Assessing the Implications of the US-Syria Withdrawal on the Kurdish Democratic Union

The U.S.’ proposed withdrawal of the majority of its military presence from Syria leaves the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) in a challenging position. Now lacking clear U.S. protection and in the midst of preparing its final assault on ISIS-held positions, the PYD is now forced to weigh the decision of aligning with Russia and the Syrian government to hedge against the threat of a Turkish assault from the north.

The PYD

On December 19th of 2018, in a surprise move following a call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump announced that the U.S.’ roughly 2,000 military personnel would be withdrawing from Syria within 30 days. The reason stated was that the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been defeated and the U.S. could continue to carry out support operations in the form of airstrikes[1]. Trump’s decision signalled a likely end to any aspirations of fostering a legitimate alternative to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s government, which has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and has been found to have deployed chemical weapons against them [2]. Beyond the implications of the withdrawal on the U.S.’ geopolitical aims, Washington’s decision leaves the U.S.-allied People’s Protection Units (YPG), with little leverage and minimal options in its fight for greater legitimacy in its controlled territory along Syria’s northern border. This is significant because the YPG represents the Kurdish component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that has been engaged in most of the combat on the ground against ISIS. Trump’s National Security Advisor, John Bolton, has stated that ‘the U.S.’ withdrawal is contingent upon ISIS’ continued defeat and Turkey’s commitment to not attacking the YPG’, but prospects of enforcing these conditions would be hampered by a diminished U.S. military presence along its border[3]. At present, it appears that the U.S. will leave 200 troops after the completion of the withdrawal to serve in a peacekeeping capacity.

The YPG represents the militarised branch of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD). The PYD was originally marginalised and closely monitored by the Assad government, but the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War allowed the group to operate largely independently, drive ISIS back thousands of kilometres with U.S. support, and establish a semi-autonomous enclave in Syria’s northern region along its Turkish border. The  proximity of the PYD-claimed territory to Turkey represents the most imminent threat to the Kurdish enclave as Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Turkey-based Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organisation [4]. Turkey typically maintains a more measured foreign policy approach and avoids third-party conflicts but it entered northern Syria in August 2016 to support an offensive against ISIS and block the SDF from seizing territory that would have connected the sizable Kurdish northern territory to Afrin in the west [5]. This would have yielded the SDF a near complete control over Syria’s northern border. Turkey views the YPG’s gains as a direct cross-border threat to link up with the PKK and now that the U.S. presence is decreasing drastically, it stands to reason that the Turks may seek to attack the Kurdish gains. Turkey’s Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, was quoted saying that after Turkish military intervention, Kurdish fighters would be ‘buried in their ditches’[6].

U.S. Policy Pivot

In concert with Bolton’s stated commitment to a conditional withdrawal, Trump has stated that there will be an established 32-kilometer safe zone between the YPG and Turkey and threatened economic sanctions against Turkey if it were to violate it. The Trump administration has imposed sanctions on Turkey already as a result of its detainment of an American pastor in August of 2018[7]. Turkey, for its part, dismissed Trump’s warning of sanctions with its foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu stating ‘we have said multiple times that we will not fear or be deterred by any threat. You can get nowhere by threatening Turkey economically’[8]. The question facing both the PYD and the U.S. is: will a 200-person peacekeeping force be able to enforce a safe zone against an emboldened Turkey, or is there potential that the U.S. forces may become caught in a crossfire between the PYD and Turkish forces and spark a larger conflict?

Despite President Trump’s stated commitment to a safe-zone, the PYD has begun pursuing alternative partners to guarantee its survival. The Kurds initially protested the U.S.’ decision  when thousands gathered near the U.S. coalition headquarters in Syria but has since acquiesced and begun engaging with potential partners[9]. Faced with a Turkish government with a stated pledge to destroying its territory and an uncertain U.S. military commitment, the PYD is left with few other state partners to align with. The PYD has decided that the only way to hedge against the Turkish threat is to align with allied Syrian and Russian governments. This alliance makes further strategic sense considering that Moscow has been pushing for an alternative to a Turkish presence on Syrian soil. Therefore, a Russian supported YPG could both aim to secure the northern border for the Assad government and provide the PYD the security assurances it seeks[10]. Considering these factors, the SDF has asked Moscow for protection and the PYD expects negotiations with the Assad government to begin soon.

