This article assesses the impact of multipolarity on nuclear relations in the Arctic. Due to climate change, geopolitical tension, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nuclear relations in the Arctic are unstable and present serious security risks that cannot be contended with through the use of classic deterrence theory [1]. Melting polar ice means growing competition for Arctic territory and resources amongst North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, the Russian Federation, and China. This is occurring alongside the threat of nuclear warfare, which is considered by all actors to be a matter of deterrence despite it being beyond the bipolar rational choice modelling of deterrence theory [2].
BY Rebecca Rempe
Arctic security can be characterised as a nexus between multipolar nuclear conflict and climate change. Multipolarity is defined as a global balance of power between multiple actors [3]. Climate Change is making seaways and resources more accessible, which is leading to a thawing of territorial conflicts which were formerly frozen [4]. China’s increasing economic interests in the Arctic means it must be considered as a regional actor despite its near-regional status [5]. Russia has recently threatened to use nuclear weapons against the United States (U.S.) due to its objections to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; this sets a precedent for heightened nuclear tension in the Arctic, which is the most nuclearized area in the world and has seen a steady buildup of nuclear and conventional forces by regional actors [6]. These factors have led to direct tensions between three major nuclear actors (namely, NATO, China, and Russia) in a region that is becoming increasingly competitive [7]. These tensions cannot be adequately explained by existing deterrence models, which rely on Cold War-era bipolar game theory [8]. Due to climate change, geopolitical tension, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nuclear relations in the Arctic are unstable and present serious security risks that cannot be contended with through the use of classic deterrence theory [9].
Arctic Governance and Climate Change
The Arctic region is 66.5° north of the equator and encompasses the United States, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Iceland, all of whom are members of the region’s governing body, the Arctic Council [10]. The region’s international legal status currently lies under the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, however, due to climate change, polar ice is melting, making the region more accessible by sea and opening up its vast oil and gas deposits for extraction by regional actors [11].
Sino-Russian cooperation along sea routes has given China significant influence in the region, which it wants to develop into a “Polar Silk Road” as outlined in its 2018 Arctic White Paper [12]. Chinese development interests do not align with Russia’s geopolitical goals in the Arctic, and China’s ownership over Arctic infrastructure represents an economic threat to Russian interests [13]. There is growing competition between these regional actors which is exacerbated by overlapping territorial boundary claims by Denmark, Canada, and Russia. In addition, the Arctic Council has suspended cooperation due to its chairmanship by Russia until the end of 2023 [14].
Deterrence and Arctic Nuclear Relations
Classic nuclear deterrence is steeped in Cold War bipolarity and relies on two rational actors basing their decisions on what they believe their opponents' actions will be [15]. Classic deterrence is expressed through the Chicken Game [16]. As seen in the figure below, a player’s options are to defect and pursue a foreign policy objective or to cooperate and maintain the status quo [17]. The best outcome for an actor is to defect against a cooperating partner; however, this runs the risk of both players defecting, leading to nuclear annihilation [18].
This classic deterrence game does not contend with the possibility of conflict between multiple nuclear actors, which is a key feature of Arctic security [19]. Though a three-player chicken game has been applied to theoretical problems, such as two out of three players needing to complete a task that all would rather not complete, this model has yet to be applied to nuclear relations [20]. China, NATO, the U.S., and Russia’s nuclear doctrines are informed by deterrence theory, which is problematic due to the theory’s assumption of a bipolar world order [21].
Nuclear multipolarity in the Arctic is unstable because it no longer falls within the traditional game theory matrix, and there is an increased risk of nuclear action due to a larger number of nuclear actors and significant regional tension [22]. Preemptive nuclear strikes are more prevalent in multipolar nuclear politics due to a greater perception of threat from other actors [23]. Though China promotes itself as a No First Use (NFU) state, meaning that it will not strike unless struck upon in a nuclear capacity, Russia has threatened to strike first, and America’s position on NFU is vague [24]. NATO is a nuclear deterrent organisation in the Arctic region, only Sweden is not yet a full NATO member and Finland has just recently gained NATO membership [25]. In multipolar deterrence, regional conflicts are more likely to escalate into total nuclear warfare, and de-escalation relies on political bargaining as opposed to rationality modelling. Thus, it is unclear how political bargaining will take place in an increasingly polarised Arctic [26].
Though the U.S., China, and Russia have all acceded to or ratified the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NNPT), both Russia and the U.S. have backed out of data-sharing obligations under the New START treaty [27]. This breakdown in communication between Arctic actors due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Russia’s recent threat to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. indicates that future regional disputes over Arctic resources, navigation, and territory may give rise to nuclear crises [28].
Conclusion
Climate change in the Arctic has rendered the region more accessible to its actors; this has inflamed tensions between the NATO bloc and Russia over territorial disputes and Russia’s war in Ukraine and between China and Russia due to diverging economic development goals [29]. As temperatures warm, the region may become a nuclear flashpoint that cannot be analysed using classic deterrent models [30].
References
[1] Horatio Sam-Aggrey & Marc Lanteigne, “Environmental Security in the Arctic: Shades of Grey?” in Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2020): 102; Joe Walsh, “All but Quiet on the Northern Front: The Sector Principle as a Means of Resolving Arctic Territorial Disputes.” Cornell International Law Journal 53 (4), (2020): 840; Romain Chuffart et al.,“Dealing with Insecurities and Geopolitics: Science Diplomacy at the Poles.” Antarctic Science, vol. 34, no. 3, (2022): 205-206; Stephen Cimbala “Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century: Realism, Rationality, or Uncertainty?” Strategic Studies Quarterly : SSQ 11 (1), (2017): 129.
