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In late September 2024, Georgia's Parliament passed a law on "family values and protection of minors," cloaked as a defence of tradition but, in reality, a severe rollback of LGBTQ+ rights. This legislation, which prohibits same-sex marriages, LGBTQ+ adoptions, and positive media representation of queer individuals, aligns with Russia's influence and the Orthodox Church’s anti-LGBTQ+ stance. As Georgia nears the October elections, populist, anti-Western rhetoric intensifies, weaponising anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments. Pro-Russian parties leverage these sentiments to sway voters. The Georgian Dream Party, led by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, stands poised to capitalise on this, hoping to cement Georgia’s ties with Moscow and looking forward to criminalising even more LGBTQ+ communities.
In recent years, the Kremlin has intensified its campaign against Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) minorities, identifying them as Western propaganda. However, this rhetoric has an old origin that started with the criminalisation of “sodomy” done by Iosif Stalin. Recently, tactics of attacking the LGBTQ+ community have evolved into designating it as Western propaganda. This has led to an increasing criminalisation of the community, which has become a systematic technique that involves all the elites and powers of the Russian state from Putin to Kirill and running through the judicial system. Moreover, this propaganda has spread outside the country's borders, with anti-LGBTQ+ disinformation being spread in the former Soviet space and globally, reproducing similar anti-Western rhetoric. In this environment, the condition of SOGI minorities in Russia is worrying, and the situation will likely become worse in the future.
This article explores how the Wagner Group’s (WG) expanding footprint in Africa can exacerbate the migration crisis in Europe. It argues that the group can provoke irregular migration by supporting violence and political oppression in Africa and cooperating with hybrid warfare tools against EU borders. It also reflects on the challenges for the EU to address such threats and comments on what could be done by the Union to contain the WG in Africa.
This article assesses the impact of multipolarity on nuclear relations in the Arctic. Due to climate change, geopolitical tension, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nuclear relations in the Arctic are unstable and present serious security risks that cannot be contended with through the use of classic deterrence theory. Melting polar ice means growing competition for Arctic territory and resources amongst North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, the Russian Federation, and China. This is occurring alongside the threat of nuclear warfare, which is considered by all actors to be a matter of deterrence despite it being beyond the bipolar rational choice modelling of deterrence theory.
The second part of the series “Gas, War and Europe” looks at the latest developments on the energy crisis triggered by the War in Ukraine, its current impact in Europe and the possible future scenarios. For this, the article delves into the institutional response given by the European Union (EU), the evolution of imports and energy suppliers as well as the challenges ahead.
This first part of the series “Gas, War, and Europe” aims to analyse the different factors that have shaped the longstanding dependency of the European Union (EU) on Russian gas, and how these have laid the foundations for the energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine. For this, the spotlight is placed on the interdependence of economic, political, and infrastructural issues as the main factors capable of explaining the current situation.
On the 26th of March 2022, the President of the United States of America (USA), Joe Biden, visited Warsaw to rally North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in support of Ukraine [1]. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, the Western world had started sanctioning the aggressor rather than getting involved militarily [2]. Biden addressed the US allies in a very long speech that contained words described as surprising by some and alarming by others. This article aims at providing an alternative view of the two main narratives that address Biden’s statement that Putin cannot remain in power.
Since the 2010s youth popular culture has become an object of close attention and management on the part of political actors and institutions in Russia, with substantial funds being diverted towards young people via a national project of patriotic education (Kukulin, 2020) (Hemment, 2015, p 7). From school curriculums that discourage critical thinking to the formation of youth groups such as the infamous Nashi (Ours), the Kremlin has sought to imbue the Russian youth with the “correct” moral values. This article explores how youth culture is firstly securitized and then leveraged, to justify the expansion of further security measures into wider parts of society.
The final instalment in this series will explore Rosgvardiya the newly formed National Guard in Russia. From its creation and the roles it fulfils, to its leadership and its future uses, the National Guard of the Russian Federation is a force to be reckoned with. This article will delve into all of these themes and underline how Rosgvardiya fits into the security apparatus of the Russian Federation. Readers should ask themselves the following throughout: Is Rosgvardiya a new and improved method of maintaining the internal security, or is the National Guard the personal police of the Russian President?
In modern-day Russia, policing is one of the most employed professions, with one police officer for every seventy-five people [1]. Considering the legacy of the Soviet Union, this should come as no surprise. In recent times, public order assets have been greatly revamped under President Vladimir Putin. This article explores the development of policing in Russia since the collapse of the USSR, fundamentally analysing the role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, MVD) and the importance – and controversies – of Russia’s riot police, the Special Purpose Mobile Unit (Otryad Mobil'nyy Osobogo Naznacheniya, OMON).
