Observers of the 2023 TPNW Meeting - Why Should We Care?

This article explores the importance of observing states attending the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in November 2023. It focuses on Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia to argue how the TPNW discussions can foster the nuclear disarmament discourse in countries concerned with nuclear deterrence. It advocates for the state parties to promote the humanitarian approach and the relationship between the TPNW and NATO to bring observers closer to the Treaty’s disarmament goals.

BY Lara Maria Guedes Gonçalves Costa 

The TPNW: Moving Towards Nuclear Disarmament

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted at the United Nations (UN) on 7 July 2017 and entered into force on 22 January 2021. At the time of writing, 65 states have ratified and four have acceded. Under the treaty, state parties are committed not ‘to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons’ [1]. In addition, states parties shall take necessary measures to prevent and suppress any activity forbidden by the TPNW, provide environmental remediation in areas under their control in case of contamination by nuclear weapons, and assist victims of the use or testing of those weapons [2]. 

This comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons results from a strong aspiration and effort of several states and anti-nuclear activists over the years [3]. The humanitarian approach of the TPNW has brought to the discussion the risks of the use of nuclear weapons and its severe consequences. Moreover, it has served as a response to the stagnation of nuclear disarmament efforts from the nuclear-armed states and a challenge to the conception of nuclear deterrence as a necessary step towards disarmament [4]. Hence, as per Article 12 on “universality”, states parties should work to encourage and influence other states to adhere to the TPNW [5].

One of the strategies to achieve this goal is the involvement of non-state parties, including nuclear-armed states and the ones hosting nuclear weapons, as observers - according to Article 8.5 - in the TPNW meetings [6]. For the Second Meeting of the State Parties (MSP) to the TPNW taking place in New York from November 27 to December 1, several non-state parties are expected to attend as observers as they did in the First MSP, such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia [7]. These countries are either hosting nuclear weapons or relying on the United States’ (US) nuclear assistance. Still, especially in recent years, they have expressed interest in participating in the TPNW discussions on nuclear disarmament. Hence, their potential adherence to the treaty would represent significant progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. 

Observers of the TPNW

This year, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) published a detailed document on the importance and duties of the observing states in TPNW meetings (see: ICAN 2023). These states are not only welcome to follow the discussions on the Treaty but also contribute to them by making statements and submitting papers [8]. While the observers do not have any legal obligation under the Treaty, they can ‘demonstrate its general support for UN processes aimed at advancing nuclear disarmament’ by engaging with states parties and communities affected by the use and testing of nuclear weapons [9].

Some of the countries that have decided to engage in these discussions are Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia. The reasons for that include an evolving discourse over the years toward nuclear disarmament, highly influenced by public pressure and governments particularly concerned with nuclear weapons. Indeed, analysing these countries helps clarify the crucial role of observing states at the TPNW discussions and how states parties can explore such an opportunity to foster anti-nuclear policies.

I. Germany

Germany is part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the NATO nuclear alliance, hosting US tactical nuclear weapons on its territory since the mid-1950s. Yet, Germany attended the First MSP to the TPNW in 2022 as an observer and is expected to attend the November 2023 meeting [10]. Over recent years, German political coalitions, such as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democrats have been advocating for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons [11]. The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a member of the SPD, had also previously vowed to work for Germany’s nuclear disarmament [12]. Moreover, polls conducted in the country have shown the strong support that the German population has given for the state to join the TPNW [13].

II. Netherlands

As a NATO member and part of the organisation’s nuclear sharing, the Netherlands also finds itself in a difficult position regarding the TPNW. Besides participating as an observer in the 2022 TPNW meeting, the country attended the negotiations of the Treaty in 2017. It was the only NATO member to do so. However, it voted against its adoption based on the country’s commitments to the NATO nuclear alliance [14]. As regards public opinion, the Dutch government has been particularly pressured to engage in the TPNW meetings and consider terminating nuclear sharing [15]. A poll conducted in 2021 has shown that overall the public would prefer to accede to the TPNW if other NATO allies and nuclear-armed states also joined, and that young generations also support a unilateral accession [16]. Importantly, research suggests that if Germany decides to remove nuclear weapons, it is likely that this would create a domino effect, pushing the Dutch government to do the same [17].

III. Australia

Although Australia is not a NATO member and does not host US tactical nuclear weapons, there is a widespread perception in the country that it is protected by the American nuclear umbrella. Despite the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) to guarantee the security of the Pacific, there is no mention of nuclear weapons nor extended nuclear deterrence agreement [18]. Nonetheless, the presumption of US protection, mentioned in Australia's 2016 and 2017 defence white papers, has incentivised the country to support the US nuclear policies, including the rejection of the TPNW and other disarmament measures [19]. This posture has changed since 2022 under the mandate of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who has vocally supported the TPNW and expressed commitment to sign and ratify it. Indeed, in 2022 for the first time, Australia abstained - not rejected - from the UN resolution to adopt the TPNW, despite strong US pressure on its allies [20]. 

Universalisation - Bringing Observers Closer

Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, who was President of the 2022 TPNW meeting, and Nick Ritchie (2021) explain that the universalisation principle of the Treaty (Article 12) should be seen as a tactic to enhance the impact of the TPNW’s norms and principles [21]. These standards should aim to reshape the nuclear policies of nuclear-armed states and states hosting nuclear weapons toward nuclear disarmament [22]. Accordingly, the participation of observers like Germany and the Netherlands, formally part of a nuclear alliance, is a key opportunity for insightful discussions with the state parties. It is especially, a unique momentum to address the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons and the TPNW relationship with NATO. 

