This article tackles the involvement of the Syrian government in drug trafficking, to then delve into and evaluate the economic, diplomatic and military measures undertaken by Western governments and Arab states to curtail the smuggling of Captagon.
North-Eastern Syria: Lasting Peace Unlikely as Instability and Conflict Is Set to Increase
Russia and Turkey’s deal halted the Turkish-led operation in North-Eastern Syria and avoided direct confrontation between Turkey and Syrian forces. The situation remains tenuous, however, as lasting peace settlements between all sides remains a distant prospect. The continuing presence of Turkish-backed rebels in former SDF areas along with a worsening humanitarian crisis will gradually destabilise the area, making conflict likely to resume.
by Keir Watt
On the 6th of October 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump suddenly announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North-Eastern Syria. The move cleared the way for the Turkish-led OPERATION PEACE SPRING against the SDF, which had served as a key U.S. partner in the coalition against the Islamic State (I.S.).
Within weeks of the announcement, Russia brokered a deal with Turkey which halted their advance and ended the heavy fighting while leaving the SDF precariously reliant on the Syrian government. The deal brought temporary peace to the region, but the Turkish operation has already sowed the seeds of further violence which will hamper lasting peace in the future.
The operation began on October 9th when the Turkish military and their allies the Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded SDF controlled territory along Syria’s north-eastern border with Turkey. Turkey attacked the SDF because the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the largest of the various groups within the SDF and exert overall control.[i]
The YPG is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in armed conflict with Turkey since 1984 and is considered a terrorist group by NATO and the European Union. Turkey vowed never to allow the YPG to establish an enclave in Syria which it fears would support the PKK in Turkey. Turkey’s attack has been anticipated since Donald Trump agreed the U.S. would withdraw in December 2018.
On the 17th of October, the U.S. brokered a ceasefire which ended the intense fighting. Shortly after, Presidents Putin and Erdogan agreed to a deal to halt the Turkish advance. It required the SDF to withdraw from a 30km deep ‘safe zone’ along the Syrian-Turkish border whilst Russian and Syrian government forces took over former SDF positions.[ii]
Syrian government forces had already begun to deploy to SDF areas as they quickly agreed to cooperate against the Turkish offensive, but the deal brings Syrian President Bashar al- Assad closer to finally controlling the SDF territories which constitute almost a third of Syria as a whole.
Turning to Assad was simply the best way for the SDF to avoid being defeated by the Turks. The SDF had no effective way of resisting the Turkish offensive without U.S. support, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and after the U.S. convinced them to dismantle their northern defences to placate Turkish concerns last year. The YPG and SDF have been coordinating with the Assad regime since their substantial victories in 2015.[iii] Moreover, the swift and well-coordinated deployment of regime forces to support SDF positions suggests the two had already planned for a Turkish invasion.
The Turkish operation has brought the Assad regime and the SDF closer together, but the fate of the YPG remains very uncertain. Arab leaders within the SDF such as Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, leader of the Shammar tribe, have been discussing peace settlements with Assad for months,[iv] which probably led to the cooperation against the Turkish operation. However, YPG negotiations with the Syrian government have failed whilst their Arab partners’ have progressed; suggesting they could be left isolated as the rest of the SDF join with Assad.
At the same time, the future of the YPG will be impacted by any cooperation between Turkey and Syria. A year ago, Russia suggested the Adana Agreement (1998) could be a path for cooperation between Syria and Turkey. Under the agreement Syria expelled the PKK and ended their presence in Syria until the civil war in 2011. President Erdogan’s recent comments that Turkey will “allow no place for the YPG in Syria’s future” suggests it would still form the basis of cooperation.[v] Such an agreement would suit both parties and be disastrous for the YPG.
However, the Assad regime remains in talks with the YPG. Unlike the PKK in the 1990s, the YPG’s strong military force means a political settlement is preferable to the Assad regime rather than years of more fighting. Making the expulsion of the YPG an unlikely policy of the Assad regime.
The Assad regime would also demand Turkey withdraw all its forces from Syria as part of any deal. And while Turkey may be willing to withdraw its military, removing the SNA rebels would be significantly harder.
The SNA is an amalgamation of mostly Turkman and Arab militias which previously formed the Turkish-backed free Syrian Army and the National Liberation Front. These groups were unified under the ‘SNA’ just weeks before OPERATION PEACE SPRING began and frequently clashed in the past. This patchwork of rival groups is likely to destabilize as they establish territory, making it difficult for Ankara to exert the same control as when the operation started.
