The South and East China Seas have become highly contested regions due to their strategic importance in international trade and global supply-demand dynamics. In this sense, the increasing Chinese maritime assertiveness in the region aims to safeguard economic development, critical shipping lanes, and uphold territorial claims. This assertiveness clashes directly with the countries conforming to the so-called first island chain, stretching from Japan to the Malay Peninsula, and involves territorial disputes and geopolitical tensions.
BY Adrián Merino Puente
The South China Sea and, to a lesser extent, the East China Sea, have become highly contested waterways due to their strategic location between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These seas, which touch the shores of major economic powers like China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN member states, play a crucial role in international trade and global supply-demand dynamics. Roughly one-third of all sea-transported commercial goods and half of Northeast Asian energy demand pass through the South China Sea. Additionally, the region holds unexploited energy and fisheries resources of significant importance [1].
In the past two decades, China has increased its assertiveness on maritime sovereignty claims as one of the core pillars of its ultimate goal: the survival of the state under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), through the preservation of economic development [2]. Thus, while economic growth has enabled social prosperity and stability, it has exponentially increased the cost of acquiring the necessary resources to maintain it. As such, Chinese maritime assertiveness is focused on protecting its coastal wealth, the shipping lanes carrying around 85% of its trade, the vital supply chains as well as upholding its maritime claims [3].
Therefore, the maritime geography that surrounds China, and more specifically those who exert dominance over it, is key to understanding the relevance of this region in the current geopolitical balances between world powers.
The strategic context of the East and South China Seas
As an ultra-realist geopolitical power, China, far from seeking any type of ideological expansionism with its maritime claims, aims to guarantee its security by ensuring access from its ports to the main trade routes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The geographical reality of the region, however, poses a major challenge to this objective in the form of the so-called first island chain [4]. The chain, stretching from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay Peninsula, separates China and its adjacent seas from the Pacific and Indian Oceans in a rather adverse geopolitical environment, mainly due to a regional reluctance surrounding Chinese dominance and the widespread presence of the US [5].
To the north, Japan restricts free access to the Pacific Ocean by largely controlling La Perouse Strait, between the Japanese archipelago and Russia. To the south, the Ryukyu Islands, including the Island of Okinawa which hosts a major US Air Base, and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands hinder access from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean [6]. Further south, Chinese vessels must sail next to the coasts of Vietnam, historical rival of Beijing and American ally, and through the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, who are concerned with Chinese dominance and seek to maintain a geopolitical balance in the region [7]. Yet the core of the chain is located at its centre: Taiwan. The island separates the East and South China Seas as well as mainland China from the Pacific Ocean; therefore, its reunification would have a dramatic geostrategic impact as it would open the chain to Beijing [8].
In 2009, China initiated its maritime assertiveness by submitting its nine-dash-line map to the United Nations claiming around 90% of the South China Sea. This was followed by the seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 disputed by the Philippines, of great importance for its fishery resources [9]. Manila later initiated an arbitration case under the UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) against China, receiving a favourable ruling that was disregarded by Beijing calling it “nothing more than a piece of paper” [10]. In 2013, China went one step further by reclaiming the vast majority of the Spratly Islands, mainly disputed by Vietnam, and began creating artificial islands on which seven military bases have been built so far. In addition, it imposed a Sea Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, disputed by Japan and with potential energy deposits [11].
The major shift, however, was introduced by the 2015 China’s Military Strategy as it stated that “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans,” being necessary to “develop a modern maritime military force” [12]. China thus asserted itself not only as a land power but as a new naval power. Since then, Beijing has been developing a true blue-water navy capable of safeguarding Chinese interests and patrolling the oceans, while continuing its coercive actions through naval incursions, interference in vessels routes, military clashes, and denial of access to fishing and energy resources areas [13].
In a further reflection of this approach, China has been conducting military drills around Taiwan on an unprecedented scale. In August 2022, the military exercises extended to Taiwanese territorial waters including the launching of missiles that landed into Japanese and Philippine exclusive economic zones [14]. In the same line, China conducted a new military drill around Taiwan in April 2023 specifically focused on pre-invasion manoeuvres [15].