The Sluzhba vneshney razvedki (SVR) or Foreign Intelligence Service continues to be an extremely potent organisation and key component of Russia’s Security Council in implementing the foreign policy aims of the Kremlin. Accusations of election interference, social-manipulation and widespread cyber attacks have put a spotlight on this branch of the Russian intelligence services. This article will provide an overview of the SVR, outlining its origins from the 1990s and how it operates in relation to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. It will then detail the SVR’s utilisation of active measures (aktivnye meropriyatiya) in the Kremlin’s continuing conflict with the West.
The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - (Главное Разведывательное Управление/Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie) - or ‘GRU’ is one of the most inconspicuous organisations imaginable. Even among the generally taciturn cohort of Russian intelligence agencies, the GRU has been remarkable in its pursuit of secrecy. Whereas an endless stream of horror stories emanated from the Lubyanka, from the Aquarium - the GRU’s headquarters built atop a mass grave - there was only ever silence. This article will explore this most secretive and dangerous of organisations, offering a detailed assessment by comparing its Cold War past and its modern identity.
Any talk of the Soviet Union or the Cold War inevitably includes the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). Just as the Russian Federation succeeded the Soviet Union, so too did a number of organisations and agencies succeed the KGB. This first article will explore one of these institutions, the Federal Security Service (FSB). Beginning with the history and how the service came to be in modern Russia, this piece will go on to explore the nominal role and functions of the FSB. It will also shine a light on the actual role played by the Federal Security Service in Russian politics and society today, as well as touch on some of the controversy that surrounds this organisation. The purpose of this article is to illuminate the FSB as a service and inspire readers to dig a little deeper into the world of the security services of Russia.
After the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the EU- and US-imposed sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin employed a counter-strategy: disinformation and propaganda. The Western Balkans, a key strategic partner to the EU and NATO, became a fertile ground for Russian disinformation campaigns. Capitalizing on ethnic divides, weak institutions, and the deteriorating freedom of media, the Kremlin inserted itself into the region. Using Serbia as a launch site for disinformation, Russia established a regional base for the Sputnik news agency in Belgrade.
“Following the end of the Russian military operations in 2008, Chechnya has experienced a period of economic recession and consistent low-level political violence perpetrated by Jihadist and separatist insurgent movements. The brutal Counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Chechen security forces inflicted severe casualties on the rebels but antagonised large segments of the local population. A sudden decline in the regime’s capacity to enforce law and order could arouse the dormant Chechen insurgency and drive the little republic towards a new, bloody civil war.“
In February 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the end of the Russian military operations in the Republic of Chechnya. Promising the return of peace and stability in the troubled region, Putin asserted in front of the Russian State Council that, starting from early 2004, the Russian armed forces operating in conjunction with the Chechen government’s paramilitary units successfully inflicted a ‘decisive and crushing blow’ to the Chechen rebels [1]. Welcomed with enthusiasm by the Russian population, the end of the Russian Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and the institution of a competent pro-Russian indigenous COIN force were supposed to mark the conclusion of a military engagement that, since August 1999, claimed the lives of more than 10,000 Russian soldiers and 30,000 Chechen civilians (according to Russian official estimates) [2] [3]. Despite Putin’s speech describing the Chechen conflict as resolved, scholars and journalists challenged the Kremlin’s optimistic viewpoint. ‘It is a fairy tale that Chechnya has become a stable region,’ stated the editor of the Caucasian Knot website, Grigory Shvedov, a few days after the declaration, noting that clashes between insurgents and security forces continued to occur on a daily-basis in spite of the Chechen regime’s heightened COIN capabilities [4]. Although the pro-Russian government headed by Ramzan Kadyrov since May 2004 forced the insurgency to assume a ‘dormant’ configuration characterised by a low-level frequency of violent attacks, it only did so by implementing brutal COIN measures that alienated the civilian population and exacerbated the local communities’ hostility towards the official authorities [5]. Notwithstanding the decrease in their operational efficacy, the insurgents have not been dissuaded from attempting to unsettle the status quo through the use of terrorism, political assassinations, and low-level guerrilla warfare [6]. Should the regime’s capability of enforcing law and order be weakened or challenged, the dormant Chechen insurgency could swiftly gain momentum by mobilising the populace against the pro-Russian government and triggering an escalatory cycle of retaliatory violence between civilian population and security forces [7].
