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This article explores how the Wagner Group’s (WG) expanding footprint in Africa can exacerbate the migration crisis in Europe. It argues that the group can provoke irregular migration by supporting violence and political oppression in Africa and cooperating with hybrid warfare tools against EU borders. It also reflects on the challenges for the EU to address such threats and comments on what could be done by the Union to contain the WG in Africa.
The second part of the series “Gas, War and Europe” looks at the latest developments on the energy crisis triggered by the War in Ukraine, its current impact in Europe and the possible future scenarios. For this, the article delves into the institutional response given by the European Union (EU), the evolution of imports and energy suppliers as well as the challenges ahead.
This first part of the series “Gas, War, and Europe” aims to analyse the different factors that have shaped the longstanding dependency of the European Union (EU) on Russian gas, and how these have laid the foundations for the energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine. For this, the spotlight is placed on the interdependence of economic, political, and infrastructural issues as the main factors capable of explaining the current situation.
The European Union´s role as a global cyber power mainly relies on its ability to shape cyber-related legislation and standards of state behavior. This might prove challenging due to its institutional structure and civilian power characteristics. Still, the cyber diplomacy directive adopted by the European Council in December 2015 marks the EU’s more proactive role in international cyberspace policy development.
By Rusudan Zabakhidze
While the European Union (EU) has established itself as a regional cyber security player, it is far from being a global cyber power. With the EU’s defense and security policy still under construction, the EU remains a civilian power that lacks hard power capabilities – both in the “analog” and the “digital” realm.
The EU’s aspiration to become a cyber power has been the result of two developments. The first is the increasing development of EU competences and the second is the blurred distinction between domestic and international agendas. In order to demonstrate unity, the European Council has called for the development and implementation of a common and comprehensive approach to global cyber diplomacy. The Council of the EU [1] also encourages the Union and its Member States ‘to prepare cyber dialogues, avoiding duplication of efforts and taking into account the broader EU political and economic interests, collectively promoted by all EU actors’.
The EU’s role as a global cyber power mainly relies on its ability to shape cyber-related legislation as well as norms and standards of state behavior. This might prove challenging due to its institutional structure and civilian power characteristics. Still, the cyber diplomacy directive adopted by the European Council in December 2015 marks the EU’s more proactive role in international cyberspace policy development [2].
Even though the type of cyber security threats and their sources are more diversified than ever, liberal democracies are failing to respond to them with active measures. Regulating cyberspace is obviously a challenging task, as it requires to bring together diverse actors with various interests. This is where the window of opportunity opens up for the EU. The EU has been relatively successful in bringing together civilian and military stakeholders, as well as centers of excellence, industry, and academia [3]. (More on this in Part 1 of the series: EU Cyber Security Capabilities).
One of the main goals of the EU’s cyber diplomacy is to find international consensus on how to apply existing international law to cyberspace and to develop norms for responsible state behavior. The United Nations Charter does not refer to cybersecurity as by the time it was created, the Internet simply did not exist. The EU supports the idea that the UN Charter should apply to the cyber realm as well. The September 2017 Joint Communication on ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ endorses the non-binding norms, rules, and principles of responsible state behavior in the field of Information and Telecommunications that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts [4].
One of the notable examples that can be analysed to further understand the EU’s ability to influence international norm setting is the General Data Protection Regulation, which gives European citizens more control over the use of their private data. In a United States Senate hearing, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg noted that the European legislation seems fair and suitable to prevent unwelcome interferences and misuse of customer data in the future [5]. Even though the regulation has not become an international standard yet, international discourse commends the EU’s progressive vision regarding data protection. Decreasing the vulnerability of European citizens and companies, in addition to building secured information and communication systems, creates a strong foundation for cyber security deterrence.
The real challenge to develop an effective legislation lies in overcoming the EU bureaucracy against a fast-developing and ever-changing cyber environment. Even though the European Union is yet to become a powerful cyber security actor, its diplomatic efforts to support the application of the international law to cybercrimes have the potential to set international norms and principles of responsible state behavior. Amongst others, the EU has started to influence the global discourse through cooperation with third countries and other regional organisations. The scale, achievements and challenges of this type of cooperation will further be discussed in the final part of the series on the EU Cyber Security Capabilities.
