The Tense Relationship Between Social Media Intelligence and Privacy

Social media has transformed social life because of the prominent communicative role that its networks and platforms have achieved in the modern era and the new social environments that they have created. However, SOCMINT entails a great challenge as it requires access by default to the private information of social media users, affecting the legitimacy of the intelligence community as well as the morality and legality of carrying out SOCMINT surveillance.

by Alejandra Bringas Colmenarejo

Social media may be considered the most major source of information about societies, individuals, and communities that has ever existed to such an extent that it could become essential to understand the social dynamics and interactions that affect international security. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) could enable the intelligence community to tackle criminal activities and behaviours by providing warnings about outbreaks of public disorders, providing information about extremist and radicalised groups and individuals, or helping policymakers and state agencies to give a response to any kind of situation [1]. However, this intelligence assumption creates strong debates about the public nature of the information collected, the morality of the methods used for such purpose, and the real efficiency of the process.

SOCMINT is defined as ‘the process of identification, validation, collection and analysis of data and information from social media using intrusive and non-intrusive methods [opened, closed and/or clandestine channels], with the aim of developing a product for national security’ [2]. In this sense, the information accessed, processed and analysed by SOCMINT could be classified into four categories: (1) The information obtained through open and closed sources that neither identify nor could identify a concrete person – e.g. aggregated data about locations or public transport. (2) Information accessed through open channels which either identify or could identify a concrete person – such as name, gender, age, nationality. (3) Information either open or closed which is specifically accessed through covert, misleading, or deceiving tactics – e.g. posting provocative messages to tackle the social responses or entering friends-locked groups using fake, personal, or unofficial profiles. (4) Closed information accessed using clandestine tactics – such as decoding technologies or hacking software [3].

Based on this classification, it might be logical to think that, despite intelligence actions carried out to obtain specific information, SOCMINT is mainly focused on the continuous and uninterrupted access and collection of large open data sets, information for which there is no universal agreement regarding its public accessibility. On the one hand, platform companies generally consider users’ information to be publicly available when it is accessible (1) to any member of the user network within the platform; (2) to any other platform user, even though they do not coincide in any common network, or (3) to any third party external to the social media platform through unrestricted methods. On the other hand, platforms users, law enforcement agencies, and  society usually defend more restrictive definitions of privacy and intimacy so that the access to social media information is limited to specific circumstances [4]. 

The lack of consensus between social media and society about this issue leads to the possible obtention of private, sensitive, and intimate information usually without the consent and the knowledge of the social media user. Consequently, SOCMINT either performed through restricted or unrestricted channels could entail an infringement of the right of privacy and an abuse of the expectations of non-state interference in the private lives of its citizens [5]. Added to this, the novel and constantly changing characteristics of social media is complicating the classification of social media platforms as public or private spaces, provoking a number of legal controversies and loopholes. This problem can be worsened due to the number of social media networks that coexist and have different hierarchical levels of privacy; meaning  some information could be unrestricted for one group of people but could be restricted to outsiders in accordance with the pertinent settings.

The legally admissive access to social media data and its moral and ethical acceptance involve a fragile balance of interests, as the intelligence process could be considered an incisive intrusion into an individuals’ privacy. In fact, this problem also relates to people’s indifference to share their private life online without questioning how their data could be used or which level of protection is granted to it. In this regard, the peculiarities of social media have created a sense of disconnection between the real and the virtual world facilitating the sharing of personal information, political opinions, or religious beliefs, exposing the individual’s life with a lack of restriction and an excessive expectation that the state will respect their privacy [6].

Nevertheless, it may  be argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists if the user believes their data remains private because of their explicit efforts to achieve that exclusion from third parties’ access or knowledge; or if the whole society considers that such information belongs to the individual’s private sphere [7]. This divergence of opinions between the users, society, and legal systems could negatively affect a user’s privacy. Whilst society and users’ understandings of privacy could differ it is just as true that societal and individual expectations of privacy could collide with the social media platform’s privacy settings or with enforced legislation so that, contrary to the societal expectation, the information is legally considered public or non-directly defined as private making it accessible for  third parties [8].

