By Katelynn snyman
Introduction
Troops from MINUSMA – Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali – commenced their “unceremonious” withdrawal from Mali in December 2023, at the request of the transitional authorities issued earlier in the year. The expulsion coincides with what has been deemed the United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping crisis, leading many to question whether the ‘era of blue helmets in Africa is drawing to an end’ [5].
The UN peacekeeping crisis is characterised by unrealistic, “blurred” mandates [7], poorly equipped and trained troops, a divided UN Security Council (UNSC), and a disregard for local conditions, dynamics, and what peace ‘really’ looks like [3]. These problems, by no means unique to Mali, have become endemic to various UN peacekeeping missions, including the others that make up the ‘Big Four’ – South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). These issues, along with exacerbating conditions specific to Mali such as the vast number of warring parties involved, likely account for the ultimate termination of what many call an unsuccessful peacekeeping mission.
The withdrawal of UN troops from Mali have raised concerns, amongst other things, ‘about whether it is time to review UN peacekeeping mandates’ [8], and the case holds significant implications as well as lessons concerning the UN’s peacekeeping crisis. Not only does Mali provide concrete examples of what peacekeepers should not do, but the case provides valuable insights for future considerations. Nearly one year after the withdrawal of MINUSMA, this article investigates the lessons that can be drawn from the expulsion of the UN peacekeeping forces from Mali, as well as the implications it holds for the UN’s broader crisis of peacekeeping.
Mali: Brief Contextualisation
Following a rebellion in northern Mali and a consequent military takeover in 2013, the newly established government requested assistance from France – Mali’s former colonial master – as well as a UN peacekeeping mission. MINSUMA was established with UNSC Resolution 2100 of 2013, mandating the mission with support for the political process, support for the transitional authorities and their implementation of the transition roadmap, as well as the protection of civilians and human rights [16]. Since the deployment of French troops, as well as the UN mission, violence rapidly escalated in Mali and the political and security situation has only worsened [12]. A decade later, in 2023, following a coup d’état in 2020 and a counter-coup in 2021, transitional authorities expelled the peacekeepers, citing MINUSMA’s failure to bring peace to Mali as the main reason [8]. This follows shortly after the withdrawal of French troops from the country in 2022, a move sparked by (amongst other things) the expulsion of the French ambassador earlier in the year. Given the difficulties encountered in the ‘Big Four’ African peacekeeping missions as well as general consensus that the UN is experiencing a crisis in peacekeeping, the expulsion of the peacekeepers from Mali sparked speculations over whether this is the start of a diminishing UN military footprint in Africa [5].
The Crisis of UN Peacekeeping
Adam Roberts noted in 1994 already that ‘UN peacekeeping is in crisis’ [10] – matters have not improved since then. The UN’s peacekeeping crisis can be divided into four categories. Firstly, peacekeeping mandates have become stretched and blurred throughout the years, rendering them difficult to implement [7]. Because these mandates are the product of compromise, they are necessarily vague and open to interpretation [3]. Additionally, mandates face a paradoxical problem between expanding so that peacekeepers can be more proactive, and curbing mandate inflation for the sake of viability. Indeed, can ‘mandates be curtailed if peacekeepers [have] to be more active?’ [9]. The UNSC also faces a peacekeeping “trilemma” [13], as mandates need to balance being comprehensive enough to address conflict, being resource efficient (often translating to insufficient resources), and prioritising the safety of peacekeepers. As such, peacekeeping mandates become incoherent, characterised by tensions and contradictions between tasks [13], and mandate execution is at times superseded by personnel safety. Through their imposition of over-ambitious goals and poor resource allocation, as well as the inability to learn and adapt, the UNSC sets missions up for failure [13].
A second category of problems pertain to peacekeeping troops. There exists a disparity between troop contributing countries, and those who donate funds. Wealthy countries tend to contribute to funding, whilst mostly postcolonial states contribute troops – yet they have little say in peacekeeping operations [7]. These operations thus adopt an element of imperialism [9] where former colonial masters fund missions that end up in former colonies, often executed by other former colonies. Additionally, since great powers rarely have critical interests in the destination of peacekeeping missions, UN troops that are (slowly) gathered on voluntary bases end up poorly trained, poorly paid, and poorly equipped [3]. Troops have also done more harm than good in some cases: the UN, up to 2019, received nearly 1000 allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers [3], who are in many instances regarded locally as ‘observers of slaughter and displacement’ [1].
