Abstract

After the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the EU- and US-imposed sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin employed a counter-strategy: disinformation and propaganda. The Western Balkans, a key strategic partner to the EU and NATO, became a fertile ground for Russian disinformation campaigns. Capitalizing on ethnic divides, weak institutions, and the deteriorating freedom of media, the Kremlin inserted itself into the region. Using Serbia as a launch site for disinformation, Russia established a regional base for the Sputnik news agency in Belgrade. The most prominent narratives promulgated by Sputnik Serbia are that the EU and NATO are weak, fragmented, hegemonic and aggressive. This can pose a challenge to further EU and NATO integrations in the region.

Keywords: Russia, Disinformation, Western Balkans, Serbia

By Jelena Jevtić

Russian Struggle for Information Dominance

During the Cold War, the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) experts coined the term “dezinformatsiya” as the dissemination of false information with the purpose to deceive the audience [1]. Propaganda and disinformation were prominent USSR tools in the second half of the 20th century. After the collapse of the USSR and leading up to the 21st century, the West demonstrated superior ability to dominate the information sphere. This was evident when the Western media reporting on the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 assigned the blame to Russia and, therefore, diminished the image of President Vladimir Putin among Western leaders [2]. Consequently, the Western media coverage of the war initiated the rethinking of the contemporary Russian information strategy. The 2011 domestic mass demonstrations regarding the elections in Russia, however, were the pivotal moment in the development of Russian disinformation campaigns. The Russian elite asserted that the eruption of domestic demonstrations was synonymous with West’s interference and meddling in Russian politics [3]. They decided to assert Russia’s dominance in the information sphere by investing, once again decades later, in disinformation and propaganda in the digital era. Russia’s present-day disinformation strategy involves using facts and reliable information paired with false narratives to manipulate target audiences. One of the goals of this information strategy was to “rebrand and repurpose Russia Today (RT) [4].” RT and the Sputnik news agency became a strategic “counter-propaganda tool and part of the Russian foreign policy apparatus” [5]. Since then, Russia has increasingly utilized disinformation to challenge European order and values in the United Kingdom, France, Estonia, Germany, and other European states. The Western Balkans, a key strategic partner to the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has not remained immune to the targeted Russian information warfare. In fact, this region has been heavily influenced by Russia’s information strategy in the past decade.

Russian Disinformation in the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans - comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia - is a region characterized by “weak governance, fragile civil societies, and geopolitical disputes [6].” These internal and regional factors make the Western Balkans an attractive ground for both domestic and foreign disinformation campaigns. Recognizing this, the Kremlin began capitalizing on the region’s democratic vulnerability, post-conflict tensions, and “old” resentments toward the West. In addition to the domestic circumstances in the Western Balkans, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the consequent EU- and U.S.-imposed sanctions on Russia presented an opportunity for the Kremlin's counter-strategy [7]. Russian disinformation campaigns, having emerged in line with the West’s sanctions, have had two goals in the Western Balkans: undermining the values and perceptions of the EU and the U.S. and delaying nations from the region from entering Trans-Atlantic institutions [8]. According to the research conducted by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, the Kremlin has been emphasizing several narratives to achieve its political goals in the region:

“The Western Balkans region is a playground for a clash of interests between East and West
The Western Balkans is unstable and there is a high potential for conflict
The EU is hegemonic
The Western Balkan countries are weak, incapable, and corrupt
Human rights are endangered
The EU and NATO are weak and not united
NATO is aggressive and provocative
Montenegro is seeking to rewrite history
NATO is not beneficial [9].”

The Western Balkan countries have mutual developmental challenges, but also experience context-specific struggles that have become the target of Russian disinformation. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most vulnerable state to Russian propaganda, still faces ethnic divides between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subtle support for the secession of Republika Srpska, a region in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority Serb population, further fuels the tensions [10]. Second, North Macedonia finally joined NATO after its historic name-change referendum from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to North Macedonia. Before then, Russia had been pushing narratives and reforms to drive North Macedonia further from the EU and NATO, but unsuccessfully [11]. Third, Kosovo’s disputed status makes it especially sensitive to Russian disinformation with Kosovo Serbs as the main target [12]. While all six nations are affected to different degrees, Serbia, the largest country in the Western Balkans, is considered to be the launch site for Russian disinformation in the region [13].