Conclusion

The U.S. withdrawal demonstrates yet another example of the Trump administration’s commitment to recusing U.S. forces from participating in conflicts beyond its borders. The Syrian Civil War has been a devastating conflict, featuring many stakeholders, and few appealing options for coalition forces to align with. The YPG-led SDF has been the U.S.’ most reliable partner in this conflict up to this point but is now likely to turn to Washington’s adversaries to counter what the PYD surely views as an existential threat. The major questions remaining are: how will a PYD pivot to Moscow impact the remaining U.S. peacekeeping force’s ability to enforce strategic objectives and will Moscow and Damascus be reliable partners for the PYD going forward? The situation in which the PYD finds itself represents another chapter in the Kurdish pursuit of statehood in a region offering complex challenges and limited supporters of its aims of state legitimacy.

Online Political Microtargeting in the United States

Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements. In the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election.

By Agniete Pocyte

‘Political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [1]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.’

Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising which targets voters based on the predictions of an algorithmic model, manipulated from publicly available data and private data [2]. Facebook is the most popular advertising platform as nearly three-quarters of American adults use Facebook, and 44% of the adult population cite it as a part of their news sources [3]. Although Facebook is not the only social media site that functions as a news source, it is by far the largest [4].

Despite the focus on President Trump’s 2016 campaign, George W. Bush made use of similar, albeit less complicated, microtargeting. In 2004, Bush’s presidential campaign bought data on 5.7 million Michigan consumers from Acxiom, one of the world’s largest data brokers, and merged it with their own polling information to categorise Michigan voters into 34 ‘microtargeting segments’ [5]. With this information, the campaign created advertisements and scripted messages targeted at the narrow categories of voters through telephone and direct-mail messages. Mitt Romney’s 2012 US presidential campaign used micro-categories to target undecided voters with advertisements that emphasised different aspects of his campaign. Zac Moffet, the digital director of Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign stated: ‘two people in the same house could get different messages. Not only will the message change, the type of content will change’ [6].

A microtargeting strategy will rarely target more than a small portion of the voting population. That is because most of the population is either set on voting for a particular candidate or is extremely unlikely to vote. By targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements, microtargeting becomes a cost-effective strategy. Most importantly in the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election. Since 1980, the number of contested swing states has dwindled [7]. In 1976, 20 states were won by a margin of less than 5%. This number dropped to 11 states in 2004 and to just 7 states (Florida, Ohio, Virginia, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Colorado) in 2008. The fact that US presidential elections are fought over ‘relatively small margins in a handful of states sets up conditions for continued importance of fine-grained tactical efforts’ to persuade a select group of voters [8]. That being said, ‘political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [9]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.

Although political microtargeting purports to engage with voters in a more relevant fashion, the threats to individual privacy, the electorate, and democracy outweigh the benefits. American voters do not have adequate control of their data and cannot dictate who uses it. Many organisations, including political campaigns, are under no obligation to protect user’s information privacy and political privacy. Moreover, microtargeting practices suppress certain voter populations and exacerbate the effects of the ‘filter bubble’ by channeling voters into informational silos. Due to the highly personalised nature of the messages in political ads, thousands of variations of the same ad exist to maximise voter receptiveness. Political campaigns do not publish a database of all the ad variations which makes it difficult for journalists and the general public to investigate the honesty of a particular campaign. Third parties including social media companies, data brokers, and data analytic firms, are unregulated and possess a questionable amount of political power if the effects of microtargeting are as extreme as purported by campaign managers. Regulations are difficult to implement due to alleged conflicts with freedoms of speech and expression and the lack of empirical evidence surrounding the effects of microtargeting. Technology has outgrown regulation and it is vital to keep the possible threats of microtargeting in mind not only for policymakers, but the voters as well.

N.B. ‘the ‘filter bubble’ is the intellectual isolation that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the information a user would want to see, and then give information to the user according to this assumption’ [10].

Sources:

[1] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.

[2] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80.