Thirdly, UN peacekeepers are far removed from local contexts. When foreign staff are deployed, they often have no in-depth understanding of the societies and cultures within which they operate [3]. Consequently, they apply universal templates to the situation, based on information gathered from elites, with groupthink frequently taking hold. This is problematic, because in-depth insight of local dynamics is essential in understanding intra-state wars. Given this lacking understanding, the UN suffers from a ‘fundamental misunderstanding about what makes for sustained peace’ [3], as creating peace in complex conflicts with various warring parties requires peace processes to be tailored to local contexts and dynamics. The UN’s fixation with top-down peace processes which push for elections as soon as possible thus omits the crucial element of local considerations[3]. Frequently, then, peacekeeping missions do nothing more but freeze conflicts, which tend to resurge once missions are withdrawn.
Finally, UNSC divisions between the so-called P5 who hold the veto power, are to some extent responsible for the peacekeeping crisis [5]. Peacekeeping missions rely on the Council’s full support and backing for legitimacy and authority [13]. However, due to geopolitical tensions between the P5 members, a regression towards a Cold-War, deadlocked UNSC has led to divided support for peacekeeping missions. In a further shift reminiscent of the Cold-War, some permanent members utilise the Council to further their own national interests. Given that African countries are increasingly becoming sites of strategic competition between great powers [13], peacekeeping missions ‘amount more to self-interested meddling than genuine efforts to strengthen Africa’s security’ [1].
Lessons from Mali
It is evident from Mali that mandates are indeed cause for concern. MINUSMA’s founding mandate was expanded in 2014 under Resolution 2164, to include the implementation of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programs, as well as the support of elections and human rights monitoring (UNSC, 2024). However, Resolution 2423 of 2018 expanded the mandate even further, despite the fact that the initial goals had not yet been reached. Suddenly, MINUSMA was also tasked with anticipating and deterring threats, countering asymmetrical attacks, responding to threats of violence, preventing the return of armed elements to certain regions, and engaging in direct operations where needed [13]. MINUSMA’s broad mandate, which included direct counterterrorist and counterinsurgent tasks [4], eventually rendered the mission party to the conflict in Mali. Furthermore, because UN peacekeepers were direct targets of extremist attacks, the mandate had to be extensively interpreted on various occasions. This led to actions that fell outside the realm of traditional peacekeeping and leaned towards peace enforcement, including the strategic use of force to deter attacks [4]. Mali also demonstrates the UNSC’s failure to learn and adjust mandates accordingly. Despite 31 peacekeeper fatalities in 2019 alone and the escalating security crisis, the UNSC adopted resolution 2480 in that same year, further expanding MINUSMA’s mandate, without adding a single additional peacekeeper to the mission [13]. Mali thus illustrates that inflated peacekeeping mandates do indeed lead to incoherent or contradictory tasks, and that mandate inflation can render peacekeepers party to civil wars.
Furthermore, Mali highlights the problem with tasking troops to address issues such as weak governance, poverty, and corruption, when troops themselves hail from countries where these problems are rampant. The top troop and police contributing countries to MINSUMA were Chad, Senegal, Bangladesh, and Togo (United Nations, 2024). Countries that contributed to MIINSUMA funding were almost exclusively Western, including Germany, Austria, Canada, Italy, and Sweden (United Nations Missions, 2024). However, the disparity between troop contributing and fund contributing states led to more than poorly trained or equipped troops. In Mali, peacekeepers from Sweden and the Netherlands conducted intelligence, whilst troops from Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Senegal did ground patrol in dangerous areas [11]. Consequently, a divide between the “skiing nations” and the “barefoot nations” was developed in MINUSMA, leading to poor execution of mandate and a lack of intelligence sharing. Mali illustrates the power dimension that occurs in peacekeeping missions, where neo-colonial and imperial dichotomies are reinforced throughout. This, in turn, leads to weak implementation of the mandate and a lack of coordination amongst troops [11]. Furthermore, in “country after country,” foreign peacekeeping troops are accused of being arrogant, demeaning, and demanding lavish lifestyles [3] further alienating local populations. From this, Mali illustrates that peacekeeping troops encounter a layered problem: Western countries contribute funds, whilst African states send troops, creating the first neo-colonial divide. On a second level, even when Western troops are present on the ground, they continue to reinforce colonial legacies, where Africans are seen as expendable and suited to the dangerous ground work, whilst Western troops conduct intelligence operations and make lavish demands. Not much has been done to address divides between troops from different nations, likely contributing to the overall crisis.
Division amongst troops also provides a third insight, which is the need for understanding local contexts. The African troops studied above had extensive knowledge of local languages and were highly aware of their operational contexts, whilst very few Western troops had mastered French or Arabic, ‘let alone the local Malian languages’ [11]. Furthermore, Western troops were equipped with highly advanced and sophisticated information and technological systems, whilst these were hardly ever used by the African troops [11]. This divide is demonstrative of the fact that, when poorer postcolonial states end up volunteering troops (due to lack of interest from Western powers), these troops do indeed end up being poorly equipped and trained. Considering that peacekeepers are already viewed negatively by local populations, this divide highlights the need for better understanding of local contexts, before deployment. The idea that subject-area experience is more valuable than country expertise [3] was highlighted in Mali, which also demonstrates why this idea should be reformed.