Serbia as the Launch Site for Disinformation

Serbia and Russia have been historically bonded through the Orthodox Church and Slavic identity. These ties were further solidified when Russia opposed the NATO bombing of former Yugoslavia (now Serbia) in 1999 and rejected Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. The latter has been “the cornerstone of Russia’s strong political leverage” and the pronounced pro-Russian sentiment in Serbia [14]. Russia took advantage of not only these strong political ties but also the deteriorating freedom of media in Serbia. In the past decade, the traditional media with high-quality reporting has gradually been replaced with mundane, low-quality content [15]. Launched in 2015, Russia’s state-run Sputnik started broadcasting anti-EU and NATO disinformation to the Western Balkans from its regional base in Belgrade [16]. Russia’s strategic positioning of Sputnik in Serbia, and its production of content in the Serbian language, have easier access to the region. Moreover, the Serbian language is easily understood in Bosnia and Herzegovina, parts of Kosovo, Montenegro, and even North Macedonia. News and social media content often cross borders and capitalize on the vulnerabilities of the six nations [17]. Even with the presence of Sputnik in Serbia, the Serbian local media channels have still been playing the most significant role in disseminating Kremlin’s messages to the public, making Russia’s involvement even easier [18]. In 2019 alone, a Serbian fact-checking portal Raskrinkavanje uncovered 917 pieces of disinformation disseminated across three Serbian tabloids Alo, Srpski Telegraf and Informer [19]. Examples of those Serbian tabloid covers typically portray Russia as a saviour with titles such as “Putin is ready to enter Kosovo with the Army” and “America’s horror story for Kosovo” (see image below) [20]. Interestingly and more dangerously, the Serbian ruling party began to emulate Russian social media disinformation techniques to increase its popularity and reclaim the status of a regional hegemon [21]. Therefore, both domestic and Russian disinformation campaigns are increasing the vulnerability of the Serbian public to anti-EU and NATO sentiments.

Conclusion

Russia has powerful disinformation campaign tools that are propagated across the Western Balkans. The constrained media and the geopolitical position of the Western Balkans make it attractive to Russian influence. The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated the region’s vulnerability to disinformation and has caused the overall mistrust in the EU. This may, of course, impact regional stability and undermine further EU and NATO integrations in the region.

Bibliography

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[4] Crull et. al., p. 70

[5] Crull et. al., p. 70

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[7] Sunter, Daniel. “Disinformation in the Western Balkans.” NATO Review. Nato Review, December 21, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/12/21/disinformation-in-the-western-balkans/index.html.

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[10] Bajrović, Reuf, Richard Kraemer, and Emir Šuljagić. “Bosnia on the Russian Chopping Block: The Potential for Violence and Steps to Prevent It.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 30, 2018. https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/03/bosnia-russian-chopping-block-potential-violence-steps-prevent/.

[11] Duffy and Green

[12] Duffy and Green

[13] Sunter

[14] Meister, p. 14

[15] Meister, p. 18

[16] Sunter.

[17] Sunter.

[18] Burazer, Nikola. “Kosovo Is Crimea: Pro-Russian Narratives in Serbia Driven by Domestic Politics?” European Western Balkans, December 26, 2020. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/11/30/kosovo-is-crimea-pro-russian-narratives-in-serbia-driven-by-domestic-politics/.

[19] Presić, Jovana. “How Russia Influences Serbian Media.” Global Voices, February 8, 2020. https://globalvoices.org/2020/02/07/how-russia-influences-serbian-media/.

[20] Presić.

[21] Duffy and Green.

[22] Presić.