Russia and Turkey’s deal halted the Turkish-led operation in North-Eastern Syria and avoided direct confrontation between Turkey and Syrian forces. The situation remains tenuous, however, as lasting peace settlements between all sides remains a distant prospect. The continuing presence of Turkish-backed rebels in former SDF areas along with a worsening humanitarian crisis will gradually destabilise the area, making conflict likely to resume.
by Keir Watt
On the 6th of October 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump suddenly announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North-Eastern Syria. The move cleared the way for the Turkish-led OPERATION PEACE SPRING against the SDF, which had served as a key U.S. partner in the coalition against the Islamic State (I.S.).
Within weeks of the announcement, Russia brokered a deal with Turkey which halted their advance and ended the heavy fighting while leaving the SDF precariously reliant on the Syrian government. The deal brought temporary peace to the region, but the Turkish operation has already sowed the seeds of further violence which will hamper lasting peace in the future.
The operation began on October 9th when the Turkish military and their allies the Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded SDF controlled territory along Syria’s north-eastern border with Turkey. Turkey attacked the SDF because the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the largest of the various groups within the SDF and exert overall control.[i]
The YPG is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in armed conflict with Turkey since 1984 and is considered a terrorist group by NATO and the European Union. Turkey vowed never to allow the YPG to establish an enclave in Syria which it fears would support the PKK in Turkey. Turkey’s attack has been anticipated since Donald Trump agreed the U.S. would withdraw in December 2018.
On the 17th of October, the U.S. brokered a ceasefire which ended the intense fighting. Shortly after, Presidents Putin and Erdogan agreed to a deal to halt the Turkish advance. It required the SDF to withdraw from a 30km deep ‘safe zone’ along the Syrian-Turkish border whilst Russian and Syrian government forces took over former SDF positions.[ii]
Syrian government forces had already begun to deploy to SDF areas as they quickly agreed to cooperate against the Turkish offensive, but the deal brings Syrian President Bashar al- Assad closer to finally controlling the SDF territories which constitute almost a third of Syria as a whole.
Turning to Assad was simply the best way for the SDF to avoid being defeated by the Turks. The SDF had no effective way of resisting the Turkish offensive without U.S. support, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and after the U.S. convinced them to dismantle their northern defences to placate Turkish concerns last year. The YPG and SDF have been coordinating with the Assad regime since their substantial victories in 2015.[iii] Moreover, the swift and well-coordinated deployment of regime forces to support SDF positions suggests the two had already planned for a Turkish invasion.
The Turkish operation has brought the Assad regime and the SDF closer together, but the fate of the YPG remains very uncertain. Arab leaders within the SDF such as Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, leader of the Shammar tribe, have been discussing peace settlements with Assad for months,[iv] which probably led to the cooperation against the Turkish operation. However, YPG negotiations with the Syrian government have failed whilst their Arab partners’ have progressed; suggesting they could be left isolated as the rest of the SDF join with Assad.
At the same time, the future of the YPG will be impacted by any cooperation between Turkey and Syria. A year ago, Russia suggested the Adana Agreement (1998) could be a path for cooperation between Syria and Turkey. Under the agreement Syria expelled the PKK and ended their presence in Syria until the civil war in 2011. President Erdogan’s recent comments that Turkey will “allow no place for the YPG in Syria’s future” suggests it would still form the basis of cooperation.[v] Such an agreement would suit both parties and be disastrous for the YPG.
However, the Assad regime remains in talks with the YPG. Unlike the PKK in the 1990s, the YPG’s strong military force means a political settlement is preferable to the Assad regime rather than years of more fighting. Making the expulsion of the YPG an unlikely policy of the Assad regime.
The Assad regime would also demand Turkey withdraw all its forces from Syria as part of any deal. And while Turkey may be willing to withdraw its military, removing the SNA rebels would be significantly harder.
The SNA is an amalgamation of mostly Turkman and Arab militias which previously formed the Turkish-backed free Syrian Army and the National Liberation Front. These groups were unified under the ‘SNA’ just weeks before OPERATION PEACE SPRING began and frequently clashed in the past. This patchwork of rival groups is likely to destabilize as they establish territory, making it difficult for Ankara to exert the same control as when the operation started.