The SNA groups will also be extremely unwilling to leave now that they control territory and Ankara is unlikely to settle them in Turkey. Ankara would either abandon SNA militias which do not withdraw or incorporate their demands into a deal with Syria; making a final settlement with Assad very difficult.
Meanwhile, the ceasefire brought by Russia’s deal is unlikely to hold before a final peace agreement can be reached. The SNA’s hostility to Kurdish and Christian communities is being condemned as ethnic cleansing as communities are forcibly displaced.[vi] Creating a situation the SDF will struggle to tolerate, as they watch their communities and former territory thrown into chaos. The possibility of SDF retribution also increases as more reports surface of SNA war crimes committed during the Turkish-led offensive in October.[vii]
Arab contingents within the SDF are also deeply opposed to Wahhabi groups in their territory. Which raises another source of conflict as the SNA have been widely accused of containing Jihadi elements. They were also reported to have recruited former I.S. fighters during the Turkish-led operation in Afrin last year.[viii] If SNA militias begin to assert Wahhabi doctrines upon the local populace hostilities will inevitably erupt.
At the same time, there is a growing humanitarian crisis in the area caused by the disruption of essential services and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.[ix]. This crisis will grow in scale and intensity as winter arrives, bringing harsher conditions and reduced food supplies.
Whilst all sides struggle to agree amongst themselves, they will inevitably fail to manage the humanitarian crisis effectively. Which will further destabilise the area and bring both sides closer to conflict. Russia and Turkey have advertised their deal as a big success, but in reality it has only temporarily halted the conflict. Sources of conflict and instability continue to fester, making a lasting deal more imperative but increasingly hard to achieve.
Sources:
[i] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019].p.3.
[ii] Turkey Syria offensive: Erdogan and Putin strike deal over Kurds. 2019. BBC [online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50138121.[Accessed 23/10/2019].
[iii] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019], pp.5-7.
[iv] Zaman, A., 2019. Syria’s Kurds increasingly isolated as Arab tribes cut deals with regime. Al Monitor [online]. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/syria-kurds-isolated-arab-tribes-deals-damascus.html.
[v] Erdogan quoted in. Zontur, E.C., 2019. Turkey says YPG/PKK has no role in the future of Syria. AA [online]. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-says-ypg-pkk-has-no-role-in-future-of-syria/1622247. [accessed 4 November 2019].
[vi] OCHA Syria Flash Update #5: Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria 14 October 2019. 2019. OCHA [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_syria_flash_update_5_nes_14_octoberfinal.pdf.[Accessed 21/10/2019].
[vii] Higgins, E., 2019. Video Evidence Sheds Light on Executions Near Turkey-Syria Border. Bellingcat [online]. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/10/31/video-evidence-sheds-light-on-executions-near-turkey-syria-border/. [accessed 4 November 2019]; Chulov, M., Rasool, M., 2019. Kurdish politician among nine civilians shot dead by pro-Turkey forces in Syria. 2019. Guardian [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/female-kurdish-politician-among-nine-civilians-killed-by-pro-turkey-forces-in-syria-observers-say. [Accessed 21/10/2019]; Seligman, L., 2019. Turkish Proxies Appear to Be Using White Phosphorus in Syria. 2019. Foreign Policy [online]. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkish-proxies-chemical-weapons-syria-kurds/. [Accessed 21/10/2019].
[viii] Cockburn, P., 2019. Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria. Independent [online]. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-isis-afrin-syria-kurds-free-syrian-army-jihadi-video-fighters-recruits-a8199166.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].
[ix] UNHCR. Hundreds of thousands in harm’s way in northern Syria. UNHCR [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/10/5d9f10eb4/hundreds-thousands-harms-way-northern-syria.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].[x] Photo: Specialist Arnada Jones U.S. Combined Joint Task Force.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combined_Joint_U.S.,_Turkey_Patrols.jpg.
Assessing the Implications of the US-Syria Withdrawal on the Kurdish Democratic Union
The U.S.’ proposed withdrawal of the majority of its military presence from Syria leaves the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) in a challenging position. Now lacking clear U.S. protection and in the midst of preparing its final assault on ISIS-held positions, the PYD is now forced to weigh the decision of aligning with Russia and the Syrian government to hedge against the threat of a Turkish assault from the north.