To this effect, social media is considered as a privately-owned public sphere:  spaces owned by private companies where people voluntarily join and freely share public, private, or even intimate information [9] due to two main reasons. Firstly, because of the users’ willingness to upload and share their personal and intimate lives on these platforms, and secondly, because of the users’ voluntary consent to the terms and conditions of the platforms which normally state the openness and the public nature of the networks [10]. Consequently, although social media users expect a reasonable level of privacy on social media platforms, this expectation is easily undermined since they have voluntarily joined these platforms, accepting that platforms’ rules even when the settings could threaten their right  to privacy. Furthermore, while users may expect different levels of privacy from each option available to communicate and interact within the networks, from the point of view of the owner companies, social media platforms are public spheres where their users can freely communicate with each other and whose data, information, and shared content can be openly accessed and used. The concerns that arise from this lack of consensus are clear; when and how would it be morally justified for the intelligence community to access, store, and analyse the personal data of social media users? 

Social media has created an online society where people can communicate, interact, and share information even on a broader scale than the real world would ever allow. However, this online society affects their physical reality, threatening the security, defence, and safety of the public and private international actors. Consequently, social media has become an incredibly important issue of concern for the intelligence community and security agencies as it appears to be the most innovative and initially effective tool to understand social interactions and dynamics. However, SOCMINT entails a great challenge as it requires access by default to the private information of social media users, affecting the legitimacy of the intelligence community and the morality and legality of carrying out SOCMINT surveillance. The ambiguous nature of social media platforms as public private-owned spaces affects the consideration of the information shared and accessed as publicly available and its protection by the society and the individuals’ legitimate expectations of privacy. No  legislation has been able to offer an adequate delimitation of social media spaces to restrict the collection, use and exploitation of social media private information by private and public actors. However, what is clear is that SOCMINT is intrinsically connected with a reality, social media, that provokes more challenges than certainties and as a consequence, SOCMINT has to deal with great concerns in relation to the individuals’ rights and the legitimacy of the security interest.

Sources:

[1] Vrist Rønn, K., & Obelitz Søe, S. (2019). Is social media intelligence private? Privacy in public and the nature of social media intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 34(3), 363-378. doi:10.1080/02684527.2019.1553701[2] Liviu, A., Anamaria, C., Codruta, R., & Nicolae, M. (2015). Social Media Intelligence: Opportunities and Limitations. CES Working Papers, VII(2A), p. 506

[3] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016). Privacy in Public Spaces: What Expectations of Privacy do we have in Social Media Intelligence? International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Autumn,p. 279-310

[4] Privacy International. (n.d.). Social Media Intelligence. Retrieved from Privacy International: https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/55/social-media-intelligence

[5] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

[6] Gibson, S. (2004). Open Source Intelligence. The RUSI Journal, 149(1), p.16-22. doi:10.1080/03071840408522977

[7] Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). Intelligence and National Security, 27(6), 801-823. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.716965

[8] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

[9] Privacy International. (n.d.).

[10] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

Don’t depend on Drones in intelligence

Drones have advanced warfare and counterinsurgency operations carried out in the War on Terror, their positive effect on intelligence is less significant however. Whilst drone technology has facilitated better observational intelligence, lethal capacity, and new forms of counterinsurgency strategy, they are limited in their application and not as infallible as policy-makers often believe. It also remains uncertain if drones will remain as applicable to future intelligence operations as they are today. 

By Keir Watt

Drones are commonly considered to be revolutionising warfare. According to P.W. Singer, expert on 21st Century warfare, their impact can even be compared to ‘the introduction of gunpowder, the printing press or the airplane.’[1] Yet, as revolutionary as drones seem, their impact on intelligence is not as dramatic.

