The African continent has never received significant political attention from Russia’s government, Russian economic investments, or tight trade ties. The peculiarity of Russian-African relations is the specific role of private but indeed state-connected military actors in ensuring Russian presence on the continent. One of the illustrative examples of such a presence is the activity of Prigozhin’s “Company” network, which includes the military organization called “Wagner group”.
By Kateryna Anisova
Introduction
In June 2022, the Head of the African Union and the President of Senegal, Macky Sall, visited the Kremlin [1]. The Russian media portrayed the event as Putin´s diplomatic victory for Putin [2]. In late July 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister conducted a five-day diplomatic tour to Africa [3]. This tour followed the signing of the Black Sea Grain Initiative on the 22nd of July this year [4], and the Russian attack on the Odesa Port the following day [5]. Earlier in March 2022, 17 African countries abstained from the UNGA Resolution ES-11/1 “Aggression against Ukraine”, and one state voted against it [6]. Although the motivations of each African country arguably vary, the fact of Russian advancement of strategic, diplomatic, and economic ties with African countries becomes undeniable.
Russian Turn to Africa
The African continent has never received significant political attention from Russia’s government, Russian economic investments, or tight trade ties. Russian foreign policy experts themselves recognize the rise of interest in Africa as the result of the deteriorating relations with Western countries [7], which has reached a point of no return after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Indeed, the main narratives Russia uses to build relations with African states are anti-imperialistic and anti-Western ones to evoke neo-colonial sentiments and discredit the activities of European countries and the US in the region. Moreover, Russia often uses pan-African populist ideas, which makes its propaganda more effective. Therefore, the general perception of Russia in the continent is positive, both at the leadership and societal levels.
Arguably, the Sochi Summit in October 2019 became a set point for the advancement of Russian-African relations advancement. Back then, Vladimir Putin claimed that: “the development and strengthening of mutually beneficial ties with African countries and their integration associations is one of Russia's foreign policy priorities” [9]. At the same time, Putin described the desire to build “fair partnership relations based on equality and mutual practical interest” [Ibid.]. On paper, Russia stands up for fair competition for business cooperation with Africa, supports the democratic and independent development of African countries and claims its readiness to assist in addressing transnational issues on the continent. However, analysing the most recent cases of Russian interference in African affairs, it becomes more apparent that the Kremlin pursues other interests on the continent and uses extraordinary tools to reach its goals.
The peculiarity of Russian-African relations is the specific role of private but indeed state-connected military actors in ensuring Russian presence on the continent. Moreover, these relations are the most tangible in the military or regime security sphere. The tactic of non-state agents’ involvement does not exclude traditional diplomatic and political relations on a high level; however, Russian influence in Africa becomes possible through covert actions by private paramilitary groups.
Costless Tactics for Presence Assurance
Russia does not possess enough resources to compete with the US, China and the EU regarding infrastructure projects, economic development, trade ties and humanitarian initiatives in Africa. Neither will it possess these in the future due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and sanctions imposed against Russia. Therefore, the country applies almost costless techniques to ensure its presence and influence in African countries where elites benefit from closer relations with Russia, and Russia itself will gain its revenues in international diplomacy fora and regional geopolitics. These techniques include disinformation campaigns with anti-Western propaganda and spreading narrative about the Russian vision of the world order, election interference, mercenary deployment and training of local military groups. It is usually supported by the weapons export or arms-for-resource deals and exploitation of African natural resources in an often environmentally damaging manner. Therefore, Russia mainly targets countries where leaders seek help to secure their positions in power. Then, Russian mercenaries become either elites’ guards or perpetrators of human rights abuses and the segregation of African citizens, sometimes combining both roles [10].
One of the illustrative examples of such a presence is the activity of Prigozhin’s “Company” network, which includes a military organisation called “Wagner group” [11]. Evidently,, fragile African governments resort to recruiting private armed forces to help ensure the state leaders’ security and suppress any unease and opposition across countries. Therefore, the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner group are not unique nor newfound in Africa; however, Wagner managed to hold its strategic niche in certain countries.