[3] Gottfried, J., & Shearer, E. (2016). News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/
[4] Ibid.

[5] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.

[8] Ibid, p. 144

[9] Ibid, p146

[10] Techopedia. (2018). What is a Filter Bubble? – Definition from Techopedia. [online]. Available at: https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28556/filter-bubble [Accessed 30 Aug. 2018]

Author’s further reading:

[1] Borgesius, F. J., Moller, J., Kruikemeier, S., Fathaigh, R. Ó., Irion, K., Dobber, T., … & de Vreese, C. (2018). Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy. Utrecht L. Rev., 14, 82.

[2] Ienca, M. (2017). Do We Have a Right to Mental Privacy and Cognitive Liberty?. Scientific American Blog Network. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-have-a-right-to-mental-privacy-and-cognitive-liberty/

[3] Tenove, C., Buffie, J., McKay, S., & Moscrop, D. (2018). How Foreign Actors Use Digital Techniques to Undermine Democracy. Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, UBC.

The American Swarming Programme – Part Two of Three

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting: the Perdix drone swarm, the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) and the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS systems.

By Caitlin Irvine

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. A swarm consists of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a certain amount of autonomy to navigate and sense the surrounding area [1]. In comparison to Predators or Reapers they ‘are smarter and more autonomous, designed to take off and land on their own, fly mission sets on their own, refuel in the air on their own, and penetrate enemy air defences on their own’ [2].

Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting. Both the Perdix drone swarm and the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) programmes demonstrate the future trend towards more autonomous warfare. Finally, the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS system, demonstrates that swarm technology can be applied to multiple theatres of operation.

In October 2016, the US military ‘released a 103-strong swarm of Perdix drones’ in California [3]. The Perdix drone is a micro-UAV as its wingspan is less than 30 centimetres – making it ideal for operating in urban environments. The swarm demonstrated advanced behaviours ‘such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing’ [4]. The UAVs were launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets showing the ability of the US Air Force to use the developments in swarm technology in combination with their advanced air superiority. The Department of Defence’s press release stated that ‘Perdix is a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature’ [5]. The DoD’s optimism concerning swarm technology, might indicate  that it will play a role in future conflicts.

Whereas the Perdix drones indicate a move towards autonomously functioning hardware, the LOCUST programme refers to the software used. LOCUST is currently being used in Coyote UAVs that are tube-launched from a platform – not dissimilar from the anti-ship missile launchers currently on board US naval vessels. Seen as a cheaper way of gaining attack capabilities the LOCUST programme could potentially substitute for a single, expensive, anti-ship missile [6]. LOCUST systems fire a minimum of 30 Coyote UAVs in 40 seconds and they are then synchronised mid-flight to create the swarm [7]. At around $500,000 for a 30-drone swarm and just $15,000 for a single unit, the cost of LOCUST is less than half the price of the currently deployed million-dollar Harpoon anti-ship missile [8]. The LOCUST is specifically intended to take advantage of the low-cost UAVs such as the Coyote – the drones are expendable so that if one is destroyed ‘the others autonomously change their behaviour to complete the mission’ –  into an offensive dimension [9].

Finally, the third development in the US swarming programme can be found in the CARACaS programme. CARACaS developed both software and hardware that can be fitted in any vessel in the US Navy illustrating that the move towards autonomous systems is happening across multiple theatres. CARACaS is currently used in small, unmanned boats – but can be used in any vessel – and operates using swarm technology that allows the boats to communicate with one another [10]. The idea behind this project is that expensive but important routine tasks such as harbour patrols could be delegated to an unmanned supervised system. The Navy’s CARACaS system is removing the ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks from sailors lives’ [11]. But the phrase ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous’ covers almost every duty and responsibility given to a standing military.

The majority of swarming software is being designed by civilian firms, for both offensive and defensive uses. Defensive systems have been relatively untouched by the current debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is simply because it is difficult to campaign against a system with defensive purposes. By creating a system that has offensive capabilities – but is primarily used defensively – the issue of whether or not such a system is acceptable becomes blurred. Within the narrative surrounding drone swarms, it appears that the main use of such systems will be reconnaissance. However, their ability to also host attack capabilities is what makes them particularly terrifying.  