[2] Sam-Aggrey & Lanteigne, 102; Alexander Sergunin, “Arctic Security Perspectives from Russia.” In Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, 1st ed., (Routledge 2020): 131-132; Russian Federation, National Security Strategy, 2021, https://actual-pravo-gov-ru.translate.goog/text.html?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp#pnum=0001202107030001; People’s Republic of China, Defence Policy, Accessed: 03/28/2023, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/DefensePolicy/index.html#:~:text=China%20is%20always%20committed%20to,%2Dweapon%2Dfree%20zones%20unconditionally; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm; Andrew Brown & Lorna Arnold, “The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Relations, 24 (3) (2010): 293.
[3] Zaki Laidi “Towards a Post-Hegemonic World: The Multipolar Threat to the Multilateral Order.” International Politics, vol. 51, no. 3, (2014): 351.
[4] Duncan Depledge et al., “The UK’s Defence Arctic Strategy: Negotiating the Slippery Geopolitics of the UK and the Arctic.” The RUSI Journal, vol. 164, no. 1, (2019): 30.
[5] N Miheeva, “Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic: Geopolitics and Economics.” IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, vol. 302, no. 1, (2019): 1; People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm
[6] Edna Mohamed & Virginia Pietromarchi, "Russia-Ukraine live news: Moscow could destroy US – Patruchev" Al Jazeera, March 27, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/3/27/russia-ukraine-live-avdiivka-turning-post-apocalyptic-kyiv; U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, 2022, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/; Alexander Sergunin & Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv, “The Politics of Russian Arctic Shipping: Evolving Security and Geopolitical Factors.” Polar Journal, vol. 10, no. 2, (2020): 258; Depledge et al., 36.
[7] Chuffart et al., 205-206; NATO “Nato's nuclear deterrence policy and forces” 2022; Guy Faulconbridge, “Analysis: What is Russia's policy on tactical nuclear weapons?" Reuters, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-russias-policy-tactical-nuclear-weapons-2022-10-17/; Benjamin Schreer, “China’s Development of a More Secure Nuclear Second-Strike Capability: Implications for Chinese Behavior and U.S. Extended Deterrence.” Asia Policy, no. 19, (2015): 14; Walsh, 841.
[8] Brown & Arnold, 293.
[9] Sam-Aggrey & Lanteigne, 102; Walsh, 840; Chuffart et al., 205-206; Cimbala, 2017, 129.
[10] “Arctic,” National Geographic, Accessed 03/29/2023, https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/arctic/; “Arctic Council,” Arctic Council, 2023, https://arctic-council.org/.
[11] Walsh, 839-840; Sam-Aggrey & Lanteigne, 102.
[12] Miheeva, 1; PRC “China’s Arctic Policy” 2018.
[13] Miheeva, 6.
[14] Walsh, 840; U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement,” 2022; “Russian Chairmanship 2021-2023” Arctic Council, 2023, https://arctic-council.org/about/russian-chairmanship-2/.
[15] Brown & Arnold 2010 293; Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory : the Search for Credibility. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press, 1990): 35.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Cimbala, 2017, 129; Chuffart et al., 205-206; NATO “Nato's nuclear deterrence policy and forces” 2022; Faulconbridge 2022; Schreer, 14; Walsh, 841.
[20] Hugh Ward, “Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 34, no. 3, (1990): 371; Brown & Arnold, 293.
[21] PRC Defence Policy; NATO "Nato's nuclear deterrence policy and forces” 2022; United States, White House, “National Security Strategy,” (2022): 22, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf; Russian Federation, “National Security Strategy,” 2021; Brown & Arnold, 293
[22] Ibid.; Stacie Pettyjohn & Jennie Matuschak, “Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age.” Center for a New American Security Reports, (2022): 1; “Nuclear deterrence theory for a multi-polar world,” National Strategic Research Institute, 2013 https://nsri.nebraska.edu/irad/projects/nuclear-deterrence-theory-for-a-multi-polar-world.
[23] Stephen Cimbala, "Deterrence in a multipolar world: prompt attacks, regional challenges, and US-Russian deterrence." Air & Space Power Journal. 29 (4) (2015): 59.
[24] PRC Defence Policy; Mohamed & Pietromarchi 2023; United States, White House, "National Security Strategy" 22.
[25] NATO "Nato's nuclear deterrence policy and forces (2022); NATO, “What is NATO?” (2020) https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200327-What-is-NATO-en.pdf; “Hungary approves Finland’s bid to join NATO,” Deutsche Welle, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-approves-finlands-bid-to-join-nato/a-65142432; Gardener, F. “Turkey approves Finland Nato membership bid” BBC, March 31, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65132527
[26] Cimbala, 2015, 60; “II. Multipolar Deterrence.” Adelphi Papers, Vol. 15, No. 116, (1975): 27; Walsh, 841.
[27] United Nations, “Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 1970, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/; Michael Gordon, “U.S. Stops Sharing Data on Nuclear Forces With Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-wont-share-data-on-nuclear-forces-with-russia-46700a50.
[28] Chuffart et al., 205-206; Mohamed & Pietromarchi 2023.
[29] Sam-Aggrey & Lanteigne,102; Walsh, 839-841; Chuffart et al., 205-206; Miheeva 2019 6.
[30] Sam-Aggrey & Lanteigne, 102; Cimbala, 2017, 129.
