With the onset of Joko Widodo's presidency, expectations arose among scholars and analysts regarding Indonesia's ascent as a middle power in the region. The nation has actively pursued a foreign policy encompassing bilateral relations and multilateral engagement through international forums. Noteworthy milestones in this trajectory include the adoption of the 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific' and Indonesia's hosting of international summits as the chair of the G20 in 2022 and ASEAN in 2023. Nevertheless, the country's domestic politics and leadership styles influence specific foreign policy outcomes. Nonetheless, Indonesia has demonstrated progress in its pursuit of regional leadership, building upon the initiatives of previous administrations.
BY NYEIN nyein thant aung
Indonesia, the world's third-largest democratic country, is renowned for its abundant natural resources and cultural diversity. In the realm of international relations, Indonesia made a significant multilateral stride by hosting the Asian-African Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference, in 1955, shortly after gaining independence. The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 further solidified Indonesia's natural leadership within the regional bloc, attributing to its strategic geographic position, large population, and vast resources. While Indonesia had previously experienced assertive relationships with its neighbours, particularly Malaysia [1], during the 1960s and 1970s, the country adopted a more pragmatic approach following the resignation of former President Haji Mohammad Suharto in 1998.
Despite facing periods of domestic political unrest and armed struggles by ethnic groups, Indonesia's successful democratisation has served as an exemplar of civil-military relations in Southeast Asia, with some scholars regarding it as a demonstration of soft power [2]. Previous studies have highlighted the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as a pivotal point for an outward-looking foreign policy [3]. At the same time, the present government under Jokowi is seen as a period of further advancement. This article aims to explore Indonesia's regional impact by assessing its progress as a leading nation.
Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Overview
Having played a pivotal role in convening the Bandung Conference, Indonesia emerged as a prominent supporter of the non-aligned movement (NAM) during the Cold War. Drawing from its own experiences as a former colony, the country upholds the principles of freedom and active engagement as central pillars of its foreign policy [4]. At the core of Indonesia's foreign policy lies Pancasila, or the Five Principles, which serve as the normative foundation. Pancasila encompasses the values of belief in one God, just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by consensus, and social justice for all Indonesians. Since the era of Suharto's New Order, Indonesia has adhered to Pancasila as the guiding principle of its foreign policy, which advocates for a policy of freedom and active involvement [5]. While few notable observations occurred during the initial five years following Suharto's resignation in 1998, the ten-year SBY administration witnessed significant efforts to enhance Indonesia's bilateral and multilateral relations [6], reflecting the country's internationalist character. SBY's policy, however, remained anchored in a neutral position.
Some studies argue that Jokowi's first term exhibited a slight shift in foreign policy activism, with a greater emphasis on domestic politics [7]. This shift manifested in Jokowi prioritising the country's economy and infrastructure development. Supported by empirical evidence, such as the introduction of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) or Jokowi's maritime doctrine just a month after taking office in 2014 [8], this article contends that Jokowi did make efforts towards foreign policy activism. These efforts showcased the country’s diverse leadership approaches within the region, especially in Southeast Asia. Despite the country’s leadership changes, policies and actions towards the region have not diverted from the concepts developed by predecessors.
Regional Navigation and Leadership
Indonesia's policy culture regarding regional affairs takes into consideration domestic perception, regional dynamics, and the international system. Grounded in a nationalist perspective shaped by its self-made independence, Indonesia maintains an anti-imperialist sentiment and is cautious about international interference in both domestic and regional affairs [9]. Additionally, due to anti-China and anti-Japan sentiments among the population, Indonesian governments have exercised caution in accepting investments from these countries, making neighbouring Southeast Asian countries a preferred alternative [10].
As previously mentioned, Indonesia's geographic and ethnic condition has naturally positioned the country as a leader, or the "first among equals" in ASEAN. Studies utilising neoliberal institutionalist approaches have highlighted the perceived lack of leadership within ASEAN [11]. However, constructivists have pointed out the presence of informal leadership during ASEAN meetings [12]. At the same time, ASEAN scholars have emphasised the role of chairmanship and its influence on the summit agenda, implying a form of unilateral leadership. Scholars such as Pattharapong Rattanasevee have highlighted Indonesia's sectoral leadership or issue-based leadership, particularly regarding ASEAN's political and security issues. In contrast, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines hold sway in economic and socio-cultural proposals [13].
From a sectoral leadership perspective, Indonesia has actively led in ensuring the region's security and stability. For instance, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, Indonesia initiated both informal and formal channels for mediating dialogue, establishing itself as a credible regional player [14]. This trend continued in initiatives related to the South China Sea, including workshops on managing potential conflicts involving six ASEAN member states, Taiwan, and China [15]. Indonesia's strategic focus on multilateral dialogue has solidified its position as the "first among equals." As a result of its credible standing within the bloc, Indonesia became a representative of the region through ascension to the G-290 in 1999.
Indonesia possesses both informal and formal leadership roles. The presence of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, the country's capital, further highlights its prominent stature. Since ASEAN's establishment in 1967, Indonesia has chaired the organisation five times: in 1976, 1996, 2003, 2011, and currently in 2023 [16]. Following ASEAN's enlargement in 1998 to include ten member states, Indonesia actively led the community's security pillar. During its chairmanship in 2003, Indonesia proposed the creation of the ASEAN Security Community, which later evolved into the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), which went on to become one of ASEAN's three pillars [17]. Even during the years when it did not hold the rotational chairmanship, Indonesia consistently brought game-changing proposals to the table. In 2019, Indonesia introduced and advocated for adopting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia's Indo-Pacific strategy builds on the previous SBY administration. The proposal for an "Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" was suggested by then-Foreign Minister Natalegawa [18]. To navigate ASEAN's non-interference principle, Jokowi's foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, removed the term "treaty" to garner member states' support [19]. While Western countries' strategies in the Indo-Pacific region highlight the Sino-American competition, the ASEAN Outlook does not mention specific countries, instead emphasising collaboration to strengthen maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals, and cooperation in the economy and other fields [20].
Indonesia also actively engages with other Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific region through platforms such as the East Asia Summit and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). While empirical progress may not be evident yet, Indonesia's active participation in multilateral dialogues is undeniable [21]. In 2022, Indonesia successfully hosted the G20 summit in Bali, further affirming its rising regional influence. The summit's theme, "Recover Together, Recover Stronger," emphasised equitable and sustainable development. As the first Southeast Asian country to host the G20, Indonesia showcased its capability to engage with global issues.
Conclusion
Indonesia's journey as a middle power has seen significant progress, building upon the initiatives of previous administrations. The country's foreign policy approaches, ranging from sectoral leadership within ASEAN to active participation in multilateral forums, have enhanced its regional impact. Despite certain shifts in emphasis and leadership styles under different administrations, Indonesia's commitment to regional stability, security, and cooperation remains consistent. As Indonesia continues to navigate the regional stage, it is poised to play an influential role in shaping the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia.
References
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