Ironically, the paramilitary forces that allowed the pro-Russian regime to quell the insurgency might also be the catalyst for a new wave of violence throughout the region. Realising that the deployment of Chechen natives would have significantly assisted the Russian military forces in isolating and neutralising the insurgents, Moscow in 2000 supported the establishment of the kadyrovtsy, a pro-Russian indigenous paramilitary group named after Chechnya’s ruling family – the Kadyrov clan [8]. Against a backdrop of judicial impunity, the kadyrovtsy resorted to collective punishments against the insurgents’ relatives, including threats, beatings, rapes, torture, and executions, to force the insurgents to lay down their weapons and deter the population from providing assistance to the rebels [9]. Because of their experience as former insurgents, their loyalty to the incumbents, their access to high-quality information, and their inclination to target innocent civilians, the kadyrovtsy proficiently contained the insurgency and effectively coerced the civilian population into submission [10]. Nevertheless, the kadyrovtsy’s draconian techniques exacerbated the society’s polarisation and deeply antagonised the civilian population. Many Chechens are ‘in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy and are waiting for ‘a propitious time to commence violence’ [11]. As long as Kadyrov is able to control and direct his paramilitary units against the insurgents and their supporters, the kadyrovtsy will continue to constitute a formidable COIN force. But because the Kremlin retains the authority to appoint and dismiss the leaders of any autonomous republic of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), Kadyrov’s supremacy is dependent on Moscow’s volition. If deprived of their leader’s guidance and the government’s patronage, the kadyrovtsy would lose their organizational and operational efficacy, exposing themselves to the populations’ retaliatory strikes [12]. Such a tense and unpredictable socio-political landscape is particularly suited to trigger large-scale collective violent outbreaks. Consequently, the Chechen insurgency could easily capitalise on the population’s grievances and swiftly turn from dormant to rampant. In other words, the repressed Chechen population is likely to retaliate against the security forces and join the insurgency in large numbers as soon as the regime’s capability to subdue the local communities and suppress the insurgents wanes [13].
As mentioned, the dormant Chechen insurgency might also reawaken if the relationship between Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and Moscow deteriorates to the point of endangering the Chechen political establishment’s survival. Since 2004, Chechnya has been ruled by a leader fully loyal to Putin and anxious to demonstrate his allegiance to the Russian Federation. As a reward for his ability to quell the insurgency, Kadyrov enjoys Putin’s personal support and is afforded the freedom to ‘treat Chechnya as his personal fiefdom’ [14]. However, the Chechen leader’s political hegemony is subject to significant restrictions. Despite Kadyrov behaving like a monarch and his political power steadily growing, his dominion over Chechnya cannot be secured without Moscow’s direct approval. Therefore, Kadyrov’s position might drastically change overnight if Moscow decides to dispossess the Chechen leadership of its official federal endorsement [15]. Currently, the strongest opposition to Kadyrov’s rule is represented by the Russian siloviki – politicians that previously served within Russian military, security, and law enforcement agencies [16]. Many among the siloviki consider the presence of an ambitious warlord dominating a small Russian region and disposing of a large personal elite force as a serious threat to the federal government’s authority [17]. At the moment, Putin’s patronage prevents the siloviki from taking actions against Kadyrov and undermining the Chechen leadership’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, a significant weakening of the Chechen regime’s political power cannot be ruled out from the possible outcomes of an increasingly tense relationship between Grozny and Moscow. Although Chechnya exhibits lower levels of political violence in comparison to other areas of the NCFD, the situation on the ground remains highly volatile [18]. If the regime is deprived of Moscow’s endorsement or loses its ability to confront the insurgents, the Chechen population would be able to massively engage in politically-motivated violence and revitalise an insurgency that, until now, seemed to have been patiently waiting for favourable conditions to arise once again.
[1] Putin, V (2008) ‘Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020.’ [online] available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24825. Accessed on 12th May 2019.
[2] ‘Chechen Official Puts Death Toll for 2 Wars at Up to 160,000,’ (2005) New York Time, 16th August [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/world/europe/chechen-official-puts-death-toll-for-2-wars-at-up-to-160000.html. Accessed on 12th May 2019.
[3] Department of Justice (Russia) ‘Armed Conflict Report: Russia (Chechnya) (1999-First Combat Deaths in Current Phase,’ January 2019 [online] available from: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Russia.pdf. Accessed on 12th May 2019.
