Don’t depend on Drones in intelligence

Drones have advanced warfare and counterinsurgency operations carried out in the War on Terror, their positive effect on intelligence is less significant however. Whilst drone technology has facilitated better observational intelligence, lethal capacity, and new forms of counterinsurgency strategy, they are limited in their application and not as infallible as policy-makers often believe. It also remains uncertain if drones will remain as applicable to future intelligence operations as they are today. 

By Keir Watt

Drones are commonly considered to be revolutionising warfare. According to P.W. Singer, expert on 21st Century warfare, their impact can even be compared to ‘the introduction of gunpowder, the printing press or the airplane.’[1] Yet, as revolutionary as drones seem, their impact on intelligence is not as dramatic.

Weaponising drones has certainly advanced counterinsurgency operations. When the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) located al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998 they had to predict where he would be four to six hours later, accounting for the flight time for cruise missiles.[2] Now drones can observe for days and launch strikes instantly, speeding up the ‘find-fix-finish’ loop so much that counterinsurgency strategy has become shaped around their use. [3]

Drones have not made intelligence gatherers as all-knowing as some officials would like to believe, however. Whilst drones can provide excellent surveillance, this does not remove the need for other sources of corroborating intelligence. Strikes like the “Roboski Massacre” in 2011 emphasise this necessity, as thirty-eight adult smugglers and their children were killed merely for looking suspicious, the drone could not even tell whether or not they were armed.[4]

Signature strikes are, controversially, almost entirely reliant on drones and have become a cornerstone of U.S. strategy against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and similar enemies. These target individuals solely on patterns of their behaviour, if they ‘bear the characteristics of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders on the run.’[5] As a senior U.S. military official described, ‘using the all-seeing eye, you will find out who is important in a network, where they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are . . . wait till these people have gone down a lonely stretch of road and take them out with a Hell-fire missile.’[6]

These operations are a significant development in counterinsurgency strategy. Yet what distinguishes them most is not so much drone technology, but their reliance on behavioural analysis. One of its biggest weaknesses is not using a big enough quantity and variety of information to form conclusions. Current operations which use primarily or exclusively drone footage remain crude in their analysis. Developing big data processes which use huge quantities of information could transform these operations into a more accurate and complete model.[7] However, this advancement has not come to fruition and signature strikes remain a flawed strategy.

There also remains a lot more to intelligence than drone missions and behavioural analysis. The main function of agencies like the CIA is developing human intelligence and keeping policy makers informed. Drones may offer an “antiseptic solution” for terrorism in places where we don’t want to send troops, however, seeking a technological “fix” to all problems distracts from investing in less flashy but more important areas. In the United States of America, the transfer of control of drone programmes from the CIA to the Pentagon is a positive sign that things are getting back on track.  

More generally, it’s not clear drones will remain relevant for future conflicts. Drone technology evolved to meet the challenges of the War on Terror War and has been very effective, but  may struggle to address different challenges. Conflict with major powers such as China or Russia, for example, would require different capabilities than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. As the threat environment changes, intelligence will have to develop new responses and drones may not be a part of that.

Drones were first used to provide surveillance during the Vietnam War. They were so successful that the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westermoreland was convinced they were leading a ‘quiet revolution’ in warfare.[8] Once the war was over, however, the drone programmes were scrapped as budgets faced new priorities. Like Vietnam, U.S. commander’s demand for ‘situational awareness 24/7/365’ in Afghanistan made them an integral part of the War on Terror.[9] As new threats emerge, however, it’s possible current drone programmes may be relegated like those of the 1970s. 

This is not to say that drones will become redundant altogether; contemporary drones are increasingly advanced and have more applications than those of the past. But assuming that what makes drones useful for today’s conflicts can be applied to those of the future would ignore the basic lesson of both Vietnam and Afghanistan: that changing contexts and challenges require new responses.

Sources:

[1] Spiegel Online, 2010. Interview with Defence Expert P.W. Singer: ‘The Soldiers Call It War Porn.’ SPIEGEL ONLINE.  Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-defense-expert-p-w-singer-the-soldiers-call-it-war-porn-a-682852.html. [Accessed 10 July 2019]. 