The situation in Mali is further demonstrative of the fact that a divided UNSC, and the view of African states as theatres of great-power competition, contributes to the peacekeeping crisis. In 2022, the UNSC could not unanimously agree on an extension of MINUSMA’s mandate, with Russia and China abstaining from the vote [13]. Not only does this division take away from MINUSMA’s legitimacy and authority due to lack of full support from the Council, but it illustrates how great powers use the UNSC to further their own political interests. Firstly, Mali itself has become a theatre of great-power competition. Russia’s Wagner mercenary group were invited to Mali in December 2021, and by providing regime survival packages to the military junta, Wagner fosters pro-Russia dispositions with the intention of countering Western influence. Although Russia is not suspected of being directly involved in the expulsion of the UN peacekeepers [7], the failure to reach unanimity demonstrates that great-power interests can divide the Council on peacekeeping matters. Additionally, political conflict about broader matters “remains salient” on the Council [13], evidenced by the impact that Chinese and Russian interests had on MINUSMA. France, having led the UN Department for Peace Operations for 27 years, has also frequently been accused of using UN operations to deploy “self-interested missions” to its former colonies, which include Mali [1]. Indeed, Mali ushers in an era where the P5 will likely no longer agree on peacekeeping missions as ‘cost-effective means of providing stability in situations where few vital national interests are at stake’ [13].
Finally, the aftermath of the exit of UN troops from Mali demonstrates the broader implications of the peacekeeping crisis. Although many do not consider MINUSMA to be successful, the peacekeepers did achieve some successes. Peacekeeper outposts served as locations for aid distribution, and MINUSMA troops had developed local conflict prevention systems along with mechanisms to monitor and implement human rights [8]. Additionally, the departure of UN troops have sparked concern about the safety of Malian civilians, which MINUSMA had contributed to despite difficulties. The departure is also likely to bolster Wagner’s position in Mali, further causing concern for civilian safety given Wagner’s track record of human rights abuses [8]. Regionally, Mali shares its extremist problems with much of the Sahel, including Niger and Burkina Faso. If the withdrawal of UN troops leaves the country sliding into further crisis, with the terrorist threat facing very little opposition, it is likely to have spill-over effects into the rest of the Sahel, exacerbating the potential of a regional crisis. These future scenarios highlight the fact that, although UN peacekeeping missions are not without fault, their failures are detrimental to both the host country and the wider region. Indeed, ‘peacekeeping is broken, [but] that does not mean the world should give up on it’ [3].
Resolving the Crisis: Future Recommendations
Although the case of Mali highlights the variety of very real problems that contribute to the UN’s peacekeeping crisis, it also provides lessons on how to address this crisis. Tangible changes within mission composition, as well as mechanisms for peace building can address various of the problems identified above. Firstly, the UN should rethink mission composition in terms of who does what, and how. The current global North/South division of labour is not conducive to operations where mandates are strongly executed, and missions should be set up in such a way that allows for information sharing, trust building [11], and the elimination of imperial hierarchies. Peacekeeping staff should also include more local appointments, or people who at the very least have country expertise, knowledge of local languages, and in-depth understanding of the local dynamics. Secondly, the UN needs to (radically) reconsider how it thinks about peace. Instead of implementing universal, top-down templates in conflict zones, the UN should start with local conditions and create “a customised strategy” that is reflective of conditions, including root causes of conflict, on the ground [3]. Indeed, despite already inflated mandates, the UN should consider including the support for bottom-up peacebuilding, both financially and logistically, as part of peacekeeping mandates. Peace processes that are tailored to local dynamics are essential if peace is to be sustainable – the UN should thus reform its view of bottom-up and grassroots attempts at fostering peace, often run by “ordinary citizens”, and make this the focus of missions.
The case of Mali also highlights the need for adjustments on a larger scale, which should be led by a focus on regional cooperation. It was noted in 2006 already that the UN cannot deliver a legitimate world order on its own [6]. Considering that UN peacekeeping, now more than ever, is suffering a crisis of legitimacy, which is fuelled by a divided UNSC and the perception of peacekeeping missions as carrying imperial legacies, the use of regional operations as both alternatives and supplements should be considered. Indeed, regional arrangements “closer to home” such as the African Union (AU) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) counter the appearance of a distant, imposing UN [6]. The benefits associated with these missions, such as faster deployment than an often slow and divided UN [6], combined with the fact that regional bodies (especially the AU) suffer from funding and resource constraints, make for a good case of UN and African-led missions serving as complements to one another. In especially West Africa, where extremist groups operate extensively across the entire region, regional groups such as the G5-Sahel or the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) are generally better equipped to address cross-border challenges. Additionally, African-led peace missions allow for localised ownership of conflict management [2]. Indeed, it is these regions that need to live with the consequences of the conflict, providing them with increased buy-in in creating sustainable peace. Because regional bodies cannot simply ‘pack up and go home,’ regions themselves are often better suited to ‘deal with their own conflicts’ [6]..
