This article explores how the Wagner Group’s (WG) expanding footprint in Africa can exacerbate the migration crisis in Europe. It argues that the group can provoke irregular migration by supporting violence and political oppression in Africa and cooperating with hybrid warfare tools against EU borders. It also reflects on the challenges for the EU to address such threats and comments on what could be done by the Union to contain the WG in Africa.
BY Lara Maria Guedes Gonçalves Costa
The Wagner Group (WG) is a private military company (PMC) with strong ties to the Kremlin. In the past years, the WG has been a key strategic tool facilitating Russian engagement with African governments, providing political, military, and economic support to its client states such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mali [1]. Due to diplomatic isolation and Western sanctions following Russia’s war against Ukraine, the importance of the African continent in Russian foreign policy has increased [2]. In the past years, Russia has employed the WG’s military and security services as an alternative to Western armed forces and as a means to access economic resources through organised crime, including the smuggling of arms and natural resources. At the same time, the WG is of particular relevance to African authoritarian regimes, being part of a power-projection toolkit essential to their existence [3].
In June 2023, the international community watched attentively the rebellion led by the WG’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, against the Kremlin. Due to the tensions between the WG and Russia’s Ministry of Defence in Ukraine, a significant number of the WG’s fighters have been reallocated. Indeed, several are possibly in Belarus under the protection of Lukashenko’s regime [4]. In addition, the WG’s reallocation from Ukraine could potentially increase its presence in the African continent and redirect its efforts towards those countries [5]. This is particularly concerning because of the illicit activities of the WG in Africa and the violations of human rights committed by its fighters. Whereas there is a debate about the WG’s crimes, little attention has been given to the potential implications of the WG’s presence on the migration crisis from Africa to Europe. Therefore, this article aims to explore this topic and reflect on the challenges ahead to address the WG’s threat.
How the Wagner Group boosts migration through violence
The WG has been deployed in several African countries for political purposes. In the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mali, for example, the group has been hired primarily to provide security services to authoritarian regimes [6]. Moreover, the WG engages in corruption and patronage, cooperating with local governments and military officials to repress any form of opposition. Several countries where the WG is present have experienced democratic backsliding and indiscriminate violence against civilians [7]. According to United Nations (UN) experts on the CAR, the WG has been committing systemic and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations, including arbitrary detention, torture, and executions [8]. A recently published UN report on Libya has emphasised that the WG has been actively supporting General Khalif Haftar, being involved in human rights violations, including the killing of civilians [9].
Research reports have also revealed that violence has increased in Mali since the French forces left the country and the WG was hired to provide security services. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the group has committed mass atrocities, torture, and summary executions, among other crimes [10]. Additionally, civil society organisations (CSOs) and investigative journalists engaged in documenting the WG’s activities and human rights violations in Africa have been exposed to death threats and challenges by the WG [11]. In regards to Mali, experts have drawn attention to how the WG’s presence will directly affect the terrorist threat in the country. For instance, human rights abuses committed by the WG can worsen grievances among the population, thus facilitating terrorist groups’ recruitment of new members [12].
According to the UN, insecurity and political oppression are among the most prominent factors underlying migration flows from Africa to European countries [13]. Due to the involvement of the WG in human rights abuses and its military support to violent regimes, it is likely that the insecurity and oppression in the countries where the WG is present will increase. This can possibly bring about a rise in the number of internally displaced people as well as individuals willing to migrate to Europe.
How The Wagner Group exploits migrant smuggling
Whereas intense migration flows from Africa to Europe can be a side effect of the WG’s presence in African countries, the crisis can also be intentionally exacerbated by the group. Indeed, Wagner’s footprint in Africa has attracted the attention of researchers concerned with Russia’s strategy to subvert the European security order. As the group facilitates Russia’s hybrid warfare against the West, the WG can be used to boost the migration crisis in Europe. In 2022, Italy’s Ministry of Defence alleged that the WG has attempted to destabilise European countries by negotiating with smugglers and facilitating illegal migration across the Mediterranean Sea from Libya [14]. According to prominent researchers, WG is actively involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, especially in conflict zones [15].
With the recent reallocation of Wagner’s fighters to Belarus, after their failed mutiny in Russia, the risk of the WG’s use of migrants to destabilise Europe has increased. In 2021, as a response to the EU sanctions on Belarus, Lukashenko facilitated illegal migration flows to Poland as part of a hybrid warfare strategy [16]. Therefore, there is a growing concern that the WG’s assets in Africa could be deployed to escalate forced migration and asymmetric attacks on the borders of Poland and the Baltic states [17]. The mass atrocities and criminal activities conducted by the WG in Ukraine, African countries, and the Middle East testify to the security threats it poses.
Challenges ahead
The European Union (EU) will likely face challenges in addressing the threats posed by the WG. Firstly, it would be difficult to clearly assess the impact of the WG on migration flows from Africa to Europe. In particular, it would be challenging for the EU to assess which migrants were motivated to migrate due to any threat or fear related to the WG. Secondly, holding the WG accountable for its crimes is arduous due to its uncertain legal status in international law, as the fighters are neither civilians nor lawful combatants. Furthermore, the states where the WG operate have weak independent legal systems and investigative resources [18]. Thirdly, the EU will likely find strong resistance from African authoritarian regimes to stop engaging with the WG, as they currently lack other options for security services [19].
