Putin "cannot remain in power" – Were Biden’s words a blunder or intentional?

ABSTRACT

On the 26th of March 2022, the President of the United States of America (USA), Joe Biden, visited Warsaw to rally North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in support of Ukraine [1]. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, the Western world had started sanctioning the aggressor rather than getting involved militarily [2]. Biden addressed the US allies in a very long speech that contained words described as surprising by some and alarming by others. This article aims at providing an alternative view of the two main narratives that address Biden’s statement that  Putin cannot remain in power.

BY EUGENIO MONTALTI


INTRODUCTION

 Within public and academic spheres, it is debated whether Russia’s actions were provoked by NATO’s expansions or are in line with renewed Russian imperialism [3]. While this discussion remains an interesting theoretical dispute, more focus ought to be paid to accounting for the continuation of the war and what comes after.

We are witnessing the biggest war Europe has seen since the Second World War, which has the potential to escalate beyond Ukrainian borders. For this reason, European countries must be cautious in their foreign policy. On the one hand, it is important not to appease Putin as was done with Hitler in the past; on the other hand, it is crucial for the safety of the European people that the war does not spill over and escalate into other countries. In this situation, it is essential to analyse what the U.S., a key global player, is doing besides the military support to Ukraine [4] and the economic sanctions on Russia [5].

THE ARGUMENT OF THE OFFICIALS – BIDEN’S SLIP

In his nearly half-an-hour speech to NATO, President Biden covered various issues, from alliance security and support of Ukraine to further economic sanctions and the Russian Army’s atrocities in the invaded territories. This last bit allowed him to speak about Putin directly, saying at the end, ‘For God's sake, this man cannot remain in power,’ [6][7]. As expected, right after the speech, Russia’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Biden, stating that who rules Russia ‘is not to be decided by Mr. Biden. It should only be a choice of the people of the Russian Federation,’ [8].

To clarify, White House officials proclaimed that it was out of the script and Biden was just carried away during his speech: ‘The president’s point was that Putin cannot be allowed to exercise power over his neighbours or the region,’ spokesmen clarified, reassuring that ‘he was not discussing Putin’s power in Russia or regime change,’ [9]. Biden himself refused to apologise for the words pronounced, but at the same time explained that they were just ‘expressing [his] outrage,’ and that the U.S. government is not pursuing, ‘a fundamental policy to do anything to take Putin down in any way,’ [10]. The U.S. stance is that Biden was carried away by emotions, but his words did not imply any serious policy changes.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE WORRIED ANALYSTS AND RUSSIA – BIDEN’S WILL TO KILL PUTIN

The alternative argument that has been made about Biden’s comment on Putin is that he seeks a regime change in Russia and plans to carry it out through a secret military operation. This position might appear far-fetched or speculative, but it is not entirely implausible. The use of covert action to protect national interests is a common tool of foreign policy, even if not publicly advertised [12]. The U.S. is not exempt from this logic. In fact, since the end of the Second World War, it has been responsible for setting multiple regime changes abroad, more than twenty of which were successful [13]. Considering this, it can be seen how historical trends favour this theory.

Getting back to the specific case of this article, the U.S. administration showed its inability to communicate peacefully and constructively with President Putin. This incommunicability is testified by the renewed presence of other heads of state, ministers of foreign affairs, or prime ministers during peace talks that did not involve Ukrainian President Zelensky–or President Biden. From the beginning of 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin met just once in Geneva in January [14]. Since then, the two presidents have not had direct contact, not even through phone calls, despite the initial attempts of the White House [15]. In parallel, the representatives of the major European countries managed to meet Putin in the second half of February [16][17], and to stay connected with him even while the invasion was taking place despite tensions with the West [18].

Biden’s words at the end of March indicate a caesura within Russo-American relations and cut the bridge that was still technically open between the two nations. In addition, in an interview with Ukrainian refugees to the press after his speech, Biden underlined his condemnation of his Russian counterpart, calling him a ‘butcher’ [19]. This indicates his stare decisis in its positions and goes against the hypothesis of a lapsus.

Two more themes motivate this hypothesis to be more valid than the other. These are instead internally oriented and differentiate Biden from his Republican concurrent and former president Donald Trump. First, Biden’s relationship with Putin is much worse than Trump’s. This is not only evident from the behaviour of the former president when he was in office, but also from the recent comments he made. Trump recently described Putin as ‘very savvy’ and his move to invade Ukraine as a ‘genius’ move[20]. This is in line with the high consideration Trump previously had for the Russian President. Biden’s position is stark contrast against the one of his predecessor[21]. Further contrasting against Trump, Biden has not been treating Russia as an equal ‘great power,’ a status Putin’s Russia is desperately seeking to obtain [22]. This goal has been stated in Russia’s national security strategies for at least a decade, proving its importance [23]. 

Finally, showing that Putin is not a desirable interlocutor could indeed signal that the only way for Biden’s administration to reach peace is without Putin. This motivation would give credibility to the voices that argue for a covert intervention of the US into the Kremlin.

THE POTENTIAL THIRD EXPLANATION

The truth might lie in between the extremes. While it might be true that the phrase was not scripted, it is likely that it reflects what Biden thinks and wants for the future. The incumbent US president is a deeply experienced politician, supported by a well-prepared entourage, and it is then unlikely that he made such a grave mistake on such a momentous occasion as the speech he made in Warsaw.

Conversely, while it can be said that Biden would like to see a regime change in Russia, there is little to argue in favour of the US being able to obtain it through covert action without being caught. Therefore, it is more probable that the aim of the US president was simply to signal his virtue as opposed to Putin, to both external and internal audiences [24]. Regarding the latter, Biden wants to distance himself from the admiration Trump has for Putin. With regard to his foreign audience, Biden aimed to show his determination to his allies within NATO and to Russia. Throughout his speech, Biden consistently made a clear distinction between Putin and the Russian people [25]. This is because he is aware of the crucial role Russia will maintain in the international system after the war as a result of its historical, geographical, and economic importance. Only the current regime, and not the Russian people, then, must get the blame for the Ukrainian events.

Within Russia, Biden is signalling to Putin’s opposition that it is now a good moment to act, whatever they have in mind. This counts for people that want to protest as well as for those within the government and military establishments. 

Within NATO and Ukraine, Biden wants to demonise Putin specifically to build a sustainable future in which Europe still has a constructive relationship with the Russian Federation which favours stability and development and Russians are not hated.  For this reason,  through his discourse, Biden signalled the willingness of the US to accept the outcome of protests or coups against Putin without being directly involved. The US can distinguish between Putin and Russia; therefore, whoever wants to oppose the current regime is welcome to act in that direction even if they will not benefit from US assistance in finding the means or organising it. Such a regime change would be favorable to U.S. interests in ensuring stability and economic development in Europe. With an ideally western-oriented elite in power in the Russian Federation, this would allow the U.S. to focus its security concerns on China.

CONCLUSION

This article argues that, given the circumstances, the content of the speech has several ways of being interpreted. However, while the key arguments presented by the press and analysts have strong points, Biden is probably both more prepared and cautious than some may think. In addition, his stance, even if well set, is not going towards a direct confrontation with Russia, not even through covert action. Indeed, this would stain the current US administration with not easily justifiable actions both at home and on the global stage.




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