The fighting in Gaza has divided much of the international community’s opinion, generating much scrutiny over the most polemical urban fighting battle in years. The current engagement of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip has introduced measures that define a distinct approach along legal, methodological and tactical considerations. Further, the combination of new technology, new ideas and the same old battlefields and problems justifies further research into this matter. This article aims to offer a brief overview of the realities of urban warfare in the 21st century, highlighting key insights that the current conflict in Gaza may be revealing.
BY PABLO VILLAR BOLAÑOS
The Complexity of Modern Urban Warfare
Modern hostilities increasingly occur in urban settings; the consequences of which are far-reaching, and leading to scenarios that are more convoluted, nuanced, and bloody than what politicians and the public can initially fathom.
Cityscapes have long been a preferred venue for many military “underdogs”, even paramilitary and terrorist forces, to put up a fight. Brazilian gangs, Kenyan terrorist organizations, or Somali militias have all retreated to the urban terrain in order to gain significant tactical leverage over their enemy. Urban warfare seems to have proliferated globally; its scope, significance, and depth remains hugely significant for security policymaking. Gaza, in fact, is but another chapter in a long list that sweeps over the likes of Aden Town’s “Crater”, Hue, Kosovo, Belfast, Grozny, Basra, Fallujah, Aleppo, Marawi or Mosul.
New Wars and Decentralized Armies
To properly chart the realm of urban warfare, many refer to the “new wars'' concept coined by professor Mary Kaldor. What Israel is facing in Gaza, or what some invested observers could spot along the frontline in Ukraine, is a highly decentralized army, with an expertise on advanced technology (though arguably not “high technology”; rather, they use their panoply of advanced light weapons, modern communications, and more publicly available developments of the arms race). As Kaldor notes, these new wars “involve decentralized, dispersed military activity, with a great emphasis on surprise and mobility”; she goes as far as recognizing that peace and conflict may be simultaneous in some instances [1].
In fact, an increase in protracted city fighting, as part of larger conflict continuums, means that one can no longer expect clear outcomes from military campaigns in urban settings: the ramifications are becoming larger and more entangled.
Classically, it has been agreed that cities are a unique fighting environment. The synchronization of forces, or the mastering and generation of military tempo and momentum, are some of the elements which have constantly proved vital for urban security initiatives worldwide [2]. The resources of the warring parties are consumed at a higher rate, while logistical supply is usually more complicated. The reality on the ground usually revolves around dismounted, or even close-quarters combat; the attrition rate of a fighting force in these circumstances is very high, even in low-intensity or mid-intensity operations. One must not forget, after all, the nature and complexity of the urban battle par excellence, Stalingrad, and the rest of the assessment that this fact entails.
Technological Developments and Persistent Challenges
More precisely, fights in urban environments are perhaps the most complex engagement for an army to sustain. Every city presents a series of physical characteristics and constraints, a “complex multidimensional blend of horizontal, vertical, interior and external forms, superimposed on natural relief” [3]. Operations may become thwarted by the urban terrain, which provides cover and concealment, habilitating safe points and by-ways which can be constantly shifting.
The hassles innate to war in a city, in fact, have not been fully surpassed by the technological developments of the modern era. Engagement ranges are liquid, and the effectiveness and mobility of weapons systems remain a challenge in the operations room. The complicated communication or Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities any army may pride itself on can be rendered effectively useless by interferences of multiple natures. The vulnerabilities of any fighting force become evident in a scenario of urban fighting.
IDF´s Multidomain Campaign
Gaza is not an exception to this rule. One of the key facts to remember is that the Gaza Strip is a piece of land that is highly densely-populated, with almost all its territory being covered by urban sprawl. Moreover, the IDF’s previous experience and more recent intelligence reports may have pointed out some other key elements for the ongoing campaign; rockets, tunnels, drones, or the use of human shields, namely [4].
The security approach has been based on a multidomain campaign. An aerial campaign, underway since October 7th, seeks to eliminate relevant logistic and infrastructure nodes, such as ammunition factories, weapon depots, terrorist caches, tunnels, intelligence and communication posts and headquarters. A segmented entry into the Strip, supported by specialized engineer and demolition units, has ensued. The IDF tactic, it seems, may involve isolating pockets, “consolidating control over each area before moving on to the next” [5]. However, it is quite clear that, as the Israeli planning itself suggests, this is not being an easy nor a particularly agile operation; instead, the expectations of Tel Aviv are based on a quite notably protracted fighting.