[4] Schwirtz, M (2009) ‘Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya,’ New York Times, 16th April [online] available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html. Accessed on 12th May 2019.
[5] Halbach, U (2018) ‘Chechnya’s Status Within the Russian Federation,’ German Institute for International and Security Studies, SWP Research Paper, p. 5.
[6] Blank, S & Kim, Y (2016) ‘The North Caucasus: Russia’s Other War,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, p.187.
[7]Souleimanov, E; Abbasov, N; Siroky, D (2019) ‘Frankenstein in Grozny: Vertical and Horizontal Cracks in the Foundation of Kadyrov’s Rule,’ Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 17, p. 87.
[8] Souleimanov, E (2017) ‘A Failed Revolt? Assessing the Viability of the North Caucasus Insurgency,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 219. & Souleimanov, E; Aliyev, H (2017) How Socio-Cultural Codes Shaped Violent Mobilisation, Palgrave, p. 39.
[9] Ratelle, J & Souleimanov, E (2016) ‘A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No. 8, p. 1298.
[10] Souleimanov, E & Aliyev, H (2016) ‘Evaluating the Efficacy of Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Chechnya and Dagestan,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 394.
[11] Souleimanov; Abbasov; Siroky, p. 95.
[12] Ratelle & Souleimanov, p. 1308.
[13] Souleimanov, p. 222.
[14] Halbach, p. 13.
[15] Ratelle & Souleimanov, p. 1304.
[16] Taylor, B (2017) ‘The Russian Siloviki & Political Change,’ American Academy for Arts & Sciences, Vol. 146, No. 2, p. 53.
[17] Souleimanov, E (2015) ‘An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenisation,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 107.
[18] Dannreuther, R (2014) ‘Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in the North Caucasus,’ Ethnopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 4, p- 378.
We know that the Russians are involved, stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban. Russia’s logistical and financial support to the Afghan Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.
During 2018, United States (U.S.) military commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly reported that the Taliban received material, financial and logistical support from Russian representatives.[1] “We know that the Russians are involved,” stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban.[2] These allegations were backed up by testimonies of Afghan police and military officials, which reported to Western media that recently-produced Russian military equipment, including night-vision goggles, heavy machine guns and small arms, is now part of the Taliban’s arsenal.[3] Russia denied any involvement in the alleged shipment of Russian weapons to the Afghan Taliban, declaring that these weapons could have been smuggled by several transnational non-state actors.[4] This escalation of suspicions and accusations demonstrates that Russia’s increasing influence in Afghanistan is causing significant problems for the U.S. and the Afghan Government. Russia’s decision to embrace the Taliban stands in clear contrast with the previous history of logistical help that Moscow guaranteed to the U.S.-led forces fighting the Taliban.[5] Why is Moscow reversing its political stance regarding Afghanistan? This article will analyse Russia’s strategic turnaround from three perspectives: geopolitical considerations, national security and long-term interests.
Geopolitical considerations are an evident catalyst of Russia’s strategic turnaround. In the wake of Russia’s revisionism, Moscow is unlikely to discard the occasion that the Afghan quagmire offers to its regional aspirations. Russia’s support to the Taliban poses significant extra costs on the U.S. because a stronger insurgency in Afghanistan jeopardises the progress that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations achieved during years of protracted political and military engagement. Consequently, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan forces the U.S. to strengthen its presence in the country. Without the United States’ support, the Afghan Government is unlikely to regain control of the provinces overrun by the enemy. The increasing amounts of resources and personnel diverted to Afghanistan limits the United States’ capability of projecting its hard and soft power in other regions. Therefore, while the U.S. tries to prevent the Taliban from seizing power in Kabul, Moscow is incentivised to expand its influence in North Africa, the Middle East and in the Euro-Atlantic area.[6]
Nevertheless, Russia’s primary interest regarding Afghanistan is directly linked to the security and protection of its external borders.[7] Moscow, by providing support to the Taliban, is aiming at disrupting the presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan. The IS is considered by the Taliban a hostile entity that challenges their monopoly on insurgency. Therefore, the Taliban are determined to force the IS out of Afghanistan through the use of force. Similarly, Russia regards the Islamic State as a threat because it poses several challenges to its security. Among these difficulties, the return of foreign fighters to Russia, the connections between the IS in Afghanistan and segments of the underground North Caucasian insurgency and the influence of the IS propaganda on Russia’s population are the most concerning.[8] Russia and the Taliban are partnering because they share a common enemy and their interests are mutually compatible. While the Taliban are focused exclusively on dominating Afghanistan and do not have any interest in expanding their presence outside the country’s borders, the IS strives for enlarging its network both in Russia and Afghanistan.[9] The imperative of preventing the spread of takfiri ideology (radical Islam) and the radicalisation of segments of the Russian society would explain the alleged smuggling of Russian weapons to the Taliban. These weapons do not provide the Taliban with enough firepower to challenge the U.S. forces supremacy, but they can make a difference in the fight against the IS. Furthermore, Russia’s top-priority of disrupting the Islamic State’s cells in Afghanistan also explains why the Russian foreign ministry shared intelligence with the Taliban regarding the movements of the Islamic State’s fighters in Afghanistan.[10]
Lastly, long-term interests of Russia’s support to the Taliban must be considered. The Kremlin is aware that the Taliban are a reality in Afghanistan that cannot be ignored.[11] When Russian officials, interviewed by press representatives, give statements such as “defeating the Taliban by military means is no longer an option,”[12] they are embracing the fact that peaceful settlements of the Afghan situation are meaningless without the Taliban’s consensus. Consequently, having a leverage on the largest non-state actor in Afghanistan enables Russia to seize a favourable position from which to influence the peace talks that could eventually take place between the Taliban and the Afghan Government.