Finally, due to the recent rebellion of WG fighters against the Kremlin and the alleged death of Prigozhin [20], the future of the WG’s leadership is still unclear and its actions are difficult to predict. Whereas some observers had speculated the weakening of Russia’s influence in Africa, several observers argue that the WG’s decentralised command in Africa should allow it to continue its operations unaffected by Prigozhin’s passing [21].
Conclusion
The WG’s growing presence and influence in Africa can hinder the irregular migration between Africa and Europe through its illicit and hostile activities in the African continent, such as violence and migrant smuggling. In order to address the aforementioned challenges, this article suggests that the EU should reevaluate the WG’s present sanctioning strategies and impose sanctions on WG-affiliated businesses. Furthermore, the EU should work to strengthen its relationships with African partner countries to reduce WG’s footprint in Africa. Such efforts should target especially fragile states that might consider engaging with the WG in the future. The EU, together with Western allies, should work on developing options to improve security in Africa. It should also strengthen support to CSOs and investigative journalism engaged in documenting the WG’s activities and human rights violations, providing capacity-building assistance and enhancing their protection.
References
[1] Fasanotti, Federica Saini. “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure.” Brookings, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/.
[2] Pokalova, Elena. “The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia’s Quasi-State Agent of Influence.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, July 2, 2023, 2. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2023.2231642.
[3] Larsen, Karen Philippa , and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen. “Russia’s Comprehensive Approach and the Increased Use of the Wagner Group Challenges the West in Africa.” DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies, 2022. https://www.diis.dk/en/research/russias-comprehensive-approach-and-the-increased-use-of-the-wagner-group-challenges-the.
[4] Millender, Michaela. “IntelBrief: The Wagner Group Finds a New Home in Belarus.” The Soufan Center, July 31, 2023. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-july-31/?fbclid=IwAR2wQECKXnitUl8hjbZPdd-0tCHIHjN-YcWBOTSp4IQ4nX0_J2xxlrKI5Mc.
[5] Erling, Barbara, and Raphael Minder. “Poland Fears Wagner in Belarus Could Spark Migration Crisis.” Financial Times, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/4ee8d1eb-2836-4e23-aaac-422a8dc06ddb.
[6] Stanyard, Julia, Thierry Vircoulon, and Julian Rademeyer. “The Grey Zone: Russia’s Military, Mercenary and Criminal Engagement in Africa.” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-in-africa/.
[7] Blazakis, Jason, Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, and Sean Steinberg. “Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army.” The Soufan Center, 2023. https://thesoufancenter.org/research/wagner-group-the-evolution-of-a-private-army/.
[8] Stanyard, Julia, Thierry Vircoulon, and Julian Rademeyer. “The Grey Zone: Russia’s Military, Mercenary and Criminal Engagement in Africa.” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-in-africa/.
[9] Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas. “Dogs of War: Russia’s Corporate Warriors in Armed Conflicts.” European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2023. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/dogs-war-russias-corporate-warriors-armed-conflicts.
[10] Serwat, Ladd, Héni Nsaibia, Vincenzo Carbone, and Timothy Lay. “Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali.” ACLED | Bringing Clarity to Crisis, August 30, 2022. https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/.
11] Marten, Kimberly. “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group.” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (March 26, 2019): 182–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2019.1591142.
[12] Nasr, Wassim. “How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel.” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 11 (2022): 23–24. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel/
[13] United Nations. “Migration.” United Nations, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/migration#:~:text=Some%20people%20move%20in%20search.
United Nations Africa Renewal. “Despite Dangers, Many Africans Still Migrate to Europe.” Africa Renewal, October 21, 2019. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/despite-dangers-many-africans-still-migrate-europe.
[14] Kilner, James, and Nick Squires. “Russian-Linked Wagner Mercenaries Try to Destabilise Italy with Migrant Influx.” The Telegraph, July 30, 2022. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/07/30/russian-linked-wagner-mercenaries-try-destabilise-italy-migrant/; Nova, Redazione Agenzia. “Tajani: ‘Wagner Plays a Direct Role in the Smuggling of Migrants in Libya.’” Agenzia Nova, March 14, 2023. https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/tajani-wagner-direct-role-migrants-libya/.
[15] Clarke, Collin P., Emelie Chace-Donahue, and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. “Understanding the US Designation of the Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organisation.” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT, 2023. https://www.icct.nl/publication/understanding-us-designation-wagner-group-transnational-criminal-organisation.
[16] Dempsy, Judy. “Lukashenko Uses Migrants to Exploit Europe’s Vulnerability.” Carnegie Europe, 2021. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/85735.
[17] Erling, Barbara, and Raphael Minder. “Poland Fears Wagner in Belarus Could Spark Migration Crisis.” Financial Times, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/4ee8d1eb-2836-4e23-aaac-422a8dc06ddb.
[18] Clarke, Colin P. “How Russia’s Wagner Group Is Fueling Terrorism in Africa.” Foreign Policy, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/25/russia-wagner-group-africa-terrorism-mali-sudan-central-african-republic-prigozhin/.
[19] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “What’s Ahead for the Wagner Group in Africa and the Middle East?” Brookings, 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/whats-ahead-for-the-wagner-group-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/.
[20] Méheut, Constant. “Russia Officially Confirms Prigozhin’s Death.” The New York Times, August 27, 2023, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/08/27/world/russia-ukraine-war-news.
[21] Matt Murphy, “What Now for Wagner after Prigozhin’s Reported Death?,” BBC News, August 24, 2023, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66604261.
