Türkiye’s upcoming elections in June will be the most consequential in the country’s recent history. The country continues to suffer from pressures that threaten to tear apart the Turkish republic. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has continued to mould the political landscape around increasingly greater authoritarian leanings following the failed 2016 Coup. Furthermore, rampant inflation has decimated much of the country’s middle and working classes, even threatening currency collapse. The disastrous earthquake of 2023 and the government’s subsequent response has decimated one of the country’s most insecure regions, impacting the upcoming election. The outcome of the election will ultimately prove to be decisive in determining the future direction of one of NATO’s most critical members.
By joel moffat
The following article will expand on the key stakeholders and events influencing the process and outcome of the Turkish election. These include the current political environment, the pressing economic situation and the consequences of the recent earthquake.
president Erdogan’s Position
With early polling indicating a tight outcome, Erdogan’s unbroken two-decade rule is now seen to be under serious contestation. Erdogan is the de facto leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) . This has been the dominant force within Turkish politics since 2002. The AKP describes itself as centre-right and is heavily associated with provoking Islamist trends of the contemporary Turkish political sphere. It was in the aftermath of the 2016 military coup that major constitutional referendums abolished the position of the Prime Minister and designated the President as both the head of state and head of government. This effectively transformed Türkiye from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential one [1]. Although the position of President in Türkiye is supposed to be impartial, Erdogan has ruthlessly campaigned on behalf of his party [2].
The Opposition
The ‘National Alliance’, a 6-party coalition, presents the most significant opposition force to Erdogan’s continued rule. The group campaigns on reform of the Presidential post that Erdogan created. The National Alliance aims to curb its powers through a seven-year term limit and re-introduce the Prime Minister position [3]. It also targets corruption and weakness in traditional institutions, most importantly in the media.
Coalitions are necessary within the Turkish political system, which is particularly harsh for smaller parties. Individual parties need to win a minimum of 10% of the vote for parliamentary representation [4]. Therefore, niche, regional, or specialist parties must coalesce to chip away at AKP parliamentary seats.
The pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) is excluded from the alliance. The HDP is the second largest opposition party after the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Entrance of the HDP into the National Alliance could prove decisive, triggering serious legal pressure on the party. These have largely been found on alleged ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Selahattin Demirtas, the imprisoned leader of the HDP, urged the National Alliance to cooperate with his party [5]. However, HDP admittance into the National Alliance coalition could trigger even greater legal pressure on the group, disincentivizing them significantly.
The power of the opposition is further undermined by legal threats against the Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu. Imamoglu is not part of the dominant AKP and it should be noted that Istanbul is home to one out of every five eligible voters in the country. Therefore, his hold on power is a significant threat to AKP votes in Türkiye’s largest city. In November 2022, Imamoglu was barred from politics for a period of two years and seven months, on the grounds of insulting state officials [6]. Temporarily knocking Imamoglu out of politics could help wrestle control of Türkiye’s largest city back to Erdogan.
The Economic Situation
The AKP oversaw the rapid expansion of the Turkish economy in the early to mid-2000s, especially concerning Turkish industry. Indeed, it is the party that is popularly accredited with effectively creating the Turkish middle class. This lineage has cemented the AKP, and Erdogan in particular, as the symbol of Türkiye’s rise in the 21st century. Yet, it is Erdogan’s recent unorthodox economic policies that are effectively destroying the middle class he is seen to have created, something particularly damaging to his electoral hopes [7]. Erdogan claims that such policies foster economic growth through the stimulation of manufacturing and increasing export attractiveness. However, the realisation of these promises is yet to be seen. In reality, the Lira has lost 2/3 of its value in the last two years. Inflation peaked at 85% in November 2022, second only to Argentina in the G20 [8]. This has forced Türkiye to increasingly dip into its foreign reserves in order to slow the collapse of its currency.