Weaponising drones has certainly advanced counterinsurgency operations. When the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) located al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998 they had to predict where he would be four to six hours later, accounting for the flight time for cruise missiles.[2] Now drones can observe for days and launch strikes instantly, speeding up the ‘find-fix-finish’ loop so much that counterinsurgency strategy has become shaped around their use. [3]

Drones have not made intelligence gatherers as all-knowing as some officials would like to believe, however. Whilst drones can provide excellent surveillance, this does not remove the need for other sources of corroborating intelligence. Strikes like the “Roboski Massacre” in 2011 emphasise this necessity, as thirty-eight adult smugglers and their children were killed merely for looking suspicious, the drone could not even tell whether or not they were armed.[4]

Signature strikes are, controversially, almost entirely reliant on drones and have become a cornerstone of U.S. strategy against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and similar enemies. These target individuals solely on patterns of their behaviour, if they ‘bear the characteristics of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders on the run.’[5] As a senior U.S. military official described, ‘using the all-seeing eye, you will find out who is important in a network, where they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are . . . wait till these people have gone down a lonely stretch of road and take them out with a Hell-fire missile.’[6]

These operations are a significant development in counterinsurgency strategy. Yet what distinguishes them most is not so much drone technology, but their reliance on behavioural analysis. One of its biggest weaknesses is not using a big enough quantity and variety of information to form conclusions. Current operations which use primarily or exclusively drone footage remain crude in their analysis. Developing big data processes which use huge quantities of information could transform these operations into a more accurate and complete model.[7] However, this advancement has not come to fruition and signature strikes remain a flawed strategy.

There also remains a lot more to intelligence than drone missions and behavioural analysis. The main function of agencies like the CIA is developing human intelligence and keeping policy makers informed. Drones may offer an “antiseptic solution” for terrorism in places where we don’t want to send troops, however, seeking a technological “fix” to all problems distracts from investing in less flashy but more important areas. In the United States of America, the transfer of control of drone programmes from the CIA to the Pentagon is a positive sign that things are getting back on track.  

More generally, it’s not clear drones will remain relevant for future conflicts. Drone technology evolved to meet the challenges of the War on Terror War and has been very effective, but  may struggle to address different challenges. Conflict with major powers such as China or Russia, for example, would require different capabilities than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. As the threat environment changes, intelligence will have to develop new responses and drones may not be a part of that.

Drones were first used to provide surveillance during the Vietnam War. They were so successful that the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westermoreland was convinced they were leading a ‘quiet revolution’ in warfare.[8] Once the war was over, however, the drone programmes were scrapped as budgets faced new priorities. Like Vietnam, U.S. commander’s demand for ‘situational awareness 24/7/365’ in Afghanistan made them an integral part of the War on Terror.[9] As new threats emerge, however, it’s possible current drone programmes may be relegated like those of the 1970s. 

This is not to say that drones will become redundant altogether; contemporary drones are increasingly advanced and have more applications than those of the past. But assuming that what makes drones useful for today’s conflicts can be applied to those of the future would ignore the basic lesson of both Vietnam and Afghanistan: that changing contexts and challenges require new responses.

Sources:

[1] Spiegel Online, 2010. Interview with Defence Expert P.W. Singer: ‘The Soldiers Call It War Porn.’ SPIEGEL ONLINE.  Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-defense-expert-p-w-singer-the-soldiers-call-it-war-porn-a-682852.html. [Accessed 10 July 2019]. 

[2] Logan, L., 2012. Hank Crumpton: Life as a spy. CBS News. Available at: : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kdkoqem9s1Y. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[3] CIA Director Leon Panetta quoted in CNN editor, 2009., Airstrikes in Pakistan called ‘very effective.’CNN. Available at:  edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[4] Eralp, D.U., 2015. The Role of U.S. Drones in the Roboski Massacre. Peace Review, 27(4), pp. 448-452.

