Abstract
Riddled with persistent conflicts, bitter rivalries and a plethora of economic, social and political fractures, the Middle East stands today as one of the most convoluted regions of the globe. As such, the international community holds a great interest in promoting effective policies to avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The tensions coming from Iran's nuclear program have been for long a top priority in this area, but other regional actors should not be overlooked, as they may play an important role in the near future’s nuclear dynamics. This is the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whose perspectives on nuclear technology, both for civil and military uses, will be explored in this article.
By Juan Javier Macho Guerrero
In 2018, shortly after the United States unilaterally pulled out from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as the Nuclear Deal), Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declared that if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia would do the same as soon as possible [1], a stance that was further reaffirmed by the Kingdom´s Minister of Foreign Affairs [2]. Two years later, in 2020, The Wall Street Journal revealed that Saudi Arabia had constructed a facility for processing uranium in cooperation with China [3]. In addition, an initial report identified potential uranium ore reserves that could provide enough fissile material to fuel several reactors, and even a surplus to export [4]. Perhaps overshadowed by the Iranian issue, nuclearization in Saudi Arabia has been a growing concern for some time and raises several questions: how developed is the Saudi nuclear program? Is it focused on civilian or military purposes? What can we expect from the near future?
The prospective employment of nuclear technology in the Kingdom is not a new topic. As early as 2006, the Gulf Cooperation Council decided to promote the study and implementation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes [5]. Three years later, Saudi Arabia established its first specialized research centre, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE). In 2011, the coordinator of scientific collaboration at KA-CARE announced the construction of 16 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years at a cost of more than $80 billion in cooperation with several countries like South Korea, China, Russia and Japan with the objective of diversifying the economy and reducing the oil dependency [6].
Indeed, Saudi Arabia now has one of the lowest oil extraction costs (around $10 per barrel) and the largest proven oil reserves (about 25% of all discovered up to this point) [7], which has traditionally positioned them as the world´s biggest supplier (responsible for 12% of total production in 2020) [8] and accounting for over 40% of its GDP in 2019 [9]. These trends have had a clear positive effect, providing economic development for decades, but could also represent a liability since the country is a big oil consumer as well. The Kingdom’s growing population and modernizing economy require a rising amount of energy each year, but oil production is not projected to expand accordingly. The risk of internal demand meeting the supply capacity, and therefore lacking any oil to export, is a real possibility that could hit a devastating blow to the Kingdom´s revenues [10]. In this scenario, nuclear energy arises as a reasonable solution capable of producing a surplus of relatively clean energy and diversifying the national energy market.
But, perhaps the most obvious use of nuclear technology is in the security sphere. The Saudi rulers must confront a constant sense of vulnerability as the country is located in a hostile environment, surrounded by pending threats coming not only from Iran, but Israel, Iraq and Yemen as well. The nuclear weapon, some would argue, could be used as the definitive deterrence tool to safeguard the territory's integrity and buttress their regional influence. Getting an atomic bomb, however, is far from an easy feat. Even though dozens of countries have pursued this path in diverse stages, very few have ultimately succeeded. Despite its ambitious long-term plans (often postponed or rescaled), Saudi Arabia still presents an infrastructure that is by large regarded as rudimentary and underdeveloped. Simply put, at this moment it lacks both a nuclear power facility structure and the necessary scientific knowledge to enrich uranium, convert nuclear fuel, or operate nuclear reactors [11].
Some have speculated that Saudi Arabia might acquire the bomb from a state that already possesses it, rather than develop its own. Scholars have identified Pakistan as the most logical potential seller since both share cultural, political and military ties. After all, Saudi Arabia even financially assisted Pakistan´s own nuclear program [12]. But even so, Islamabad has strong incentives to do the opposite. It is one of the main beneficiaries of American military and economic foreign aid ($684 million just in 2019) [13] and engaging in nuclear proliferation schemes would jeopardize the advantageous status quo currently held with Washington. Additionally, Pakistani nuclear scientists with the required knowledge to develop the technology are placed in advisory capacities and subjected to subtle but strict control to prevent know-how spillovers to third countries [14].
Nevertheless, possessing a nuclear weapon is not always the best solution to a security problem. Moreover, and contrary to what may seem as intuitive, it could make a country less secure, for instance if a regional arms race is triggered or a preventive attack from a rival power is launched to counter the use of the weapon altogether. International backlash is also a very likely consequence derived from nuclearization. At a time when Saudi Arabia is actively trying to further integrate with the international community and strengthen its bonds with the West, nuclearization could very well produce a cascade of economic sanctions, political condemnation and diplomatic tensions [15].
As such, a strategy of nuclear weaponization does not offer the Kingdom enough substantial benefits to legitimately pursue. More accurately, it risks unnecessarily stressing the region and reducing collective security. Besides, there are other ways to enjoy a strong deterrence power without creating or acquiring nuclear weapons. According to some analysts, Saudi nuclear declarations could be a way to pressure Washington to commit to a stronger presence in the Middle East. The United States is still their most effective ally when it comes to security matters, so they can benefit from the American “Nuclear Umbrella” and even let them deploy nuclear forces on Saudi soil as an effective deterrence move [16]. All things considered, nuclear proliferation in the short term seems unlikely, and whatever advancements the region witnesses will probably be dependent on international cooperation agreements, perhaps in a process similar to that of the United Arab Emirates, where nuclear technology has already been implanted for civil purposes under some limitations to prevent a quick transfer to military uses [17].
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