[1] Reform of the Cyber Security in Europe. 2017. Council of the European Union. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/ [2] European Commission. (2017. Digital Single Market. Cybersecurity. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cyber-security [3] European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2013). Cyber Security Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf [4] Jaku Bund, Pawlak Patryk. (2017) Minilateralism and norms in . cyberspace. EU Institute for Security Studies. Retrived on Sep 15, 2018 from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert%2025%20Cyber%20norms_0.pdf [5] The Washington Post. (2018). Mark Zuckerberg testifies on Capitol Hill (full Senate hearing). Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ValJMOpt7s
Transport, energy, health, and finance are the most vulnerable sectors exposed to cyber-threats. Issuing the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 was an important step forward in developing a common framework; however, the strategy lacked the practical initiatives that would deliver tangible outcomes.
By Rusudan Zabakhidze
In the past decade, cyber warfare has become an exceptional phenomenon that has increased the vulnerability of individuals, non-state actors, and state actors to unprecedented levels. Businesses and governments rely on networks to provide their services across the EU. However, the cyber threat vulnerability of the world’s second-largest economy remains unclear. This article provides an introduction to the EU’s strategic cyber security vision by critically analysing internal and external challenges in the implementation of the recently published cyber security strategy: “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU.”
In the case of a cyber offense, the victimised country is often hampered to find a proper response because of the ambiguity surrounding the nature and origin of the attack. Since the cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, there have been growing concerns over the possibility of election hacking by foreign states, ransomware attacks, and other cybercrime. According to the statistics provided by the European Commission, 80% of European companies experienced at least one cybersecurity incident in 2017 [1]. Correspondingly, 86% of Europeans believe that the cybercrime risks are increasing [2].
The European Union is working on completing the Digital Single Market which will further extend the “four freedoms” (movement, capital, goods, and labour) by providing the rules of fair competition for the individuals and businesses of the Member States to engage in online activities [3]. Therefore, the costs related to cyber attacks are only expected to increase, creating a need for the development of effective preventive mechanisms. Some Member States have already included Cybersecurity in their National Security Strategies. Yet, the ambition of creating the Digital Single Market coupled with the highly interdependent nature of the EU economy indicates a need for action on the collective European level, rather than the individual national levels.
Transport, energy, health, and finance are the most vulnerable sectors exposed to cyber-threats [4]. Issuing the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 was an important step forward in developing a common framework; however, the strategy lacked the practical initiatives that would deliver tangible outcomes [5]. Necessary resources, for example, are still up to each Member State to acquire. In September 2017, the European Commission proposed a wide range of concrete measures that aim to further strengthen the EU’s cyber defense structures and capabilities, entailing more cooperation between the Member States. The updated strategy, “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,” revolves around three principles: building resilience, developing legislative responses, and strengthening international cooperation [6].
While the implementation of the proposed initiatives is a long-term process, the EU has already taken its first steps regarding the security of its own institutions. An inter-institutional arrangement established a permanent Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) covering all EU institutions, bodies, and agencies.
The European Commission has created the EU Cybersecurity Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). This agency coordinates cooperation among member states against cyberattacks. The EU has created a blueprint that guides incident responses for large-scale cyberattacks. An EU-wide certification scheme is also in consideration to increase the quality and security of digital products and services. The EU plans to support Research and Competence Centers and to set up a cyber defense training and education platform. The EU also aims to develop a framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities and to deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [7].
Even though the proposed initiatives cover a wide range of responses, there are a number of practical challenges that will significantly affect the speed, as well as the outcomes, of the mentioned initiatives. The EU has neither properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues [8]. Other tasks that lie ahead include finding consensus on what constitutes a cybercrime and building the capacities to trace the sources of attacks.
While updating the original cyber security strategy can be considered a positive step towards the EU’s increased resilience, the challenges posed by institutional fragmentation of the Union may hinder the implementation process. Ultimately, as the frequency and scale of cyberattacks increase, effective mechanisms are essential. Failure to implement the proposed initiatives will automatically result in the failure of the establishment of the Digital Single Market. Failure to adapt to the risks and realities of the 21st century could harm the EU’s credibility, and ultimately its viability, not only with its citizens, but worldwide.
[1] European Commission. 2017. State of the Union. Cyber Security Factsheet. [online]
Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21480/cybersecurityfactsheet.pdf
[2] ibid
[3] European Commission. 2015. Shaping the Digital Single Market. [online]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market
[4] Council of the European Union. 2017. Reform of the Cyber Security in Europe. [online]
Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/
[5] European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
2013. Cyber Security Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. [online]
Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf
[6] European Commission. 2017.