[5] Zenko, M., 2013. Reforming US Drone Strike Policies. Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 65, p. 14. 

[6] Quoted in Barnes, J.E., 2009. Military Refines ‘A Constant Stare Against Our Enemy.’ Los Angeles Times, November 2nd, 2009.

[7] Atwood, C.P., 2015. Activity-based intelligence: revolutionizing military intelligence analysis. Joint Force Quarterly 77, 2nd Quarterly, p. 29.

[8] William C. Westermoreland quoted in Dickson, P., 1996. The Electronic Battlefield. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 220-221.

[9] Air Force Secretary Michael Donley quoted in Lubold, G., 2010. As drones multiply in Iraq and Afghanistan, so do their uses.The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0302/As-drones-multiply-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-so-do-their-uses. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[10] Photo: Sergeant Ross Tilly (RAF)/MOD: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reaper_Remotely_Piloted_Air_System_MOD_45156829.jpg#filelinks

The Influence of Big Data in the Intelligence Cycle

Big Data entails innovative technological progress to the intelligence cycle as it strengthens the collection stage, introduces the correlational analysis method, and facilitates the dissemination of data to the final consumers. However, Big Data also presents some challenges and risks as human consciousness and expert participation remains essential to ensure the intelligence cycle’s effectiveness.

by Alejandra Bringas Colmenarejo

The inclusion of Big Data (BD) in the intelligence cycle has entailed a great advance since it introduced objective and quantitative methods in a discipline highly characterised by its subjectivity. In this sense, BD attempts to reduce intelligence uncertainty through the collection of a huge volume of data and the identification of hidden correlations unobservable in smaller samples. However, while BD is a beneficial technological advance of the intelligence cycle, it also leads to deep controversy given that policymakers may be tempted to replace the expert knowledge and the intelligence analysis with raw BD assets and correlations [1].

BD “represents the Information assets characterized by such a High Volume, Velocity and Variety to require specific Technology and Analytical Methods for its transformation into value” [2]. Consequently, BD is defined by the extremely large quantity of information collected in real-time and in continuous flows. Such information includes structured and unstructured data, traditional processed numeric and text databases, as well as unprocessed formats like images, audios, videos, tweets, emails and more [3]. Furthermore, BD also entails the necessary technologies to collect, manipulate, compare and analyse the collected bulk data and transform it into a reasoned intelligence assessment [4].

The inclusion of BD in the intelligence cycle has several challenges since it surpassed information, knowledge, casualty and context to centre the focus of attention on correlations [5]. Once its veracity and validity have been determined, the data collected from different sources is analysed to predict, determine or even prevent future scenarios, actions and behaviours [6]. Consequently, BD intelligence analysis is “the process of examining and interrogating Big Data assets to derive insights of value for decision making in a quasi-immediate response” [7]. However, this intelligence progress entails some risks and challenges since the increasing dependence on gathering technologies, as well as the enormous quantity of data collected, could result in a sense of overconfidence in technologies and a refusal of human capabilities.

Regarding intelligence collection, BD improves the inductive approach that attempts to recognize long-term trends, patterns and anomalies [8]. Different algorithms and informatics tools enable the automatization of collection, storage, management and transmission of data. This automatization decreases the dependence from manual processes and facilitates the continuous flows of data, [9] which strengthens the analysts’ capabilities to discover intelligence gaps or unusual behaviours. However, to avoid a paralysation of the intelligence process it is essential that the algorithms used are effective in selecting valid and useful data from the vast raw data collected [10].

BD also allows intelligence analysts to generate and refute hypotheses. BD analysis appears to be quite inductive since it refers to past events and historical patterns to causally respond to the question of ‘what is happening’. However, the value of BD lies in the correlation and the identification of hidden events and circumstances so that realities which may not be evident or observable become available to the intelligence analyst. Consequently, filtering valid information from the massive quantity of data allows analysts to support their speculations with facts or to deny a previously confirmed hypothesis [11]. The quick and real-time collection, as well as the long-term storage of data, provides analysts with the necessary evidence to develop informed and predictive intelligence hypotheses. In spite of that, the BD correlation process could also result in the identification of patterns and realities that extrapolated from their specific context are completely useless or coincidental. Consequently, intelligence agents should carefully use BD correlations as without the appropriate expertise analysis they could lead to irrelevant events or unconnected behaviours [12].