For the U.S., Russia’s support to the Taliban represents a serious problem that could jeopardise years of progress towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, favourable to the U.S. backed Afghan Government. The Taliban, counting on the assistance of a great power, are likely to increase their efforts to overthrow the central government and refuse to be party to U.S. sponsored peace talks. In contrast, insurgents would be inclined to cooperate during meetings sanctioned by Russia specifically designed to advance Moscow’s projects for the region.
A reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government that would not deliver the control of the country to the insurgents has always been a difficult objective to achieve. Currently, Russia’s increasing interference and the Taliban’s growing capabilities suggest that a conflict resolution beneficial to the United States’ strategic interests is, for the moment, out of reach.[13] Therefore, there are no short-term solutions at the United States’ disposal. Furthermore, Trump’s plans to withdraw a significant number of troops from Afghanistan in 2019 indicate that forcing the Taliban to the negotiation table is no longer considered a viable option by U.S. policy-makers. At this point, predicting how the Afghan dilemma will evolve in the coming months is not possible. What is certain is that Russia’s support to the Taliban is adding uncertainty to an already strategically complex situation.
Russia, from its relationship with the Taliban, gains geopolitical advantages, national security guarantees and long-term interests at a relatively low political, financial and logistical cost. For all the reasons addressed in this article, Russia’s support to the Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.[14]
[1] Groll, E. (2018, April 2). Security Brief: Russia Providing Arms to Taliban; China’s Global Kidnapping Campaign. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/02/security-brief-russia-providing-arms-to-taliban-chinas-global-kidnapping-campaign/.
[2] Azami, D. (2018, April 2). Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban?. Retrieved from BBC World Service: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41842285.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rasmussen, S. (2017, October 22). Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/russia-supplying-taliban-afghanistan.
[5] Chellaney, B. (2017, March 8). Putin’s Dance with the Taliban. Retrieved from The Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/putins-dance-taliban/#.XA-C6y2cat8.
[6] Sazonov, V. (2017, June 16). Afghanistan as an Example of the Kremlin’s Hybrid Warfare-Why Russia is Arming the Taliban. Retrieved from International Centre for Defence and Security: https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-the-kremlins-hybrid-warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/, p. 7.
[7] Kaura, V. (2018) “Russia’s Changing Relations with Pakistan and Taliban: Implications for India,” Jadvpur Journal of International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 73.
[8] Stepanova, E. (2018) “Russia’s Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Contexts,” Russie.NEI.Reports, No. 23, p. 22.
[9] Rayan, M. (2018, October 12). The Kremlin’s Comeback. Retrieved from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/10/12/feature/behind-the-scenes-russia-regains-a-complicated-status-afghanistan-power-broker/?utm_term=.072b3271945b.
[10] Rasmussen, Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows.
[11] Azami, D. (2018, April 2). Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban?. Retrieved from BBC World Service: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41842285.
[12] Stepanova, p.28.
[13] Chellaney, B. Putin’s Dance with the Taliban. [14] Rayan, The Kremlin’s Comeback.
June’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Qingdao, Shandong saw visits from delegates of all SCO members, most notably leaders Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin of China and Russia. Despite it being promoted as a primarily multilateral organisation and platform, it is clear that this year’s summit reflects China’s role as its dominant force.
