In the wake of the geopolitical shocks, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) faces notable challenges. This article examines Beijing’s response to security concerns within the BRI framework, with a specific focus on the exploration of Private Security Companies (PSCs) as a viable solution. Highlighting the distinctions between PSCs and Private Military Companies, the article traces the evolution of the legal landscape governing Chinese PSCs, noting a shift towards a change in policy in their favour. Against the backdrop of the BRI’s global expansion, often in regions with precarious security conditions, China’s consideration and deployment of PSCs are explored. Despite challenges and limited combat experience, Chinese PSCs are gaining preference from Chinese companies operating abroad. Recent discussions in Beijing suggest an assertive global posture, hinting at an expanded role for PSCs in safeguarding overseas interests and influencing global politics. The article concludes by emphasising the dynamic significance of this evolving aspect within China’s global engagement.
BY Emanuele Chizzoni
Introduction
The “decade of geopolitical shocks,” commencing with Russia's unlawful annexation of Crimea and culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, along with conflicts in the South Caucasus and the persistent civil unrest in Libya and Syria, has significantly influenced the security landscape across broader Eurasia. These developments have created a series of additional challenges to China’s ambitious plans within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, the rapid growth of China’s outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) and expansion of trade ties with foreign countries and overseas regions (many of which are located in challenging areas from a security perspective) has resulted in a growing number of incidents involving Chinese nationals and property.[1] Thus, to protect its assets as well as Chinese nationals working along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing is searching for comprehensive solutions that would be more effective in this regard while trying not to alienate local stakeholders. After years of cautious considerations, Beijing has now considered the increased use of private security companies (PSCs) as one possible solution. [2]
Understanding the Differences between Private Military Companies and Private Security Companies
The private sector has long been involved in conflicts worldwide, and private companies today are increasingly common providers of security services under various titles. Moreover, private military companies or firms (PMCs or PMFs) provide armed or unarmed services to replace or backup state armies. Generally, Private Military Firms can be divided into three main groups. In the first category, we can find the so-called “Military Provider Firms”: these firms specialise in organising and deploying elite fighting forces wherever they are needed. A perfect example of such a company can be found in the Executive Outcomes (EO), the legendary PMC founded in 1989 by the former Lieutenant-Colonel of the South African Defense Force, Eeben Barlow. In 1995, EO deployed a consistent and highly trained fighting force in Sierra Leone, which single-handedly wiped out the rebels’ resistance in a matter of weeks.[3] The second category represents the “Military Consulting Firms”; as the name suggests, they are specialised in providing consulting or training. The most famous firm in this sector is the “Military Professional Resource Incorporated” (MPRI), which - during the Yugoslavian conflict - was responsible for transforming the ragtag Croat militia into a modern and efficient army almost comparable to NATO’s one.[4] The last category comprises the “Military Support Firms” (MSF); their business resides in supporting conventional armies in their operations with improved logistics. This means dealing with the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military materials, facilities, and personnel. In short, it involves supporting the troops in the field. These firms, such as “Brown & Root Services”, became so effective that U.S. military planners no longer envisage the possibility of a large-scale intervention taking place without MSF providing the logistics.[5]
On the other hand, PSCs differ from the abovementioned PMCs: while the latter operate primarily in conflict situations, PSCs come into play when, for instance, actors from the private sector feel that they cannot rely on adequate provision of security by a state. Thus, the PSCs are mainly responsible for the protection of businesses and property from criminal activity. However, it must be mentioned that it is not unusual for PSCs to be drawn into active combat situations.
The Legal Framework
The emergence of Chinese private security companies traces back to the 1990s when a series of laws were introduced, permitting, albeit in a highly restricted manner, the licensing of private security firms in mainland China. This regulatory initiative was aligned with Deng Xiaoping’s overarching strategy of “opening up” China to the West, allowing a controlled privatisation of certain state security functions.[6] Initially, the law stipulated that only individuals with a military or police background could seek authorisation from relevant authorities to establish and register a private security company, with restrictions on carrying weapons for private security officers.[7] Subsequent amendments expanded the scope of the sector, but the initial constraints continue to influence the development of private security companies with distinct “Chinese Characteristics.” [8]
In 2009, a new and more permissive law was introduced. It granted private security firms the flexibility to offer armed escort services during the transportation of cash and valuable goods, removing the requirement that only former public security officers could obtain licences. Nevertheless, most of the several thousand Chinese private security companies based in mainland China are still founded and directed by former security officers, and the core personnel are recruited from the People’s Liberation Army, People’s Armed Police, and the police force.[9] Interestingly, the comprehensive legislation governing the operations of private security companies within China contrasts with the absence of specific rules and regulations for such companies operating abroad. Moreover, a persistent legal vacuum creates an environment where the entire sector is susceptible to competition from semi-legal Chinese private security companies establishing themselves overseas without the necessary licensing domestically.[10]
PSCs start to go global alongside the Chinese’s State-Owned Enterprise
Involving 65 countries and an estimated 900 billion USD of planned investments around the globe, the BRI has substantially expanded China’s overseas economic presence.[11] According to data from the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, by 2016, a total of 847.000 Chinese nationals worked in more than 16.000 companies worldwide. [12] Furthermore, numerous Chinese companies situated along the BRI are located in regions characterised by particularly volatile security conditions. A stark reminder was the number of threats and attacks against Chinese citizens and assets along the BRI in the last few years have underlined this concern: in 2017, terrorist groups linked to the Salafist jihadist organisation of Jabhat al-Nusra bombed the Chinese embassy in Bishkek. [13] In Pakistan, the security situation has resulted in the loss of lives for at least three Chinese nationals. Specifically, two teachers were abducted and killed by ISIS in June 2017, and an employee of a shipping company was fatally shot in Karachi in February 2018.
