Political instability at the core of the Pakistani state threatens the intricate, yet delicate, domestic power balance that has worked to sustain the volatile nation. Imran Khan’s challenge against the Pakistani political establishment that followed the ex-cricketer’s ousting last year followed by his arrest this month is indicative of both the deep political structures of the state but also reflects a new testing of this status quo. Furthermore, the transitional government that overtook Khan has experienced persistent shock and tragedy in its first year of power. With the turbulent context surrounding Khan, the lead up to the upcoming general elections in November could prove to be one of the most consequential periods of the country’s recent history.
BY Joel MOffat
A Background on Pakistani Politics
Following the violent cessation of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan has shifted between intermittent eras of military dictatorship and civilian governance. The latter periods have been characterised by the intertwining dynasties of the Bhuttos and the Sharifs. Through their associated political parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the various incarnations of the Pakistan Muslim League N (PMLN) respectively, the two families have dominated civilian governance in Pakistan. However, even during these intervening periods of civilian control, the military retains a strong domineering influence over domestic politics.
The territorial division of Pakistan splits the country into four provinces (Baluchistan, Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh), two administrative units (Azad and Jammu Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan) and Islamabad operating as a distinct federal territory. These regions are generally distinguished by their linguistic and ethnic characteristics, whilst also indicative of unique voting patterns. Indeed, Pakistan’s predominant parties have often defined themselves along these regional cleavages. For instance, Sindh has been the historic centre of PPP support, whereas the PMLN has generally been favoured in Punjab [1]. With the latter province being by far the most populous of the country, it holds a fundamental role in the political process. Indeed, governments are made through winning a majority vote in Punjab.
The creation of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (Movement for Justice, PTI) party by Imran Khan in the late 1990s significantly upset this political status quo. Despite the party initially achieving little success in the first few decades of its existence (in one election the only Parliamentary seat the party won was for Khan himself [2]), its victory in the 2018 General Elections proved a historically unprecedented moment. The PTI became the most voted party in Punjab in the 2018 General Elections, robbing PMLN of its regional stronghold.
The Ousting of Imran Khan and the Pakistani Judicial System
Imran Khan’s seemingly perfect storm of political ascension was cut short by the no-confidence vote placed against him in April 2022. Khan attempted to block the vote by dissolving parliament, an action the Supreme Court quickly ruled unconstitutional [3]. Khan persistently stressed a US-backed conspiracy against him during his tenure, founded on a continued unwillingness to reduce support for Russia and China [4]. Following his removal, Shehbaz Sharif (brother of three-time PM Nawaz Sharif) took the position of interim Prime Minister, with a general election called for November this year. The aftermath triggered a period of heightened internal political tension, with the subsequent year witnessing Khan’s fight for his political life.
As a proclaimed dissident, the ex-PM has envisioned himself in a classically populist fashion as a true representative of the people’s will against the corrupt establishment. Months of tension erupted into violence following the arrest of Khan in April earlier this year. The arrest was based on multiple corruption accusations that Khan has consistently rejected as “biased” [5]. Following the claims of Khan, pro-PTI protesters targeted their indignation at the military. The official residence of an army commander in Lahore and the army headquarters in Rawalpindi were both targeted [6].
The fate of Khan has exposed a previously unseen rift between the courts and the military. Shortly following his arrest, the Supreme Court issued a declaration that the act was unlawful and ordered his immediate release [7]. Furthermore, the Islamabad High Court granted Khan pre-emptive bail on several corruption cases [8]. The emergence of the judicial system as an independent power broker within the Pakistani political domain is historically unprecedented.
The military has acted as the domineering influence on the judicial system, in many cases covertly dictating its rulings [9]. Where it was in the interest of the military for dissidents to be removed or journalists pushed away, the courts provided legal recourse. Indeed, they even granted three military coups the legal stamp of approval [10]. The conflation of interest between the courts and the military regarding Khan’s political campaign against corruption facilitated his successful rise to power in 2018. It is ultimately the break of this coercive alliance that is facilitating Khan’s survival, with the Supreme Court issuing several rulings that have undermined the military’s attempts to permanently remove Khan from the Pakistani political realm.