The Turkish president is attempting to shore up votes through a spending spree. This fiscal campaign has targeted areas most affected by inflationary pressures. Since December 2022, Erdogan has increased the minimum wage by 55%, increased the salaries of civil servants by 30%, and expanded retirement benefits [9]. Yet, such rampant spending could simply exacerbate inflation and result in post-election economic meltdown, severely harming any potential AKP victory. Erdogan’s pursuit of increasing authoritarianism is fundamental to this economic meltdown. The President’s domination of the Turkish Central Bank facilitates the promotion of policies that are largely against the advice of major economists and international organisations. Such tendencies, and the perception that these are set to increase should the AKP win again, has made the country less attractive to international investors [10]. Therefore, the outcome of the election will also impact the economic future of Türkiye.
The Earthquake
Erdogan’s electoral position has been put under greater pressure due to the catastrophic earthquake decimating Southern Türkiye and Northern Syria earlier this month. With over 40,000 deaths recorded on the Turkish side of the border, and with that figure expected to rise, Erdogan’s image as a father figure to the nation is under scrutiny. Such black swan events have the potential to throw an election firmly in favour of the incumbent or the opposition depending on the present government’s response. CHP leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has argued that in the last 20 years, Erdogan has failed to prepare the country for earthquakes, despite the knowledge that they are forthcoming [11]. Largely, the disaster has been seen to negatively impact Erdogan’s standing. This emerges from the failure to properly implement construction legislation passed in 1997 following a previous earthquake incident, and a lack of clarity as to where money from the 1999 solidarity tax has gone. This is especially true for the areas affected, which are under current AKP electoral control [12]. Those living in the area have largely felt let down by the state’s inability to sufficiently manage the urban development in this region. This is especially true as it is hit Türkiye’s poorest and most insecure regions. The area has been victim to recurrent violent conflict against insurgent groups, further affected by the refugee spill-over from Northern Syria.
Conclusion
Whilst Nigeria holds the biggest election of 2023, Türkiye’s will be the most notable for global security. Expanding authoritarianism and deepening economic fragility on Europe’s doorstep threatens a global world order already under significant stress following Russian aggression, COVID, and divisive politics. An economically and politically precarious Türkiye not only cultivates domestic instability but also the wider security interests of NATO and the West. Regardless of the outcome, these elections will not be without domestic, regional, and global consequences.
References
[1] "Turkey opposition vows to cut presidential powers if it wins vote”, Al Jazeera, 30 Janurary 2023 (Accessed 10 February 2023). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/30/turkey-opposition-vows-to-strengthen-democracy-ahead-of-may-vote
[2] Barkey, Henri J. “Can the Kurds Stop Erdogan’s Bid for Total Power?”, Foreign Policy, May 28 2015 (Accessed 12 February 2023) https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/28/can-the-kurds-stop-erdogans-bid-for-total-power-turkey-akp/
[3] "Turkey opposition vows to cut presidential powers”.
[4] “Political System & Political Parties In Turkey - All You Need To Know”, Move2Turkey, 12 June 2020 (Accessed 12 February 2023). https://move2turkey.com/political-system-political-parties-in-turkey-all-you-need-to-know/
[5] “Turkish court rejects delay in case over pro-Kurdish HDP closure”, Al Jazeera, 26 January 2023 (Accessed 10 February 2023) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/26/turkish-court-rejects-delay-to-pro-kurdish-party-closure-trial
[6] Hubbard, Ben. “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”, The New York Times, 5 December 2023 (Accessed 10 February 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/turkey-inflation-erdogan.html
[7] Hubbard, Ben. “As Turkey Elections Loom, Erdogan Fights for Political Future”, The New York Times, 27 Janurary 2023 (Acessed 12 February 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-elections.html?searchResultPosition=1
[8] “As Turkey Elections Loom, Erdogan Fights for Political Future”.
[9] “As Turkey Elections Loom, Erdogan Fights for Political Future”.
[10] “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”.
[11] Özdemir, Özge & Kirby, Paul. “Turkey earthquake failures leave Erdogan looking vulnerable”, BBC News, 11 February 2023 (Accessed 13 February 2023) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64594349
[12] “Turkey earthquake failures leave Erdogan looking vulnerable”.
