The first part of the series “War in Sudan” looks at the outbreak of the military conflict that began on April 15, 2023, and its main causes. With this aim, it analyses the two main warring factions, their leaderships, and capabilities as well as the troubled democratic transition still trying to succeed since 2019. Precisely, the role of the military in Sudan’s political, economic, and social affairs is key in this analysis.
BY Adrián Merino Puente
After weeks of tension and uncertainty, on April 15, 2023, Sudan was again struck by a large-scale military conflict initiated in the capital, Khartoum, which has quickly spread throughout the country, reaching its borders with Eritrea and Ethiopia [1]. Since then, more than 600 people have been killed, thousands wounded, and approximately one million people internally displaced [2]. This new outbreak of violence adds to an extensive list of internal conflicts that have destabilised Sudan since its independence in 1956. However, its nature differs from the rest because of the actors involved. Historically, all conflicts in Sudan have pitted the central government and the military against rebel and paramilitary groups, yet in this case it is two generals who are fighting each other [3]. The struggle for power and the instrumentalization of the democratic transition has turned into a direct confrontation between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – head of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and of the ruling Sovereign Council - and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti – head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and deputy of the Sovereign Council – [4].
Despite the doubts surrounding who started the conflict, both parties were prepared for confrontation with the deployment of troops, tanks, and heavy artillery in the capital, Khartoum, as well as other regions of the country. It had also certified the loss of interest and confidence in the democratic transition process by both Burhan and Hemedti, despite their alleged support until hours before the violence started [5].
A fight for power in the midst of a political transition
Aside from the armed conflict confronting the two generals, Burhan and Hemedti were once allies. In 2003, during the conflict between the government and the rebel groups in Darfur, former president Omar al-Bashir resorted to the use of militias – a widely used resource against rebel groups by different Sudanese governments – with Hemedt playing a prominent role. After the conflict, which resulted in war crimes committed by the militias, Hemedti was chosen as the leader of the paramilitary force that would replace the militias: the RSF. At the time, al-Bashir viewed the RSF and Hemedti as protection against military coups, being integrated into the intelligence services [6].
In 2019, after three decades of dictatorship, al-Bashir was overthrown by widespread popular uprising followed by a military coup in which Burhan and Hemedti played a major role. Two years later, in 2021, both of them led a new coup against the civilian government, established through a power-sharing agreement between the military and the democratic forces [7]. In December 2022, to promote a new democratic transition, Burhan, Hemedti, and pro-democracy movements led by the Forces of Freedom and Change signed the political Framework Agreement. The deal was sponsored by the UN, the African Union, and the African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which aimed at establishing a new constitution by April 6, 2023. Alongside the new constitution, a transitional administration was also planned, including a transfer of power to a civil government, by April 11 [8].
The Framework Agreement, however, was vague on two key issues. The timing for the integration process of the RSF into the SAF was left unresovled, with Burhan demanding a quick absorption in two years and Hemedti expanding that process to ten years. Similarly, the Agreement also overlooked the resulting command structure of the SAF and therefore the power relations between both generals [9]. Additionally, both generals’ partnership was based on appearing to support the process in order to gain more influence, while manoeuvring to avoid giving up the power to a civil government [10].
In this context, as a new transition of power was approaching and the relationship between the RSF and the SAF remained unclear, both Burhan and Hemedti have broken their alliance to promote their own interests, even if that has meant dragging Sudan into a new armed conflict.
No signs of de-escalation
Since the violence erupted on April 15, the conflict has turned into a battle where thewinner takes all with no signs of de-escalation and with both parties having similar capabilities and resources. As head of the SAF, Burhan has about 100,000 available troops in addition to commanding the air force – key in the bombing campaign of Khartoum against RSF’s positions – while Hemedti only has about 40,000 troops in his RSF [11]. Despite this, Hemedti and the RSF are believed to have the most troops deployed on ground [12].
Control of resources is also a key factor in the conflict, mainly due to the considerable influence of both the SAF and the RSF in the Sudanese economy and the widespread personal enrichment of top officials. In this sense, Burhan, as head of the ruling Sovereign Council, controls around 250 vital companies ranging from mining to agriculture, providing an important source of funding and an incentive to maintain his grip on power [13]. Similarly, Hemedti relies on his control of Sudan’s gold mines and gold exports, a right granted by former president al-Bashir as an exchange for the RSF’s loyalty [14].