[2] Logan, L., 2012. Hank Crumpton: Life as a spy. CBS News. Available at: : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kdkoqem9s1Y. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[3] CIA Director Leon Panetta quoted in CNN editor, 2009., Airstrikes in Pakistan called ‘very effective.’CNN. Available at:  edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[4] Eralp, D.U., 2015. The Role of U.S. Drones in the Roboski Massacre. Peace Review, 27(4), pp. 448-452.

[5] Zenko, M., 2013. Reforming US Drone Strike Policies. Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 65, p. 14. 

[6] Quoted in Barnes, J.E., 2009. Military Refines ‘A Constant Stare Against Our Enemy.’ Los Angeles Times, November 2nd, 2009.

[7] Atwood, C.P., 2015. Activity-based intelligence: revolutionizing military intelligence analysis. Joint Force Quarterly 77, 2nd Quarterly, p. 29.

[8] William C. Westermoreland quoted in Dickson, P., 1996. The Electronic Battlefield. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 220-221.

[9] Air Force Secretary Michael Donley quoted in Lubold, G., 2010. As drones multiply in Iraq and Afghanistan, so do their uses.The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0302/As-drones-multiply-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-so-do-their-uses. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[10] Photo: Sergeant Ross Tilly (RAF)/MOD: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reaper_Remotely_Piloted_Air_System_MOD_45156829.jpg#filelinks

The Strategic-Tactical Dichotomy of Drone Warfare

“Drones have arguably revolutionised modern warfare, especially their use in targeted killings. However, over-reliance on this tactic due to its measurable results has come at the expense of long-lasting strategic advances, moving drones away from their original intelligence-focused tasks and stagnating an already exhaustive War On Terror.”

by Javier Martínez Mendoza

The failed assassination attempt of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, on 7th October 2001, marked the first use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or “drones” for a targeted killing in the Global War on Terror [1]. Since then, the involvement of drones in this struggle has shifted from merely surveillance and intelligence-related activities to an additional function: leadership decapitation, arguably revolutionising the way war is waged [2].

Despite their tactical achievements, over-reliance on this tactic has had repercussions on the Global War on Terror’s strategic goals, stagnating any significant advance for the sake of short-term gains that require these operations to be carried out constantly. Ultimately, this strategic-tactical dichotomy has caused a misperception regarding how modern wars should be waged, prolonging an already exhaustive war.

How do drones fit in the War On Terror?

The use of drones is not new for US war efforts and intelligence. For decades, drones have been used just for activities relating to surveillance, training, and information gathering [3]. Originally, American decision-makers’ attitudes towards using drones to carry out strikes were of clear opposition, but the response to 9/11 paved the way for their use in targeted killings of Al Qaeda militants and enablers [4]. From that moment on, the US underwent ‘the most overt, technologically advanced, and prolific assassination programme the world had seen to that point’ [5].

In the broader context of the Global War on Terror, drones have been used or could be used for activities such as persistent surveillance, especially ‘pattern of life’ surveillance (following an individual’s everyday activities for a prolonged time), as well as tasks that involve entering environments that are risky for human health or that are deemed not worth endangering personnel [6]. It is possible to identify two trends: drones have been used mostly for surveillance and air support in Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas they have been extensively involved in targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, where the US is not officially engaged in a war and thus has not deployed a significant number of personnel [7].

The strategic-tactical dichotomy

Drones have become essential for the US decapitation strategy against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, which aim at taking down terrorist organisations by capturing or killing their leadership. However, targeted killings could have a limited impact in reducing the frequency of militant attacks in the regions where they are carried out, providing a short-term solution that must be consistently carried out to maintain its impact, instead of a definite solution to terrorist violence [8].

For instance, even if it is true that the assassination of terrorist leaders decreases the incidence of terrorist attacks by increasing the organisations’ vulnerability by disrupting cohesion and deterring its militants, terrorist groups might remain operational. Due to their decentralized and clandestine nature, communal support and the bureaucracy they create over time, these organisations can develop a resilience that allows them to engage in terrorism even while weakened [9].

Nonetheless, other research suggests that Al Qaeda and the Taliban do suffer the effects of drone attacks, losing bases and militants, and facing operational setbacks [10]. Moreover, these attacks not only take down organisation leadership, but also deter their activities due to fear of imminent strikes. Despite the latter seeming as a long-term strategic advantage, targeted killings would need to take place constantly to keep exerting their deterring effect. 