State of the Union - Cybersecurity: Commission scales up EU's response to cyber-attacks.
[online] Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3193_en.htm
[7] European Commission. 2017. State of the Union. Cyber Security Factsheet. [online]
Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21480/cybersecurityfactsheet.pdf
[8] Bendiek, A, Bossong, R & Matthias Schulze. 2017. The EU’s Revised Cybersecurity Strategy.
German Institute for International and Security Affairs. [online]
Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C47_bdk_etal.pdf
In an increasingly open and interconnected market, one of the most vital elements of the European Union (EU) common market project is lagging behind: energy. The European Energy Union is an ongoing project of the EU to create an open and interconnected energy market throughout the EU providing secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy.
By Dorien van Dam
In an increasingly open and interconnected market, one of the most vital elements of the European Union (EU) common market project is lagging behind: energy. The European Energy Union is an ongoing project of the EU to create an open and interconnected energy market throughout the EU providing secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy. The initiative was launched in 2014 and published its last progress report in November 2017 [1]. These reports monitor the advancement of the EU towards its 2020 and 2030 energy and climate targets. The reports repeatedly draw the same unsatisfactory conclusion: more work will be needed. So, what exactly is going wrong?
The road towards this Energy Union is outlined in a framework, and can be roughly divided into four pillars: (1) more interconnection, (2) higher energy efficiency, (3) higher share of renewable energy and (4) cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Some countries, however, are struggling more with their targets than others.
As per the 2014 numbers of Eurostat, nine member states have already met their national renewable energy targets for 2020. The states that are the furthest away from reaching their targets are France, the Netherlands and Ireland [2]. Ironically, these are countries with relatively high GDP per capita within the EU. Irish officials argue that their progress towards the targets were hampered by slow recovery following the financial crisis. Ireland was however not disproportionately affected by the financial crisis; it was a truly global crisis [3].
A possible explanation is that the four countries were not politically equipped to surpass the tragedy-of-the-commons problem. Renewable energy is a typical good that everyone wants but nobody wants to pay for. In the Netherlands, even after a sharp increase in ‘green’ voters during the 2017 election, the new government coalition agreement was exceptionally weak from an environmental perspective. The French system, on the other hand, is infamous for its layered bureaucracy with high amounts of red-tape. This system, in addition to a well-organized fossil fuel lobby are severely hindering the development of a green energy sector [4].
On a more positive note, the EU is expected to surpass their goals in cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 1%. Even though this goal does not include ‘embedded emissions’: GHG emissions involved in the production of imported goods [5], it is still a hard-needed win for the EU in the realisation of their 2020 goals.
Another area where progress is being steadily observed is that of energy efficiency. Per capita energy consumption in the EU has decreased from 2007 to 2014. Yet, 2015 and 2016 witnessed small increases, likely due to cooler winters. This resulted in the repetition of the EU Energy mantra: “additional efforts may be needed.” Despite these cooler winters, the EU is the first economic bloc to decouple economic growth from energy consumption.
Finally, the EU has a range of projects on their way to increase energy interconnection. These projects, however, are facing their own geopolitical issues. To conclude, the EU has set out a structured path towards the creation of its Energy Union, but along the way it has had to face multiple political—and meteorological—realities. Most of the 2020 goals are legally binding targets, resulting in possibly hefty fines for the countries that fail to meet their targets. Yet it is doubtful that the European Court of Justice will accept a cold winter as a justification for a breach, but imposing fines when the EU is suffering from low levels of support might prove a politically risky move. All in all, 2020 will prove to be an interesting year, not just for the Energy Union, but for the wider European Union as well.
[1] European Commission. 2018. Energy Union and Climate. [ONLINE]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en.
[Accessed 3 March 2018].
[2] TheJournal.ie. 2017.
Ireland is expected to miss its EU renewables target - and cop a multimillion-euro bill.
[ONLINE]
Available at: http://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-eu-2020-energy-fines-2-3231942-Feb2017/. [Accessed 3 March 2018].
[3] Ibid.
[4] ICIS. 2017. ICIS Power Perspective: France likely to miss 2020 renewables target. [ONLINE]
Available at: https://www.icis.com/resources/news/2017/10/06/10149918/icis-power-perspective-france-likely-to-miss-2020-renewables-target/?redirect=english. [Accessed 3 March 2018].
[5] European Commission. 2018. Energy Union and Climate. [ONLINE]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en. [Accessed 3 March 2018].