Mysterious Wagner and Traditional “They're Not There”
Wagner was first identified in 2014, during the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas region by Russia. Because Wagner is registered neither in Russia nor abroad, there is no direct evidence of its relations with certain individuals. However, this company is usually linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and confidant from Putin’s inner circle. Moreover, there is plenty of documented evidence that Wagner relies on the Ministry of Defence of Russia and has connections to the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) [12].
Wagner was first traced in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in the Central African Republic (CAR), in 2018 [12]. However, some experts argue that Russian agents, particularly Prigozhin, were also involved in the suppression of protests in Sudan in 2017; however, by non-military means [13]. According to the UN report, Wagner was cooperating with the CAR army and police in the intimidation of civilians by severe violation of human rights. These violations included arbitrary detention, torture, rape, disappearances and summary execution [14], helping Touadéra (current CAR President) to suppress the rebellion against him and become reelected in 2020 [15].
The presence of Wagner was also registered during the civil war in Libya (2016-2020) on the side of a rebel general Khalifa Hifter, when in April 2019, he initiated an attack against the UN-backed government in Tripoli, the capital. There, Wagner was engaged in advising and training rebelling troops, as well as in private mining areas, helping Hifter gain control of some of Libya's oil-rich territories [16]. In 2019, Wagner provided its service to Mozambique’s government for a counterinsurgency operation, which, however, failed [17]. Wagner activities were also identified in Mali in August 2020, with a more considerable presence from 2021, after the second Malian coup d'etat and sanctions imposed against the country by the Economic Community of West African States [18]. These developments led to the search for new security partners, and Wagner successfully occupied the niche. In Mali, Wagner not only trains the junta’s soldiers and protects the country’s government officials but also actively engages in targeting civilians by threatening and dispersing them. [19].
Conclusion
One interesting observation is the geographical and geopolitical location of the countries in which Wagner has been identified. All the above-mentioned countries are rich in raw materials - oil, gold, diamonds, and uranium - or have outlets to the seas, where Kremlin is willing to gain its presence and leverage. Consequently, Wagner likely receives access to the resources as a trade-off for their activities and cooperation with rebels or weak governments. Simultaneously, the presence of Russia in geopolitically important areas, even through covert actions, allows Putin to claim a great power status for Russia, although Russian presence and influence are malign and still limited.
References
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[6] “Aggression against Ukraine ”: 2022. Digitallibrary.un.org, March. Accessed November 22, 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039.
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[8] Financial Times. 2022. “Russia Has Made Worrying Inroads into Africa,” September 4, 2022. Accessed November 25, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/eaf7c419-beab-4afb-b989-126ea452dc13.
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[13] Elbagir, Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla,Nima. 2019. “Fake News and Public Executions: Documents Show a Russian Company’s Plan for Quelling Protests in Sudan.” CNN. April 25, 2019. Accessed November 26, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/25/africa/russia-sudan-minvest-plan-to-quell-protests-intl/index.html.
[14] Fabricius, Peter. 2022. “Wagner Is Being Used in Africa as a Proxy to Target Civilians.” ISS Africa. September 16, 2022. Accessed November 26, 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/wagner-is-being-used-in-africa-as-a-proxy-to-target-civilians.
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[16] Barabanov, Ilya, Ibrahim Nader. 2021. “Wagner: Scale of Russian Mercenary Mission in Libya Exposed.” BBC News. August 11, 2021. Accessed November 26, 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58009514.
[17] Fabricius, Peter. 2022. “Wagner Is Being Used in Africa as a Proxy to Target Civilians.” ISS Africa. September 16, 2022. Accessed November 26, 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/wagner-is-being-used-in-africa-as-a-proxy-to-target-civilians.
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[19] Fasanotti, Federica Saini. 2022. “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure.” Brookings. February 8, 2022. Accessed November 26, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/.