Despite the massive volume of data gathered by the intelligence actors, some information remains unknown and excluded from the correlation process because of its secrecy or its restricted access. In this context, non-state data collectors, such as social media platforms, marketing agencies or companies collect and store information that can be bought by the intelligence actors to fulfil the information gap. Nevertheless, the veracity and accuracy of this information remains dependent on the initial collectors [13]. As a result, data provided by private actors could involuntarily impact the effectiveness of the intelligence process or maliciously corrupt, manipulate and counterfeit the reality to deliberately influence the final intelligence assessment [14].

In this manner, BD remains dependent on human capabilities because it still lacks creativity, consciousness and judgement to contextualize new correlations within a broader analytical framework [15]. The limitations of BD should be understood completely in order to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstandings of reality. BD needs expert analysts who are able to identify mere coincidences and consider the unpredictable behaviour of human beings.

Concerning the relation between intelligence analysts and consumers, BD could play different roles. It could help disseminate relevant intelligent assessments to their effective consumers facilitating well-informed analysis and decision-making. Despite this progress in the dissemination stage, intelligence consumers may be sceptical about the veracity and validity of BD’s correlations. Consequently, they could ask for in-depth pattern’ explanations or even become reluctant to authorise action or enact policies supported by BD’s analysis [16]. Otherwise, consumers may be tempted to use raw data without the necessary subsequent analysis to support their own interest and purposes, contrary to the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle [17].

The challenges introduced by Big Data in the intelligence cycle are part of the existential debate between humans and technology and a logical consequence of the very speed of technological advances. Nevertheless, an even greater intelligence revolution could result from the next technological progress – the autonomy of artificial intelligence (AI). AI would collect BD in real-time, develop the consequent intelligence analysis and finally disseminate a reasoned assessment. Future BD analysis and AI would be able to reduce uncertainty and solve intelligence puzzles. However, the challenges and risks associated with this kind of technology are also undeniable since the human element in the intelligence cycle is reduced to the mere intelligence consumer. In the present time, BD does not possess human consciousness, however, full autonomy could be a reality in the near future [18].

Sources:

[1] Van Puyvelde, Damien, Stephen Coulthart, and M. Shahriar Hossain. “Beyond the buzzword: big data and national security decision-making.” International Affairs, 2017: 1397-1416.

[2] De Mauro, Andrea, Michele Grimaldi, and Marco Greco. (2014) “What is Big Data? A Consensual Definition and a Review of Key Research Topics.” 4th International Conference on Integrated Information. AIP Proceedings, pp. 1-11.

[3] Normandeau, K. (2013, September 12). Beyond Volume, Variety and Velocity is the Issue of Big Data Veracity. Available at https://insidebigdata.com/2013/09/12/beyond-volume-variety-velocity-issue-big-data-veracity/

[4] Boyd D. & Crawford. K. Critical Questions for Big Data. (Information, Communication and Society, 2012), p. 662-678

[5] Landon-Murray, M. (2016). Big Data and Intelligence: Applications, Human Capital, and Education. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(2), p.92-121.

[6] Lyon, D. (2014, July-December). Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique. Big Data & Society, p.1-13. doi: 10.1177/2053951714541861

[7] Couch, N., & Robins, B. (2013). Big Data for Defence and Security. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, p.6.

[8] Lim, K. (2015). Big Data and Strategic Studies. Intelligence and National Security, p.619-635.