The SNA groups will also be extremely unwilling to leave now that they control territory and Ankara is unlikely to settle them in Turkey. Ankara would either abandon SNA militias which do not withdraw or incorporate their demands into a deal with Syria; making a final settlement with Assad very difficult.
Meanwhile, the ceasefire brought by Russia’s deal is unlikely to hold before a final peace agreement can be reached. The SNA’s hostility to Kurdish and Christian communities is being condemned as ethnic cleansing as communities are forcibly displaced.[vi] Creating a situation the SDF will struggle to tolerate, as they watch their communities and former territory thrown into chaos. The possibility of SDF retribution also increases as more reports surface of SNA war crimes committed during the Turkish-led offensive in October.[vii]
Arab contingents within the SDF are also deeply opposed to Wahhabi groups in their territory. Which raises another source of conflict as the SNA have been widely accused of containing Jihadi elements. They were also reported to have recruited former I.S. fighters during the Turkish-led operation in Afrin last year.[viii] If SNA militias begin to assert Wahhabi doctrines upon the local populace hostilities will inevitably erupt.
At the same time, there is a growing humanitarian crisis in the area caused by the disruption of essential services and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.[ix]. This crisis will grow in scale and intensity as winter arrives, bringing harsher conditions and reduced food supplies.
Whilst all sides struggle to agree amongst themselves, they will inevitably fail to manage the humanitarian crisis effectively. Which will further destabilise the area and bring both sides closer to conflict. Russia and Turkey have advertised their deal as a big success, but in reality it has only temporarily halted the conflict. Sources of conflict and instability continue to fester, making a lasting deal more imperative but increasingly hard to achieve.
Sources:
[i] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019].p.3.
[ii] Turkey Syria offensive: Erdogan and Putin strike deal over Kurds. 2019. BBC [online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50138121.[Accessed 23/10/2019].
[iii] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019], pp.5-7.
[iv] Zaman, A., 2019. Syria’s Kurds increasingly isolated as Arab tribes cut deals with regime. Al Monitor [online]. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/syria-kurds-isolated-arab-tribes-deals-damascus.html.
[v] Erdogan quoted in. Zontur, E.C., 2019. Turkey says YPG/PKK has no role in the future of Syria. AA [online]. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-says-ypg-pkk-has-no-role-in-future-of-syria/1622247. [accessed 4 November 2019].
[vi] OCHA Syria Flash Update #5: Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria 14 October 2019. 2019. OCHA [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_syria_flash_update_5_nes_14_octoberfinal.pdf.[Accessed 21/10/2019].
[vii] Higgins, E., 2019. Video Evidence Sheds Light on Executions Near Turkey-Syria Border. Bellingcat [online]. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/10/31/video-evidence-sheds-light-on-executions-near-turkey-syria-border/. [accessed 4 November 2019]; Chulov, M., Rasool, M., 2019. Kurdish politician among nine civilians shot dead by pro-Turkey forces in Syria. 2019. Guardian [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/female-kurdish-politician-among-nine-civilians-killed-by-pro-turkey-forces-in-syria-observers-say. [Accessed 21/10/2019]; Seligman, L., 2019. Turkish Proxies Appear to Be Using White Phosphorus in Syria. 2019. Foreign Policy [online]. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkish-proxies-chemical-weapons-syria-kurds/. [Accessed 21/10/2019].
[viii] Cockburn, P., 2019. Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria. Independent [online]. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-isis-afrin-syria-kurds-free-syrian-army-jihadi-video-fighters-recruits-a8199166.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].
[ix] UNHCR. Hundreds of thousands in harm’s way in northern Syria. UNHCR [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/10/5d9f10eb4/hundreds-thousands-harms-way-northern-syria.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].[x] Photo: Specialist Arnada Jones U.S. Combined Joint Task Force.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combined_Joint_U.S.,_Turkey_Patrols.jpg.