Since the first conversations about the creation of TPWN, several NATO allies have been concerned about the TPNW’s impact on the cohesion of the alliance. However, researchers have underlined that nuclear deterrence is not addressed in NATO’s treaty and that engaging in nuclear activities is not a formal requirement for membership [23]. Conversely, the 2010 NATO Strategy asserts the alliance’s commitment to create the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons [24]. Furthermore, the TPNW does not restrict military cooperation concerning the conventional area, meaning that states like Germany and the Netherlands would still cooperate with the alliance even if they decided to withdraw nuclear weapons from their territories [25]. These countries’ participation in such discussions would be of significant value for the TPNW goals. 

Amidst intensive talks within NATO about essential nuclear deterrence due to the Russian war in Ukraine, the TPNW observers should be strongly motivated to rethink the issue from a humanitarian perspective. Indeed, Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons should serve to highlight the discourse of its catastrophic humanitarian and environmental effects. Analysts have argued that it is also necessary to emphasise the legal and ethical concerns regarding nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence [26]. For this purpose, discussions between states parties and observers could include the assessment of international humanitarian law implications of nuclear doctrines, strategies and concepts, as per Article 6 of the Treaty [27]. 

Regarding the victim assistance and environmental remediation principles of the TPNW, Australia could be a great contributor to the discussions, as it suffered the detrimental consequences of the United Kingdom's (UK) nuclear testing in its territory from 1952 to 1963 [28]. Notably the Aboriginal community was highly affected by the tests, being a prominent example of the greater impact of nuclear tests on overlooked minorities [29]. Undoubtedly, Australia’s adherence to the TPNW and engagement in talks concerning the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons would represent a big achievement for nuclear disarmament. 

Conclusion

This article concludes that the presence of observing states such as Germany, the Netherlands and Australia, is of great value to the TPNW goals. Especially due to their current stances on the use and testing of nuclear weapons, these countries are able to significantly contribute to the discussions on nuclear disarmament. The TPNW states parties, in turn, are expected to exploit this opportunity to tackle crucial topics such as the humanitarian perspective of nuclear weapons and the TPNW relationship with NATO. Hence, it is important for the international community, especially those concerned with the nuclear disarmament cause, to monitor the progress of the TPNW discussions that will follow this month. 

References

[1] United Nations. “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – UNODA.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed November 5, 2023. https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Løvold, Magnus. “The Future of the Nuclear Taboo: Framing the Impact of the TPNW.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 1 (2021): 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1940701.

[4] Ritchie, Nick, and Ambassador Alexander Kmentt. “Universalising the TPNW: Challenges and Opportunities.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 1 (2021): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1935673.

[5] United Nations. “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” United Nations General Assembly, 2017. https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/.

[6] Ibid.

[7] ICAN Australia. “Media Release: Labor Re-Commits to Signing Nuclear Weapon Ban.” ICAN Australia, August 18, 2023. https://icanw.org.au/media-release-labor-re-commits-to-signing-nuclear-weapon-ban/.

[8] ICAN. “Observing Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”  International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 2023.

[9] Ibid. 

[10] ICAN. “Germany.” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Accessed November 2, 2023. https://www.icanw.org/germany.

[11] Stelzenmüller, Constanze . “Nuclear Weapons Debate in Germany Touches a Raw NATO Nerve.” Brookings, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nuclear-weapons-debate-in-germany-touches-a-raw-nato-nerve/.

[12] Meakem, Allison. “Germany Confronts Its Nuclear Demons.” Foreign Policy, June 20, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/20/germany-nuclear-power-energy-weapons-nato-russia-ukraine-war-energy-crisis-greens/.

[13] ICAN. “Germany.” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Accessed November 2, 2023. https://www.icanw.org/germany.

[14] ICAN. “Netherlands.” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Accessed November 9, 2023. https://www.icanw.org/netherlands.

[15] Ibid. 

[16] Onderco, Michal, Michal Smetana, Sico van der Meer, and Tom W. Etienne. “When Do the Dutch Want to Join the Nuclear Ban Treaty? Findings of a Public Opinion Survey in the Netherlands.” The Nonproliferation Review 28 (2021): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.1978156.

[17] Smetana, Michal, Michal Onderco, and Tom Etienne. “Do Germany and the Netherlands Want to Say Goodbye to US Nuclear Weapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77, no. 4 (2021): 215–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2021.1941603.

[18] Hanson, Marianne. “No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons: Australian Perspectives and Possible Contributions.” Asian Security 18, no. 3 (2021): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015651.

[19] Ibid. 

[20] ICAN. “Australia.” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Accessed November 5, 2023. https://www.icanw.org/australia.

[21] Ritchie, Nick, and Ambassador Alexander Kmentt. “Universalising the TPNW: Challenges and Opportunities.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 1 (2021): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1935673.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] NATO. “Active Engagement, Modern Defence - Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon.” NATO, 2010. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm.

[25] Hajnoczi, Thomas. “Implications of Germany’s Accession to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” ICAN, 2022. https://www.icanw.org/the_implications_of_germany_s_accession_to_the_tpnw.

[26] Ritchie, Nick, and Ambassador Alexander Kmentt. “Universalising the TPNW: Challenges and Opportunities.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 1 (2021): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1935673. 

[27] Løvold, Magnus. “The Future of the Nuclear Taboo: Framing the Impact of the TPNW.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 1 (2021): 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1940701.

[28] Michel, Dieter. “Villains, Victims and Heroes: Contested Memory and the British Nuclear Tests in Australia.” Journal of Australian Studies 27, no. 80 (January 2003): 221–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/14443050309387928.

[29] Ruff, Tilman A. “The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the Pacific Region.” International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (September 2015): 775–813. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1816383116000163