[9] Symon, P. B., & Tarapore, A. (2015). Defense Intelligence Analysis in the Age of Big Data. Joint Force Quarterly 79, p. 4-12

[10] Couch & Robins, p.9

[11] Lim, p. 636

[12] Landon-Murray, p.94

[13] Zwitter, A. (2015) Big Data and International Relations. Ethics & International Affairs, 29, no 4, pp. 377-389.

[14] Symon & Tarapore, p. 9.

[15] Dyndal, G. L., Berntsen, T. A., & Redse-Johansen, S. (2017, 28 July). Autonomous military drones: no longer science fiction. Available at NATO Review Magazine: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/autonomous-military-drones-no-longer-science-fiction/en/index.htm

[16] Landon-Murray, p.101.

[17] Jani, K. (2016). The Promise and Prejudice of Big Data in Intelligence Community. Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, p.14.

[18] Dyndal; Berntsen & Redse-Johansen.

Reform of the French Intelligence Oversight System

French intelligence remains a very secretive world from the public view, and the little presence it occupies in the press or public debate is more often than not one of scandal, abuse or failure. Nevertheless, a wave of reforms is attempting to perfect this system, and in some cases, to create effective intelligence oversight mechanisms.

By Anne Lise Michelot

French intelligence remains a very secretive world from the public view, and the little presence it occupies in the press or public debate is more often than not one of scandal, abuse or failure. In 2008, the government initiated a reform process of the intelligence organisation, and continued in 2015, following the numerous terrorist attacks on the national territory. The result of this long process of reshaping the intelligence community has included attempts at perfecting, and in some cases creating, oversight mechanisms. [1]

These reforms have been the subject of public and parliamentary debates for the past decade, as many politicians, scholars and journalists pointed out the lack of supervision and the relative freedom intelligence agencies enjoyed in performing their activities. Today, the French oversight system comprises a specific institution for each type of control. This diversified/plural system was completed with the creation of a new institution, the Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Techniques de Renseignement, CNCTR (national commission for the control of intelligence techniques) in 2015.

The CNCTR is an independent administrative body in charge of controlling the legality and proportionality of the techniques implemented by intelligence agencies. Its creation was intended to counterbalance the use of modern data collection techniques introduced by the 2015 law, which many critics deemed too intrusive and disrespectful of civil liberties. [2]

Intelligence agencies are required to make requests to be examined by the CNCTR before putting in place a new surveillance technique against a target. The inspection includes the respect of procedures, the technique being justified by the threat and the proportionality of the invasion of privacy. The CNCTR then makes a non-binding recommendation to the Prime Minister, who is in charge of the approval.

Reviews can also be carried out after implementation of the technique, in particular, to ensure that it is not continued without justified motives. This can be done as well upon request of individuals who feel they are the victim of illegal techniques. If the control proves that the use of the technique is unlawful, the Commission can recommend that it be discontinued and the information destroyed. If the recommendation is not followed, it can refer the case to the Conseil d’Etat, who has the power to make these recommendations compulsory.

According to the first report it produced after a year of existence, the Commission can deliver a recommendation within a few hours, or even minutes in case of emergency. From October 2015 to October 2016, it replied to 66 584 requests, of which 1 263 resulted in negative recommendations. All these were followed by the Prime Minister and the techniques were not implemented.

Despite what seem like promising results for a young institution, the effectiveness of the CNTCR can be questioned and certainly leaves room for improvement.

Most of the flaws stem from the access the CNCTR has to the information it needs. The data collected through other techniques than phone tapping is not centralised, forcing the agency’s investigators to travel to local branches across the national territory in order to carry out inspections [3]. With no direct access to the intelligence gathered through modern techniques, the CNTCR is limited to the information intelligence agencies are willing to provide.