Thus, in recent decades, the Chinese government has crashed with a harsh reality: its foreign policy was not enough to protect its citizens and assets from overseas risks. Initially, the job of protecting China’s ever-expanding commercial interests and the Chinese living abroad has led to a shift in the country’s traditionally cautious foreign policy. Its navy has fended off pirates in the Gulf of Aden since 2012 and rescued civilians trapped in Yemen in 2015 [14]. Its combat troops are being deployed under UN peacekeeping mandates in countries where China has substantial investments. And in 2021, Beijing established its first foreign military base in Djibouti.[15] Despite this, both Beijing and host countries have shown an increasing reluctance to deploy the PLA for protection. Various factors contribute to this hesitancy, including concerns about jeopardising diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries and potential allies, the PLA's limited combat experience, and inadequacies in essential infrastructure and logistics.
In this scenario, the growing PSC industries caught the interest of the Chinese Government. According to Chinese state media, 20 Chinese PSCs had entered the international market by 2016 and deployed about 3,200 security professionals overseas [16]. Yet, their market share is small compared to Western PMCs: in 2008, an estimated 50 foreign private security companies were operating in Iraq alone, and the large UK and US-based private security and military companies are still the preferred choice for many private firms operating overseas [17]. Another factor that must be taken into account is that, due to the special conditions under which they emerged and operated, the services provided by Chinese PSCs are still substantially different from those provided by large international companies. Chinese PSCs are relatively new to the field and lack experience in operating in combat situations. Consequently, the majority of Chinese PSCs operating overseas primarily offer security consulting services, occasionally engaging in armed missions through contracted local teams. This inexperience has led large foreign multinational corporations to favour and, consequently, enlist other security firms for the protection of their overseas business operations.
Nevertheless, Chinese companies operating overseas have demonstrated a clear preference for hiring Chinese PSCs to guard their facilities abroad, preferring to use them rather than rely on protection from local firms or PMCs from other countries. [18] Thus, the BRI served as a catalyst for the increased global presence of PSCs. With the BRI propelling Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and other companies to venture into international markets, often in challenging and hazardous settings, Chinese PSCs step in to address the security needs by offering comprehensive global services.
Moreover, things recently took a significant turn during a meeting convened in Beijing in December 2023. During the discussions, representatives from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and personnel from diverse Chinese security firms hinted at an expanded role for these paramilitary forces, signalling a more assertive global posture. China’s public position reflects the belief that the country can openly leverage its PSCs in light of its increasing global influence and the diminishing sway of Russia and the United States. Consequently, it implies that Chinese authorities may employ these entities with greater frequency and scope than before, enabling Beijing to safeguard its overseas infrastructure and exert additional political influence on other nations.[19]
Conclusion
The Chinese PSCs industry was able to develop its domestic presence by navigating the narrow path between legality and illegality. Beyond its home front, the sector’s global ascent has been significantly fueled by overseas investments along the expansive BRI. Moreover, the statements coming from China regarding PSCs over the past month, as well as Beijing’s actions on the ground, suggest that China has decided to change course and that it has deemed the present an appropriate time to press forward and use PSCs in ways experts thought would only happen in the distant future. [20] Simultaneously, it is crucial to emphasise that Chinese PSCs operating abroad remain largely unregulated, introducing a degree of chaos and raising significant concerns about their reliability. Moreover, this new phenomenon must not be underestimated, as the rise and expanded use of Chinese PSCs has often been downplayed, and thus, it remained generally uncovered by scholars and literature.
References
[1] Legarda, H. Nouwens, M. (2018) “Guardians of the Belt and Road The internationalization of China's private security companies” Merics China Monitor.
[2] Sukhankin, S. (2023) “Chinese PSCs: Achievements, Prospects, and Future Endeavors.” The Jamestown Foundation. November 20.
[3] Singer, P. W. (2007). “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Arduino, A. (2023). “Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War.” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Arduino, A. (2017). “Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests.” Springer EBooks, December, 69–113.
[9] Sukhankin, S. (2023). “An Anatomy of the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry.”January 3. The Jamestown Foundation.
[10] Arduino, A. (2023). “Chinese Private Security Companies: Neither Blackwater nor the Wagner Group.” War On The Rocks.
[11] Hancock, Tom (2017). “China encircles the world with one Belt, One Road strategy.” Financial Times. May 4.
[12] Nan, Z. (2016). “Overseas security to get upgrade.” China Daily. April 22.
[13] Putz, C (2017). “3 convicted for Chinese embassy attack in Bishkek.” The Diplomat. June 30.
[14] Clover, C. (2017) ‘Chinese Private Security Companies Go Global’. Financial Times.
[15] Ibid.
[16] see Wenting, X. (2016). “Chinese security companies in great demand as overseas investment surges.” Global Times. June 23. Also, Nan. Z (2016). “Overseas security to get upgrade.” China Daily. April 22.
[17] Elsea, J. et al. (2008). “CRS Report for Congress. Private security contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues.”
[18] Goble, Paul. 2024. “Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows.’ ” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21, no. 4 (January 11).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Goble, Paul. 2024. “Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows.’ ” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21, no. 4 (January 11).