Sources:

[1] Bürkle, A, Segor, F, and Kollman, M (2011) ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV

Swarms’, Journal of Intelligent And Robotic Systems, Vol 61(1-4), p342

[2] Singer, PW (2013) ‘The Global Swarm’, Foreign Policy [online] available at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/11/the-global-swarm/

accessed on 18th April 2018

[3] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s

military debate’, The Financial Times [online] available at:

https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

accessed on 16th April 2017

[4] Adhikari, R (2017) ‘Pentagon Battle-Tests Micro Drone Swarm’,

TechNewsWorld [online] available at:

https://www.technewsworld.com/story/84217.html

accessed on 18th April 2018

[5] Department of Defence (2017) ‘Department of Defence Announces Successful

Micro-Drone Demonstration’, Department of Defence, Press release number

NR-008-17, 9th January [online] available at:

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/

accessed on 19th April 2018

[6] Richardson, J (2017) ‘Swarming UAVs demonstrate enormous attack potential’,

Defence Procurement International [online] available at:

https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/drone-swarms

accessed on 19th April 2018

[7] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[8] Lachow, I (2017) ‘The upside and downside of swarming drones’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 73:2, p97

[9] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[10] WarLeaks (2017) ‘US Navy Drone Swarm Boats: Autonomous Boats Short

Documentary’, WarLeaks - Daily Military Defence Videos and Combat Footage [online] available at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NN3A7z9diT4

accessed on 16th April 2018

[11] Ibid.

Why the Department of Homeland Security has not been able to succeed in unifying the U.S. intelligence community

“The intelligence community within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole community IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation.”

By Ashley Rebecca Donald-Tebbutt

Despite only opening its doors on March 1st, 2003 [1], Secretary Janet Napolitano admitted in 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not functioning optimally and that there was great room for improvement [2]. Even in the DHS’s short-lived lifespan the hindrances of political ambition have become undeniable to those connected to the agency.

The intelligence community (IC) within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American IC. The DHS is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation [3]. The intentions behind the DHS were idealistic; its mission threefold: secure the homeland from the evolving threat of terrorism, bring common agencies into one organization to foster cooperation, and to have a primary agency that could promote communication and the sharing of resources within the IC and independent agencies [4].

The DHS upon creation amalgamated twenty-two existing agencies and became a bureaucratic giant [5]. The head of the new organization was supposed to be able to “access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from the Federal government…”[6]. These resources were central to allow the DHS to function as intended. However, the political ambitions hindered the reforms that delivered the DHS and its continued functioning. During the reform and development of the DHS, fundamental agencies of the IC, such as the CIA and FBI, viewed the agency as a rival and did not support the centralization of the community fearing power loss and budget cutbacks [7]. As such, the CIA and FBI used their influence to prevent the DHS from having the ability to compel information from other agencies. Without the power to compel, the rivalry between agencies endured manifesting in a bureaucratic ‘turf war’ and ultimately restricting the effectiveness of the DHS [8].

It seems that the DHS has only added to the problem by adding another bureaucracy bidding for political influence and consumption of intelligence budget. With the political reforms that brought the DHS into reality, the inability to compel other intelligence agencies has resulted in a large number of redundancies across the IC. Despite the intentions of the DHS, the institution has been hampered in its inability to unite and foster a cohesive community. The blame for the DHS’s failure should not rest on the department but on the members of Congress that only provided the department with half the power it required to meet its full responsibilities. For the DHS to be able to achieve its primary intentions another series of political reforms are required; tragically those seem unlikely to occur until the U.S is faced with another attack on its national security.

Sources:

[1] “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security” Homeland Security. Last modified 09/24/2015. https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security

[2] “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.”Department of Homeland Security. February 2010. pg. iv

[3] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003): pg 529

[4] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002)
[5] Cuellar, Mariano-florentino. Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies. Stanford University Press: Stanford, (2013). pg. 126

[6] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002) pg. 12

[7] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.”

Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003). pg. 528

[8] Durbin, Brent.The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform.

Cambridge University Press: New York, (2017). Pg 38