With only fifteen agents, the CNCTR is not equipped to undertake such a time-consuming quest. In fact, it might not be sufficiently equipped to process the tremendous amount of requests (66 584 in a year) given all the information it is supposed to look upon each time. When its first annual report declares that some recommendations were delivered within minutes, one might question whether all the facts were properly taken into consideration before it was issued and the quality of such recommendations. [4]

The creation of the CNCTR in 2015 to oversee the usage of intelligence techniques has attempted to bring France up to high democratic standards in terms of intelligence oversight. However, the commission’s limited means hinder its ability to perform fully its duties. And let’s not forget that its recommendations are not binding! These considerations require particular attention now that France has entered the age of mass data collection, with the first IMSI-catchers set up in November 2017 and no additional workforce for the CNCTR in sight. [5] There is still some way to go before fully democratic intelligence oversight is achieved.

Structure of the French oversight system

Sources:

[1] Vadillo F. (2016 January), “Les modalités du contrôle démocratique des services de renseignement : scruter l’état secret”. Après-demain 37, 40-42.

[2] Guiliano C. (2015 March 31). “Jean-Marie Delarue (CNCIS) : "Le projet de loi renseignement n’est pas adapté aux libertés publiques"”. AEF Info.

[3] Chataignier L., Geraud A., Gauthier T. (2017 February 17), “L’Etat de droit à l’épreuve du renseignement : Bilan du premier rapport d’activité de la CNCTR”. La Revue des droits de l’homme, p3.

[4] Rees, M. (2016 December 14). “Renseignement : ce que nous apprend le premier rapport de la CNCTR”. Next Inpact.

[5] Alonso P., Guiton A. (2016 December 13). “Les services qui nous surveillent sont-ils mieux contrôlés ?”. Libération.

What is intelligence oversight, and why does it matter?

By definition, the work of intelligence agencies is covert and secret. Intelligence oversight maintains the integrity of the system and the techniques employed by the secret services protecting citizens’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. Although it may seem to restrict the work of intelligence, a clear legal framework increases both intelligence legitimacy and efficiency.

By Anne Lise Michelot

By definition, the work of intelligence agencies is covert and secret. They collect and process information with the purpose of supporting decision-making. Their methods of data gathering (and the data itself) are usually classified as they are of importance to national security. However, despite this necessary high level of secrecy, this does not exempt them from any type of control; for example, the head of a secret service will control the performance of the agency. In a democratic state, other forms of oversight will also be applied to compel agencies to share information regarding their activity with various institutions.

Democratic nations develop systems of oversight to ensure that the use of intelligence methods by various organisations is always carried out while respecting their citizens’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. The intrusive methods used by intelligence agencies to collect information can be exploited to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, at the expense of human rights. Intelligence oversight maintains the integrity of the system and the techniques employed by the secret services.

According to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)[1], an effective oversight and accountability system in a democratic state should have the following characteristics:

– A clear legal framework defining the mission and mandate of intelligence agencies. As mentioned earlier, this ensures that no unlawful use can be made of their abilities. Such framework should also outline the techniques and methods of intelligence collection that are permitted or prohibited, including the conditions in which they can be used.

– The oversight mechanisms should be multiple and diverse, including controls from the executive, judiciary, legislative powers and independent specialised organisms. In order to be effective, these oversight bodies need to be given the adequate means to fulfil their mission. These include independence from political interest, access to relevant classified information and the authority to conduct their investigations. In addition, oversight systems must guarantee the preservation of secrecy, as is needed in the particular field they are controlling.

– Finally, an effective oversight system will provide the possibility for legal recourse should there be abuses to report.

Oversight may seem to be restrictive to the work of intelligence, but in fact, it may be quite the opposite. When provided with a clear legal framework in which to operate, intelligence agencies increase both their legitimacy and efficiency. On the one hand, the law, by defining their work, protects them from abusive political intervention. On the other hand, the oversight system allows for their performance to be measured and earns them the trust of democratic institutions.