International Humanitarian Law & Scrutiny
In this scenario, and with the current circumstances of asymmetrical urban warfare taking place in Gaza, International Humanitarian Law, or Law of Armed Conflicts, is particularly being drawn into the spotlight along with the attention of much of the international community for this military endeavor. The key pillars of distinction, military necessity, proportionality and humanity may be faltering in the conduct of the IDF, which is under significant stress to uphold these principles under the “fast-paced, relentless campaign […] in a dense urban environment, against an enemy whose tactics include hiding among the civilian population” [6].
The long-established “roof knocking” tactics, use of speakers and media messaging of civilians are also being joined by legal advisors to military units and AI analysis of targeting missions. It seems that the IDF has the ability to produce 3D renderings of buildings, building interiors and streets at short notice, or even while the ground advance is occurring. However, the use of advanced AI models (known to the IDF as ‘Habsora’) to select targets raises ethical questions as it allows the IDF to generate “100 new targets every day (...) enormous amounts of data that tens of thousands of intelligence officers could not process (...) calculating potential casualties in advance and filling them under the category of collateral damage” [7].
In urban fighting, the role of the non-combatants is especially important. The challenges they may present to the IDF could condition the overall Rules of Engagement, the application and use of weapons systems; and more than that, they may be vital to the overall success of the operation in the Gaza Strip, which according to The Lancet estimates “applying a conservative estimate of four indirect deaths per one direct death to the 37,396 deaths reported, it is not implausible to estimate that up to 186,000 or even more deaths could be attributable to the current conflict in Gaza” [8].
Conclusion
These technological developments, international scrutiny and wider military conscience notwithstanding, it is hard to predict an easy conclusion to this fighting. The sheer clutter that is expected in Gaza, in terms of people, rubble, metal, public health concerns, lack of food, water and sanitation, access to social media or irreparably lethal fighting spaces means that urban warfare will continue to be an incredibly complex business.
The use of armored bulldozers, AI technology, or drones on the part of the IDF continues to present a highly debatable balance between urban fighting doctrine and international humanitarian law. The integration and close synchronicity of the aerial operations with the Israeli ground forces, as well as the use of sensors and unmanned vehicles of different kinds can greatly improve the situational awareness, and thus invoke greater degrees of care and due attention to the civilians stuck on the Strip. And yet, it is hard to overstate that the resources fielded in Gaza cannot prevent a certain degree of collateral damage or animosity on part of the civilian population from occurring.
Nevertheless, the reality is that given the scale of the urban fighting in Gaza, extensive efforts will be required to achieve the goal of eliminating Hamas' operational capacity, while not alienating the urban population from which Hamas itself draws its ranks, at the risk of an unending spiral of violence and suffering.
References
[1] Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 94-97.
[2] Tumchewics, Louise A. (ed.). 2022. Small Armies, Big Cities: Rethinking Urban Warfare. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: pp. 281-283.
[3] Hills, Alice. 2004. Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, pp. 23-29.
[4] Spencer, John. 2023. “These are the challenges awaiting Israeli ground forces in Gaza”. Modern War Institute at West Point. Available at: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/these-are-the-challenges-awaiting-israeli-ground-forces-in-gaza/
[5] Dostri, Omer. 2023. “Hamas’ October 2023 Attack on Israel: The End of the Deterrence Strategy in Gaza”. Military Review Online, November 23 Issue. Available at: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Online-Exclusive/2023/Dostri/Hamas's-October-2023-Attack-on-Israel-UA.pdf
[6] Petrila, Jim. 2024. “Conflict in Gaza: The Law of War and Irregular Warfare in Urban Terrain”. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/03/conflict-in-gaza-the-law-of-war-and-irregular-warfare-in-urban-terrain/
[7] Abraham, Yuval. 2023. ““A Mass Assassination Factory”: Inside Israel’s Calculated Bombing of Gaza.” +972 Magazine, Available at: www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/.
[8] Khatib, Rasha, et al. 2024. “Counting the Dead in Gaza: Difficult but Essential.” Lancet, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(24)01169-3.