On the other hand, statistical data on the effect of drone strikes in North-western Pakistan and Eastern Afghanistan shows there could be a negative correlation between terrorist violence and the recurrence of drone attacks in these regions [11]. Notwithstanding the latter, drone warfare as a long-lasting counter-terrorism solution remains a dubious policy, since its deterent effect on terrorism would require strikes to keep taking place indefinitely.

When drone warfare is assessed from a strategic point of view, it can be argued that its groundbreaking character has been exaggerated, both by supporters and detractors, as it has produced an over-reliance on tactics at the detriment of strategy. As targeted killings deliver measurable results, it becomes “addictive” for decision-makers to continue to carry them out even if, ultimately, there is no territorial gain and terrorists maintain activities and control over the territory [12].

Furthermore, over-reliance on killing targets denies the possibility of vital information gathering had the operation been aimed at capturing. Targeted killings are shifting the focus from drones’ initial intelligence-driven role in the Global War On Terror: surveillance [13]. However, it is possible to consider that drones are also changing the dynamics of this armed conflict, causing a shift in the display of police functions instead of waging war against terrorists. Ultimately, it could be argued that carrying out drone strikes is stagnating US-led efforts, as it is driving American forces to maintain police-like surveillance over terrorists that are being deterred but not taken down as an organisation.

Conclusion

The tactical efficiency of drone strikes offers decision-makers much desired results in a seemingly endless War On Terror. However, the tactical advantages of drones have distracted from wider strategic goals, giving decision-makers a false sense of progress. Drone use in war should remain a tactic, but current policy-making has missed the point and favoured tactical gains rather than fulfilling strategic goals [14].

Due to the tangible and measurable results of targeted killings, US-led efforts in the Global War On Terror have run the risk of emphasising immediate achievements at the expense of pursuing long-lasting strategic objectives. This might ultimately contribute to the stagnation of US military efforts by stopping its forces from attaining fatal blows to resilient terrorist structures. In this regard, it could be argued that drone use for targeted killings has become just a tactically efficient way to cut the weed, without addressing the underlying roots.

Drones’ effectiveness is mostly present in their ability to support military operations and gather valuable information. However, as long as the tactical-strategic dichotomy analysed previously, keeps misleading decision-makers from the idea that drones’ true potential will be fulfilled when their use follows strategy instead of setting it, they will fail to truly revolutionise US efforts against terrorism.

Sources:

1- Neal Curtis, “The explication of the social: Algorithms, drones and (counter-)terror,” Journal of Sociology 52, no. 3 (2016).

2- Hugh Gusterson, Drone: remote control warfare (London: The MIT Press, 2016), 6. Christopher J. Coyne, and Abigail R. Hall, “The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror,” The Independent Review 23, no. 1 (2018).

3- Patrick F. Walsh, “Drone paramilitary operations against suspected global terrorists: US and Australian perspectives”, Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 4 (2017). Coyne, and Hall, “The Drone Paradox”.

4- Gusterson, “Drone”.

5- Simon Frankel Pratt, “Crossing off names: the logic of military assassination,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 1 (2015): 11.

6- Ann Rogers, and John Hill, Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security (London: Pluto Press, 2014).

7- Walsh, ”Drone paramilitary operations”. Gusterson, ”Drone”.

8- Trevor McCrisken, ”Obama’s Drone War,” Survival 55, no. 2 (2013)

9- Jenna Jordan, ”Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014).

10- Asfandyar Mir, ”The U.S. Drone War in Pakistan Revisited”, Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-drone-war-pakistan-revisited

11- Patrick B. Johnston, and Anoop K. Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2017): 215-216. McCrisken, ”Obama’s Drone War”.

12- Lawrence D. Freedman, ”The drone revolution: less than meets the eye,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (2016), http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/ps/i.do?p=EAIM&u=glasuni&id=GALE%7CA477460848&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon

13- Tyler Wall, ”Ordinary Emergency: Drones, Police, and Geographies of Legal Terror,” Antipode 48, no. 4 (2016).

14- Johnston, and Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US“.

The American Swarming Programme – Part Two of Three

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting: the Perdix drone swarm, the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) and the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS systems.

By Caitlin Irvine

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. A swarm consists of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a certain amount of autonomy to navigate and sense the surrounding area [1]. In comparison to Predators or Reapers they ‘are smarter and more autonomous, designed to take off and land on their own, fly mission sets on their own, refuel in the air on their own, and penetrate enemy air defences on their own’ [2].

Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting. Both the Perdix drone swarm and the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) programmes demonstrate the future trend towards more autonomous warfare. Finally, the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS system, demonstrates that swarm technology can be applied to multiple theatres of operation.

In October 2016, the US military ‘released a 103-strong swarm of Perdix drones’ in California [3]. The Perdix drone is a micro-UAV as its wingspan is less than 30 centimetres – making it ideal for operating in urban environments. The swarm demonstrated advanced behaviours ‘such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing’ [4]. The UAVs were launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets showing the ability of the US Air Force to use the developments in swarm technology in combination with their advanced air superiority. The Department of Defence’s press release stated that ‘Perdix is a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature’ [5]. The DoD’s optimism concerning swarm technology, might indicate  that it will play a role in future conflicts.

Whereas the Perdix drones indicate a move towards autonomously functioning hardware, the LOCUST programme refers to the software used. LOCUST is currently being used in Coyote UAVs that are tube-launched from a platform – not dissimilar from the anti-ship missile launchers currently on board US naval vessels. Seen as a cheaper way of gaining attack capabilities the LOCUST programme could potentially substitute for a single, expensive, anti-ship missile [6]. LOCUST systems fire a minimum of 30 Coyote UAVs in 40 seconds and they are then synchronised mid-flight to create the swarm [7]. At around $500,000 for a 30-drone swarm and just $15,000 for a single unit, the cost of LOCUST is less than half the price of the currently deployed million-dollar Harpoon anti-ship missile [8]. The LOCUST is specifically intended to take advantage of the low-cost UAVs such as the Coyote – the drones are expendable so that if one is destroyed ‘the others autonomously change their behaviour to complete the mission’ –  into an offensive dimension [9].

Finally, the third development in the US swarming programme can be found in the CARACaS programme. CARACaS developed both software and hardware that can be fitted in any vessel in the US Navy illustrating that the move towards autonomous systems is happening across multiple theatres. CARACaS is currently used in small, unmanned boats – but can be used in any vessel – and operates using swarm technology that allows the boats to communicate with one another [10]. The idea behind this project is that expensive but important routine tasks such as harbour patrols could be delegated to an unmanned supervised system. The Navy’s CARACaS system is removing the ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks from sailors lives’ [11]. But the phrase ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous’ covers almost every duty and responsibility given to a standing military.

The majority of swarming software is being designed by civilian firms, for both offensive and defensive uses. Defensive systems have been relatively untouched by the current debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is simply because it is difficult to campaign against a system with defensive purposes. By creating a system that has offensive capabilities – but is primarily used defensively – the issue of whether or not such a system is acceptable becomes blurred. Within the narrative surrounding drone swarms, it appears that the main use of such systems will be reconnaissance. However, their ability to also host attack capabilities is what makes them particularly terrifying.  

Sources:

[1] Bürkle, A, Segor, F, and Kollman, M (2011) ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV

Swarms’, Journal of Intelligent And Robotic Systems, Vol 61(1-4), p342

[2] Singer, PW (2013) ‘The Global Swarm’, Foreign Policy [online] available at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/11/the-global-swarm/

accessed on 18th April 2018

[3] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s

military debate’, The Financial Times [online] available at:

https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

accessed on 16th April 2017

[4] Adhikari, R (2017) ‘Pentagon Battle-Tests Micro Drone Swarm’,

TechNewsWorld [online] available at:

https://www.technewsworld.com/story/84217.html

accessed on 18th April 2018

[5] Department of Defence (2017) ‘Department of Defence Announces Successful

Micro-Drone Demonstration’, Department of Defence, Press release number

NR-008-17, 9th January [online] available at:

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/

accessed on 19th April 2018

[6] Richardson, J (2017) ‘Swarming UAVs demonstrate enormous attack potential’,

Defence Procurement International [online] available at:

https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/drone-swarms

accessed on 19th April 2018

[7] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[8] Lachow, I (2017) ‘The upside and downside of swarming drones’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 73:2, p97

[9] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[10] WarLeaks (2017) ‘US Navy Drone Swarm Boats: Autonomous Boats Short

Documentary’, WarLeaks - Daily Military Defence Videos and Combat Footage [online] available at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NN3A7z9diT4

accessed on 16th April 2018

[11] Ibid.