As military clashes continue, it remains unclear which side has a strategic advantage. During an interview, Burhan stated that he was willing to negotiate for the RFS’s surrender as he felt certain about its defeat while Hemedti has repeatedly stated that he has no intention of negotiating his surrender [15]. In the meantime, efforts to establish a ceasefire have been unsuccessful despite the support of international actors such as the US and Saudi Arabia, with at least five attempts to establish one, failing due to both sides breaching the terms [16]. The most recent attempt at a ceasefire, agreed on May 29, collapsed with the bombing of a market in Khartoum [17].
The scale of the military clashes – which have not respected humanitarian missions international organisations’ staff, or diplomatic personnel – and the continued violation of the ceasefires reflects the inability of the international community to de-escalate the conflict. This includes regional actors with strategic interests in Sudan, particularly the Gulf nations and African countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan, or Chad, which all have relationships with both generals and different approaches to the conflict [18].
Conclusion
The new war in Sudan has turned into a winner-takes-all conflict, with both generals being confident that they can impose themselves on each other and presenting themselves as the true protectors of the now derailed democratic transition. The reality is much more complex and challenging for Sudan. Both Burhan and Hemedti have already shown that they have only supported the democratic transition as long as they have been able to maintain their power and influence, and that they will only concede to an outcome in which their interests are guaranteed. Moreover, the balance of military assets and capabilities between both parties, along with the international community’s indecisiveness, predict a long conflict with a devastating impact on Sudan, its people, and the region.
References
[1] Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Sudan Descends Into Conflict as Rival Generals Clash,” Foreign Policy, April 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/19/sudan-conflict-generals-burhan-hamdan-hemeti-rsf/
[2] VOA News, “Death Toll from Sudan War Rises to More Than 600,” VOA News, May 10, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-from-sudan-war-rises-to-more-than- 600/7086508.html#:~:text=Smoke%20billows%20in%20Khartoum%20amid,Sudan%20on%20May%206%2C%202023.&text=The%20World%20Health%20Organization%20says,Sudan%20is%20now%20 over%20600
[3] Susan Stigant, “What’s Behind the Fighting in Sudan?” United States Institute of Peace (April 2023), https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan
[4] Peter Fabricius, “Sudan’s military rivals fight to the death over the spoils,” Institute for Security Studies (April 2023), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sudans-military-rivals-fight-to-the-death-over-the-spoils
[5] Susan Stigant, “What’s Behind the Fighting in Sudan?”
[6] Yasir Zaidan, “Hemeti’s Rise in Sudan Is a Threat to Regional Stability,” Foreign Policy, April 24, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/sudan-hemeti-conflict- rsf-regional-stability/
[7] Yonas Berhané “Latest developments in the transition to a civilian government in Sudan,” ACCORD, (March 2023), https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/latest-developments-in-the-transition-to-a-civilian-government-insudan/#:~:text=On%2019%20March%202023%2C%20Sudan's,government%20on%2011%20April% 202023
[8] Peter Fabricius, “Sudan’s military rivals fight to the death over the spoils.”
[9] Susan Stigant, “What’s Behind the Fighting in Sudan?”
[10] Jeffrey Feltman, “The eruption of violence in Sudan shows the generals can’t be trusted,” The Washington Post, April 18, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/18/sudan-civil-war-generals-negotiations/
[11] Jok Madut Jok, Anette Hoffman and Dan Watson, “Conflict Briefing on Sudan: Roots of the war, regional implications, and the way forward,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (May 2023), https://www.iiss.org/events/2023/05/conflict-briefing-on-sudan-roots-of-the-war-regional-implications-and-the-way-forward/
[12] Peter Fabricius, “Sudan’s military rivals fight to the death over the spoils.”
[13] AFP, “Sudan PM says military's vast business holdings 'unacceptable',” The East African, December 16, 2020, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/sudan-pm-says-military-s-vast-business-holdings-unacceptable--3230404
[14] Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Sudan Descends Into Conflict as Rival Generals Clash.”
[15] Alexandra Sharp, “Sudan Clashes Expose Failures of Democratic Transition,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/17/sudan-clashes-fighting-burhan-hemeti-rsf-military-coup-democracy/
[16] Sam Hancock, “Sudan conflict: Warring factions agree seven-day ceasefire, US says,” BBC News, May 21, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65661257
[17] Will Ross, “Sudan conflict: Rockets hit Khartoum market as talks collapse,” BBC News, June 1, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65777311
[18] Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Maram Mahdi, “Stopping the spread of Sudan’s bloodshed,” Institute for Security Studies (May 2023), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/stopping-the-spread-of-sudans-bloodshed
