shoots dead a worshipper during Friday prayers at a synagogue in Poway, California.
3 August 2019: Patrick Crusius kills 23 people in a mass shooting targeting Hispanics at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas.
10 August 2019: Philip Manshaus attempts to attack a mosque in Baerum, Norway, but is repelled by worshippers.
9 October 2019: Stephan Balliet kills two people after failing to gain entry into a Synagogue in Halle, Germany.