Swarming Technology is Changing Drone Warfare – Part One of Three

Swarming technology, therefore, represents a disruption in terms of the strategic status quo of warfare due to the low entry cost, the general trend towards more autonomous systems, and the onus of differentiation being placed on those being attacked.

By Caitlin Irvine

‘Swarm technology is nascent, and some have pegged it as the next significant drone innovation’ [1]. It allows a group of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to complete an objective whilst coordinating with one another [2]. It is not pragmatic to ask one individual to monitor up to 250 UAVs so the operator delegates a task to the swarm and monitors the network that senses, communicates, and computes the surrounding environment [3]. Investment in this subset of independently operating systems has made the use of swarming technology in operational theatres a topical matter.

 The economic case for this new technology is clearly attractive as shown by the two major players investment in the field. The US Army’s funding for robotics for 2017-2021 has tripled to $900 million whilst China currently holds the world record for the largest swarm of drones collectively controlled at the Guangzhou Air show in 2017 [4]. The cost of a swarm relative to a harpoon missile (around $1.2 million) highlights that creating an entire swarm may be cheaper than building conventional defence systems [5]. Swarm technology has been developed primarily in small quadcopters because they are cheaper, easier to transport, and can be deployed in a shorter time than larger hardware such as the Predator B or MQ9-Reaper [6].

 Militarily, these small drone swarms provide several advantages in a built-up operational theatre where bottlenecks are common and buildings or trees can reduce the signal range. Quadcopters are adaptable simply because of their size – they are able to navigate through narrow urban terrain [7]. A swarm can also project further than an individual quadcopter; by placing members of the swarm at different points along the approach to an operational area they can act as relay stations back to the base station where the operator is [8].

 The issue surrounding swarms is how to defend against them. Their innovation causes a paradigm shift. Due to their ability to overwhelm and confuse traditional radar detection-based missile shields mass again becomes a decisive factor on the battlefield [9]. ‘A manned or unmanned aircraft can be brought down by a single missile, but a swarm can take multiple hits’; this places a military with a dilemma of how to respond to a swarm without looking like the aggressor [10]. Simply put, ‘there is lower costs for offense relative to the difficulty of defending against a swarm’ [11].

 Swarming technology therefore represents a disruption in terms of the strategic status quo of warfare due to the low entry cost, the general trend towards more autonomous systems, and the onus of differentiation being placed on those being attacked. Militaries are interested in developing and deploying swarm technology because of the cost-effective advantages it presents in urban environments and the difficulties of defending against such a system. Their use in contested areas could lead to a perpetual cycle of warfare given that the best way to respond to a swarm of UAVs is to deploy your own. The investment drone swarms have received from both civil and military entities shows that they are an important developmental step for the future conduct of warfare. However, the growing trend towards autonomous weapons is concerning primarily because of the lack of thought given to the knock-on effects of such weaponry. 

Sources:

[1] Sims, A (2018) ‘How do we thwart the latest terrorist threat: swarms of weaponised drones?’The Guardian

[online]

available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/19/terrorists-threat-weaponised-drones-swarm-civilian-military-syria accessed on 11th April 2018

[2] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[3] Lachow, I (2017) ‘The upside and downside of swarming drones’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 73:2, p96

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[6] Bürkle, A, Segor, F, and Kollman, M (2011) ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV Swarms’

Journal of Intelligent And Robotic Systems, Vol 61(1-4), p340

[7] Ibid.

[8] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[9] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s military debate’,

The Financial Times [online] available at: https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

Accessed on 16th April 2017

[10] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[11] Kania, E (2017) ‘Swarms at war: Chinese advances in Swarm Intelligence’

The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, Vol 17, Issue 9, p14

Author’s Further Reading

[1] Kumar, V (2015) ‘The Future of Flying Robots’, Ted Talks [online]

Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge3--1hOm1s A

ccessed on 9th April 2018

[2] Boyle, MJ (2013) ‘The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare’

International Affairs, Vol 89: 1 (2013) pp1–29

[3] Nurkin, T (2016) ‘Unmanned ground vehicles: technology and market trends’

Jane’s Review [online]

available at: http://www.janes.com/article/61176/security-unmanned-ground-vehicles-technology-and-market-trends-es2016d1

Accessed on 10th April 2018