Thus, as Beijing’s maritime assertiveness increases and its strategic objectives are gradually consolidated, the region is beginning to find itself caught between the dynamics of great-power competition. This, in turn involves serious economic, military and geostrategic implications including the potential spillover of maritime disputes into an open conflict.
Emerging implications of Chinese maritime expansionism
The South China Sea, and to a lesser extent the East China Sea, are of vital importance for the global economy and international trade. Annually, trade through the South China Sea amounts to around $3.4 trillion, leading to important dependencies on commerce as well as resources – from energy to fisheries – of the region, including China and numerous US allies. Chinese dominance would therefore pose a major economic challenge as it would give Beijing further coercion capabilities, mainly through the blockade or threat of blockade of trade routes [16].
Furthermore, the existing power asymmetry and economic interdependence with China already forces the region to maintain good relations with Beijing, making states more vulnerable to economic coercive measures [17]. This has been particularly visible through Chinese threats of economic retaliation against states intending to intensify their partnership with the US or taking a stronger stand against Beijing’s maritime claims [18].
From a military perspective, China’s maritime expansionism entails an enlargement of its capabilities to deny access to foreign vessels and to project its military power. This has been carried out through the construction or upgrading of numerous military bases in disputed areas such as the Spratly – disputed by Vietnam – and Paracel Islands – disputed by Vietnam and Taiwan [19]. In addition, in 2017, Beijing opened a military base in Djibouti with the aim of securing its raw materials and energy supply lines to Africa and the Gulf, along with numerous commercial ports along the trade routes [20].
As a result, the cases of maritime incidents between Chinese vessels, both military and fishing, and vessels from countries such as Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and even the US have dramatically increased [21]. This is, however, only a narrow reflection of a larger dynamic: the clash of two major spheres of influence. Until now, the region has maintained a clear military balance characterised by a strong US presence, under which a high degree of regional stability and openness was guaranteed in line with Washington’s interests. Nevertheless, the expansion of the Chinese Navy along with the territorial claims, will increase competition for the maritime space, in turn increasing the possibilities of military confrontation between Beijing on one side, and Washington and its regional allies on the other side [22].
Thus, the scenario presented by the South and East China Seas has significant geostrategic implications, both regionally and globally. Beijing is not only actively seeking to secure its access to the Pacific and Indian Oceans but also aiming to develop capabilities that would enable it to deny access to areas it considers within its maritime domain [23]. With this aim, until now, China has followed a “balance between rights protection and stability”, calibrating its actions to avoid military clashes with the US or triggering a regional balance against it [24].
For its part, the US influence in the region is strongly dependent on maintaining the stability – through peaceful settlement of disputes, openness, and preserving freedom of navigation – in accordance with international law [25]. In this sense, each administration has sought to reduce tensions and maintain a neutral stand, and while this approach has prevented a major military confrontation with China, it has not restricted the expansion of Beijing’s sphere of influence, creating a delicate situation mainly vis-à-vis its regional allies [26].
Crucially, it is the stance of the other countries in the region, particularly in terms of how they align with world powers, that proves to be pivotal. So far, the Southeast Asian states have sought US support when dealing with territorial disputes with China, either through explicit actions or lasting military cooperation. However, increasing Chinese coercion along with the US’s preference to avoid tensions, are changing perceptions [27]. If the region loses its sense of security from the US, it will inevitably align towards China to avoid larger retaliation [28].
Conclusion
In such rich and economically dynamic regions, whoever holds primacy acquires great power not only regionally but also globally, and in East and South East Asia this occurs mainly through the control of maritime geography. Until now, the geopolitical context of the South and East China Seas had been shaped by a power balance among all states backed by the US, allowing for a great degree of stability and openness in the region. However, China’s maritime expansionism is a highly disruptive factor. Its increasing assertiveness in pursuing its territorial claims has already raised military tensions while its economic power is increasingly becoming a source of pressure to achieve a favourable regional balance. Thus, the region is beginning to see itself caught between Beijing’s expanding sphere of influence and one held by the US. The expected consolidation of this clash will therefore create even more scenarios of naval confrontation, which could potentially spill over into direct military conflict.
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