Such an argument was made by Jean-Jacques Urvoas, a French socialist deputy who advocated strongly for reforms of the oversight system. According to him, bringing intelligence further under control is beneficial not only to democracy but also to national security and the agencies themselves [2]. By bringing intelligence out of the darkness, public understanding of its benefits can be increased, as opacity and suspicion over this covert field diminish. Moreover, given a legal framework, intelligence agencies will have a stronger voice within the decision-making process and will be given access to more resources, allowing them to increase their capacities to better respond to new threats [3].

Measuring the effectiveness of oversight in reality, as opposed to theory, is not an easy task. While a key component of oversight is transparency, the work of intelligence requires secrecy. Therefore, the organisms performing controls cannot give detailed overviews of their work and their findings. As a result, a more informal, public form of oversight cannot be achieved. Public opinion, through civil society organisations, can hold elected governments and their agencies accountable for their actions and demand for more transparency. This can only be achieved if the public is made aware of their activities.

The peculiar nature of intelligence makes it a difficult state activity to control and keep under check. Yet, a democratic state if it wants to abide to human right standards cannot conduct intelligence activities without a suitable oversight system.

Sources:

[1] Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “Intelligence Oversight”, SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: DCAF, 2017).

[2] Urvoas, J-J (2014 February 4). “Le contrôle parlementaire des services de renseignement, enfin !”. Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

[3] Urvoas J-J, Pascal Lorot (2013/4). “Les enjeux du contrôle et de l'efficacité du renseignement français”. Géoéconomie 67, p34.

Why the Department of Homeland Security has not been able to succeed in unifying the U.S. intelligence community

“The intelligence community within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole community IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation.”

By Ashley Rebecca Donald-Tebbutt

Despite only opening its doors on March 1st, 2003 [1], Secretary Janet Napolitano admitted in 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not functioning optimally and that there was great room for improvement [2]. Even in the DHS’s short-lived lifespan the hindrances of political ambition have become undeniable to those connected to the agency.

The intelligence community (IC) within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American IC. The DHS is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation [3]. The intentions behind the DHS were idealistic; its mission threefold: secure the homeland from the evolving threat of terrorism, bring common agencies into one organization to foster cooperation, and to have a primary agency that could promote communication and the sharing of resources within the IC and independent agencies [4].

The DHS upon creation amalgamated twenty-two existing agencies and became a bureaucratic giant [5]. The head of the new organization was supposed to be able to “access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from the Federal government…”[6]. These resources were central to allow the DHS to function as intended. However, the political ambitions hindered the reforms that delivered the DHS and its continued functioning. During the reform and development of the DHS, fundamental agencies of the IC, such as the CIA and FBI, viewed the agency as a rival and did not support the centralization of the community fearing power loss and budget cutbacks [7]. As such, the CIA and FBI used their influence to prevent the DHS from having the ability to compel information from other agencies. Without the power to compel, the rivalry between agencies endured manifesting in a bureaucratic ‘turf war’ and ultimately restricting the effectiveness of the DHS [8].

It seems that the DHS has only added to the problem by adding another bureaucracy bidding for political influence and consumption of intelligence budget. With the political reforms that brought the DHS into reality, the inability to compel other intelligence agencies has resulted in a large number of redundancies across the IC. Despite the intentions of the DHS, the institution has been hampered in its inability to unite and foster a cohesive community. The blame for the DHS’s failure should not rest on the department but on the members of Congress that only provided the department with half the power it required to meet its full responsibilities. For the DHS to be able to achieve its primary intentions another series of political reforms are required; tragically those seem unlikely to occur until the U.S is faced with another attack on its national security.

Sources:

[1] “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security” Homeland Security. Last modified 09/24/2015. https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security

[2] “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.”Department of Homeland Security. February 2010. pg. iv

[3] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003): pg 529

[4] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002)
[5] Cuellar, Mariano-florentino. Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies. Stanford University Press: Stanford, (2013). pg. 126

[6] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002) pg. 12

[7] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.”

Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003). pg. 528

[8] Durbin, Brent.The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform.

Cambridge University Press: New York, (2017). Pg 38