The PYD
On December 19th of 2018, in a surprise move following a call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump announced that the U.S.’ roughly 2,000 military personnel would be withdrawing from Syria within 30 days. The reason stated was that the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been defeated and the U.S. could continue to carry out support operations in the form of airstrikes[1]. Trump’s decision signalled a likely end to any aspirations of fostering a legitimate alternative to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s government, which has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and has been found to have deployed chemical weapons against them [2]. Beyond the implications of the withdrawal on the U.S.’ geopolitical aims, Washington’s decision leaves the U.S.-allied People’s Protection Units (YPG), with little leverage and minimal options in its fight for greater legitimacy in its controlled territory along Syria’s northern border. This is significant because the YPG represents the Kurdish component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that has been engaged in most of the combat on the ground against ISIS. Trump’s National Security Advisor, John Bolton, has stated that ‘the U.S.’ withdrawal is contingent upon ISIS’ continued defeat and Turkey’s commitment to not attacking the YPG’, but prospects of enforcing these conditions would be hampered by a diminished U.S. military presence along its border[3]. At present, it appears that the U.S. will leave 200 troops after the completion of the withdrawal to serve in a peacekeeping capacity.
The YPG represents the militarised branch of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD). The PYD was originally marginalised and closely monitored by the Assad government, but the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War allowed the group to operate largely independently, drive ISIS back thousands of kilometres with U.S. support, and establish a semi-autonomous enclave in Syria’s northern region along its Turkish border. The proximity of the PYD-claimed territory to Turkey represents the most imminent threat to the Kurdish enclave as Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Turkey-based Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organisation [4]. Turkey typically maintains a more measured foreign policy approach and avoids third-party conflicts but it entered northern Syria in August 2016 to support an offensive against ISIS and block the SDF from seizing territory that would have connected the sizable Kurdish northern territory to Afrin in the west [5]. This would have yielded the SDF a near complete control over Syria’s northern border. Turkey views the YPG’s gains as a direct cross-border threat to link up with the PKK and now that the U.S. presence is decreasing drastically, it stands to reason that the Turks may seek to attack the Kurdish gains. Turkey’s Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, was quoted saying that after Turkish military intervention, Kurdish fighters would be ‘buried in their ditches’[6].
U.S. Policy Pivot
In concert with Bolton’s stated commitment to a conditional withdrawal, Trump has stated that there will be an established 32-kilometer safe zone between the YPG and Turkey and threatened economic sanctions against Turkey if it were to violate it. The Trump administration has imposed sanctions on Turkey already as a result of its detainment of an American pastor in August of 2018[7]. Turkey, for its part, dismissed Trump’s warning of sanctions with its foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu stating ‘we have said multiple times that we will not fear or be deterred by any threat. You can get nowhere by threatening Turkey economically’[8]. The question facing both the PYD and the U.S. is: will a 200-person peacekeeping force be able to enforce a safe zone against an emboldened Turkey, or is there potential that the U.S. forces may become caught in a crossfire between the PYD and Turkish forces and spark a larger conflict?
Despite President Trump’s stated commitment to a safe-zone, the PYD has begun pursuing alternative partners to guarantee its survival. The Kurds initially protested the U.S.’ decision when thousands gathered near the U.S. coalition headquarters in Syria but has since acquiesced and begun engaging with potential partners[9]. Faced with a Turkish government with a stated pledge to destroying its territory and an uncertain U.S. military commitment, the PYD is left with few other state partners to align with. The PYD has decided that the only way to hedge against the Turkish threat is to align with allied Syrian and Russian governments. This alliance makes further strategic sense considering that Moscow has been pushing for an alternative to a Turkish presence on Syrian soil. Therefore, a Russian supported YPG could both aim to secure the northern border for the Assad government and provide the PYD the security assurances it seeks[10]. Considering these factors, the SDF has asked Moscow for protection and the PYD expects negotiations with the Assad government to begin soon.
Conclusion
The U.S. withdrawal demonstrates yet another example of the Trump administration’s commitment to recusing U.S. forces from participating in conflicts beyond its borders. The Syrian Civil War has been a devastating conflict, featuring many stakeholders, and few appealing options for coalition forces to align with. The YPG-led SDF has been the U.S.’ most reliable partner in this conflict up to this point but is now likely to turn to Washington’s adversaries to counter what the PYD surely views as an existential threat. The major questions remaining are: how will a PYD pivot to Moscow impact the remaining U.S. peacekeeping force’s ability to enforce strategic objectives and will Moscow and Damascus be reliable partners for the PYD going forward? The situation in which the PYD finds itself represents another chapter in the Kurdish pursuit of statehood in a region offering complex challenges and limited supporters of its aims of state legitimacy.