Conclusion
This article sought to extract specific lessons about the UN’s peacekeeping crisis from the expulsion of UN troops from Mali. This case demonstrates that inflated and unrealistic mandates, accompanied by poor decisions in troop composition are indeed cause for concern. Furthermore, Mali demonstrates that the UN suffers from a chronic lack of considerations for local dynamics, and that staffing decisions, the appointment of experts, peace processes, and mandates need to adopt a genuine concern for local understanding. However, Mali also highlights why this crisis should be addressed in the first place – despite their failures, peacekeepers do benefit local populations on occasion, and more importantly, the lack of peacekeepers open up avenues for regional spill-overs and the entering of mercenaries into the conflict. The peacekeeping crisis is not impossible to solve, but realistic changes in mandates and increased acknowledgement of African agency, manifesting in African-led peace missions, need to be implemented if progress is to be made. Indeed, many of the solutions to the UN’s peacekeeping crisis can be resolved by a single shift: ‘rely on the very people it is ostensibly trying to protect’ [3].
References
[1] Adebajo, A. 2023. The Crisis of African Peacekeeping. Project Syndicate [Electronic]. Available:https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/united-nations-peacekeeping-forces-expelled-mali-drc-somalia-africa-by-adekeye-adebajo-2023-10 [Accessed April 9, 2024].
[2] Allen, N.D.F. 2023. African-Led Peace Operations : A Crucial Tool for Peace and Security. Africa Center for Strategic Studies [Electronic]. Available: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-led-peace-operations-a-crucial-tool-for-peace-and-security/ [Accessed April 11, 2024].
[3] Autesserre, S. 2019. The Crisis of Peacekeeping. Foreign Affairs, 98(1): 101-118.
[4] Fabra, J.B. 2022. Analysis of the United Nations Peace Operation in Mali: Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in MINSUMA. Revista Análisis Jurídico-Politico, 4(8): 17-50.
[5] Gowan, R. and Forti, D. 2023. What Future for UN Peacekeeping in Africa after Mali Shutters Its Mission? International Crisis Group [Electronic]. Available: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global-mali/what-future-un-peacekeeping-africa-after-mali-shutters-its-mission [Accessed March 31, 2024].
[6] Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. 2006. The UN and Regional Organisations in Global Security: Competing or Complementary Logics? Global Governance, 12: 227-232.
[7] Klobucista, C. and Ferragamo, M. 2023. The Role of Peacekeeping in Africxa. Council on Foreign Relations [Electronic]. Available: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-peacekeeping-africa#chapter-title-0-7 [Accessed March 31, 2024].
[8] Namatovu, R. 2023. UN Withdrawal from Mali: Consequences and Containment Strategies for Peacekeeping. Wilson Center: Africa Up Close Blog [Electronic]. Available: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/un-withdrawal-mali-consequences-and-containment-strategies-peacekeeping [Accessed Aprill 11, 2024].
[9] Pugh, M. 2021. Peacekeeping, in The Oxford Handbook of Peacekeeping, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation, O.P. Richmond & G. Visoka (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press. 247-261.
[10] Roberts, A. 1994. The Crisis in Peacekeeping, Global Politics and Strategy 36(3): 93-120. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339408442752
[11] Ruffa, C. and Rietjens, S. 2023. Meaning making in peacekeeping missions: mandate interpretation and multinational collaboration in the UN mission in Mali. European Journal of International Relations, 29(1): 53-78.
[12] Sauter, M. 2024. The Mali Puzzle: International Isolation, Anti-French Sentiments, and Withdrawal of UN Peacekeepers. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs [Electronic]. Available: https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/01/17/the-mali-puzzle-international-isolation-anti-french-sentiments-and-withdrawal-of-un-peacekeepers/ [Accessed April 7, 2024].
[13] Tull, D.M. 2023. UN Peacekeeping in Africa: The End of a Cycle? Megatrends Afrika, Working Paper 07. Berlin.
[14] United Nations Missions. 2024. MINUSMA [Electronic]. Available: https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/united-nations-trust-fund-peace-and-security-mali [Accessed April 11, 2024].
[15] United Nations Security Council. 2014. Resolution 2164. 25 June. [Online]. Available: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/773580?ln=en&v=pdf [Accessed April 9, 2024].
[16] United Nations Peacekeeping. 2024. MINUSMA Fact Sheet [Electronic]. Available: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma#:~:text=By%20unanimously%20adopting%20resolution%202164,reestablishment%20of%20State%20authority%2C%20the [Accessed April 5, 2024].
