On the 26th of March 2022, the President of the United States of America (USA), Joe Biden, visited Warsaw to rally North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in support of Ukraine [1]. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, the Western world had started sanctioning the aggressor rather than getting involved militarily [2]. Biden addressed the US allies in a very long speech that contained words described as surprising by some and alarming by others. This article aims at providing an alternative view of the two main narratives that address Biden’s statement that Putin cannot remain in power.
Exploring the Legality of US Humanitarian Assistance to Venezuela
For years Venezuela has been affected by mass displacement and famine, caused by natural disasters and a significant economic crisis. At the beginning of 2019, the United States sent food and medicines to the population of Venezuela to help mitigate the situation. President Nicolás Maduro— sworn in for a second term in January of the same year — refused to accept the help of the United States and ordered the barricade of the bridge where the American aid was supposed to be transported.
Online Political Microtargeting in the United States
Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements. In the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election.
By Agniete Pocyte
‘Political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [1]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.’
Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising which targets voters based on the predictions of an algorithmic model, manipulated from publicly available data and private data [2]. Facebook is the most popular advertising platform as nearly three-quarters of American adults use Facebook, and 44% of the adult population cite it as a part of their news sources [3]. Although Facebook is not the only social media site that functions as a news source, it is by far the largest [4].
Despite the focus on President Trump’s 2016 campaign, George W. Bush made use of similar, albeit less complicated, microtargeting. In 2004, Bush’s presidential campaign bought data on 5.7 million Michigan consumers from Acxiom, one of the world’s largest data brokers, and merged it with their own polling information to categorise Michigan voters into 34 ‘microtargeting segments’ [5]. With this information, the campaign created advertisements and scripted messages targeted at the narrow categories of voters through telephone and direct-mail messages. Mitt Romney’s 2012 US presidential campaign used micro-categories to target undecided voters with advertisements that emphasised different aspects of his campaign. Zac Moffet, the digital director of Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign stated: ‘two people in the same house could get different messages. Not only will the message change, the type of content will change’ [6].
A microtargeting strategy will rarely target more than a small portion of the voting population. That is because most of the population is either set on voting for a particular candidate or is extremely unlikely to vote. By targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements, microtargeting becomes a cost-effective strategy. Most importantly in the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election. Since 1980, the number of contested swing states has dwindled [7]. In 1976, 20 states were won by a margin of less than 5%. This number dropped to 11 states in 2004 and to just 7 states (Florida, Ohio, Virginia, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Colorado) in 2008. The fact that US presidential elections are fought over ‘relatively small margins in a handful of states sets up conditions for continued importance of fine-grained tactical efforts’ to persuade a select group of voters [8]. That being said, ‘political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [9]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.
Although political microtargeting purports to engage with voters in a more relevant fashion, the threats to individual privacy, the electorate, and democracy outweigh the benefits. American voters do not have adequate control of their data and cannot dictate who uses it. Many organisations, including political campaigns, are under no obligation to protect user’s information privacy and political privacy. Moreover, microtargeting practices suppress certain voter populations and exacerbate the effects of the ‘filter bubble’ by channeling voters into informational silos. Due to the highly personalised nature of the messages in political ads, thousands of variations of the same ad exist to maximise voter receptiveness. Political campaigns do not publish a database of all the ad variations which makes it difficult for journalists and the general public to investigate the honesty of a particular campaign. Third parties including social media companies, data brokers, and data analytic firms, are unregulated and possess a questionable amount of political power if the effects of microtargeting are as extreme as purported by campaign managers. Regulations are difficult to implement due to alleged conflicts with freedoms of speech and expression and the lack of empirical evidence surrounding the effects of microtargeting. Technology has outgrown regulation and it is vital to keep the possible threats of microtargeting in mind not only for policymakers, but the voters as well.
N.B. ‘the ‘filter bubble’ is the intellectual isolation that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the information a user would want to see, and then give information to the user according to this assumption’ [10].
Sources:
[1] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.
[2] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80.
[3] Gottfried, J., & Shearer, E. (2016). News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/
[4] Ibid.
[5] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80
[6] Ibid.
[7] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.
[8] Ibid, p. 144
[9] Ibid, p146
[10] Techopedia. (2018). What is a Filter Bubble? – Definition from Techopedia. [online]. Available at: https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28556/filter-bubble [Accessed 30 Aug. 2018]
Author’s further reading:
[1] Borgesius, F. J., Moller, J., Kruikemeier, S., Fathaigh, R. Ó., Irion, K., Dobber, T., … & de Vreese, C. (2018). Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy. Utrecht L. Rev., 14, 82.
[2] Ienca, M. (2017). Do We Have a Right to Mental Privacy and Cognitive Liberty?. Scientific American Blog Network. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-have-a-right-to-mental-privacy-and-cognitive-liberty/
[3] Tenove, C., Buffie, J., McKay, S., & Moscrop, D. (2018). How Foreign Actors Use Digital Techniques to Undermine Democracy. Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, UBC.
Why the Department of Homeland Security has not been able to succeed in unifying the U.S. intelligence community
“The intelligence community within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole community IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation.”
By Ashley Rebecca Donald-Tebbutt
Despite only opening its doors on March 1st, 2003 [1], Secretary Janet Napolitano admitted in 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not functioning optimally and that there was great room for improvement [2]. Even in the DHS’s short-lived lifespan the hindrances of political ambition have become undeniable to those connected to the agency.
The intelligence community (IC) within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American IC. The DHS is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation [3]. The intentions behind the DHS were idealistic; its mission threefold: secure the homeland from the evolving threat of terrorism, bring common agencies into one organization to foster cooperation, and to have a primary agency that could promote communication and the sharing of resources within the IC and independent agencies [4].
The DHS upon creation amalgamated twenty-two existing agencies and became a bureaucratic giant [5]. The head of the new organization was supposed to be able to “access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from the Federal government…”[6]. These resources were central to allow the DHS to function as intended. However, the political ambitions hindered the reforms that delivered the DHS and its continued functioning. During the reform and development of the DHS, fundamental agencies of the IC, such as the CIA and FBI, viewed the agency as a rival and did not support the centralization of the community fearing power loss and budget cutbacks [7]. As such, the CIA and FBI used their influence to prevent the DHS from having the ability to compel information from other agencies. Without the power to compel, the rivalry between agencies endured manifesting in a bureaucratic ‘turf war’ and ultimately restricting the effectiveness of the DHS [8].
It seems that the DHS has only added to the problem by adding another bureaucracy bidding for political influence and consumption of intelligence budget. With the political reforms that brought the DHS into reality, the inability to compel other intelligence agencies has resulted in a large number of redundancies across the IC. Despite the intentions of the DHS, the institution has been hampered in its inability to unite and foster a cohesive community. The blame for the DHS’s failure should not rest on the department but on the members of Congress that only provided the department with half the power it required to meet its full responsibilities. For the DHS to be able to achieve its primary intentions another series of political reforms are required; tragically those seem unlikely to occur until the U.S is faced with another attack on its national security.
Sources:
[1] “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security” Homeland Security. Last modified 09/24/2015. https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security
[2] “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.”Department of Homeland Security. February 2010. pg. iv
[3] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003): pg 529
[4] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002)
[5] Cuellar, Mariano-florentino. Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies. Stanford University Press: Stanford, (2013). pg. 126
[6] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002) pg. 12
[7] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.”
Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003). pg. 528
[8] Durbin, Brent.The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform.
Cambridge University Press: New York, (2017). Pg 38