Additional Pressures Facing the New Government
Rampant domestic political strife is not the singular pressure threatening the interim government, with Pakistan victim to severe issues of financial insolvency. Indeed, the country is living month to month financially. It is predicted that a failure of IMF support will ensure a near 100% chance of government default within 6 months [11]. Sharif’s government worked to unlock at least a portion of the $2.5 billion left out of a $6.5 billion programme Pakistan entered in 2019, which was set to expire by the end of July [12]. The government was able to secure this money by the middle of that month [13]. The recently proposed budget must satisfy the demands of the IMF lest Pakistan be plunged further into a fiscal crisis. Furthermore, the interim government is still dealing with the previous year’s traumatic floods that submerged much of the country early in its tenure. The financial resources needed for reconstruction and safeguarding the vulnerable are simply not available domestically, with foreign aid and investment also being dreadfully insufficient [14]. With Pakistan under significant risk from climate-induced threats, securing financial resources to ensure future climate security is an existential threat.
Recent Developments
The 5th of August saw the final arrest of Khan, representing a culmination of these months of turmoil. This has proved a significant upset to the ongoing political drama of the preceding year. The final verdict has found Khan guilty of financial corruption, forcing him to serve a 3 year term [15]. During this time he will be unable to run for office. With the expulsion of several PTI politicians, the party is in dire circumstances. Following the arrest, Khan posted a video to his personal twitter page demanding the immediate mobilisation of his supporters. Khan’s political future seem increasingly dim, the reaction from the Pakistani civil society may determine the outcome.
Conclusion
The preceding year has witnessed a domestic crisis engulf Pakistan. Since the ousting of Khan, the provisional government has fought a political battle for the future of the state. The continued contention of Khan against this transitory government has exposed the dissolution of the delicate power balance between Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the military that has historically been a tenet of the state. The transitional government’s management of this situation is beset by several domestic challenges that have disputed their tenure since its initiation. Most notable are the extensive flooding and a potentially fatal financial crisis. Politics work fast and unpredictably in Pakistan, and for the upcoming four months before the general election, anything is possible. The stakes of control have never been higher.
References
[1] “Explainer: Pakistan’s Main Political Parties”, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2013 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/5/6/explainer-pakistans-main-political-parties
[2] - “Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf: Pakistan’s Iconic Populist Movements”, Populism Studies, February 3 2021 https://www.populismstudies.org/pakistan-tehreek-e-insaf-pakistans-iconic-populist-movement/
[3] - “Pakistan court rules presidents move to dissolve parliament is unconstitutional”, NPR News, April 7 2022 https://www.npr.org/2022/04/07/1091487882/pakistan-court-rules-presidents-move-to-dissolve-parliament-is-unconstitutional
[4] “Imran Khan ousted as Pakistan’s PM after vote”, BBC News, 10 April 2022 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61055210
[5] “Former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan arrested by paramilitary police”, CNN News, May 9 2022 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/09/asia/imran-khan-arrest-intl/index.html
[6] “Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Ex-Leader, is Arrested”, The New York Times, May 9 2023 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/world/asia/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan.html
[7] “Pakistan’s Powerful Military Faces New Resistance From Courts”, The New York Times, May 31 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/31/world/asia/pakistan-courts-challenge-military.html
[8] “Islamabad Court Grants Imran Khan Bail”, The Diplomat, May 12 2023 https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/islamabad-court-grants-imran-khanbail/#:~:text=Friday%E2%80%99s%20ruling%20by%20the%20Islamabad%20High%20Court%20gave,usually%20is%20renewed%20in%20the%20Pakistan%20judicial%20system
[9] “Pakistan’s Powerful Military Faces New Resistance From Courts”, The New York Times, May 31 2023 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/31/world/asia/pakistan-courts-challenge-military.html
[10] “Pakistan’s Powerful Military Faces New Resistance From Courts”, The New York Times, May 31 2023 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/31/world/asia/pakistan-courts-challenge-military.html
[11] “Pakistan lays out budget but may not satisfy IMF”, Al Jazeera, 9 June 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/6/9/pakistan-lays-out-budget-but-may-not-satisfy-imf
[12] “Pakistan lays out budget but may not satisfy IMF”, Al Jazeera, 9 June 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/6/9/pakistan-lays-out-budget-but-may-not-satisfy-imf
[13] “Will Pakistan’s IMF agreement save its economy”, Al Jazeera, 14 July 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/14/will-pakistans-imf-agreement-save-its-economy#:~:text=The%20International%20Monetary%20Fund's%20board,the%20South%20Asian%20country's%20economy
[14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrYYsWXG2Z8 – (Pakistan’s FM: ‘We’re at the fork in the road towards democracy’: Talk to Al Jazeera)
[15] “Imran Khan: former Pakistan prime minister sentenced to three years in jail”, The Guardian, 5 Aug 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/05/former-pakistan-prime-minister-imran-khan-jailed-for-three-years
